JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Gupta, J. 1. Heard Sri H.P. Sahi for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2, Sri J.P. Singh assisted by Sri Fahim Ahmad for respondent Nos. 3 & 5. Sri R.P. Singh, who has filed counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 4 is not present, even in revised call. 2. The petitioner was Principal of Shibli National Inter College, Azamgarh, an Institution having due recognition under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. It is a minority institution. The petitioner has assailed the resolution of the Committee of Management of the Institution dated 13.6.2005 resolving to dismiss him from service and the communication of the said decision to the petitioner by letter dated 18.6.2005. 3. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by serving a charge sheet dated 19.12.2004 containing as many as fifteen charges. Some of the charges are of serious nature relating to embezzlement of scholarship money and disbursement of scholarship to students not eligible for the same. The petitioner contested the proceedings by filing his reply dated 11.1.2005, in which he denied all the charges levelled against him. It was followed by issuance of a second charge sheet dated 20.1.2005 by the Sub-Committee constituted for conducting disciplinary enquiry. The petitioner submitted his reply on 4.2.2005 and 7.2.2005. One of the principal objection raised by the petitioner in his replies and objections dated 13.2.2005 and 21.2.2005 was regarding the constitution of the Sub-Committee/Enquiry Committee, which had to enquire into the charges levelled against him. The Convener of the Sub-Committee was Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate. Two other members of the Sub-Committee were S. Rizqan Masood and Abu Saad alias Shamshi. According to the petitioner, the Convener of the Sub-Committee Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate had himself made several complaints against the petitioner relating to the same charges before the Educational Authorities as well as the State Government. The petitioner also alleged that Abu Saad alias Shamshi, member of the Enquiry Committee is nephew of Akhtar Rasid Khan, who had also made similar complaints against the petitioner. He is also nephew of Akhtar Rasid Khan, Secretary of the Committee of Management, who had also made complaints against the petitioners. The petitioner also filed specific application/objection requesting for change of the Sub-Committee, as he did not expect a fair and impartial enquiry by it. He is also nephew of Akhtar Rasid Khan, Secretary of the Committee of Management, who had also made complaints against the petitioners. The petitioner also filed specific application/objection requesting for change of the Sub-Committee, as he did not expect a fair and impartial enquiry by it. The objection of the petitioner was rejected by the Convener of the Sub-Committee by the following order : - “Heard, so far as the allegations made in Para 3 of the application in concerned, it is absolutely wrong to say that I have ever been complainant against Sri N.A. Daudi or signed in his signature as complainant on any application, on earlier correspondence made by you, I have already apprised you regarding any complaint by me on earlier occasion.” 4. The Sub-Committee, after rejecting the objection of bias, proceeded to conclude the enquiry and submitted its report dated 22.4.2005. The petitioner once again submitted his objection against the enquiry report and in which also, the plea of bias was reiterated. The Committee of Management by its resolution dated 13.6.2005 impugned herein, resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service and which was communicated to the petitioner by impugned communication dated 18.6.2005. 5. Sri H.P. Sahi, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry proceedings stand vitiated, as the Convener of the Sub-Committee and one of its members were themselves complainant at different stages, therefore, they were not eligible to be part of the Enquiry Committee. It is submitted that a person cannot be judge in his own case. The Convener and one of its member having themselves made complaint against the petitioner levelling most of the charges, they could not have enquired into the same. It is also submitted that the Committee of Management wrongly placed reliance upon the enquiry report of the Sub-Committee, the Convener and one member of which were biased against the petitioner having themselves made similar complaints. It is submitted that the objection/application filed by the petitioner for changing the Sub-Committee should have been placed before the Committee of Management but instead the Convener himself proceeded to pass order on the said plea, which itself has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. Alternatively, it is submitted that the ground taken for rejecting the plea of bias that the Convener had never been complainant against the petitioner nor had signed any complaint or any application is factually incorrect. Alternatively, it is submitted that the ground taken for rejecting the plea of bias that the Convener had never been complainant against the petitioner nor had signed any complaint or any application is factually incorrect. In support of the said contention, he has placed reliance upon paragraph 13 of the petition, which is relevant for adjudication of controversy involved in the instant petition and is therefore extracted below : - “13. That in support of the aforesaid fact the petitioner is filing