JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions, the petitioners are all working as Lecturers or Assistant Teachers (LT grade) in different Government Colleges in the State of Uttarakhand on their being appointed as ad hoc Lecturers/Teachers prior to 01.10.1990, and have continued in service ever since. 2. Proceedings dated 21.11.1995 was issued, in favour of persons working in the Uttarakhand area of the State of Uttar Pradesh, as an exceptional circumstance, resolving to regularize the services of those who were appointed as ad hoc lecturers/teachers prior to 01.10.1990. Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal, whose services were also regularized in terms of the very same proceedings dated 21.11.1995, invoked the jurisdiction of this court claiming that he was entitled to be regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990 in terms of the proceedings dated 21.11.1995. 3. A learned Single Judge of this Court considered this issue in great detail and, after referring to paragraphs no.1 and 4 of Government Order No. 3179/15-2-95-27(40)/93 dated 21.11.1995, held that these paragraphs of the G.O. left no doubt as to the fact that appointees of LT Grade on ad hoc basis prior to 01.10.1990 were regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990, and no further orders were needed to be issued by the respondents regularizing the services of the petitioner from 31.12.1999.. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention, urged on behalf of the respondents, that, since no cut-off date was prescribed in the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, the petitioner’s services could not be treated to have been regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. The learned Single Judge observed that the opening sentences of paragraph no.4, of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, would show that the intention of the G.O. was clear that the LT Grade teachers, who were appointed on an ad hoc basis prior to 01.10.1990, were required to be regularized in service w.e.f. 01.10.1990. 4. The learned Single Judge also observed that the last words of paragraph no.1 of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995 expressly stipulated that, by these proceedings, the services of such employees were being regularized; and, since the petitioner had been continuously serving in LT Grade right from 19.09.1990 till rejection of his representation, revising his seniority, vide order dated 17.01.2003, was bad in law. A mandamus was issued directing that the petitioner’s services be treated to have been regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990, and the petitioner’s case for promotion was directed to be considered in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Uttarakhand carried the matter in appeal (Special Appeal No. 28 of 2005). 5. A Division Bench of this Court, in Stay Application No. 5625 of 2005 in Special Appeal No.28 of 2005 dated 06.09.2005, observed that a careful reading of Annexure-II of the G.O. made it clear that the services of lecturers LT Grade, who were appointed on an ad hoc basis prior to 01.10.1990, were regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990; there was no indication in Annexure-II of the G.O. to regularize the petitioner w.e.f. 01.10.1990 i.e. from the date of his appointment on an ad hoc basis; and, in the absence of any such indication or intention of the Government to regularize their services w.e.f. 01.10.1990, or from the date of said G.O., it had to be understood that regularization was granted only with effect from the date of Annexure-II of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995. The operation, of the impugned judgment, was stayed pending final disposal of the appeal; and the Division Bench observed that, subject to the final decision in the appeal, the services of the petitioner (Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal) should be treated to have been regularized as an Assistant Teacher w.e.f. 21.11.1995. 6. Thereafter, Special Appeal No. 28 of 2005 was finally heard and a Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 23.02.2006, confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge keeping in view the G.O. dated 21.11.1995 as also the fact that Mr. Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal had filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, and had obtained a stay order; the writ petition was allowed and a mandamus was issued that the services of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal be treated as regularized in L.T. Grade w.e.f. 01.10.1990; it was admitted in the counter affidavit that, in terms of the order passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 14794 of 1991, Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal continued in service till his regularization; and the learned Single Judge had rightly issued a mandamus directing the appellants, i.e., the State of Uttaranchal, to treat the services of the petitioner as having been regularized in L.T. Grade w.e.f. 01.10.1990. As the Division Bench did not find any infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the special appeal was dismissed as devoid of merits. Aggrieved thereby the State of Uttaranchal carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court i.e. in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006. 7. Both the learned counsel for the petitioners, and the learned counsel for the respondent, agree that, till the Supreme Court finally dismissed Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006 vide its order dated 20.04.2011, there was an interim order in force; and, consequently, the order of the Division Bench, affirming the order of the learned Single Judge, was not given effect to. 8. In its order in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006, the Supreme Court, on a perusal of G.O. dated 21.11.1995, observed that they were of the view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court had taken a correct view in directing that the services of the respondents be treated to have been regularised in L.T. Grade w.e.f. 01.10.1990; and dismissal of the Special Appeal by the Division Bench, therefore, could not be faulted. Holding the appeal to be without merit, the Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Appeal filed by the State of Uttaranchal. 