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2019 DIGILAW 1315 (HP)

HaTarlok Singh Chauhanrbans Singh v. Wattan Singh

2019-09-05

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The defendants are the appellants, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2007 passed by learned first Appellate Court whereby it reversed the judgment and decree dated 29.8.2000 passed by learned trial Court, have filed the instant appeal. The parties shall be referred to as the 'plaintiffs' and the 'defendants'. 2. The facts in brief are that the land comprised in Khewat No. 83, Khatauni No. 123, Kitta 53 measuring 251 Kanals 12 Marlas, situated in Tika Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P.(hereinafter referred to as the suit land) was the ancestral property. Pohlo Ram, father of the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 was in possession of this land as owner through his ancestors. The parties have a right of ownership and possession in this land since their birth because the same is Hindu coparcenary property. The plaintiffs and defendants have got 1/2 share each in this land. Pohlo Ram died on 14.3.1989 and the mutation No. 953 dated 7.11.1989 qua the suit land was sanctioned in favour of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in equal share. Later on, on 4.8.1990 the said mutation was wrongly and illegally reviewed and sanctioned in favour of defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of some fraudulent, sham and fictitious Will alleged to have been executed by Pohlo Ram in their favour. Pohlo Ram had been living with the plaintiffs and was served by them and there was no occasion for him to execute any such Will. Accordingly, the mutation sanctioned in favour of defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of alleged Will is nullity, inoperative, not binding on the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit land. Even otherwise also the alienation through a Will is illegal as the suit land is Hindu coparcenary property. The plaintiffs along with defendants have been coming in possession of the suit land, but defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of the aforesaid sham and fictitious Will threatened to oust the plaintiffs from the joint ownership and possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs along with defendants have been coming in possession of the suit land, but defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of the aforesaid sham and fictitious Will threatened to oust the plaintiffs from the joint ownership and possession of the suit land. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the suit land being Hindu coparcenary property is jointly owned and possessed by the parties and the plaintiffs are having 1/2 share in it and the Will claimed by the defendants alleged to have been executed by Pohlo Ram in their favour and the mutation sanctioned in their favour on 4.8.1990 on the basis of said Will, are nullity and not binding upon the plaintiffs, with a consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants to oust the plaintiffs from the joint possession of the suit land. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections qua mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties were taken. On merits, they denied that the suit land is Hindu coparcenary property. It was averred that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the suit land and further alleged that in fact the suit land was self acquired property of Pohlo Ram, who was living with defendant No.1 and his family members. Defendant No.1, his wife and sons used to serve Pohlo Ram in all manners and in lieu of their services, Pohlo Ram executed a Will dated 28.3.1973 qua the suit land in their favour. In fact, Pohlo Ram was having immoveable property in two villages i.e. Mauja Thara Teeka Changar and Teeka Lidkot and vide registered Will dated 28.3.1973 he bequeathed the entire suit land which is situated in village Lidkot in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5, whereas the land situated in Teeka Changar was bequeathed in favour of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in equal share. After the death of Pohlo Ram, the defendants are owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of aforesaid Will and the plaintiffs have no concern with the same. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the Will of March, 1973 in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5 is fraudulent, fictitious, illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff as alleged? OPP 2. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the Will of March, 1973 in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5 is fraudulent, fictitious, illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit land is joint Hindu coparcenary property and is not subject to alienation by way of Will? OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 4. Relief. 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs on 29.8.2000, constraining him to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court and the same was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 01.11.2007. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants/ appellants have filed the instant appeal before this Court, which came to be admitted on 28.12.2007 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether Exhibit DW-4/A Will as executed by late Sh. Pohlo Ram stands proved on record and same is legal and valid? 2. Whether Will Exhibit DW-4/A stands established and proved on record in accordance with law and there is no legal infirmity in the same? 3. Whether there being no suspicious circumstances in the preparation of the Will Exhibit DW-4/A, therefore, the same is legal and valid? 4. Whether the registered Will as executed by late Sh. Pohlo Ram, more than 16 years back, prior to his death, which was got duly registered by him from the Sub Registrar, Una does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same is genuine? 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 7. Since all the substantial questions of law are intrinsically inter-linked and inter-connected, therefore, these were taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by a common reasoning. 8. It is not in dispute that Pohlo Ram was the common ancestor of the parties. Plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 are the sons, whereas plaintiff No.2 and defendants No.2 to 5 are the grand-sons of Pohlo Ram, who died on 14.3.1989. The deceased had landed property in two Villages namely Changar and Lidkot. As per the plaintiffs, Pohlo Ram died intestate and after his death, the plaintiffs have got half share in the suit land and the other half share belongs to the defendants. The deceased had landed property in two Villages namely Changar and Lidkot. As per the plaintiffs, Pohlo Ram died intestate and after his death, the plaintiffs have got half share in the suit land and the other half share belongs to the defendants. Whereas, defendants No. 2 to 5 are claiming themselves to be the owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of the Will dated 28.3.1973 Ex. DW-4/A. 9. The plaintiffs have termed the Will to be fraudulent, sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal. Meaning thereby that there is half hearted admission that even though there is a Will but the same is fraudulent, Sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal. But the reasons for the same has not been spelled out. 10. At the outset, it may be noticed that the plaintiffs had not disputed the execution of the Will but had only claimed the same to be an outcome of fraud and is a result of undue influence. Therefore, the first question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiffs have raised these pleas as contemplated under Order 6 Rule 4 CPC, which reads thus:- "4. Particulars to be given where necessary.