following documents : - (i) True copy of the complaint made by Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate and Sri Nabi Server Khan before the District Magistrate, Azamgarh dated 26.2.2001 with regard to scholarship given to the students belonging to minority community as Annexure -7 to this petition. (ii) True copy of the letter dated 12.4.2001 sent by Sri Ehsan Ahmad together with Sri Nabi Server Khan to the Chief Development Officer, Azamgarh, as Annexure – 8. True copy of letter dated 19.4.2001 sent by Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate, to the Chief Development Officer, as Annexure – 9. (iii) True copy of the notice dated 26th April, 2001 issue by the District Minority Welfare Officer Azamgarh asking Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate and Sri Nabi Server Khan to appear before him on 2.5.2001 along with evidence which was there in their possession in support of the allegations made by them vide letters dated 26.2.2001, 25.3.2001, 12.4.2001 and 19.4.2001, as Annexure – 10. (iv) True copy of letter dated 2.5.2001 sent by Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate, seeking adjournment as Annexure – 11 to this petition. (v) True copy of letter dated 9.1.2002 sent by Pariyojna Nideshak Azamgarh asking the petitioner to appear before him on 17.1.2002 as Annexure-12. A copy of the letter was also sent to Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate, and to Sri Nabi Sever Khan. (vi) True copy of order dated 2nd May, 2002 passed by the Director Minority Welfare whereby he directed the District Magistrate to submit a report in respect of the complaints made by Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate, against the petitioner as Annexure – 13.” 6. (vi) True copy of order dated 2nd May, 2002 passed by the Director Minority Welfare whereby he directed the District Magistrate to submit a report in respect of the complaints made by Sri Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate, against the petitioner as Annexure – 13.” 6. It is submitted that on basis of complaint filed by the Convener of the Sub-Committee, the District Minority Welfare Officer, Azamgarh issued a notice dated 26.4.2001 to the Convener Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate to appear before him on a particular date along with evidence in support of the allegations levelled by him vide complaints dated 26.2.2001, 25.3.2001, 12.4.2001 and 19.4.2001. Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate on receipt of notice, vide application dated 2.5.2001, sought adjournment of the proceedings, expressing his inability to attend the enquiry on the date fixed. In the said application, he also prayed that on the next date, certain officials specified by him in the application be also summoned along with records pertaining to an enquiry held by him against the petitioner. Thus, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the ground taken by the Convener in rejecting the plea of bias that he had not made any complaint against the petitioner is factually incorrect inasmuch as, he had not only filed complaints against the petitioner, but the same were also taken cognizance of by the District Minority Welfare Officer and in pursuance whereof even enquiry was held. He further points out that in the said enquiry, the petitioner was exonerated of the allegations levelled against him. 7. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in respect of charge relating to misappropriation of the scholarship money, there was an independent report from District Minority & Welfare Officer dated 4.6.2002, which absolves the petitioner of the charges levelled against him in this regard but the same was discarded by the Sub-Committee in its entirety by observing that the report is arbitrary, but without assigning any reason for arriving at such a conclusion. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was declined opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Badruddin and Faiz Ahmad, ex-Managers, resulting in serious prejudice to him. 8. Per contra, Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 & 5 submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner were of serious nature. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was declined opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Badruddin and Faiz Ahmad, ex-Managers, resulting in serious prejudice to him. 8. Per contra, Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 & 5 submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner were of serious nature. It is urged that the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself during the course of enquiry and he cannot complain of any bias or prejudice. He reiterated the stand taken by the Convener while rejecting the request for constituting another Sub-Committee. He also submitted that the prayer for cross-examination of Dr. Badruddin was not a bonafide prayer on part of the petitioner, as Dr. Badruddin was seriously ill and he had even conveyed the factum of his illness to the Enquiry Committee. He has placed reliance on copy of the letter written by Dr. Badruddin to the Enquiry Committee mentioning about his failing health. As regards other witness, Faiz Ahmad, the stand of the respondent is that he was defence witness and he was duly informed by letter dated 4.2.2005 to appear in the enquiry. The notice when sought to be served upon him was refused. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the report of process server. It is urged that in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Committee did not give proper opportunity to cross-examine Faiz Ahmad. 9. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents and the material placed on record. 10. In Rattan Lal Sharma Versus Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and others, AIR 1993 SC 2155 , the Supreme Court held that one of the cardinal principles of natural justice is that no one can be judge of his own cause – Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. The appellant before the Supreme Court was charged of embezzlement of amalgamated fund allegedly handed over to him by Maru Ram, teacher incharge. The Enquiry Committee comprised of Maru Ram as one of its members. The appellant objected to the constitution of the Enquiry Committee with Maru Ram as one of its member. However the objection was over-ruled by the Enquiry Committee. In course of the enquiry proceeding, Maru Ram himself appeared as a witness. The Enquiry Committee comprised of Maru Ram as one of its members. The appellant objected to the constitution of the Enquiry Committee with Maru Ram as one of its member. However the objection was over-ruled by the Enquiry Committee. In course of the enquiry proceeding, Maru Ram himself appeared as a witness. In the above backdrop, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of bias, by observing as follows : - “One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is : 'Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa' (No man shall be a judge in his own cause). The deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It has been held by this Court in Secretary to Govt. Transport Dept. v. Munuswamy 1988 (Suppl) SCC 651 : ( AIR 1988 SC 2232 ), that a predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. Personal bias is one of the three major limbs of bias namely pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. A classic case of personal bias was revealed in the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh 1958 SCR 595 : (AIR 158 SC 86). In the said case, a departmental enquiry was held against an employee. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile. The officer holding the enquiry then left the enquiry, gave evidence against the employee and thereafter resumed to complete the enquiry and passed the order of dismissal. This Court quashed the order of dismissal by holding inter alia that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated. ..........It is really unfortunate that although the appellant raised an objection before the enquiry committee by clearly indicating that the said Shri Maru Ram was inimical towards him and he should not be a member in the enquiry committee, such objection was rejected on a very flimsy ground, namely, that since the said Shri Maru Ram was one of the members of the Managing Committee and was the representative of the teachers in the Managing Committee it was necessary to include him in the enquiry committee. It is quite apparent that the enquiry committee could have been constituted with other members of the Managing Committee and the rules of the enquiry are not such that Shri Maru Ram being teacher’s representative was required to be included in the said enquiry committee so that the doctrine of necessity may be attracted. If a person has a pecuniary interest, such interest, ever it very small, disqualifies such person. For appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1980) at page 262 has observed that real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R. v. Sunderland Justices, (1924) 2 KB 357 (373) it has been held that the Court will have to judge the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. In R. v. Sussex Justices (1924) 1 KB 256 (259) it has been indicated that answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In Halsbury Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol.2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957) SCR 575 : ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ). This Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” 11. In Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan vs. Kamta Prasad Shukla, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 21, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the law in relation to principles of bias laid down in Rattan Lal Sharma. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” 11. In Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan vs. Kamta Prasad Shukla, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 21, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the law in relation to principles of bias laid down in Rattan Lal Sharma. In that case, the Enquiry Committee which was to hold enquiry against the charge sheeted teacher comprised of Principal as one of its members. The delinquent teacher raised objection against his inclusion in the enquiry Committee on the ground that he had a deep rooted bias against him as in the past, he had given a notice to him for initiating defamation proceedings. However, the objection was ignored and the delinquent teacher was dismissed from service, relying on the report of the enquiry Committee. In appeal, the order of dismissal was reversed interalia, on the ground of bias on part of Principal, who was one of the members of the enquiry Committee. On further appeal, the order of disciplinary authority was restored. The Supreme Court disapproving the order of the disciplinary authority held that : “3. It must be realised that Shri Inder Raj Sudan the Principal of the school was deeply biased against the delinquent. He had given notice to the delinquent on 