JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Prakhar Srivastava, holding brief of Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Pranav Ojha, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has preferred this petition so as to challenge the judgment and order dated 4.3.2011 passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. The petitioner worked as a Professor and attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.1998. His pension was computed on the basis of his total length of service, i.e., 24 years 10 moths and 7 days upto 27.5.1996, on which date he took voluntary retirement. The petitioner represented that he is entitled to computation of pension by taking his service upto the date of superannuation, i.e. 31.7.1998. The representation of the petitioner was allowed and his pensionary benefits were revised by taking his total length of service to 27 years 11 days. This period was calculated by taking 16.7.1971 as date of inclusion into service of the petitioner. The petitioner protested against the said and alleged that prior to above, he had worked as Demonstrator and as such, his service from 1.1.1966 to 16.7.1971 should also be added in his total length of service for the purposes of computing the pension. 3. This benefit inspite of repeated representations of the petitioner was not accorded to him. Therefore, he preferred a claim under Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976. The claim of the petitioner has been rejected by the impugned order for the following reasons- (i) that the claim petition is barred by time; (ii) the claim of the petitioners is barred by estoppel and (iii) the petitioner is not entitled to the addition of the above period for the purposes of pension in view of Article 352 of the C.S.R. 4. In so far as limitation part is concern, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case Union of India and others (2008) 8 SCC 648 , Union of India and others Vs. Tarseen Singh. It was held in the aforesaid case that in service law disputes, the principle of continuing wrong and recurring/successive wrongs will apply. Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below- “4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. Tarseen Singh. It was held in the aforesaid case that in service law disputes, the principle of continuing wrong and recurring/successive wrongs will apply. Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below- “4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A `continuing wrong' refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. `Recurring/successive wrongs' are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action.” 5. In the case of Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare, AIR 1959 SC 798 Balakrishna S.P Waghmare Vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan the concept of continuing wrong was explained in the context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963. Paragraph 31 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below- "31. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." 6. In the case of M.R. Gupta, (1995) 5 SCC 628 M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India also the Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs. Paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment which is relevant is quoted below- "The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred........." 7. In the case of Shiv Das, (2007) 9 SCC 724 Shiv Das Vs. Union of India the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that in the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of the above judgment is quoted below- "8. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.......... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years." 8. The Tribunal in its order has returned a finding that the cause of action for filing the claim petition lastly arose to the petitioner just after 10.10.2000. The petitioner thereafter had been representing for the revision of the pension but when no action was taken he was forced to file the claim petition. 9. The cause of action to file a claim petition was a recurring cause of action and in this view of the matter it cannot be said that claim was barred by time. 10. As far as estoppel is concerned, the petitioner while submitting pension papers may have indicated that his services be counted from 31.7.1971 but any error in mentioning the date is not such which cannot be rectified. More particularly, when the petitioner immediately protested and submitted that before the said date he had worked as a Demonstrator, and therefore, his service rendered as Demonstrator from 1.1.1966 to 16.7.1971 be added. Thus it is not a case of estoppel rather that of rectification of the error/mistake. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that claim was barred by Principle of Estoppel. 11. Now coming to the merits of the case notwithstanding Article 252 CSR which in our opinion is not attracted in the present case. There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner has rendered continuous service right from 1.1.1966 till 31.7.1998 in different capacities may be as Demonstrator initially. Therefore, logically the entire length of service is to be taken into account for computing the pension admissible to the petitioner. 12. The petitioner has categorically pleaded that certain others viz. Dr. V.B. Sahay, Dr. K.N.Srivastava, Dr. S.S. Sardhana and Dr. Therefore, logically the entire length of service is to be taken into account for computing the pension admissible to the petitioner. 12. The petitioner has categorically pleaded that certain others viz. Dr. V.B. Sahay, Dr. K.N.Srivastava, Dr. S.S. Sardhana and Dr. S.P. Attri all were allowed pension by taking the service rendered by them as Demonstrator. Even the Tribunal itself has allowed the claim petitions in this regard and one of them is Claim Petition No. 1824 of 1996 (Dr. Vrijendra Behari Sahai Vs. State of U.P. and others) decided on 22.11.1997. In the said case the service rendered by the claimant as Demonstrator from 16.8.1962 to 7.10.1969 were added to his regular service as Lecturer/Reader/Professor of the medical college for computing the post retiral benefits. 13. This apart in the case of Dr. A.R. Sircar and Ors., 2002 (1) AWC 323 All A.R. Sircar and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. a Division Bench of this Court held that for the purpose of computation of the retiral benefits the faculty members cannot be discriminated against none even with the teachers of the University. It further held that any such discrimination is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that the entire service period including ad hoc/temporary/administrative capacity are also to be counted in the regular service for the purpose of computing the pension. 14. It may be pertinent to mention here that it is not the case of the respondents that all the other persons with whom the petitioner is claiming equality or parity were allowed pension by illegal counting of service rendered by them as Demonstrator 15. In view of the above, on the principle of equality also the petitioner is entitled to the same benefit which has been extended to his fellow colleagues. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Tribunal is not tenable in law. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 4.3.2011 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and the respondents are directed to re-compute the pensionary benefits admissible to the petitioner by taking his service period from 1.1.1966 to 17.7.1971 as Demonstrator in his length of service. The computation/revision may be done within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is produced. The computation/revision may be done within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is produced. The petitioner would be entitled to the arrears of pension as per the revised pension which shall also be paid to him within the same period. 17. The writ petition is allowed with the above observations.