- In all cases in which the party pleadings relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading." 11. The answer to this question is definitely in the negative for the simple reason that apart from using the words like fraud, undue influence, not genuine, there are no specific particulars that have been set-forth. It is more than settled that a vague or general plea can never serve this purpose and the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the other. 12. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others, AIR 1967 SC 878 wherein it was held as under:- "10. 12. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others, AIR 1967 SC 878 wherein it was held as under:- "10. Before, however a court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinize the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud. See Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, (1964) 1 SCR 270 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1279 ) above referred to. In that case it was observed (at p. 295 of SCR): (at p. 1288 of AIR): "A vague of general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other." "25. There was practically no evidence about the domination of Balaram over Prasanna at the time of the execution of the deed of gift or even thereafter. Prasanna, according to the evidence, seems to have been a person who was taking an active interest in the management of the property even shortly before his death. The circumstances obtaining in the family in the year 1944 do not show that the impugned transaction was of such a nature as to shock one's conscience. The plaintiff had no son. For a good many years before 1944 he had been making a living elsewhere. According to his own admission in cross-examination, he owned a jungle in his own right (the area being given by the defendant as 80 bighas) and was therefore possessed of separate property in which his brother or nephew had no interest. There were other joint properties in the village of Parbatipur which were not the subject matter of the deed of gift. It may be that they were not as valuable as the Lokepur properties. The circumstances that a grandfather made a gift of a portion of his properties to his only grandson a few years before his death is not on the face of it an unconscionable transaction. It may be that they were not as valuable as the Lokepur properties. The circumstances that a grandfather made a gift of a portion of his properties to his only grandson a few years before his death is not on the face of it an unconscionable transaction. Moreover, we cannot lose sight of the fact that if Balaram was exercising undue influence over his father he did not go to the length of having the deed of gift in his own name. In this he was certainly acting very unwisely because it was not out of the range of possibility that Subhas after attaining majority might have nothing to do with his father." 13. It shall be apt to make reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar Shaikh and another vs. Soleman Bibi and others, AIR 1976 SC 163 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "While it is true that 'undue influence', 'fraud', 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the trial court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate court." 14. Thus, it is absolutely clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that if a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him and only where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will, then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 15. 15. Reverting back to the facts, it would be noticed that save and except though a general statement that the Will is fraudulent, sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal, there is no specific details qua the same and can conveniently be held that such pleadings are definitely deficit. 16. Nonetheless, as per settled law, it is for the propounder of the Will to repel all the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will and to prove the genuineness of the Will. Besides this, the propounder would also be required to satisfy the following points qua the due execution of the Will:- (i) the Will was signed by the testator; (ii) at the relevant time, the testator was in sound disposing state of mind; and (iii) testator had understood the nature and effect of depositions and had put his signatures on the document of his own free volition and will. 17. How the Will is required to be proved and what would constitute suspicious circumstance has been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharpur Singh and others vs. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 , wherein it was observed as under: "14. The legal principles in regard to proof of a will are no longer res integra. A will must be proved having regard to the provisions contained in clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in terms whereof the propounder of a will must prove its execution by examining one or more attesting witnesses. Where, however, the validity of the Will is challenged on the ground of fraud, coercion or undue influence, the burden of proof would be on the caveator. In a case where the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it would not be treated as the last testamentary disposition of the testator. 15. This Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 opined that the fact that the propounder took interest in execution of the Will is one of the factors which should be taken into consideration for determination of due execution of the Will. 15. This Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 opined that the fact that the propounder took interest in execution of the Will is one of the factors which should be taken into consideration for determination of due execution of the Will. It was also held that: (AIR p. 451, para 19) one of the important features which distinguishes Will from other documents is that the Will speaks from the date of death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. 16. In H. Venkatachala case , It was also held that the propounder of will must prove: (i) that the Will was signed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind duly understanding the nature and effect of disposition and he put his signature on the document of his own free will, and (ii) when the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of propounder, and (iii) If a Will is challenged as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, all such legitimate doubts have to be removed by cogent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence to dispel suspicion. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein. It was moreover held: (H. Venkatachala case, AIR p. 452, para "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein. It was moreover held: (H. Venkatachala case, AIR p. 452, para "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter." 17. This Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 433 : (2006) 14 SCALE 186 , held: ( SCC pp. 447-48, paras 33-34) "33. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. This Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 433 : (2006) 14 SCALE 186 , held: ( SCC pp. 447-48, paras 33-34) "33. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the Will and that he had put his signature out of his own free will having a sound disposition of mind and understood the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. But, the onus would be on the applicant to remove the suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent evidence if there exists any. In the case of proof of Will, a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. [See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 and Sridevi and Ors. v. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors., 2005 8 SCC 784]. Subject to above, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document. 34. There are several circumstances which would have been held to be described (sic) by this Court as suspicious circumstances: (i) When a doubt is created in regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on the Will; (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances; (iii) Where propounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit. [See H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 443 and Management Committee T.K. Ghosh s Academy v. T.C. Palit and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1495 ]" 18. Respondent was a mortgagee of the lands belonging to the testatrix. He is also said to be the tenant in respect of some of the properties of the testatrix. It has not been shown that she was an educated lady. She had put her left thumb impression. Respondent was a mortgagee of the lands belonging to the testatrix. He is also said to be the tenant in respect of some of the properties of the testatrix. It has not been shown that she was an educated lady. She had put her left thumb impression. In the aforementioned situation, the question, which should have been posed, was as to whether she could have an independent advice in the matter. For the purpose of proof of will, it would be necessary to consider what was the fact situation prevailing in the year 1962. Even assuming the subsequent event, viz., the appellants had not been looking after their mother as has been inferred from the fact that they received the news of her death only six days after her death took place, is true, the same, in our opinion, would be of not much significance. 19. The provisions of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act keeping in view the nature of proof required for proving a Will have no application. A Will must be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto would be attracted. Compliance with statutory requirements for proving an ordinary document is not sufficient, as Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates that execution must be proved by at least one of the attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. {See B. Venkatamuni vs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 449, SCC p. 458, para 19]} 20. This Court in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors., (2008) 7 SCC 695 ] opined that court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as existence of suspicious circumstances play an important role, holding: (SCC p. 714, paras 52-55) "52. This Court in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors., (2008) 7 SCC 695 ] opined that court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as existence of suspicious circumstances play an important role, holding: (SCC p. 714, paras 52-55) "52. Whereas execution of any other document can be proved by proving the writings of the document or the contents of it as also the execution thereof, in the event there exists suspicious circumstances the party seeking to obtain probate and/ or letters of administration with a copy of the Will annexed must also adduce evidence to the satisfaction of the court before it can be accepted as genuine. 53. As an order granting probate is a judgment in rem, the court must also satisfy its conscience before it passes an order. 54. It may be true that deprivation of a due share by (sic to) the natural heir by itself may not be held to be a suspicious circumstance but it is one of the factors which is taken into consideration by the courts before granting probate of a Will. 55. Unlike other documents, even animus attestandi is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation." 21. Unfortunately, the first appellate court as also the High court did not advert to these aspects of the matter. 22. We may notice that in Jaswant Kaur vs. Amrit Kaur & ors., (1977) 1 SCC 369 this Court pointed out that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and defendant. An adversarial proceeding in such cases becomes a matter of Court's conscience and propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances to satisfy that Will was duly executed by testator wherefor cogent and convincing explanation of suspicious circumstances shrouding the making of Will must be offered." 18. What would be suspicious circumstance was thereafter set out in para-23 of the judgment, which reads as follows: "23. Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: (i). The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. (ii). The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. (iii). Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: (i). The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. (ii). The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. (iii). The disposition may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provisions for the natural heirs without any reason. (iv). The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator's free will and mind. (v). The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will. (vi). The testator used to sign blank papers. (vii). The Will did not see the light of the day for long. (viii). Incorrect recitals of essential facts." 19. It was further clarified that the circumstances narrated hereinabove are not exhaustive and were subject to offer of reasonable explanation, existence thereof, which were required to be considered before coming to the conclusion on the genuineness of the Will. It was also clarified that even though the Will may be registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. 20. The defendants examined eight witnesses. DW-1 Kishan Singh was retired as Registration Clerk from the D.C. Office, Una, who stated that an endorsement on 28.3.1973 on the Will in question was in his hand and it was made by him at the instance of the Sub Registrar, who has since died. However, in his cross-examination, he specifically stated that both of them i.e. the witness and the Registrar used to sit in separate rooms. He further admitted that endorsement in question was made by him while sitting in his own room and at that time he was not personally knowing the parties. All this shows that the testimony of this witness is of formal nature and it is insufficient to prove the execution of the Will. 21. Dw-2 Shanti Lal is the Stamp Vendor, who was examined to prove the signatures of Sant Ram the attesting witness on the Will in question. But then he has not produced any register maintained by the said Sant Ram, scribe and has also not deposed that he used to work with Sant Ram. 21. Dw-2 Shanti Lal is the Stamp Vendor, who was examined to prove the signatures of Sant Ram the attesting witness on the Will in question. But then he has not produced any register maintained by the said Sant Ram, scribe and has also not deposed that he used to work with Sant Ram. There is no explanation on the part of the defendants that why they did not examine the son or any other family members of deceased Sant Ram to prove his signatures and why the register maintained by him was not produced in the Court. 