JUDGMENT Rakesh Srivastava, J. 1. The award dated 1.6.1995 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Pandu Nagar, Deoki Palace Road, Kanpur (hereinafter 'the Tribunal') in Industrial Dispute No. 323 of 1989 is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. The Indian Institute of Sugarcane Research, Lucknow (hereinafter the 'Institute') is an autonomous institute of higher learning, under the umbrella of Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India for advanced research in sugarcane agriculture. The Government of India sanctioned the Agricultural Production Cess Scheme P.L. 480 Project (hereinafter "the Scheme') on ad hoc basis for a fixed period of 4 years with effect from 13.10.1980 and provided a fixed fund for the purpose. 3. By an order dated 24.2.1984, the Director of the Institute appointed the petitioner as Fieldman/Field Assistant with effect from 14.2.1984 on a consolidated salary of Rs. 300/- p.m. under the said Scheme for a minimum period of two years/till the completion of the Scheme which ever was earlier. The service of the petitioner stood terminated on 12.10.1984, the date on which the scheme came to an end. After a considerable delay, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute. On 19.10.1988, the Central Government, Ministry of Labour by notification dated 19.10.1989 referred the following dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication: "Whether the Director, Indian Institute of Sugarcane Research was justified in terminating the services of Sri Ram Kewal as Field-man/Field Assistant w.e.f. 19.10.1984? If not what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?" 4. In his statement of claim the petitioner claimed that he was appointed in the Institute with effect from 19.10.1984 on a monthly salary of Rs. 300/- p.m.; that the petitioner had continuously worked for 240 days in a year without any break in his service; that his service was terminated on 19.2.1984 without complying with the mandate of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter 'the Act'); that persons junior to the petitioner had been retained in service and that the petitioner had not signed any contract of service with the stipulation that the services of the petitioner would be terminated without notice or without payment of retrenchment compensation on 12.10.1984. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the Institute opposing the claim of the petitioner. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the Institute opposing the claim of the petitioner. It was inter alia contended that the petitioner was appointed under a time bound Scheme sponsored and funded by Central Government and on completion of the Scheme the services of the petitioner automatically stood terminated on 12.10.1984. It was specifically pleaded that the terms and conditions of employment contained in memorandum dated 2.2.1984, was communicated to the petitioner by registered post and it was only after the petitioner accepted the offer in writing, that he was given appointment under the Scheme. Paragraphs 27, 28, 33, 34 & 36 of the written statement being relevant are being extracted below for ready reference: "27. THAT Agricultural Production Cess Scheme (Time Bound Scheme) was sanctioned on ad hoc basis for a fixed period of 4 years with effect from 13.10.1980 and a fixed fund was provided by the Government of India for the same. 28. THAT the Director Indian Institute of Sugarcane Research Lucknow vide Memorandum No. F-1-16/80-Adm. I(O) Dated February, 2, 1984 offered the Post of Fieldman/Field Assistant to one Shri Ram Kewal at Dimapur Centre Nagaland for being posted under A.P. Cess Scheme "Survey & Collection of Insect Posts". * * * 33. THAT the above Memorandum was sent to Shri Ram Kewal under Registered A.D. Cover in response to which Shri Ram Kewal accepted the offer in writing and joined at Lucknow on 14.2.1984 with the result that the Contract of employment took legal shape and became complete. 34. THAT as such an Office Order No. F.3-207/84-Adm. I Dated February, 24, 1984 was issued to Shri Ram Kewal appointing him to the post of Fieldman/Field Assistant under the time bound Agricultural Production Cess Scheme P.L.480 Project with effect from 14.2.1984 for a period upto 13.10.1984 on the terms and conditions laid down in Office Memorandum No. 1-16/80-Adm.I(C) Dated 2.2.1984. * * * 36. THAT it may be pointed out that his services came to an end after 12.10.1984 in accordance with the Office Order No. F-3-207/84-Adm. I dated February, 24, 1984 and also because the Time Bound Agricultural Production Cess Scheme and the post sanctioned under the Scheme for a time bound period of 4 years with effect from 13.10.1980 came to an end on 12.10.1984. (emphasis supplied) 6. The petitioner filed his replication. I dated February, 24, 1984 and also because the Time Bound Agricultural Production Cess Scheme and the post sanctioned under the Scheme for a time bound period of 4 years with effect from 13.10.1980 came to an end on 12.10.1984. (emphasis supplied) 6. The petitioner filed his replication. Paragraphs 27, 32, 33 & 35 of the replication being relevant are being extracted below: "27. That contains of para 27 & 28 no comments. * * * 32. That contains of para 33 denied as the refer terms of contract not received by the workman and the reference of the para is without any proof. 