9. After the appeal, preferred by the State Government, was dismissed by the Supreme Court, the State of Uttarakhand regularized the services of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal w.e.f. 01.10.1990 vide proceedings dated 15.10.2011, and extended him benefits vide proceedings dated 13.01.2012. After dismissal of the said Civil Appeal by the Supreme Court, a few other employees, whose services were also regularized by the very same G.O. dated 21.11.1995, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court filing WP(S/S) No. 1181 of 2011. A learned Single Judge of this Court, following the earlier judgment in the case of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal as upheld by the Supreme Court, disposed of the writ petition granting the very same relief which was granted to Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal. 10. Aggrieved thereby the State of Uttarakhand preferred Special Appeal No. 402 of 2015, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 26.10.2018 recording the fact that the learned Single Judge had disposed of the writ petition relying on the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. 11. 11. It is true that the petitioners, in these batch of writ petitions, have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court more than one and a half year after the order of the Supreme Court was implemented, by the State of Uttarakhand, in the case of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal. While some of them have filed writ petitions in the year 2013, and have subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of this Court a second time in 2014, some others have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court later during the years 2015-2017 seeking extension of the very same benefits, which were extended to Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal. While the petitioners appear to have chosen to avail their legal remedies a year and a half after the order of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006 dated 20.04.2011, and some others a few years thereafter, Shri Kailash Chandra Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would submit that, since the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No. 162 of 2002 dated 28.10.2004 is a judgment in rem, the said judgment would apply to the petitioners also; and they cannot be denied similar benefits, as were extended to Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal, merely on the ground of delay and latches. Learned counsel would rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in “State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 ”, in this regard. 12. On the other hand Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel for the State and Mr. K.P. Upadhyaya, Mr. Narain Dutt, Mr. K.N. Joshi, Ms. Neetu Singh and Mr. Yogesh Pacholia, learned counsel for the interveners/private respondents, would submit that, some of the private respondents/interveners were appointed as teachers in CT Grade during the years 1986 to 1989 and were later taken into services as teachers LT Grade during the years 1991 to 1994; and others were appointed through a process of recruitment undertaken by the State of Uttarakhand, in the years 1995 to 1997. 13. 13. It is their complaint that, if the petitioners request for regularization from 01.10.1990 is acceded to, its consequence would be that they would be placed above the private respondents/interveners in the seniority list of lecturers/teachers; consequently, the existing seniority list would stand unsettled; some of them have also been promoted to higher posts of Lecturers, Head Masters and Principals of Inter Colleges; and granting the petitioners, the relief sought for in these writ petitions, would prejudicially affect their rights. Shri K.P. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the private respondents, would also submit that, since the order dated 21.11.1995 was issued by the erstwhile Government of Uttar Pradesh long before the State of Uttarakhand came into being on 09.11.2000, any grievance, which the petitioners may have with regards their date of regularization from a period anterior to the very creation of the State of Uttarakhand, can only be agitated before the Allahabad High Court, and not before this Court. Reliance is placed by him on State of Uttarakhand & Another Vs. Umakant Joshi, (2012) 11 SCC 164 , Dr. Kamaljeet Singh and another Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others, (2018) 1 U.D. 337 and Vijay Kumar Kaul and Others Vs. Union of India & Others, (2012) 7 SCC 610 . 14. It is also the case of the respondents that the petitioners are all fence sitters, who were awaiting the outcome of the civil appeal before the Supreme Court; they have chosen to approach this Court, seeking enforcement of their alleged rights, only after the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Mr. Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal; and, consequently, the relief sought by them should be denied also on the ground of inordinate delay and latches. 15. As reliance is placed by Shri Kailash Chandra Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners, on State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others, to contend that the petitioner cannot be denied relief on the ground of delay and laches, it is necessary to refer to the law declared therein. The Supreme Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others (2015) 1 SCC 347 , observed: “………….. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others, to contend that the petitioner cannot be denied relief on the ground of delay and laches, it is necessary to refer to the law declared therein. The Supreme Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others (2015) 1 SCC 347 , observed: “………….. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the Appellants as well as the Respondents, can be summed up as under: The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India (supra). With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence……………..” (Emphasis supplied) 16. The law declared by the Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava is that, when a particular set of employees are given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending them that benefit; the normal rule would be that, merely because other similarly situated persons did not chose to approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently; this principle is, however, subject to the well-recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delay as well as acquiescence; those persons who woke up after a long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached earlier in time, had succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them; and they would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 17. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that this exception, regarding delay and laches would not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was a judgment in rem with the intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not; with such a pronouncement, the obligation was cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons; and such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon policy makers, like claims of regularization and the like. 18. 18. Since the petitioners have, admittedly, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court during the years 2013 to 2017 seeking enforcement of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, and consequently by regularization of their services w.e.f. 01.10.1990, nearly two decades after the G.O. dated 21.11.1995 was issued, this Court would, ordinarily, have refrained from extending to them the said benefit on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay and latches. However, in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others, if the order of the learned Single Judge, in Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal vs. State of Uttaranchal and other (Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No. 162 of 2002) dated 28.10.2004, is held to be a judgment in rem, then the State of Uttarakhand was obligated to extend to the petitioners the very same relief, which was extended to Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal; and delay and laches would not, by itself, justify this Court refusing to grant the petitioners the relief sought by them. 19. As noted hereinabove, all the petitioners, in this batch of writ petitions, were appointed prior to 01.10.1990 and continued in service till the order of regularization dated 21.11.1995. Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal was also regularized in terms of the very same Government Order dated 21.11.1995. As he was treated to have been regularized in services only w.e.f. 31.12.1999, he invoked the jurisdiction of this Court contending that, in terms of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, all employees, who were appointed prior to 01.10.1990 and continued in service till G.O. dated 21.11.1995 was issued, were entitled to have their services regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. 20. In the case of Sri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal, the learned Single Judge construed paragraphs nos. 1 and 2 of G.O. dated 21.11.1995 and held that appointees in L.T. Grade on ad hoc basis prior 01.10.1990 stood regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. The relevant observations of the learned Single Judge, in the said order, read thus: “…………….Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher (English) in L.T. Grade vide order dated 04.09.1990 (copy Annexure-1 to the writ petition). It is also admitted that he joined his duties in pursuance of said orders on 19.09.1990. It is also admitted between parties that in compliance of Government Order dated 21.11.1995 (copy annexure-2 to the writ petition), services of the petitioner were regularized on 31.12.1999. It is also admitted that he joined his duties in pursuance of said orders on 19.09.1990. It is also admitted between parties that in compliance of Government Order dated 21.11.1995 (copy annexure-2 to the writ petition), services of the petitioner were regularized on 31.12.1999. The dispute relates to the fact as to from which date the petitioner’s services stood regularized and from which date he is entitled to his seniority before further discussions, it is pertinent to mention here the relevant paras of the Government Order No. 3179/15-2-95-27 (40)/93 dated 21.11.1995. Para 1 and Para 4 of said Government Orders reads as under: ^^¼1½ mRrjk[k.M {ks= ds lHkh ,sls ÁoDrk@,yŒVhŒ xzsM f'k{kdksa dks tks jktdh; f'k{k.k laLFkkvksa esa rnFkZ :Ik ls fnukad 1 vDVwcj 1990 ls iwoZ fu;qDr fd;s x;s gS] dks ,rn~}kjk fofu;fer fd;k tkrk gSA--------------------- ¼4½ bl 'kklukns'k ds rgr fofu;feuhdj.k fnukad 1 vDVwcj 1990 fufnZ"V fd;s tkus ds QyLo:Ik fofu;fer fd;s x;s dqy ÁoDrk@,yŒVhŒ xzsM f'k{kdksa dk fo"k;okj] tuinokj fooj.k funs'kd] ek/;fed f'k{kk@vij f'k{kk funs'kd ¼mRrjk[k.M½ }kjk 'kklu dks ;Fkk'kh?kz miyC/k djk;k tk;sxk ,oa ,rn~}kjk fofu;fer ÁoDrk@ ,yŒVhŒ xzsM f'k{kdksa dh ikjLifjd T;s"Brk lwph@dkfeZd foHkkx }kjk fufnZ"V ÁfØ;k ds v/khu fu/kkZfjr dh tk;sxhA** The above paragraphs of said Government Order leave no doubt as to the fact that the appointees in L.T. Grade on adhoc basis prior to 1st October, 1990 stood regularized