22. Dw-4 Prem Singh was examined to prove the signatures of another marginal witness namely Udho Ram and that of the then Pradhan Harbans Singh. Though, this witness in examination-in-chief stated that he could identify the signatures of both these witnesses on the Will Ex. DW-4/A, but again in cross-examination, he admitted that he had a weak eye sight and was having cataract in both of his eyes. He was unable to read or identify the signatures appearing on the plaint by saying that he had a weak eye sight. When he was not able to identify the signatures on the plaint which are in the same language i.e. English due to his weak eye sight, it is doubtful that he was able to identify the signatures of Udho Ram on the Will in question which are in the same language. 23. Dw-7 Kulwant Singh is the son of Harbans Singh, who deposed that the Will Ex.DW-4/A bears the signatures of his father and he can identify the same. The learned first Appellate Court has rightly noted that the signatures of Harbans Singh are in Urdu, whereas the witness cannot read and write Urdu. He did not produce any other material to show the signatures of his father on the basis of which some comparison could have been drawn by the Court itself or the same could have been sent the same to the handwriting expert. 24. What is more intriguing is that no endeavour was made by the defendants to send the signatures of Udho Ram and thumb impression of Pohlo Ram on the Will for scientific examination. 25. 24. What is more intriguing is that no endeavour was made by the defendants to send the signatures of Udho Ram and thumb impression of Pohlo Ram on the Will for scientific examination. 25. Another fact which cannot be lost sight is that the recital in the Will claims that the same was being executed in view of the services being rendered by defendants No. 2 to 5 to the testator. The Will was executed in the year 1973 and as per admitted case of the defendants themselves, defendant No.1 was serving in the Army while all his sons were minors, so there was no occasion for them to serve the testator at that time. 26. That apart, even the defendants No.2 to 5, who by then have attained the majority, have not entered into the witness box to depose that it was on account of the services rendered by them that the grand-father Pohlo Ram had executed a part of the Will in their favour. 27. Further there is nothing on record to establish that the relations with plaintiff No.1 and his father Pohlo Ram were not good or otherwise not normal as those between defendant No.1 and Pohlo Ram. It is admitted case of the parties that at the time of execution of Will in the year 1973, plaintiff No.1 was residing at Chandigarh as he was employed there, whereas defendant No.1 who was employed in the Army and continued to serve there till 1975. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the Chandigarh is comparatively nearer from Una and therefore could be conveniently called by Pohlo Ram as and when desired, while the same is not true qua defendant No.1, who was serving in the boarder area. This assumes importance as there is no reasons given in the Will as to why the testator wanted to deprive his natural son i.e. plaintiff No.1 from his share in the valuable property situated in Lidkot. 28. The revenue records placed on record Ex. P-1 to Ex.P-12 clearly reveal that the land at village Changar is either in the shape of Nullah or Banjar Kadim, whereas majority of land at Lidkot is either cultivated or cultivable as is evident from copy of Missal Hakiyat for the year 1988-89 Tikka Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P. 29. 28. The revenue records placed on record Ex. P-1 to Ex.P-12 clearly reveal that the land at village Changar is either in the shape of Nullah or Banjar Kadim, whereas majority of land at Lidkot is either cultivated or cultivable as is evident from copy of Missal Hakiyat for the year 1988-89 Tikka Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P. 29. To be fair to the learned counsel for the appellants, he has cited Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited vs. State of Haryana and another, (2009) 7 SCC 363 , Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale vs. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and others, (2009) 12 SCC 101 and Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and others, AIR 1968 SC 956 to contend that there is a presumption of correctness attached to the registered document. 30. There can be no quarrel with the proposition as laid down in the aforesaid cases, but the moot question is that whether the said presumption will apply even to the cases of Will. The question has clearly been answered in the negative in Bharpur Singh's case (supra) wherein it has specifically been clarified that even though the Will may be registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. 31. Mr. Verma has further relied upon R. Saraswathy v. P. Bhavathy Ammal and another, (1989) AIR Kerala 228 to canvass that the opinion of an expert as to identity of signature of testator in a Will was not relevant to decide whether Will had been validly executed. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition, but then in this case the defendants have failed to prove from the signatures of the attesting witnesses on the Will. 32. Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that merely because one of the attesting witnesses happened to be a relative of the defendants could not be a ground to discard the Will and place reliance on the following judgments: (i) Smt. Asharfi Devi vs. Tirlok Chand and others, (1965) AIR(P&H) 140; (ii) Smt. Deokali vs. Nand Kishore, (1996) 9 SCC 222 :and (iii) Smt. Deokali vs. Nand Kishore and others, AIR 1996 SC 3242 ; 33. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants have no applicability as the learned first Appellate Court has not taken the relation of the deceased with one of the attesting witnesses i.e. Udho Ram to be even one of the circumstance creating grave suspicion regarding the execution of the Will and Will in fact has not been discarded on this ground alone. 34. Lastly, Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants would argue that since the learned first Appellate Court has not gone through the reasons assigned by the learned trial Court, therefore, its findings, are perverse and deserve to be set-aside. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the following judgments: (i) Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 ; (ii) Shasidhar and others vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad and another, (2015) 11 SCC 269 ; and (iii) C. Venkata Swamy vs. H.N. Shivanna and another, (2018) 1 SCC 604 . 35. Obviously, there is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition, but in the instant case it would be noticed that the learned first Appellate Court had duly taken into consideration the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and it is only thereafter that it reversed the same. Since the Will in question has not been proved in accordance with law and now the defendants/appellants have failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances, the mere fact that it is registered will not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The defendants are the appellants, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2007 passed by learned first Appellate Court whereby it reversed the judgment and decree dated 29.8.2000 passed by learned trial Court, have filed the instant appeal. The parties shall be referred to as the 'plaintiffs' and the 'defendants'. 