2.3.1976 for initiating defamation proceedings against him. Who was responsible for the bias is not relevant to us. It was alleged that his presence on the Committee had vitiated the atmosphere for a free and fair trial and his mere presence operated as an inhibition to the delinquent throughout the proceedings. Mr. Garg contended that once it is shown that the one of the members of the Committee had a deep-rooted bias against the delinquent and was not likely to act in an objective manner he ought to have excused himself for otherwise the delinquent would have to enter the enquiry with a grave inhibition in his mind that he is not likely to get a fair deal from the Enquiry Committee. He, therefore, submitted that such a situation would not be congenial to a fair hearing to be given to the delinquent and the bias would affect the quality of the enquiry and any decision taken on the basis of record so prepared in such an environment cannot cure the ab initio voidness attached to the enquiry. We see merit in this contention. ...........................where a delinquent is asked to appear before a committee of which one member is deeply hostile towards him, the delinquent would be greatly handicapped in conducting his defence as he would be inhibited by the atmosphere prevailing in the enquiry room. Justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” 12. It cannot be doubted that in a case where Convener of the Committee holding enquiry had himself been a complainant, having levelled same charges, the person facing the enquiry would reasonably apprehend serious bias on his part and an attempt to some how or the other submit adverse report against the person charged. It would be a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter, where the test, according to law laid down in Rattan Lal Sharma, is a real likelihood of bias even though such bias may not actually take place. The test is the perception of a man of reasonable intelligence, aware of the fact that the person holding the enquiry had himself been a complainant. He would definitely not expect justice from his hand. In fact, as observed by the Supreme Court in Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan, the delinquent would be greatly handicapped in conducting his defense as he would be inhibited by the adverse atmosphere prevailing in the enquiry room. 13. Thus, the main issue for consideration by this Court is whether the Convener namely, Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate was himself complainant against the petitioner or not, as in the order passed by him rejecting the plea of bias, he has observed that he had not signed any complaint or application against the petitioner. 14. The petitioner in support of his contention that Ehsan Ahmad, Convener of the Sub-Committee was complainant against him has filed copy of the complaint made by him and Nabi Sarwar Khan to the District Magistrate, Azamgarh on 26.2.2001 levelling allegations of misappropriation of scholarship money. 14. The petitioner in support of his contention that Ehsan Ahmad, Convener of the Sub-Committee was complainant against him has filed copy of the complaint made by him and Nabi Sarwar Khan to the District Magistrate, Azamgarh on 26.2.2001 levelling allegations of misappropriation of scholarship money. He has also brought on record a letter dated 12.4.2001 sent by the aforesaid two persons to Chief Development Officer, Azamgarh. The petitioner has also brought on record notice dated 26.4.2001 issued by District Minority & Welfare Officer, Azamgarh requiring Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate and Nabi Sarwar Khan to appear before him on 2.5.2001 along with evidence in support of the allegations levelled by them against the petitioner. Copy of the adjournment application moved by Ehsan Ahmad, Advocate dated 2.5.2001 seeking adjournment of the enquiry proceedings is Annexure 19 and it reads as under: - “Sir, A letter from your office through the official concerned has been received by me on 30.4.2001, requiring my attendance in the office today. In connection with same duly urgent make, of now to go today and as such I am not in a position to attend the office today. Prayer It is therefore prayed that the proceeding be deferred to some other date and the following officials alongwith the record be also summoned for the date fixed. Yours Ehsan Ahmad Applicant Member A.M.E. (S) Azamgarh 02.05.01 Official to be summoned 1. Sri Abdul Qadeer, Astt. Clerk Shibbli National Inter College, Azamgarh 2. Sri Fateh Mohd. Asstt. Clerk Shibli National Inter Mediate College, Azamgarh 3. Sri Zafar Iqbal s/o Iqbal Ahmad R/o Jalandhari (Ghazi Mian Rauza) City Azamgarh along with the enquiry report & full details enquired by him.” 15. A counter affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 4 and in paragraph 14 thereof, respondent No. 4 has admitted having filed adjournment application dated 2.5.2001. However, the reason for seeking adjournment has been explained thus : - “So far as the letter dated 2.5.2001 sent by the answering respondent is concerned, it is submitted that the answering respondent is an Advocate and since he was not aware about the contents of the complaint, so he was curious to know and for that purpose he moved an application dated 2.5.2001, seeking adjournment.” 