JUDGMENT : Mohammad Yaqoob Mir, J. Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30th November, 2018 passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh in terms whereof appellant has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 366 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years with a fine of Rs. Ten thousand, in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, amount of fine if realised to be paid to the victim. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the ingredients of Section 366 I.P.C. are not satisfied at all, even the prosecutrix who is the sole star witness has not supported the case of kidnapping therefore appellant deserved acquittal but has been convicted and sentenced to maximum of ten years rigorous imprisonment. Buttressing his submission that the offence under Section 366 I.P.C. has not been proved, placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2018) 6 SCC 664 . 3. Learned Addl. AG and learned Addl. APP opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant by stating that the appellant, an auto rickshaw driver had deliberately avoided to stop the auto rickshaw at the destination where the prosecutrix was to be dropped and it is that situation which has prompted the prosecutrix to jump out of the auto rickshaw, as a result whereof she got severely injured and fell unconscious, was treated in Civil Hospital, Nongpoh. He has also placed reliance on the same judgment as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. 4. Background of the case - Prosecutrix was working as a labourer (helper) in a tea stall at village Nongpoh. At about 5.30 pm on 2nd September, 2010 she was waiting to go to her home situated at Umsamlem. The appellant (auto rickshaw driver along with the auto rickshaw) was found there, she asked him as to where he had to go, in reply the auto rickshaw driver told her that he is going to Umsamlem, she boarded the auto rickshaw for being dropped at her home at Umsamlem. The appellant (auto rickshaw driver along with the auto rickshaw) was found there, she asked him as to where he had to go, in reply the auto rickshaw driver told her that he is going to Umsamlem, she boarded the auto rickshaw for being dropped at her home at Umsamlem. While reaching her house at Umsamlem the auto rickshaw driver did not stop, the prosecutrix noticing that she was beyond the point of destination i.e., her home, got apprehensive that the driver may kidnap her, out of fear jumped out of the auto rickshaw where she fell unconscious. Her uncle, according to PW1, Agnes Kharshiing, President CSWO informed about the incident based on which PW1 lodged a report with the Officer Incharge Umsamlem Beat House, Ri-Bhoi Nongpoh based on which a case was registered as Nongpoh P.S. Case No.131 (9) /10 under Section 366 I.P.C. On completion of investigation chargesheet was presented under Section 173 CrPC before the Magistrate who committed the case to the court of Sessions for trial. 5. Charge against the accused was framed for commission of the offence punishable under Section 366 I.P.C. to which accused had pleaded not guilty. Prosecution in support of the case produced all seven listed witnesses who were examined. The statement of the prosecutrix was also recorded during investigation under Section 164 CrPC by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nongpoh on 9th September, 2010 wherein she had stated that on 2nd September, 2010 at about 6.30 pm while she was on her way from her shop (tea stall) to Umsamlem to her house, she met Jerman (accused) who was driving an auto rickshaw. She boarded the auto rickshaw, after travelling for few yards, got scared and jumped out of the auto rickshaw, became unconscious, then was carried by some people to the hospital. 6. She appeared as PW2 before the trial court and was examined on 4th February, 2015 wherein she has stated that she was working as a labourer in a hotel at Karbalu, it was evening time when she intended to return home at Umsamlem, she boarded the auto rickshaw driven by the accused Shri. Jerman Syngkli and asked him to take her home at Umsamlem. On reaching her house at Umsamlem, the accused did not stop and moved ahead of her house, this compelled her to jump from the auto rickshaw, as a result she sustained injuries some pedestrians found her lying on the ground unconscious. She further stated that she regained consciousness only when she was in Civil Hospital, Nongpoh and her statement was also recorded by Magistrate, Exhibit 2 is the said statement and Exhibit 2/1 is her signature. The said statement was made by her before the Magistrate. In the cross examination has stated that it is a fact that she had chosen to board the auto rickshaw driven by the accused person, she was the only passenger at that time. Due to fear that the accused driver had taken her ahead of her house, she jumped from the said auto rickshaw. 7. It is clear that the star witness and the only witness to the actual occurrence has not supported the case of kidnapping. Infact, case of kidnapping has been registered on the basis of imagination, it is quite relevant to quote Section 366 I.P.C. "366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc. -- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; (Added by Act 20 of 1923, S.2.) [and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid.]" 8. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest that the prosecutrix was in any manner compelled to marry or likely to be compelled to intercourse so as to constitute offence punishable under Section 366 intention directly or indirectly shall be gatherable from the evidence. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest that the prosecutrix was in any manner compelled to marry or likely to be compelled to intercourse so as to constitute offence punishable under Section 366 intention directly or indirectly shall be gatherable from the evidence. It is trite that prosecution has to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt, prosecution case hinges on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. Her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC which she has owned while she appeared and was examined during trial before the trial court, wherein there is no indication that the accused in any manner had forced her to board the auto rickshaw or in any manner had uttered any word so as to give rise to ill intent. Simply prosecutrix has stated that when the auto rickshaw driver did not stop at the place where her house was located, she got apprehensive. Again, an important question is whether the accused knew where the house of the prosecutrix was situated nor it is stated in any manner that she had asked the driver to stop and he refused. It is nowhere emerging from the evidence that the auto rickshaw driver while driving the auto rickshaw from Nongpoh to Umsamlem had deviated from the main road and in case he had any such intention, he would have made some remarks and deviated from the main road anywhere. 9. The accused was examined under Section 313 CrPC. He made it clear that he did not know the location of the house of the prosecutrix and even he did not hear any words from the prosecutrix for stopping the auto rickshaw because to his understanding, prosecutrix had a very low voice and trucks were passing and maybe because of that, he must have not heard. 10. The prosecution case otherwise is totally demolished by the prosecutrix herself when before the trial court in the cross examination by the counsel for the defense she stated as under, "It is a fact that I have chosen to board the auto rickshaw driven by the accused person. I was the only passenger at that time. Due to fear that the accused/ driver had taken me ahead of my house I jumped from the said auto. It is a fact that the accused person did not force me to go anywhere." 11. I was the only passenger at that time. Due to fear that the accused/ driver had taken me ahead of my house I jumped from the said auto. It is a fact that the accused person did not force me to go anywhere." 11. The said statement in clear terms suggest that the prosecutrix got apprehensive on her own, there was no such gesture or action on the part of the driver (appellant) which would constitute offence under Section 366 I.P.C.. It shall be quite relevant to quote para 17 of the judgment as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Addl. AG in the case of Kavita Chandrakant Laskhani v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2018) 6 SCC 664 para 17, "17. Apart from this, to constitute an offence under Section 366 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 IPC, the court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under Section 366 IPC." (Emphasis added) 12. Applying the law as has been laid down it is clear that the offence under Section 366 on the strength of the statement of the prosecutrix is not made out. 13. Applying the law as has been laid down it is clear that the offence under Section 366 on the strength of the statement of the prosecutrix is not made out. 13. Other witnesses to the injury sustained by the prosecutrix and medical report about her injury cannot be denied because once a person has jumped from a running auto rickshaw, she can suffer injury the way the prosecutrix has suffered injury on her chin and cheek. 14. Learned trial court while relying on para 26 of the judgment passed in the case of Khalilur Rahman v. Emperor has assumed that the accused had some different intention but in the reported judgment as quoted, it is laid down that if the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman with the necessary intent the offence is complete whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and even if in the event the woman in fact consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse taking place. 15. In the reported case it appears that the accused had kidnapped the person therefore the basic ingredient of kidnapping or abducting was satisfied then the intention of committing wrong was discernible. Here in the present case, the accused did not kidnap or abduct, the prosecutrix of her own had boarded the auto rickshaw after proper enquiry from the driver therefore, there is no question of deceit or motivation which could give rise to the intention of the accused to commit any wrong. 16. Learned trial court appear to have been swayed by the rise of cases of sexual harassment against women and minor children which she has given vent to in para 31 of the judgment, impugned. 17. Any offence against women and minor children is totally unacceptable but in the name of the same, an innocent person cannot be convicted or sentenced. Any person who dares or tries to commit such offence cannot be shown any leniency but at the same time without any basis, a person cannot be convicted and sentenced. 18. In our considered opinion while going through the entire record, more particularly the statement of the star witness (prosecutrix) there is no scope to hold the accused guilty. Therefore, the judgment of the learned trial court is unsustainable, as such, set aside. Accused is acquitted, he be released forthwith. 19. Appeal succeeds, shall stand disposed of as above. 18. In our considered opinion while going through the entire record, more particularly the statement of the star witness (prosecutrix) there is no scope to hold the accused guilty. Therefore, the judgment of the learned trial court is unsustainable, as such, set aside. Accused is acquitted, he be released forthwith. 19. Appeal succeeds, shall stand disposed of as above. Copy of the judgment along with the trial court record be sent to the trial court. Jail authority concerned where the appellant is lodged be informed accordingly.