2. The facts in brief are that the land comprised in Khewat No. 83, Khatauni No. 123, Kitta 53 measuring 251 Kanals 12 Marlas, situated in Tika Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P.(hereinafter referred to as the suit land) was the ancestral property. The parties shall be referred to as the 'plaintiffs' and the 'defendants'. 2. The facts in brief are that the land comprised in Khewat No. 83, Khatauni No. 123, Kitta 53 measuring 251 Kanals 12 Marlas, situated in Tika Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P.(hereinafter referred to as the suit land) was the ancestral property. Pohlo Ram, father of the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 was in possession of this land as owner through his ancestors. The parties have a right of ownership and possession in this land since their birth because the same is Hindu coparcenary property. The plaintiffs and defendants have got 1/2 share each in this land. Pohlo Ram died on 14.3.1989 and the mutation No. 953 dated 7.11.1989 qua the suit land was sanctioned in favour of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in equal share. Later on, on 4.8.1990 the said mutation was wrongly and illegally reviewed and sanctioned in favour of defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of some fraudulent, sham and fictitious Will alleged to have been executed by Pohlo Ram in their favour. Pohlo Ram had been living with the plaintiffs and was served by them and there was no occasion for him to execute any such Will. Accordingly, the mutation sanctioned in favour of defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of alleged Will is nullity, inoperative, not binding on the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit land. Even otherwise also the alienation through a Will is illegal as the suit land is Hindu coparcenary property. The plaintiffs along with defendants have been coming in possession of the suit land, but defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of the aforesaid sham and fictitious Will threatened to oust the plaintiffs from the joint ownership and possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs along with defendants have been coming in possession of the suit land, but defendants No.2 to 5 on the basis of the aforesaid sham and fictitious Will threatened to oust the plaintiffs from the joint ownership and possession of the suit land. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the suit land being Hindu coparcenary property is jointly owned and possessed by the parties and the plaintiffs are having 1/2 share in it and the Will claimed by the defendants alleged to have been executed by Pohlo Ram in their favour and the mutation sanctioned in their favour on 4.8.1990 on the basis of said Will, are nullity and not binding upon the plaintiffs, with a consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants to oust the plaintiffs from the joint possession of the suit land. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections qua mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties were taken. On merits, they denied that the suit land is Hindu coparcenary property. It was averred that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the suit land and further alleged that in fact the suit land was self acquired property of Pohlo Ram, who was living with defendant No.1 and his family members. Defendant No.1, his wife and sons used to serve Pohlo Ram in all manners and in lieu of their services, Pohlo Ram executed a Will dated 28.3.1973 qua the suit land in their favour. In fact, Pohlo Ram was having immoveable property in two villages i.e. Mauja Thara Teeka Changar and Teeka Lidkot and vide registered Will dated 28.3.1973 he bequeathed the entire suit land which is situated in village Lidkot in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5, whereas the land situated in Teeka Changar was bequeathed in favour of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in equal share. After the death of Pohlo Ram, the defendants are owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of aforesaid Will and the plaintiffs have no concern with the same. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the Will of March, 1973 in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5 is fraudulent, fictitious, illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff as alleged? OPP 2. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the Will of March, 1973 in favour of defendants No. 2 to 5 is fraudulent, fictitious, illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit land is joint Hindu coparcenary property and is not subject to alienation by way of Will? OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 4. Relief. 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs on 29.8.2000, constraining him to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court and the same was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 01.11.2007. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants/ appellants have filed the instant appeal before this Court, which came to be admitted on 28.12.2007 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether Exhibit DW-4/A Will as executed by late Sh. Pohlo Ram stands proved on record and same is legal and valid? 2. Whether Will Exhibit DW-4/A stands established and proved on record in accordance with law and there is no legal infirmity in the same? 3. Whether there being no suspicious circumstances in the preparation of the Will Exhibit DW-4/A, therefore, the same is legal and valid? 4. Whether the registered Will as executed by late Sh. Pohlo Ram, more than 16 years back, prior to his death, which was got duly registered by him from the Sub Registrar, Una does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same is genuine? 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 7. Since all the substantial questions of law are intrinsically inter-linked and inter-connected, therefore, these were taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by a common reasoning. 8. It is not in dispute that Pohlo Ram was the common ancestor of the parties. Plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 are the sons, whereas plaintiff No.2 and defendants No.2 to 5 are the grand-sons of Pohlo Ram, who died on 14.3.1989. The deceased had landed property in two Villages namely Changar and Lidkot. As per the plaintiffs, Pohlo Ram died intestate and after his death, the plaintiffs have got half share in the suit land and the other half share belongs to the defendants. The deceased had landed property in two Villages namely Changar and Lidkot. As per the plaintiffs, Pohlo Ram died intestate and after his death, the plaintiffs have got half share in the suit land and the other half share belongs to the defendants. Whereas, defendants No. 2 to 5 are claiming themselves to be the owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of the Will dated 28.3.1973 Ex. DW-4/A. 9. The plaintiffs have termed the Will to be fraudulent, sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal. Meaning thereby that there is half hearted admission that even though there is a Will but the same is fraudulent, Sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal. But the reasons for the same has not been spelled out. 10. At the outset, it may be noticed that the plaintiffs had not disputed the execution of the Will but had only claimed the same to be an outcome of fraud and is a result of undue influence. Therefore, the first question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiffs have raised these pleas as contemplated under Order 6 Rule 4 CPC, which reads thus:- "4. Particulars to be given where necessary.- In all cases in which the party pleadings relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading." 11. The answer to this question is definitely in the negative for the simple reason that apart from using the words like fraud, undue influence, not genuine, there are no specific particulars that have been set-forth. It is more than settled that a vague or general plea can never serve this purpose and the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the other. 12. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others, AIR 1967 SC 878 wherein it was held as under:- "10. 12. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others, AIR 1967 SC 878 wherein it was held as under:- "10. Before, however a court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinize the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud. See Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, (1964) 1 SCR 270 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1279 ) above referred to. In that case it was observed (at p. 295 of SCR): (at p. 1288 of AIR): "A vague of general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other." "25. There was practically no evidence about the domination of Balaram over Prasanna at the time of the execution of the deed of gift or even thereafter. Prasanna, according to the evidence, seems to have been a person who was taking an active interest in the management of the property even shortly before his death. The circumstances obtaining in the family in the year 1944 do not show that the impugned transaction was of such a nature as to shock one's conscience. The plaintiff had no son. For a good many years before 1944 he had been making a living elsewhere. According to his own admission in cross-examination, he owned a jungle in his own right (the area being given by the defendant as 80 bighas) and was therefore possessed of separate property in which his brother or nephew had no interest. There were other joint properties in the village of Parbatipur which were not the subject matter of the deed of gift. It may be that they were not as valuable as the Lokepur properties. The circumstances that a grandfather made a gift of a portion of his properties to his only grandson a few years before his death is not on the face of it an unconscionable transaction. It may be that they were not as valuable as the Lokepur properties. The circumstances that a grandfather made a gift of a portion of his properties to his only grandson a few years before his death is not on the face of it an unconscionable transaction. Moreover, we cannot lose sight of the fact that if Balaram was exercising undue influence over his father he did not go to the length of having the deed of gift in his own name. In this he was certainly acting very unwisely because it was not out of the range of possibility that Subhas after attaining majority might have nothing to do with his father." 13. It shall be apt to make reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar Shaikh and another vs. Soleman Bibi and others, AIR 1976 SC 163 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "While it is true that 'undue influence', 'fraud', 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the trial court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate court." 14. Thus, it is absolutely clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that if a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him and only where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will, then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 15. 15. Reverting back to the facts, it would be noticed that save and except though a general statement that the Will is fraudulent, sham, fictitious, inoperative and illegal, there is no specific details qua the same and can conveniently be held that such pleadings are definitely deficit. 16. Nonetheless, as per settled law, it is for the propounder of the Will to repel all the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will and to prove the genuineness of the Will. Besides this, the propounder would also be required to satisfy the following points qua the due execution of the Will:- (i) the Will was signed by the testator; (ii) at the relevant time, the testator was in sound disposing state of mind; and (iii) testator had understood the nature and effect of depositions and had put his signatures on the document of his own free volition and will. 17. How the Will is required to be proved and what would constitute suspicious circumstance has been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharpur Singh and others vs. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 , wherein it was observed as under: "14. The legal principles in regard to proof of a will are no longer res integra. A will must be proved having regard to the provisions contained in clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in terms whereof the propounder of a will must prove its execution by examining one or more attesting witnesses. Where, however, the validity of the Will is challenged on the ground of fraud, coercion or undue influence, the burden of proof would be on the caveator. In a case where the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it would not be treated as the last testamentary disposition of the testator. 15. This Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 opined that the fact that the propounder took interest in execution of the Will is one of the factors which should be taken into consideration for determination of due execution of the Will. 15. This Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 opined that the fact that the propounder took interest in execution of the Will is one of the factors which should be taken into consideration for determination of due execution of the Will. It was also held that: (AIR p. 451, para 19) one of the important features which distinguishes Will from other documents is that the Will speaks from the date of death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. 16. In H. Venkatachala case , It was also held that the propounder of will must prove: (i) that the Will was signed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind duly understanding the nature and effect of disposition and he put his signature on the document of his own free will, and (ii) when the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of propounder, and (iii) If a Will is challenged as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, all such legitimate doubts have to be removed by cogent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence to dispel suspicion. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein. It was moreover held: (H. Venkatachala case, AIR p. 452, para "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein. It was moreover held: (H. Venkatachala case, AIR p. 452, para "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter." 17. This Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 433 : (2006) 14 SCALE 186 , held: ( SCC pp. 447-48, paras 33-34) "33. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. This Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 433 : (2006) 14 SCALE 186 , held: ( SCC pp. 447-48, paras 33-34) "33. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the Will and that he had put his signature out of his own free will having a sound disposition of mind and understood the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. But, the onus would be on the applicant to remove the suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent evidence if there exists any. In the case of proof of Will, a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. [See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 and Sridevi and Ors. v. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors., 2005 8 SCC 784]. Subject to above, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document. 34. There are several circumstances which would have been held to be described (sic) by this Court as suspicious circumstances: (i) When a doubt is created in regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on the Will; (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances; (iii) Where propounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit. [See H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 443 and Management Committee T.K. Ghosh s Academy v. T.C. Palit and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1495 ]" 18. Respondent was a mortgagee of the lands belonging to the testatrix. He is also said to be the tenant in respect of some of the properties of the testatrix. It has not been shown that she was an educated lady. She had put her left thumb impression. Respondent was a mortgagee of the lands belonging to the testatrix. He is also said to be the tenant in respect of some of the properties of the testatrix. It has not been shown that she was an educated lady. She had put her left thumb impression. In the aforementioned situation, the question, which should have been posed, was as to whether she could have an independent advice in the matter. For the purpose of proof of will, it would be necessary to consider what was the fact situation prevailing in the year 1962. Even assuming the subsequent event, viz., the appellants had not been looking after their mother as has been inferred from the fact that they received the news of her death only six days after her death took place, is true, the same, in our opinion, would be of not much significance. 19. The provisions of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act keeping in view the nature of proof required for proving a Will have no application. A Will must be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto would be attracted. Compliance with statutory requirements for proving an ordinary document is not sufficient, as Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates that execution must be proved by at least one of the attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. {See B. Venkatamuni vs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 449, SCC p. 458, para 19]} 20. This Court in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors., (2008) 7 SCC 695 ] opined that court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as existence of suspicious circumstances play an important role, holding: (SCC p. 714, paras 52-55) "52. This Court in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors., (2008) 7 SCC 695 ] opined that court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as existence of suspicious circumstances play an important role, holding: (SCC p. 714, paras 52-55) "52. Whereas execution of any other document can be proved by proving the writings of the document or the contents of it as also the execution thereof, in the event there exists suspicious circumstances the party seeking to obtain probate and/ or letters of administration with a copy of the Will annexed must also adduce evidence to the satisfaction of the court before it can be accepted as genuine. 53. As an order granting probate is a judgment in rem, the court must also satisfy its conscience before it passes an order. 54. It may be true that deprivation of a due share by (sic to) the natural heir by itself may not be held to be a suspicious circumstance but it is one of the factors which is taken into consideration by the courts before granting probate of a Will. 55. Unlike other documents, even animus attestandi is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation." 21. Unfortunately, the first appellate court as also the High court did not advert to these aspects of the matter. 22. We may notice that in Jaswant Kaur vs. Amrit Kaur & ors., (1977) 1 SCC 369 this Court pointed out that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and defendant. An adversarial proceeding in such cases becomes a matter of Court's conscience and propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances to satisfy that Will was duly executed by testator wherefor cogent and convincing explanation of suspicious circumstances shrouding the making of Will must be offered." 18. What would be suspicious circumstance was thereafter set out in para-23 of the judgment, which reads as follows: "23. Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: (i). The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. (ii). The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. (iii). Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: (i). The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. (ii). The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. (iii). The disposition may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provisions for the natural heirs without any reason. (iv). The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator's free will and mind. (v). The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will. (vi). The testator used to sign blank papers. (vii). The Will did not see the light of the day for long. (viii). Incorrect recitals of essential facts." 19. It was further clarified that the circumstances narrated hereinabove are not exhaustive and were subject to offer of reasonable explanation, existence thereof, which were required to be considered before coming to the conclusion on the genuineness of the Will. It was also clarified that even though the Will may be registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. 20. The defendants examined eight witnesses. DW-1 Kishan Singh was retired as Registration Clerk from the D.C. Office, Una, who stated that an endorsement on 28.3.1973 on the Will in question was in his hand and it was made by him at the instance of the Sub Registrar, who has since died. However, in his cross-examination, he specifically stated that both of them i.e. the witness and the Registrar used to sit in separate rooms. He further admitted that endorsement in question was made by him while sitting in his own room and at that time he was not personally knowing the parties. All this shows that the testimony of this witness is of formal nature and it is insufficient to prove the execution of the Will. 21. Dw-2 Shanti Lal is the Stamp Vendor, who was examined to prove the signatures of Sant Ram the attesting witness on the Will in question. But then he has not produced any register maintained by the said Sant Ram, scribe and has also not deposed that he used to work with Sant Ram. 21. Dw-2 Shanti Lal is the Stamp Vendor, who was examined to prove the signatures of Sant Ram the attesting witness on the Will in question. But then he has not produced any register maintained by the said Sant Ram, scribe and has also not deposed that he used to work with Sant Ram. There is no explanation on the part of the defendants that why they did not examine the son or any other family members of deceased Sant Ram to prove his signatures and why the register maintained by him was not produced in the Court. 