16. The explanation offered by respondent No. 4 does not merit acceptance at all, as it is contrary to what is stated in the adjournment application. The explanation offered by respondent No. 4 does not merit acceptance at all, as it is contrary to what is stated in the adjournment application. In fact, a bare reading of the adjournment application reveals that respondent No. 4 was fully aware of the nature of enquiry as well as the complaint on basis of which the same was being held. He never asked the District Minority & Welfare Officer to furnish him with copy of complaint nor he sought adjournment on the ground that he was not aware of the nature of enquiry being held. On the contrary, he made specific request in his application to summon certain officials on the next date particularly Zafar Iqbal, along with enquiry report and full details of the enquiry held by him. It unequivocally reveals that the effort on part of respondent No. 4 was not only to seek adjournment, but also to bring on record report of enquiry by Zafar Iqbal to prove the allegations which were being enquired into. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that respondent No. 4 sought adjournment as he was not aware of the nature of enquiry held by District Minority & Welfare Officer or he was not the complainant. In fact, as claimed by the petitioner, it was his complaint which was being enquired into. Accordingly, this Court is also not ready to accept the reason disclosed by respondent No. 4 in its order rejecting the plea of bias. 17. Moreover, once the plea of bias was raised against the Convener of the Sub-Committee and one of its member, in normal course, the same should have been placed for consideration before the Committee of Management, which constituted the Sub-Committee. The fourth respondent himself proceeded to reject the same, which itself is inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and fair play, resulting in serious prejudice to the petitioner. The element of bias had percolated through the entire enquiry and ultimately manifested itself in an adverse report. The test of bias laid down by the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma (supra), gets attracted on all four to the facts of the instant case. 18. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether on account of bias on part of Convener of the Sub-Committee, the entire proceedings would be rendered void or the defect is a curable one. 18. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether on account of bias on part of Convener of the Sub-Committee, the entire proceedings would be rendered void or the defect is a curable one. The other aspect would be whether it is permissible for this Court to examine the material on record and arrive at independent conclusion, without the aid of enquiry report. In fact, Sri J.P Singh counsel for the respondent vehemently urged that since charges are of serious nature, so this court should examine the same in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great emphasis on a judgment of learned Single Judge dated 30.7.2018 in Writ Petition No.63431 of 2014, Kafeel Ahmad Khan vs. State of U.P. and 2 others in submitting that in the said case, this Court itself examined the charges on merits, therefore, the same course should be adopted by this Court. 20. In the said case, the order of punishment was set aside by holding that enquiry was conducted in a slip-shod manner. The explanation furnished by the delinquent was not considered, nor any independent finding was recorded in relation to the charges levelled against him. The observations on which reliance has been placed are as follows :- “(26) Ordinarily in all such matters where there is no oral enquiry held, the Supreme Court observations in the case of Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India vs. B. Karunakar (1992) 2 JT (SC) 605 are followed by this Court and the matter is remanded to the Appointing Authority to consider afresh. (27) However, in this case, this Court has considered earlier orders passed by this Court on 3.7.2014 in Writ Petition No.39071 of 2008 and thereafter the orders passed on 12.2.2014 and 19.7.2014 in two Contempt Petitions filed by the petitioners and also the Enquiry Report where charges have been found proved without any basis. (28) The charges have all been considered on merits by this Court. There is no reason to remand the matter to the respondent no.3 again to consider passing a fresh order after holding an enquiry afresh. (29) The petitioner was initially terminated in 2008 and for the past 10 years the respondent no.3 had managed not to follow the provisions of law and to keep the petitioner out of service. There is no reason to remand the matter to the respondent no.3 again to consider passing a fresh order after holding an enquiry afresh. (29) The petitioner was initially terminated in 2008 and for the past 10 years the respondent no.3 had managed not to follow the provisions of law and to keep the petitioner out of service. The petitioners appears to have also reached the age of superannuation, in the meantime. (30) This Court therefore, finds it appropriate to set aside the order of dismissal and direct the Committee of Management to pay consequential benefits to the petitioner within three months.” 21. The above observations are based on facts of that case. The learned Judge found that the enquiry reports were considered by this Court in another writ petition and two contempt petitions and the charges were not found proved. Therefore, instead of remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority, the proceedings were given a quietus. In my considered opinion, the above observation based on facts of that case do not lay down any law which could be treated as a binding precedent. On the contrary, the Court in that case did not permit the authorities even to hold fresh enquiry, the delinquent having retired in the meantime. 