33. That contains of para 34 denied, as the workman already work after 12.10.1984 as refer so far terms and conditions, the workman also not received any such terms and conditions. * * * 35. That contains of para 36 denied, as the services of the workman not terminated even after 12.10.84 in accordance office order refer in the para." 7. Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. In his cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that he was appointed under a scheme and that the Scheme had come to an end. He, however, alleged that the scheme had come to an end on 19.10.1984. The relevant portion of the statement of the petitioner is extracted below: ^^ftl Ldhe ds rgr eq>s ukSdjh ij j[kk x;k Fkk og 12-10-84 dks lekIr ugha gqbZ og 19-10-84 djs lekIr gqbZ 8. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record, made its award on 1.6.1995. The Tribunal held that the petitioner had been appointed under the Scheme and his services stood terminated on 12.10.1984, on the completion of the Scheme and, as such, the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G or 25-H were not applicable to the case. The Tribunal further held that the petitioner had to his credit only 177 days of working and in this view of the matter also the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were not attracted to the present case. 9. Sri Anagh Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Ms. Pushpila Bisht, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the petitioner has continuously worked for 240 days and the finding to the contrary recorded by the Tribunal is perverse. 9. Sri Anagh Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Ms. Pushpila Bisht, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the petitioner has continuously worked for 240 days and the finding to the contrary recorded by the Tribunal is perverse. The counsel has further contended that even if the petitioner was engaged under a scheme for a fixed period, he could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act as the petitioner had completed 240 days in a calender year. As such, the termination of the petitioner is bad in law. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27 . 10. Per contra Sri H.B. Singh, learned counsel for the Institute has supported the impugned order. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The question that arises for determination in this writ petition is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the termination of service of the petitioner amounts to "retrenchment" in terms of Section 2(oo) of the Act. 13. Section 2(oo) being relevant for the purposes of the present controversy, is reproduced below: "2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- * * * (oo) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; 14. On a plain reading of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo), it is apparent that any termination of service of a workman by the employer for any reason, whatsoever, is covered by the expression "retrenchment" subject to the exceptions enumerated in the said section. Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is an exception. According to clause (bb), termination of service on account of non renewal of contract of employment on the expiry of the term of the contract does not amount to "retrenchment". 15. In the case at hand, the petitioner had alleged that he had continuously worked from 14.2.1984 to 19.10.1984. In view of the settled legal position, the burden to prove that he was in actual and continuous service for the said period lay squarely on the petitioner. In support of his version, the solitary piece of evidence which the petitioner had filed alongwith his affidavit was a xerox copy of a certificate dated 6.11.1984 alleged to have been issued by the Senior Administrative Officer. The said certificate was not marked as an exhibit. Apart from the said document and the self statement of the petitioner there was no other material to support his version that he had worked upto 19.10.1984 and that he had put in 240 days of continuous service prior to his termination. The alleged certificate was signed by one Sri S.R. Chaurasia for and on behalf of Senior Administrative Officer. Neither the Senior Administrative Officer nor Sri S.R. Chaurasia was examined by the petitioner. Even the signature of Sri S.R. Chaurasia on the said certificate was not proved. Admittedly, the original certificate was not brought on record. It is settled that xerox copy cannot by itself be taken as evidence specially when the petitioner had stated in his cross-examination that the original was with him. On the contrary, on behalf of the Institute, the extract of the attendance roll of the petitioner from October, 1983 to 19.10.1984 was produced alongwith an affidavit of Sri Munna Lal, Assistant Administrative Officer. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record held that the petitioner had worked for 177 days only. The finding recorded by the Tribunal that the petitioner has worked for only 177 days is based on cogent evidence on record and calls for no interference. 16. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record held that the petitioner had worked for 177 days only. The finding recorded by the Tribunal that the petitioner has worked for only 177 days is based on cogent evidence on record and calls for no interference. 