w.e.f. October, 1990 and no further orders were needed as issued by the respondents on 31.12.1990 to regularized the services of the petitioner. Learned standing counsel for submitted that the petitioner’s services cannot be treated to have been regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990 as no cut-off date has been given in the Government Order. I see no force in the contention for the reason that the opening sentence of Para 4 starts with the expression ^^bl 'kklukns'k ds rgr fofu;ferhdj.k fnukad 1 vDVwcj 1990 fufnZ"V fd;s tkus ds QyLo:i** which makes the intention of the Government Order very clear. As far as regularization of petitioner is concerned his services stood regularized by the Government Order dated 21.11.1995 itself as the last word of Para 1 of said Government Order declare ^^,rn~}kjk fofu;fer fd;k tkrk gSA** That being the position, it cannot be said if the petitioner could have been deprived of his seniority against the person (read Pooran Singh Bhandari) who was admittedly appointed on adhoc basis in L.T. Grade after the year 1991. In the Para 10 of the Counter Affidavit, respondents have admitted that Shri Pooran Singh Bhandari was promoted on adhoc basis as Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade w.e.f. 01.01.1992. As such giving promotion to him in lecturer grade before considering the case of the petitioner is against all norms of the services law………. (Emphasis supplied) 21. The learned Single Judge has construed G.O. dated 21.11.1995, and has held that, in terms thereof, all appointees in L.T Grade on ad hoc basis prior to 01.10.1990 stood regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990, and no further order was needed to be issued by the respondents. The construction placed by the learned Single Judge, on G.O. dated 21.11.1995, would apply to all those whose services were regularized by the said G.O. dated 21.11.1995, which include all the petitioners herein. In terms of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the State of Uttarakhand was obligated to regularize the services of all those, who were regularized in terms of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, w.e.f. 01.10.1990, and not in subsequent years ranging from 1999 to 2004. 22. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal vs. State of Uttaranchal and other (Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No. 162 of 2002) dated 28.10.2004 is a judgment in rem. This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in its order in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006 dated 20.04.2011, wherein it was held that the learned Single Judge had taken the correct view in directing the services of the respondents to be treated to have been regularized in LT Grade w.e.f. 01.10.1990. The order of learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No. 162 of 2002 dated 28.10.2004 has merged in the order of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006 dated 20.04.2011. Consequently, the State of Uttarakhand was obligated to regularize the services of all those, in whose favour G.O. dated 21.11.1995 was issued, from 01.10.1990, and not subsequent thereto during the years 1999 to 2004. 23. Reliance placed by Shri K.P. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the respondents on State of Uttarakhand & Another Vs. Umakant Joshi, is of no avail. In the said case, the respondent sought extension of the benefit, of time scale and selection grade, relying upon an order passed in favour of Shri R.K. Khare by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 23. Reliance placed by Shri K.P. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the respondents on State of Uttarakhand & Another Vs. Umakant Joshi, is of no avail. In the said case, the respondent sought extension of the benefit, of time scale and selection grade, relying upon an order passed in favour of Shri R.K. Khare by the State of Uttar Pradesh. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed:- “We have considered the respective submissions. It is not in dispute that at the time of promotion of Class-II officers including Shri R.K. Khare to Class-I posts with effect from 16.11.1989 by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the case of Respondent No. 1 was not considered because of the adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Report and the punishment imposed vide order dated 23.1.1999. Once the order of punishment was set aside, Respondent No. 1 became entitled to be considered for promotion to Class-I post with effect from 16.11.1989. That exercise could have been undertaken only by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and not by the State of Uttaranchal (now the State of Uttarakhand), which was formed on 9.11.2000…………” 24. Unlike in Umakant Joshi, in the present case the G.O. dated 21.11.1995 was issued, in special circumstances, only for employees working in the Uttarakhand area of the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh, presently the State of Uttarakhand. As all the petitioners, and Sri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal were working in the territorial limits of the present State of Uttarakhand even when G.O. dated 21.11.1995 was issued, the judgment in Uma Kant Joshi has no application.” 