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2019 DIGILAW 1301 (GAU)

Cholamandalan v. Biki Hussain

2019-11-28

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2019
JUDGMENT : Songkhupchung Serto, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and also heard Mr. B.N. Sarmah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 9.3.2018 passed by the MACT, Dimapur in MAC Case No. 122/2016 wherein, the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 7,83,600/- to the claimant/respondent. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as follows:- On 17.4.2014 at around 9 PM, the respondent/claimant, while he was riding on a Motorcycle was knocked down by a truck bearing registration No. AS/C-3624 driven by the respondent No. 2 at Khelmati Lakhimpur. After the accident the respondent was taken to hospital namely, North Lakhimpur hospital and thereafter to Hayat Hospital at Guwahati where he was treated from 18.4.2014 to 27.4.2014. Being aggrieved by the injuries and the disabilities suffered, the respondent No. 1/claimant herein filed a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act before the learned Tribunal at Dimapur praying for adequate compensation to be given for the" injuries and disability suffered by him which is claimed to be 55%. The learned Tribunal after taking the evidence and hearing the parties came to a finding that the claimant/respondent suffered injuries and disabilities due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said truck which was insured with the appellant company herein and awarded the amount mentioned above. Being aggrieved by the judgment and award of the learned Tribunal, the appellant who is the Insurance Company has come before this Court by filing this appeal. 4. The grounds of appeal as submitted by Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant are as follows:- (i) That in a claim case under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the first and foremost duty of the claimant is to prove rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle but in this case there was no evidence showing rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle and there was no police report to support the case of the claimant (ii) That the medical certificate was issued by a Doctor who did not treat the claimant/respondent Mr. Devnath submitted that as per the report the claimant/respondent was treated at Lakhimpur Civil Hospital and Hayat Hospital at Guwahati but the Doctor who issued the certificate is from Dimapur therefore, this clearly shows that the certificate was not issued by a person who ought to have issued the same. (iii) That the eye witness who was examined before the learned Tribunal was a lady therefore it is doubtful that she would have ventured out on the street at that time of the night to witness such an incident. Therefore, the evidence given by her cannot be trusted and relied upon. (iv) That the learned Tribunal did not examine the facts and circumstances of the case properly and also did not even try to find out if there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. In support of his submissions, Mr. B. Devnath, referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jiju Kuruvila & Ors. Vs. Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors. with Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Chinnamma Joys & Ors. with Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Chinnamma Joys & Ors reported in AIR 2013 SC 2293 , paragraph 24. The contents of paragraph 24 referred to is reproduced here below:- "24. The mere position of the vehicles after accident, as shown in a scene mahazar, cannot give a substantial proof as to the rash and negligent driving on the part of one or the other. When two vehicles coming from opposite directions collide, the position of the vehicles and its direction, etc. depends on a number of factors like the speed of vehicles, intensity of collision, reason for collision, place at which one vehicle hit the other, etc. From the scene of the accident, one may suggest or presume the manner in which the accident was caused, but in the absence of any direct or corroborative evidence, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there was negligence on the part of the driver. In absence of such direct or corroborative evidence, the Court cannot give any specific finding about negligence on the part of any individual." In regard to his submission on contributory negligence, he also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 273 , paragraph 15. New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 273 , paragraph 15. The content of the paragraph is quoted here below:- "15. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan & Ors. [ 2008 (3) SCC 748 ] has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: "6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong- doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." Mr. Devnath referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar & Anr. reported in (2011) 1 SCC 343 paragraph 17 and 18 regarding the medical certificate. The contents of the paragraphs are quoted here below:- "17. If a Doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor's opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and if so the percentage. 18. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give 'ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local Hospitals/Medical Colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability." (v) Lastly, Mr. B. Devnath, submitted that disability allegedly suffered by the claimant/respondent is not included among the permanent disablement under section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, the claimant/respondent would not be entitled to any compensation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of this High Court in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Rashamong Chang & Ors reported in 2011 (1) GLT 609, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. Therefore, the claimant/respondent would not be entitled to any compensation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of this High Court in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Rashamong Chang & Ors reported in 2011 (1) GLT 609, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. The contents of the paragraphs are quoted here below:- (6) The impugned orders, passed by the learned trial Judge does not indicate that the claimants sustained any of the said injuries as mentioned in Section 142 of the M.V. Act. There is nothing on record to show as to on what basis the learned trial Judge came to the finding that the claimants sustained the injuries mentioned is Section 142 of the M.V. Act. There can be no dispute that in order to pass an interim order under Section 140 of the M.V. Act, the trial Judge is required to come to a prima facie finding that the claimants sustained the injuries mentioned in Section 142 of the M.V. Act. (7) In view of the above discussions, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned trial Judge committed error by passing the impugned orders, without complying with the provisions prescribed by Section 142 of the M.V. Act. i.e. without arriving at a finding that the claimants suffered any of the injuries as mentioned in Section 142 of the M.V. Act. There should have been a finding as to which one or more of the said injuries were sustained by the claimants. (8) In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders can't stand the test of law. However, if the claimants had sustained the injuries mentioned in Section 142 of the M.V. Act, they should be given an opportunity to substantiate their claim for interim relief and the learned trial Judge should pass appropriate order as per law. Therefore, for ends of justice, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to remand the matter to the learned trial Judge to pass necessary order in compliance with the provisions of Sections 140 and 142 of the M.V. Act, after giving sufficient opportunities to both the parties." 5. Mr. Therefore, for ends of justice, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to remand the matter to the learned trial Judge to pass necessary order in compliance with the provisions of Sections 140 and 142 of the M.V. Act, after giving sufficient opportunities to both the parties." 5. Mr. B.N. Sarmah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1/claimant at the very outset submitted that the grounds taken in this appeal are new grounds and they were never the ones taken before the learned Tribunal. In support of his submission he referred to the written statement filed by the appellant and also cross-examination of the witnesses by the appellant. Mr. Sarmah also submitted that no specific questions were asked or raised on the facts and circumstances relating to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle and no witnesses were produced to rebut the evidence of the claimant and witnesses. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the evidence of the eye witness who gave evidence under the facts and circumstances of the accident. The learned counsel also submitted that since sufficient evidence was given by the claimants, there was no need of examination of the I.O. of the case. Mr. Sarmah referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in AIR 2011 SCC 1540, paragraph 10 in support of his submission that non examination of the I.O. is not fatal when facts are not disputed. In support of his submission in addition to the judgment mentioned above, the learned counsel also referred to the judgment passed in the case of Meenakshamma Vs. B. Hanuman Thappa & Anr, reported in 1997 (1) TAC 50, paragraph 6. The contents of the paragraph is quoted here below:- "6. Sri O. Mahesh- learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that an adverse inference will have to be drawn for non-registration of a criminal case against the driver in a given case. The contention cannot be accepted. The claim is a summary civil proceedings wherein the claimant is required to prove the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by independent evidence. Hence, non-registration of a police case regarding the accident does not give rise to any adverse inference that no such motor accident occurred. The contention cannot be accepted. The claim is a summary civil proceedings wherein the claimant is required to prove the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by independent evidence. Hence, non-registration of a police case regarding the accident does not give rise to any adverse inference that no such motor accident occurred. The further contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the Medical Officer, who is duty bound to report the lego-medical case to the police, has not reported the same and this circumstances also is adverse to the claim of the claimant has no merit. It is not unusual for a Medical Officer of the hospital in not reporting the lego-medical case to the police. The failure on the part of the Medical Officer to exercise the basic/primary duty to report the lego-medical case to the police is also no circumstance to deny the claim of the claimant if the evidence on record establishes the claim from other acceptable evidence. The Tribunal on consideration of the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 has held that the accident was due to negligent driving of the tiller causing injuries, to the claimant. I find from the discussion made above that the finding is based on evidence and there is no ground to deviate from the finding." In order to strengthen his submission, the learned counsel referred to the decision of this High Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Saraswati Debnath & Ors. reported in 1995 (2) GLT 117 paragraph 6 and the recent judgment and order of this Court dated 31/10/2019 passed in MAC Appeal No. 1/2018. The relevant portion of paragraph 6 is reproduced here below:- "6. The law is settled that in a claim under Motor Vehicles Act, the evidence should not be scrutinized in a manner as is done in a civil suit or criminal case. In a civil case the rule is preponderance or probability and in a criminal case the rule is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not necessary to consider these niceties in a manner of accident claim case inasmuch as it is summary enquiry. If there is some evidence to arrive at the finding that itself is sufficient. No nicety, doubt or suspicion should weigh with the Tribunal in deciding a motor accident claim case. It is not necessary to consider these niceties in a manner of accident claim case inasmuch as it is summary enquiry. If there is some evidence to arrive at the finding that itself is sufficient. No nicety, doubt or suspicion should weigh with the Tribunal in deciding a motor accident claim case. The law on this is laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 1354 (N.K.V. Bros (P) Ltd. vs M. Karumai Ammal & Ors." 6. Mr. Sarmah further submitted that the appellant's company did not raise any question on the certificate issued by the Doctor and also did not asked for the Doctor to be produced for cross-examination. In such circumstances, the examination of the Doctor was not necessary. The learned counsel further submitted that since there was no objection when the medical certificate was exhibited and no questions were asked to test the veracity or credibility of the certificate, the question of examining the Doctor who issued the same does not arise. In support of his submission, Mr. Sarmah, referred to the decision of this High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. A.J. Thomas, reported in 2010 (1) T.A.C. 414 , paragraphs 11 and 12 and 2008 (3) GLT 931 paragraph 6. The contents of the 2 judgments mentioned are reproduced here below:- "11. In this appeal, the appellant has seriously questioned the finding of the learned Tribunal on the permanent disability to the extent of 40% without taking any evidence of the doctor and awarding the compensation. In this regard, it is to be noted that the respondent-claimant produced necessary medical certificates before the learned tribunal and the appellant had opportunity to pursue the same. No doubt, the respondent-claimant did not examine the concerned doctor but the appellant, at no point of time, made any prayer before the learned Tribunal to summon the doctor concerned for examination to testify the veracity of the medical report and thus, it failed to avail the chance of calling the materials witness. No doubt, the respondent-claimant did not examine the concerned doctor but the appellant, at no point of time, made any prayer before the learned Tribunal to summon the doctor concerned for examination to testify the veracity of the medical report and thus, it failed to avail the chance of calling the materials witness. The learned Tribunal in para 21 of his judgment rightly observed that".........The contention of the counsel for O.P. that no permanent disability certificate from doctors from Guwahati and Kerala has been produced is infructuous as much as that the MRI report dated 5th April, 2002 (Ext C13) indicate the permanent disability of claimant" and came to a conclusion in para 27 that".........this Tribunal is inclined to hold that the claimant has sustained permanent disablement as a consequence of the accident occurred on 15th March, 2000, involving the insured vehicle with the O.P.-m Insurance Co. to the extent of 40% and the issue is settled in favour of the claimant." 12. In view of the above, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal warranting any interference and as such, the appeal is found to be bereft of merit and accordingly, the same is dismissed." (6) The first and main submission of Mr. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant is that the claimant failed to adduce any medical certificate supporting his case that he suffered 100% permanent disablement and in absence of such medical evidence the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal is bad in law and liable to be set aside. On perusal of the records, it is found that the claimant was admitted in the Civil Hospital, Aizawl on 16.12.2000 i. e. on the date of accident itself. The claimant was examined by the medical board consisting of one Chairman and two Member Doctors and it found him suffering from Traumatic Quadriparesis and it recommended for necessary investigation and treatment at INS, Guwahati. This may be seen in "board's Recommendation dated 27.12.2000" which was exhibited and marked as Exh. C-12. He was discharged from the Civil Hospital, Aizawl on 28.12.2000 with advice for treatment in INS, Guwahati as he was diagnosed to have been suffering from Quadriplegia, which in medical term means a person who is permanently unable to use his arms and legs. This diagnosis is recorded in the discharge card, Exh. C-9. C-12. He was discharged from the Civil Hospital, Aizawl on 28.12.2000 with advice for treatment in INS, Guwahati as he was diagnosed to have been suffering from Quadriplegia, which in medical term means a person who is permanently unable to use his arms and legs. This diagnosis is recorded in the discharge card, Exh. C-9. As per advice of the Civil Hospital, the claimant was admitted in the GNRC Ltd. Guwahati on 29.12.2000 and in final diagnosis he was found to have been suffering from Grade-II Spondylolisthesis C6-7. In the said Hospital he was subjected to physiotherapy and regular dressing of bed sore. Surgery was contemplated but he was not found fit for surgery and he was discharged on 7.3.2001. This report is available in the case summary and discharge report Exh. C-14 and from the same it is found that the claimant was in a very bad physical condition and he was returned without further treatment. Thereafter, he was again admitted in the Civil Hospital at Aizawl on 13.4.2002, where he was diagnosed to have been suffering from complete paraplegia; a disease of loss of control and feeling in the legs and lower body. He was discharged from Civil Hospital on 7.5.2002, which may be seen in Exh. C-9 (1). His condition was not improved and as such he was again admitted in the Civil Hospital at Aizawl on 25.6.2002 for treatment of the same disease and he was discharged on 27.6.2002 as may be seen from Exh. C-9 (2). The medical certificate dated 13.11.2002 (Exh. C-17) was obtained from Dr. Thangchungnung, bone and joint specialist Civil Hospital, Aizawl. According to this certificate, the claimant is suffering from cervical spine injury C6-7 and he was not improving although he was treated at Civil Hospital and GNRC, Guwahati. It was certified that the claimant was suffering from 100% disablement with all the limbs below the neck paralyzed. This certificate is supported by the Hospital documents Exh. C-9, Exh. C-9 (1), Exh. C-9 (2) and Exh. C-12 mentioned above and there is nothing to doubt about its genuineness or authenticity. In fact during trial the appellant/opposite party did not raise any question on the genuineness of this certificate." 7. Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the appellant, in reply to the submission of Mr. C-9, Exh. C-9 (1), Exh. C-9 (2) and Exh. C-12 mentioned above and there is nothing to doubt about its genuineness or authenticity. In fact during trial the appellant/opposite party did not raise any question on the genuineness of this certificate." 7. Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the appellant, in reply to the submission of Mr. Sarmah submitted that in the case cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Supreme Court never waved examination of the Doctor who issued the certificate. Therefore, it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Mr. Devnath, lastly submitted that the learned Tribunal had also erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is liable to pay compensation on the basis of evidence which are unfounded therefore, the judgment of the learned Tribunal needs to be corrected so that a wrong committed by it is not perpetuated. 8. I have considered the submissions of both the learned counsels for the parties and perused the case record of the learned Tribunal and the judgment referred to. 9. The eye witness account reveals that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the truck bearing registration No. No. AS/C-3624. The eye witness was cross examined but not on the facts and circumstances of the accident stated by her in her examination-in-chief as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sarmah, learned counsel for the respondent/claimant and no defence witness was produced to rebut the evidence of the eye witness. Therefore, I find no reason to doubt the evidence given by the eye witness. The fact that the I.O. of the case was not examined would make no difference as the eye witness account is very clear and trust worthy. Though it is true that no final report of the police was produced before the learned Tribunal, the accident report was produced and exhibited and that collaborates the eye witness account. Besides in Motor accident claim cases, strict rules of evidence does not apply since it is quasi civil proceeding. The existence of preponderance of probability is sufficient prove in such cases. Hence, it can safely be concluded that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Besides in Motor accident claim cases, strict rules of evidence does not apply since it is quasi civil proceeding. The existence of preponderance of probability is sufficient prove in such cases. Hence, it can safely be concluded that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. It is true that the disabilities certificate was not issued by the hospital where the respondent/claimant was treated but it is also equally true that the medical certificate which was not objected to or challenged at the time it was exhibited shows that the Doctor who issued the certificate also treated the respondent/claimant and he had issued the certificate after proper examination and diagnosis. Therefore, at this stage, the appellant can no longer challenge the credibility or trustworthiness of the medical certificate. Further, from the record, one can see that the appellant never asked for the Doctor to be produced for cross-examination. Therefore, it appears that the appellant got up from his slumber too late. 10. The appellant's contention that the learned Tribunal did not consider at all the facts that there could have been contributory negligence on the part of the respondent/claimant holds no water because of the fact that the eye witness account that the accident happened due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle was not challenges at all during the trial. As stated above, the eye witness account makes it very clear that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the driver. Therefore, there is no error on the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court. Besides, if the appellant was of the view that there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondent/claimant he should have taken a plea and prove the same by producing evidence before the learned Tribunal. Since they have not done so they have missed their chance to raise that question. 11. On the last point of appeal submitted by Mr. Devnath that the disability or disabilities suffered by the respondent/claimant does not come under the disabilities recognised under section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the same is discussed, it would be appropriate to produce the provision of section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As such, the same is reproduced here below:- "142. Devnath that the disability or disabilities suffered by the respondent/claimant does not come under the disabilities recognised under section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the same is discussed, it would be appropriate to produce the provision of section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As such, the same is reproduced here below:- "142. Permanent disablement-For the purpose of this Chapter, permanent disablement of a person shall be deemed to have resulted from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 140 if such person has suffered by reason of the accident, any injury or injuries involving- (a) Permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, or privation of any member or joint; or (b) Destruction of permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; or (c) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face." 12. From the above section of the Motor Vehicles Act, a disablement to be termed as permanent disablement under the Act should be either permanent privation of one or more of the parts of the body mentioned at clause (a) or destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint or permanent disfiguration of the head or face as mentioned in clause (b) and (c) of the same. 13. The medical certificate which certified that the respondent/claimant has suffered from 55% permanent disabilities described the physical injuries of the claimant/respondent because of which it was concluded that he has suffered as such is reproduced herebelow:- "To Whom it may Concern Certified that Md. Biki Hussain, son of Md. Faruk Hussain, aged about 18 years was under my treatment for Haemorrhagic contusions, haemosinuses, Calvarial fractures & Facio-Maxillary fractures, intercondylar & lateral tibial plateau fractures (L) fracture tibial, blunt injury on chest from the month of May 2014 to February, 2016. After proper examination and diagnosis in my observation and opinion the patient is suffering from 55% permanent disablement and need continuous future treatment." 14. From the description of the injuries suffered by the petitioner as given in the medical certificate stated above, it appears that permanent disablement suffered by him are well within the description of the permanent disablement given in section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly at clause (a) and (c). Therefore, the submission of Mr. B. Devnath does not seems to be correct. Therefore, the submission of Mr. B. Devnath does not seems to be correct. In view of the conclusion drawn above, I find there is no merit in the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 15. If any statutory deposit has been made by the appellant, the same may be returned and if any part payment has been made, the same also may be deducted from the total amount to be awarded. 16. Send back the LCR.