22. These issues, in my view, already stand answered in Rattan Lal Sharma and Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan. In both cases, the Supreme Court held that when there was bias on part of enquiry officer, the punishment order would also be rendered illegal. In Rattan Lal Sharma, it has been held that the illegality committed in conducting the departmental proceedings has left an indelible stamp of infirmity on the decision of the Managing Committee. These observations in Rattan Lal Sharma were quoted with approval in Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan in repelling both the contentions that an ultimate fair decision would not vitiate the final order of punishment and the defect would stand cured if the appellate or any higher authority takes a decision without being influenced by the enquiry report. It has been held that the defect in such case goes to the root of the matter; it renders the proceedings void, and the appellate authority cannot repair the damage done. The relevant observations made in the said context in Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan are as follows :- “Mr. It has been held that the defect in such case goes to the root of the matter; it renders the proceedings void, and the appellate authority cannot repair the damage done. The relevant observations made in the said context in Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan are as follows :- “Mr. Bobde submitted that inherent in this observation is the view that the defect could have been cured if the Secretary of State had made the final decision on the basis of the record without being influenced by the decision impugned before him. We do not think that it would be permissible to draw such an inference. That cannot be said to be the ratio of the decision. The learned Judge himself says in so many words that he does not consider what would have been the result if the Secretary had given his independent decision. The decision could have gone one way or the other. Therefore, the above observation does not help Mr. Bobde. If the defect is one which goes to the root of the matter and which is incurable it cannot be remedied by the higher authority taking a decision independent of the authority that rendered the initial decision. ………………Where the lapse is of the enquiry being conducted by an officer deeply biased against the delinquent or one of them being so biased that the entire enquiry proceedings are rendered void, the appellate authority cannot repair the damage done to the enquiry. Where one of the members of the Enquiry Committee has a strong hatred or bias against the delinquent of which the other members know not or the said member is in a position to influence the decision-making, the entire record of the enquiry will be slanted and any independent decision taken by the appellate authority on such tainted record cannot undo the damage done. In this view of the matter this Court concluded that the decision of the appellate authorities could not cure the initial defect in the constitution of the Enquiry Committee and the consequences flowing from one of the members of the Enquiry Committee being biased. In this view of the matter this Court had allowed the appeal.” 23. In view of the above legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of punishment itself was rendered illegal and void and is accordingly quashed. In this view of the matter this Court had allowed the appeal.” 23. In view of the above legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of punishment itself was rendered illegal and void and is accordingly quashed. Since the defect goes to the root of the matter, it would not be open to this court to examine the material on record and come to any independent finding. 24. Ordinarily, since the order imposing punishment has been held to be illegal on account of breach of principles of natural justice, the matter has to be sent back to the disciplinary authority for conducting fresh enquiry but for an important supervening event i.e., the petitioner attaining age of superannuation during pendency of the writ proceedings, which does not permit such course being adopted. 25. A Division Bench of this Court in Ravindra Singh Rathore vs. District Inspector of Schools, 2004 (1) AWC 310 , after placing reliance on a number of judgments of the Supreme Court, has held that if Principal of an educational institution retires during pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the proceedings cannot be continued any further. In that case, the management had resolved to dismiss the delinquent Principal from service but before the proposal of the Management could be approved by the Service Selection Board in terms of Section 21 of U.P. Secondary Education (Services Selection Board) Act, he attained the age of superannuation. In arriving at the above conclusion, the Division Bench placed reliance on judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and another, JT 2003 (6) SC 20 wherein it is held as under :- “37…………A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In the event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer the employee cannot be made to retire. There must exist specific provision in the pension rules in terms whereof, whole or a part of the pension can be withheld or withdrawn where for a proceeding has to be initiated. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue.” 26. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue.” 26. Again in State Bank of India vs. A.N. Gupta, (1997) 8 SCC 60 , it was held by the Supreme Court that no disciplinary proceedings could continue against an employee after his superannuation in absence of provision either in the Pension Rules or in the Service Rules empowering the disciplinary authority to continue the proceedings. Reliance was also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors O.S.F.C. and others, 1999 (82) FLR 143 . 27. Learned counsel for the respondents could not place before the Court any provision under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or under any other statute which empowers the Management of a minority institution to continue disciplinary proceedings after retirement or award punishment. Infact, Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents does not dispute the above legal position but he has placed reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court in Brajendra Singh Yambem vs. Union of India and another, (2016) 9 SCC 20 , in contending that this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 could permit the Management to hold disciplinary enquiry afresh even after retirement of the petitioner. 28. It was a case of a person who was posted as Commandant in C.R.P.F. and to whom CCS Pension Rules, 1972 were applicable. Under Rule 9 of the CCS Pension Rules, 1972, the departmental proceedings, if not initiated while the government servant was in service, could be initiated only with the sanction of the President subject to the rider that it shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution. After examining the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that although sanction of the President was taken but it was in respect of an event which took place more than four years before initiation of proceedings and was thus barred by limitation. However, in penultimate paragraph of the judgment, the Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, issued the following directions :- “53. However, in penultimate paragraph of the judgment, the Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, issued the following directions :- “53. Though we have answered the questions of law framed in this case in favour of the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment by allowing these appeals, however, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations made against the appellant, in exercise of power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct the disciplinary authority to continue the disciplinary proceedings and conclude them within six months in accordance with the relevant provisions of law as well as the principles of natural justice. If the same are not completed within the said time period by the disciplinary authority, the said liberty granted by this Court in this order to the respondents will not ensue to their benefit.” 29. The above directions as clarified by the Supreme Court itself were in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is not under Article 141 and therefore, these directions would not invest this Court with the power to issue similar directions. 30. In Mohd. Yunus Khan vs. State of U.P. and others, (2010) 10 SCC 539 , the Supreme Court found the order of punishment to be vitiated on account of personal bias of the disciplinary authority. In that case also, the delinquent retired during pendency of the proceedings. Therefore, while holding that no fresh enquiry can be initiated, the Supreme Court directed for payment of 50% of the wages from the date of removal from service till the date of reaching the age of superannuation. Paragraph 38 of the Law Report containing the above directions is extracted below :- “38. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Arjun Chaubey vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 578 . The order of punishment is null and void and therefore, cannot be given effect to. The appeal deserves to be allowed. The appellant has already reached the age of superannuation and no fresh enquiry can be initiated in the matter if the earlier proceedings are rendered null and void for the violation of the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice. The appeal deserves to be allowed. The appellant has already reached the age of superannuation and no fresh enquiry can be initiated in the matter if the earlier proceedings are rendered null and void for the violation of the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in order to meet the ends of justice, it is desirable that the appellant be paid 50% of the wages from the date of removal from serviced till the date of reaching the age of superannuation and he be granted retiral benefits in accordance with law from the date of his retirement. In view of the above, the appeal stands disposed of. No order as to costs.” 31. This Court having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and also having regard to the seriousness of the charges levelled against the petitioner as well as the fact that the order of punishment is being quashed on ground of violation of principles of natural justice and not on account of the fact that the charges do not stand proved considers it proper to direct payment of 50% of the salary to the petitioner from the date of his dismissal till he attained the age of superannuation and for payment of retiral benefits by treating him to be in continuous service. The retiral benefits shall however, be calculated by assuming that the petitioner was drawing full salary on the date of superannuation. 32. The petition stands allowed accordingly with the above directions.