16. Even assuming that the petitioner had worked for 240 days continuously, as alleged by him, the petitioner cannot claim that his services should be continued because the services of the petitioner were purely contractual and were co-terminus with the scheme. 17. It is well-settled that termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or a project or on account of non-renewal of contract of employment on its expiry or termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein does not amount to retrenchment. 18. In Haryana State F.C.C.W. Store Ltd. v. Ram Niwas, (2002) 5 SCC 654 , the Apex Court held: "15. ... Since there exists a contract of service with the terms and conditions as noted earlier the position is inescapable that the case of disengagement/termination of the workmen concerned did not amount to retrenchment." 19. In MD, Karnataka Handloom Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeva Laxman Raval, (2006) 13 SCC 15, the Apex Court in paragraph 18 of the report has held: "18. We have perused all the appointment letters dated 14-1-1991, 24-2-1992, 10-2-1993, 3-3-1993 and 30-11-1993 produced by the respondent as annexures which consistently and categorically state that the respondent's appointment with the Corporation was purely contractual for a fixed period. The respondent was engaged only under the Vishwa programme/Scheme which is not in existence (sic any longer). Now the Scheme came to an end during August 1994; the respondent was also not governed by any service rules of the Corporation. The Corporation put an end to the contract w.e.f. 31-8-1994 which, in our opinion, cannot be termed as dismissal from service. Even assuming that the respondent had worked 240 days continuously he, in our opinion, cannot claim that his services should be continued because the number of 240 days does not apply to the respondent inasmuch as his services were purely contractual. The termination of his contract, in our view, does not amount to retrenchment and, therefore, it does not attract compliance with Section 25-F of the ID Act at all." (emphasis supplied) 20. The termination of his contract, in our view, does not amount to retrenchment and, therefore, it does not attract compliance with Section 25-F of the ID Act at all." (emphasis supplied) 20. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed under a scheme sponsored and funded by the Central Government, namely the Agriculture Production Cess Scheme. The said scheme was sanctioned on ad hoc basis for a fixed period of four years w.e.f. 13.10.1980. The Director of the Institute vide memorandum dated 2.2.1984 offered the post of Fieldman/Field Assistant to the petitioner at Dimapur Centre, Nagaland. Clause 2 and 5 of the said office memorandum being relevant are being extracted below for ready reference: "2. He will not be borne on the regular establishment of the Indian Institute of Sugar Cane Research Lucknow. Also the above appointment will not confer any title on his/her for regular absorption in any post at the Institute." * * * "5. He/she will be required to serve the Institute for a minimum period of two years/till the completion of the scheme whichever is earlier." (emphasis supplied) 21. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Institute, it was categorically stated that the memorandum dated 2.2.1984 containing the terms and conditions of employment was sent to the petitioner by registered post requiring him to convey his acceptance within the time mentioned therein and it was only after the petitioner accepted the offer in writing that he was permitted to join at Lucknow on 14.2.1984 and thereafter the letter dated 24.2.1984 was issued to him appointing him under the scheme w.e.f. 14.2.1984 for a period upto 13.10.1984 on the terms and conditions laid down in the office memorandum dated 2.2.1984. The said fact was not disputed by the petitioner in his replication. 22. In the case of S.M. Nilajkar (supra) whereupon the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance, the Apex Court was concerned with a different fact situation obtaining therein. The said case has no application because in the said case no period was indicated and the only indication was the temporary nature of engagement. In the said case the employer had failed to allege and prove the ingredients of sub-clause (bb). In the instant Case the petitioner was categorically informed that his appointment was purely contractual and for a specified period. In the said case the employer had failed to allege and prove the ingredients of sub-clause (bb). In the instant Case the petitioner was categorically informed that his appointment was purely contractual and for a specified period. The petitioner was well aware that his service was liable for termination without any notice and without payment of compensation. The petitioner was aware that his appointment stood automatically terminated on the completion of the Scheme. It is not the case of the petitioner that the scheme was not discontinued or it was thereafter revived. 23. For the reasons aforementioned, the termination of service of the petitioner on completion of the scheme which was sponsored and funded by the Central Government would be covered by the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act which in no case would amount to retrenchment. 24. In view of the above discussions, finding no merit in the petition, the same stands dismissed. 25. No order as to costs.