22. Dw-4 Prem Singh was examined to prove the signatures of another marginal witness namely Udho Ram and that of the then Pradhan Harbans Singh. Though, this witness in examination-in-chief stated that he could identify the signatures of both these witnesses on the Will Ex. DW-4/A, but again in cross-examination, he admitted that he had a weak eye sight and was having cataract in both of his eyes. He was unable to read or identify the signatures appearing on the plaint by saying that he had a weak eye sight. When he was not able to identify the signatures on the plaint which are in the same language i.e. English due to his weak eye sight, it is doubtful that he was able to identify the signatures of Udho Ram on the Will in question which are in the same language. 23. Dw-7 Kulwant Singh is the son of Harbans Singh, who deposed that the Will Ex.DW-4/A bears the signatures of his father and he can identify the same. The learned first Appellate Court has rightly noted that the signatures of Harbans Singh are in Urdu, whereas the witness cannot read and write Urdu. He did not produce any other material to show the signatures of his father on the basis of which some comparison could have been drawn by the Court itself or the same could have been sent the same to the handwriting expert. 24. What is more intriguing is that no endeavour was made by the defendants to send the signatures of Udho Ram and thumb impression of Pohlo Ram on the Will for scientific examination. 25. 24. What is more intriguing is that no endeavour was made by the defendants to send the signatures of Udho Ram and thumb impression of Pohlo Ram on the Will for scientific examination. 25. Another fact which cannot be lost sight is that the recital in the Will claims that the same was being executed in view of the services being rendered by defendants No. 2 to 5 to the testator. The Will was executed in the year 1973 and as per admitted case of the defendants themselves, defendant No.1 was serving in the Army while all his sons were minors, so there was no occasion for them to serve the testator at that time. 26. That apart, even the defendants No.2 to 5, who by then have attained the majority, have not entered into the witness box to depose that it was on account of the services rendered by them that the grand-father Pohlo Ram had executed a part of the Will in their favour. 27. Further there is nothing on record to establish that the relations with plaintiff No.1 and his father Pohlo Ram were not good or otherwise not normal as those between defendant No.1 and Pohlo Ram. It is admitted case of the parties that at the time of execution of Will in the year 1973, plaintiff No.1 was residing at Chandigarh as he was employed there, whereas defendant No.1 who was employed in the Army and continued to serve there till 1975. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the Chandigarh is comparatively nearer from Una and therefore could be conveniently called by Pohlo Ram as and when desired, while the same is not true qua defendant No.1, who was serving in the boarder area. This assumes importance as there is no reasons given in the Will as to why the testator wanted to deprive his natural son i.e. plaintiff No.1 from his share in the valuable property situated in Lidkot. 28. The revenue records placed on record Ex. P-1 to Ex.P-12 clearly reveal that the land at village Changar is either in the shape of Nullah or Banjar Kadim, whereas majority of land at Lidkot is either cultivated or cultivable as is evident from copy of Missal Hakiyat for the year 1988-89 Tikka Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P. 29. 28. The revenue records placed on record Ex. P-1 to Ex.P-12 clearly reveal that the land at village Changar is either in the shape of Nullah or Banjar Kadim, whereas majority of land at Lidkot is either cultivated or cultivable as is evident from copy of Missal Hakiyat for the year 1988-89 Tikka Lidkot, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P. 29. To be fair to the learned counsel for the appellants, he has cited Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited vs. State of Haryana and another, (2009) 7 SCC 363 , Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale vs. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and others, (2009) 12 SCC 101 and Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and others, AIR 1968 SC 956 to contend that there is a presumption of correctness attached to the registered document. 30. There can be no quarrel with the proposition as laid down in the aforesaid cases, but the moot question is that whether the said presumption will apply even to the cases of Will. The question has clearly been answered in the negative in Bharpur Singh's case (supra) wherein it has specifically been clarified that even though the Will may be registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. 31. Mr. Verma has further relied upon R. Saraswathy v. P. Bhavathy Ammal and another, (1989) AIR Kerala 228 to canvass that the opinion of an expert as to identity of signature of testator in a Will was not relevant to decide whether Will had been validly executed. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition, but then in this case the defendants have failed to prove from the signatures of the attesting witnesses on the Will. 32. Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that merely because one of the attesting witnesses happened to be a relative of the defendants could not be a ground to discard the Will and place reliance on the following judgments: (i) Smt. Asharfi Devi vs. Tirlok Chand and others, (1965) AIR(P&H) 140; (ii) Smt. Deokali vs. Nand Kishore, (1996) 9 SCC 222 :and (iii) Smt. Deokali vs. Nand Kishore and others, AIR 1996 SC 3242 ; 33. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants have no applicability as the learned first Appellate Court has not taken the relation of the deceased with one of the attesting witnesses i.e. Udho Ram to be even one of the circumstance creating grave suspicion regarding the execution of the Will and Will in fact has not been discarded on this ground alone. 34. Lastly, Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants would argue that since the learned first Appellate Court has not gone through the reasons assigned by the learned trial Court, therefore, its findings, are perverse and deserve to be set-aside. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the following judgments: (i) Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 ; (ii) Shasidhar and others vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad and another, (2015) 11 SCC 269 ; and (iii) C. Venkata Swamy vs. H.N. Shivanna and another, (2018) 1 SCC 604 . 35. Obviously, there is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition, but in the instant case it would be noticed that the learned first Appellate Court had duly taken into consideration the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and it is only thereafter that it reversed the same. Since the Will in question has not been proved in accordance with law and now the defendants/appellants have failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances, the mere fact that it is registered will not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.