25. Reliance placed by learned Counsel for the respondents on State of Uttarakhand & Another Vs. Umakant Joshi is also misplaced. The G.O. dated 21.11.1995, issued by the erstwhile Government of Uttar Pradesh, was confined only to employees working in the Uttarakhand area of the then State of Uttar Pradesh, which is now the State of Uttarakhand. The said Government Order dated 21.11.1995 conferred the benefit of regularization only to employees working in the Uttarakhand area of the State of Uttar Pradesh, and not to employees working elsewhere in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The said Government Order dated 21.11.1995 conferred the benefit of regularization only to employees working in the Uttarakhand area of the State of Uttar Pradesh, and not to employees working elsewhere in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Consequently, the petitioners cannot be relegated to approach the Allahabad High Court seeking extension of the benefit of the G.O. dated 21.11.1995, more so as the order of the learned Single Judge, in Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No.162 of 2002 dated 28.10.2004, has merged in the order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3396 of 2006 dated 20.04.2011; and, in terms thereof, all those employees whose services were regularized by G.O. dated 21.11.1995 stood regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. 26. As the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Kamaljeet Singh and another Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others merely followed the earlier order of the Supreme Court in State of Uttarakhand & Another Vs. Umakant Joshi, this judgment has also no application to the facts of the present case. 27. Reliance placed on behalf of the respondents on Vijay Kumar Kaul and Others Vs. Union of India & Others, (2012) 7 SCC 610 is also of no avail. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed:- “…………. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. Neither before the tribunal nor before the High Court, Parveen Singh and Ors. were arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over the factum that they are senior to the Appellants and have been conferred the benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In their absence, if any direction is issued for fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise their interest. When they have not been impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult to grant. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision in Indu Shekhar Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2432 wherein it has been held thus: “56. There is another aspect of the matter. The Appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the Respondents. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision in Indu Shekhar Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2432 wherein it has been held thus: “56. There is another aspect of the matter. The Appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the Respondents. In their absence, the High Court could not have determined the question of inter se seniority.” In Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht and Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2613 this Court while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-impleadment of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed observed thus (SCC pp.207-08, paras 9-10): “9. ...in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 786 , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and proforma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the Court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order I, Rule IX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called Code of Civil Procedure) provide that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat): AIR 1965 SC 1153 ; Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal, Khodidas Barat and Ors.: AIR 1974 SC 2105 ; and Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 88 ). 10. In Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 167 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 768 , it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are necessary parties.” 28. 10. In Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 167 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 768 , it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are necessary parties.” 28. It is no doubt true that, unlike in the present case where the respondents/interveners are opposing grant of the benefit of regularization w.e.f. 01.10.1990 to the petitioners, no such opposition was made to the regularization of Shri Bhuwan Chandra Kandpal in Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No.162 of 2002 dated 28.10.2004. The grievance of the respondents/interveners is with respect to their inter-se seniority vis-a-vis the petitioners herein. As on date, the Government of Uttarakhand has not revised the seniority list prepared in the year 2005. The respondents/interveners cannot, therefore, be said to have any grievance, as at present, with regards their inter-se seniority vis-a-vis the petitioners herein. 29. While the petitioners have no doubt sought the benefit of being extended seniority w.e.f. 01.10.1990, we see no reason to grant them such a relief in this writ petition, as that would necessitate this Court having to adjudicate upon the inter-se seniority between the petitioners on the one hand and the private respondents/interveners on the other. Suffice it, therefore, to permit the petitioners herein to make a representation to the State Government with regards their claim for seniority, consequent upon the order now passed by us treating their services to have been regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. On any such representation being made, the Government of Uttarakhand shall, after giving all those affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard, take a decision, regarding revision of the seniority list, in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the petitioners’ claim of seniority, over and above the private respondents/interveners with effect from 1.10.1990. 30. All the writ petitions are disposed of declaring that, in terms of G.O. dated 21.11.1995, as construed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Writ Petition (S/B) No. 162 of 2002 dated 28.10.2004 and as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3396 of 2006 dated 20.04.2011, the services of the petitioners herein stood regularized w.e.f. 01.10.1990. No costs.