JUDGMENT : 1. Heard, Shri Vivek Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the appellant and Shri D.S.Yadav, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The present intra court Special Appeal under Chapter-VIII, Rule-5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 has emanated from the judgment and order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Writ Court in Writ Petition No.499 (SS) of 2011 (Succha Singh and others versus State of U.P. and others), by which the writ petition filed by the respondents-petitioners has been allowed. 3. The brief facts of the case for adjudication of the present controversy are that the respondent no.1 was initially appointed on the post of Kurk Amin by the District Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri on 20.01.1977 in District Lakhimpur Kheri and he retired from service on 31.12.2008 after attaining the age of superannuation. The petitioner no.2 was initially appointed on the post of Kurk Amin by the District Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri on 23.11.1976 and he was retired from service on 31.03.2010 after attaining the age of superannuation. The petitioner no.3 was initially appointed on the post of Kurk Amin by the District Magistrate, Moradabad in the year 1995 and he is working on the post of Kurk Amin in District Moradabad. All the three petitioners were appointed on commission basis. 4. The Government had issued a circular dated 08.05.1978 stating therein that all the Circulars issued prior to the said date are kept in abeyance and all the Kurk Amins would be treated on salary basis and paid salary by the department. In the year 1979 another Circular was issued by the opposite party no.2 to the effect that all the Kurk Amins will work in the Department on commission basis. 5. Certain salaried Kurk Amins including the respondent no.1, who were denied to work and their services were terminated by the Department, being aggrieved with the action of the appellants, filed writ petition before this Court, which was numbered as writ petition no.737 of 1980; Mahendra Pal Singh Versus District Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, and others. The said writ petition was connected with other writ petitions and all the connected writ petitions were allowed by means of judgment and order dated 16.11.1985 by holding that the writ petitioners are government servants and quashed the termination orders. The said writ petition was connected with other writ petitions and all the connected writ petitions were allowed by means of judgment and order dated 16.11.1985 by holding that the writ petitioners are government servants and quashed the termination orders. It was provided in the order dated 16.11.1985 that all the Kurk Amins shall be kept on salary basis and none of them would be treated on commission basis as stated in the writ petition. The said order was not challenged by the appellants. The said fact has not been disputed by the appellants. 6. Subsequently Sri Chandra Prakash Pandey and others approached to this Court challenging the Circular pertaining to change of their designation as Kurk Amins on commission basis from salary by means of writ petition no.199 of 1991. The writ petition was allowed and the Circular was quashed as it related to concerned petitioners and it was directed not to implement the adverse conditions and treat them on regular pay scale and pay them salary and other allowances in accordance with Rules by means of judgment and order dated 26.04.1993. On being challenged by both the parties, the Special Appeal No.15 (SB) of 1994 of State of U.P. was dismissed and Special Appeal No.39 (SB) of 1994 of Shri Chandra Prakash Pandey was allowed with direction to take decision in regard to admissible pay scale by means of judgment and order dated 05.05.1995. The judgment was confirmed by the Apex Court holding that the petitioners are Government servants. 7. It appears that the judgment and order passed by this Court and confirmed by the Apex Court was not complied in its letter and spirit and the Government had notified the U.P. Cooperative Collection Funds and Amin and other Employees Service Rules, 2002. Therefore, the Civil Misc.Writ Petition No.7326 (SS) of 2004 ; Chandra Prakash Pandey and others Versus State of U.P. and others was filed, which was allowed with costs by means of judgment and order dated 25.11.2008. The said judgment was challenged by the appellants by filing Special Appeal No.187 of 2009 and others and other Special Appeals were filed against identical orders The Special Appeals were dismissed by means of order dated 19.11.2010 with certain direction in addition to the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. The said judgment was challenged by the appellants by filing Special Appeal No.187 of 2009 and others and other Special Appeals were filed against identical orders The Special Appeals were dismissed by means of order dated 19.11.2010 with certain direction in addition to the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. The relevant portion of the judgment passed in Special Appeal No.187 of 2009 and other connected Special Appeals reads as under:- "Of course there was no cadre as there were no Rules and these Kurk Amins were not being treated as Government servants, but it is unbelievable that such a large number of Kurk Amins were appointed by the District Magistrate/Collectors in each district without there being any post or necessity. Even assuming that the posts/vacancies were not specifically carved out and these persons were appointed in exigency of work for collection of revenue, working on such posts for such a long time would definitely entitle them to claim the benefit of past services rendered by them. Our view finds support from the fact that once the Supreme Court has declared these Kurk Amins as Government Servants holding civil posts, they are entitled to the scale of pay which was payable to Kurk Amins appointed on regular basis in the Revenue Department from the very beginning, including pay revisions which might have taken place in between. In case any other interpretation is given to this view, it would defeat the very purpose of the directives issued by the Supreme Court. It will make no sense to say that though the Kurk Amins hold civil posts since they started working as such, and they are entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution also, but the benefit of the pay scale, as given to the Government Servants, can be given only after the enforcement of the Rules, and deny them the regular pay scale for the period during which they worked prior to the commencement of the Rules 2002. The Court did not say that the Rules should be framed so as to declare the respondents as Government servants or that their status as Government Servants, was made dependant upon the declaration so made by the State Government by framing the Rules and till then deny them the payscale which is given to their counterparts working in the Revenue Department. Denial of salary in the payscale with all revisions of pay to the respondents, would, therefore, be wholly arbitrary and not supported by any law, rather in violation of the dictum of the Apex Court. The respondents once having been declared as Government servants holding civil posts are entitled to be paid salary in the given pay scale of the Kurk Amins of Revenue Department with the benefit of revision of pay which might have taken place during all the period of their services, since they joined the service." 8. The above said order was challenged by the appellants before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.312 of 2017 (State of U.P. and others Versus Chandra Prakash Pandey and others). The Hon'ble Apex Court disposed of the Civil Appeal by means of judgment and order dated 10.01.2017 with the following order:- "While the view taken by learned Single Judge is for enforcement of the judgment of this court, mentioned above, the judgment of the Division Bench, to the extent it has gone beyond the relief granted by learned Single Judge in the appeal filed by the State, is not sustainable and to that extent the said direction is set aside. The appeals shall stand disposed of in terms of the judgment of learned Single Judge. No costs." 9. The respondent-petitioners filed the writ petition No.499 of 2011 claiming the benefit of the judgment and order dated 19.11.2010 passed in Special Appeal No.187 of 2009 with the direction to treat them Government Servants and pay them all services benefits and post retiral dues including pension etc. to the petitioners no.1 and 2 and not to impose the Rules 2002 on the petitioners. 10. After considering the pleadings of the parties and orders passed by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the writ petition has been allowed by the judgment and order dated 30.11.2017, which has been challenged by the appellants in the present Special Appeal alongwith the application for condonation of delay in filing the Special Appeal. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The present Special Appeal has been filed with a delay of 493 days. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The present Special Appeal has been filed with a delay of 493 days. The cause shown in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay in moving the Special Appeal is that the learned Single Judge has passed the order dated 30.11.2017 in writ petition No.499 (SS) of 2011. The Additional Legal Remembrance, Cooperative, Section-I, U.P., Lucknow vide a letter dated 17.07.2018 has opined to challenge the order dated 30.11.2017 before the Hon'ble High Court. In pursuance of the said letter the Joint Secretary, Government of U.P., Cooperative, Section-1 vide letter dated 20.07.2018 has issued direction to file the appeal against the order dated 30.11.2017. In pursuance of the letter dated 20.07.2018 the Commissioner/Registrar, Cooperative, U.P., Lucknow vide letter dated 07.12.2018 had issued direction for filing the Special Appeal. Thereafter on 01.01.2019 a request had been made to the Chief Standing Counsel for filing the Special Appeal against the order dated 30.11.2017. On 27.02.2019 learned State Counsel has asked for certain information for filing the Special Appeal, which were provided on 6/7.04.2019 to the learned State Counsel and it appears that thereafter the Special Appeal was prepared, which was filed on 10.05.2019. Further a plea has been taken that the delay in filing the Special Appeal is not deliberate, rather the same is circumstantial and the delay in filing the Special Appeal is liable to be condoned, being filed by the State, relying on the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and others Versus Harish Chandra and others; 1996 (9) SCC 309 , State of Bihar and others Versus Kameshwar Prasad and Another; (2000) 9 SCC 94 and State of Haryana Versus Chandra Mani; (1996) 3 SCC 132 . 13. On going through the aforesaid facts mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 7 of the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay, as narrated above, after passing of the judgment and order dated 30.11.2017 by the Writ Court, it took about 8 months in seeking the opinion for challenging the order which was given by means of order dated 17.07.2018. In pursuance thereof the Government issued direction to file Special Appeal on 20.07.2018. Thereafter again the department took five months to issue directions for filing the Special Appeal on 07.12.2018. In pursuance thereof the Government issued direction to file Special Appeal on 20.07.2018. Thereafter again the department took five months to issue directions for filing the Special Appeal on 07.12.2018. In pursuance to which a request was made to the Learned Chief Standing Counsel for filing Special Appeal on 01.01.2019. In pursuance to which certain information was sought by the learned State Counsel on 27.02.2019, which was provided after about 5 months on 6/7.04.2019, which shows that the matter was dealt with in a very casual manner without caring for the period of limitation provided for filing the Special Appeal. 14. The law of limitation as provided is one and the same for private citizens and the Government authorities. Therefore, we are of the view that in absence of plausible and acceptable explanation the delay cannot be condoned in a mechanical manner merely because the Special Appeal has been filed on behalf of the Government and as argued it is common knowledge that on account of government machinery it takes time to take any decision on account of the procedure provided for taking such a decision. In the present case the opinion was taken on 17.07.2018 for filing the Special Appeal, but even thereafter the Special Appeal has been filed on 10.05.2019 with a long unexplained delay. Such a lethargic approach on the pretext of government working is not permissible and the delay cannot be condoned. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Postmaster General and others Versus Living Media India Limited and another; (2012) 3 SCC 563 after considering the various judgments including the judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana Versus Chandra Mani and State of U.P. and others Versus Harish Chandra and others, relied by the appellant, held that it is right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. The condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. The relevant paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- "27.It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 16. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a recent case of The State of Bihar and others Versus Deo Kumar Singh and others; Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary no(s). 13348 of 2019 by means of judgment and order dated 09.05.2019 has held that a clear signal has to be sent to the Government Authorities that they cannot approach the Court as and when they please, on account of gross incompetence of their officers and that too without taking any action against the concerned officers. The Hon'ble Apex Court further deprecated the casual manner in which the Division Bench was approached and also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been approached; the objective possibly being to get a certificate of dismissal from Hon'ble Supreme Court. This is complete wastage of judicial time and dismissed the Special Leave Petition on delay with costs to be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay. The relevant portion of the judgment, on reproduction, reads as under:- "We are of the view that a clear signal has to sent to the Government Authorities that they cannot approach the Court as and when they please, on account of gross incompetence of their officers and that too without taking any action against the concerned officers. No detail of this delay of 728 days have been given as if there is an inherent right to seek condonation of delay by State Government. The law of limitation apparently does not apply to the State Government according to its conduct. That such condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of Government working lethargy is clear from the judgment of this court in The Chief Post Master General vs. Living Media India Ltd. [ 2012 (3) SCC 563 ]. We strongly deprecate the casual manner in which the Division Bench was approached and also this Court has been approached; the objective possibly being to get a certificate of dismissal from this Court. This is complete wastage of judicial time and the petitioners must pay for the same. We strongly deprecate the casual manner in which the Division Bench was approached and also this Court has been approached; the objective possibly being to get a certificate of dismissal from this Court. This is complete wastage of judicial time and the petitioners must pay for the same. We, thus, dismiss the special leave petition on delay and impost cost on the petitioners of Rs. 20,000/-to be recovered from the officers responsible for this delay and be deposited with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre, within four weeks. Certificate of recovery be filed in this court. We also direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar to look into this matter to ensure better management of the legal cases." 17. In view of above, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants have processed the matter in a very casual manner and filed the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay also in a very casual manner assuming that the law of limitation does not apply to the State Government and the delay in filing the Special Appeal is liable to be condoned, being on behalf of State, which is not acceptable and highly deprecated. 18. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, we find that the learned Writ Court after considering the pleadings of the parties and the proposition of law laid down in the various judgments, which could not be disputed by the learned Standing Counsel has allowed the writ petition by means of judgment and order dated 30.11.2017. 19. The ground of challenge, as argued by learned counsel for appellant, is that the respondents are Kurk Amins appointed on commission basis and the judgment relied by the learned Writ Court is in regard to the Kurk Amins working on salary basis is also misconceived because it appears that by the Circular dated 08.05.1978 all the Kurk Amins were treated on salary basis and the salary was paid to them. Thereafter, admittedly, in the year 1979 a Circular was issued for providing the commission to salaried Amins, on account of which certain salaried Amins were removed, who had challenged their termination by means of filing writ petition No.737 of 1980 and other writ petitions, which were allowed by means of order dated 16.11.1985 holding that the petitioners are government servants, which was not challenged by the Department. 20. 20. Subsequently writ petition no.199 of 1991 was filed against the order, by which the salaried Kurk Amins were placed on commission basis, which was allowed and the order was quashed which was upheld up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thereafter due to non compliance of order in letter and spirit the writ petition was filed which was allowed with cost and the Special Appeal against the same was dismissed on 19.11.2010. The orders have been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, except certain direction in Special Appeal. 21. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant for challenging the judgment and order passed by the writ court is also misconceived and not sustainable. 22. In view of above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Special Appeal is misconceived and lacks merit besides being highly barred by limitation without any sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Such appeal is not expected from State which is said to be a model employer. 23. The Special Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 24. No order as to costs.