ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The sole appellant has been convicted under section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for life in Sessions Trial No. 13 of 2000. 2. The appellant, namely, Omlal Orawn has been granted bail by this Court vide order dated 12.04.2002. 3. Informant of this case is husband of Budhani Urawin, the deceased. The fardbeyan of Shano Urawan was recorded at about 06:30 hrs. on 10.11.1998 at village Gilingda. A First Information Report was registered vide Kuchai P.S. Case No. 26 of 1998 under section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant. The informant has alleged that last evening when his wife did not return from work at about 5:00 p.m. he went in search for her. He says that when he reached about 200 yards near the field in village-Mahulbad he noticed the appellant running away from the field. He has found the dead body of his wife drenched in blood and a sickle and spade were lying near her dead body. He has stated that there was previous enmity with the appellant who had threatened to kill his wife. 4. Admittedly, there is no eye-witness to the occurrence; the prosecution has not proved the manner in which Budhani Urawin has been done to death. 5. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether 10 witnesses; the informant, namely, Shano Urawan is PW-4 and the Investigating Officer is PW-9. 6. Dr. Devendra Jee, who has conducted the post-mortem examination, has found the following injuries on Budhani Urawin: “(i) Incised injury-2”x 1/2” x 1/2” upon right side of face below ear lobe. (ii) Incised injury-3” x 1” x 4” vertically placed upon right Maxilla going through right maxillary Antrum. (iii) Incised injury-1” x 1/2” x 1/2” horizontally placed upon right Maxilla 1/2” below injury No.2. (iv) Incised injury- 1/2” x 1/2” x full thickness of pinna of right ear including tragus. (v) Incised injury-3” x 1/2” x 4”- behind the right ear upon masloid bone with fracture of right temporal bone with tearing of the meninges and laceration of the brain matter.” 7. In the opinion of the Doctor, the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and caused within 24 hours; the post-mortem examination was conducted on 10.11.1998 at 11:50 a.m. 8. (v) Incised injury-3” x 1/2” x 4”- behind the right ear upon masloid bone with fracture of right temporal bone with tearing of the meninges and laceration of the brain matter.” 7. In the opinion of the Doctor, the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and caused within 24 hours; the post-mortem examination was conducted on 10.11.1998 at 11:50 a.m. 8. At this stage, it is relevant to record that the informant has stated that he found one injury on the head of his wife whereas the Doctor has found as many as five incised injuries on the dead body. 9. The prosecution has relied upon two circumstances against the appellant; (i) previous enmity and (ii) the appellant was found fleeing away from the scene of the crime. 10. The law on the circumstantial evidence is well-settled. In “Anant Chintaman Lagu Vs. State of Bombay”, reported in “ AIR 1960 SC 500 ”, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “Circumstantial evidence in this context means, a combination of facts creating a network through which there is no escape for the accused, because the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt.” 11. In “Charan Singh Vs. The State of U.P.” reported in “ AIR 1967 SC 520 ”, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “5. It is well established that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established, and the circumstances so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused person, that is, the circumstances should be of such a nature as to reasonably exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. To put it in other words the chain of evidence must be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused person see Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1091 ( AIR 1952 SC 343 ); and Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, (1955) 2 SCR 570 : ( AIR 1955 SC 801 ). In 1952 SCR 1091 : ( AIR 1952 SC 343 ), this Court referred further to the danger in such cases that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and ‘the mind is apt to make a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little if need be, to force them to form part of one connected whole, see the observations in Reg. v. Hodge, (1838) 2 Lewin 227. It is against the practice of this Court in an appeal by special leave to embark on an assessment of the evidence when two courts have already assessed it and come to concurrent conclusions therefrom. In view of the danger referred to above, we allowed learned counsel for the appellant to make his comments on that part of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which bears upon the question whether the circumstances alleged against the appellant have been fully established. (After discussing the evidence His Lordship concluded): In our view, the circumstances alleged against the appellant have been fully established and there is no doubt about them.” 12. The prosecution witnesses, namely, Baishakhi Urawn PW-5 and Lakho Urawn PW-8 have been tendered for cross-examination and the other witnesses examined by the prosecution are mostly hearsay witness and seizure-list witness. The spade and sickle which were found at the scene of the crime were not blood-stained and the prosecution has not established how Budhani Urawin has been done to death. 13. The circumstance that the informant has seen the appellant fleeing away from scene of the crime, in view of admission of the informant during his cross-examination turns false. The informant admits that distance between village- Mahulbad to Gilingda is 10-12 kms and it was 05:00 p.m. in the evening when he started search for his wife. It was a winter night, in the month of November. It would take him more than 3 hours to reach the place of occurrence and in the night he has not disclosed the source of identification. He further says that the same night he had gone to the police station where his statement was recorded and the police has taken his LTI. But, his previous statement has not been produced on record. The First Information Report has been lodged on the basis of his fardbeyan which was recorded on 10.11.1998 at about 06:30 hrs. He further says that the same night he had gone to the police station where his statement was recorded and the police has taken his LTI. But, his previous statement has not been produced on record. The First Information Report has been lodged on the basis of his fardbeyan which was recorded on 10.11.1998 at about 06:30 hrs. at village- Gilingda. Previous enmity between the parties may throw some light on the possible motive for the crime, however, it is well-known that enmity cuts both sides. An accused may flew away from the place of occurrence or abscond out of fear. He may also be found fleeing away out of an apprehension of false implication. In “Sk. Yusuf Vs. State of W.B.” reported in “ (2011) 11 SCC 754 ” the Supreme Court has held as under: “31…….It is a settled legal proposition that in case a person is absconding after commission of offence of which he may not even be the author, such a circumstance alone may not be enough to draw an adverse inference against him as it would go against the doctrine of innocence. It is quite possible that he may be running away merely on being suspected, out of fear of police arrest and harassment. (Vide Matru v. State of U.P., Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand and Dara Singh v. Republic of India.) Thus, in view of the law referred to hereinabove, mere abscondence of the appellant cannot be taken as a circumstance which gives rise to draw an adverse inference against him.” 14. We find that merely on the basis of suspicion raised by the informant, which is primarily founded on previous enmity between the parties, the appellant was sent up for trial and finally convicted under section 302 IPC. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we hold that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the appellant under section 302 IPC. 16. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.08.2001, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Seraikella in Sessions Trial No. 13 of 2000 against the appellant, namely, Omlal Orawn are set aside. 17. The appellant, namely, Omlal Orawn is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC and he is discharged from the liability of bail bonds furnished by him. 18. Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 468 of 2001 is allowed. 19. 17. The appellant, namely, Omlal Orawn is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC and he is discharged from the liability of bail bonds furnished by him. 18. Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 468 of 2001 is allowed. 19. We appreciate the able assistance rendered by Sri Anup Kr. Agarwal, the learned Amicus and Sri Vikash Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant who have meticulously prepared notes on the prosecution evidence and ably assisted the Court. 20. The Secretary, Jharkhand High Court Legal Services Committee shall reimburse the learned Amicus on submission of bills. He shall be paid Rs.5,500/- for each effective date, but subject to the cap as per the Notification dated 23.11.2017. 21. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith.