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2019 DIGILAW 1335 (GAU)

Jeevan Keche v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2019-12-07

HITESH KUMAR SARMA, PRASANTA KUMAR DEKA

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JUDGMENT : Hitesh Kumar Sarma, J. 1. This appeal is preferred from jail against the judgment and order dated 13.06.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East-Sessions Division, Tezu, Lohit District, in Sessions Case No. 09(LDV) of 2014, convicting the accused-appellant, under Sections 302/498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, for the offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. We have heard Mr. P. Taffo, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant and Mr. J. Tsering, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing the State of A.P. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 09.10.2013, the accused-appellant, Shri Jeevan Keche, had beaten up his wife to death in his residence at Rukmo village. The occurrence took place at night. 4. The PW 1, brother of the deceased, lodged the FIR, in respect of the above occurrence, with the Roing Police Station. On receipt of the FIR, Roing Police Station registered a case, being Roing Police Station Case No. 72/2013, under sections 498(A)/302 of the IPC, investigated into it, collected evidence, seized the weapons of offence and, after completion of investigation, laid the charge-sheet against the accused-appellant, under sections 498(A)/302 of the IPC. During investigation, the Investigating Police Officer (examined as PW 14), arrested the accused, caused the inquest and the post mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased done and got the confessional statement of the accused-appellant recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. 5. After exhausting all required formalities, the learned Sessions Judge, Tezu, framed a formal charge against the accused-appellant, under Sections 498(A) and 302 of the IPC. The accused-appellant pleaded innocence thereto and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the trial commenced. 6. In this case, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses including the autopsy doctor and the Investigating Police Officer. At the closure of the of prosecution evidence, as required under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., all the incriminating materials appearing in the evidence were put to the accused-appellant. Therefore, the trial commenced. 6. In this case, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses including the autopsy doctor and the Investigating Police Officer. At the closure of the of prosecution evidence, as required under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., all the incriminating materials appearing in the evidence were put to the accused-appellant. In his such statement, the accused-appellant denied the accusations and also declined to adduce evidence in his defence. 7. After conclusion of the trial, learned Sessions Judge, Tezu found the accused-appellant guilty under Sections 498(A) and 302 of the IPC, convicted and sentenced him accordingly, as indicated above. 8. We have scanned the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. We have also examined the records of the learned trial Court including the evidence led by the prosecution as well as the judgment put to challenge in this appeal. 9. It has come out from the evidence on record that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and that the prosecution case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. 10. The evidence of the autopsy doctor, examined as PW 8, is that he performed post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 10.10.2013, at about 13:45 hours and found as follows: "Multiple injuries and abrasions all over the body, at neck, back, gluteal region, thigh, left side of abdomen, left side of chest, both hands, left frontal scalp, left side of eye with evidence of black eye. Internal injuries: On dissection, extra extravasation of blood all over the back from neck to gluteal region. Extra extravasation of blood over the both eye leads with sub congestible haemorrhage. Extra extravasation of blood along the fracture ribs of the left side 7 to 9 ribs. Internal organ: Spleen was ruptured. All the injuries show evidence of vital reactions. The abrasion and bruises were fresh and non-scabbed." He has also opined that the death of the deceased was due to the above noted injuries sustained by her. The injuries were homicidal in nature and ante mortem. 11. Such evidence of PW 8 clearly makes out that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. In the cross-examination of PW 8, no such contradiction could be elicited to shake the credibility of his evidence in respect of the injuries sustained by the deceased and also as to the cause of her death. 12. 11. Such evidence of PW 8 clearly makes out that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. In the cross-examination of PW 8, no such contradiction could be elicited to shake the credibility of his evidence in respect of the injuries sustained by the deceased and also as to the cause of her death. 12. Now, on the basis of the evidence on record, this Court is required to find out as to whether the appellant committed the offence of murder of his wife/deceased. Let us first scan the evidence led by the prosecution in respect of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC. 13. PW 1, Shri Okili Linggi, is the informant of the case. He lodged the FIR, vide P. Exh. 1, on 10.10.2013. His evidence is that while he came back to his village at about 7.00 am, he noticed some people gathered in front of his house. He was told by the people in the gathering that his sister/deceased was killed by the appellant. On his verbal information, police accompanied him to the place of occurrence, i.e., the house of accused-appellant and found the dead body of the deceased lying on the bed. The dead body was without any cloth on the upper side of her body. He noticed number of injuries and signs of beatings on the body of the deceased. He also found the one year old son of the deceased was sucking milk from the breast of his mother, who was lying dead. He picked up the son of the deceased and handed over him to the mother of the accused-appellant (PW 5). It has also come out from his evidence that the accused-appellant used to torture his sister/deceased off and on and sometimes they sent some seniors and relatives to talk to the accused-appellant in respect of torture meted out to his sister. 14. The evidence of PW 2, Smti Rukmini Mepo, is that at about 7.00 pm on the date of occurrence, the accused-appellant was chatting with her husband near the fire place in her house. Then, she went to sleep. Suddenly, she woke up and heard the voice of the deceased and sound of beatings; it was about 9.30 pm. 14. The evidence of PW 2, Smti Rukmini Mepo, is that at about 7.00 pm on the date of occurrence, the accused-appellant was chatting with her husband near the fire place in her house. Then, she went to sleep. Suddenly, she woke up and heard the voice of the deceased and sound of beatings; it was about 9.30 pm. She has further stated in her evidence that the deceased was crying for the whole night and was shouting asking the accused-appellant not to beat her although the beatings continued. She also deposed that at about 12 midnight, the beatings decreased although she was still hearing the deceased crying which, however, was minimised. Her house is situated near to the house of the accused-appellant. At about 2.00 am, the sound stopped and she did not hear the deceased crying or any sound of beating. Her further evidence is that while it was still dark in the morning, Smti Jomiya Pulu (PW 3), one of her neighbours came to her house, made her wake and told her that she was told by the accused-appellant that his wife was seriously ailing and requested her to go to his house. PW 2, then, went to the house of the accused-appellant with PW3 and found the wife of the accused-appellant lying dead on their bed. She had seen injury on the left eye of the deceased and also seen blood oozing out from her left eye. She had also seen number of injuries all over the dead body of the deceased. The deceased was not wearing any cloth on the upper part of her body. The mother of the accused-appellant (PW 5) was sleeping in her room in the same house and PW 2 went there and told her that her daughter-in-law had already expired and that she heard the sound of beating her whole night by her son. This witness has specifically stated that the deceased was beaten up on 09th day of the month and they went to the house of the accused in the morning of 10th of the month. But, she did not remember the month. She also stated that she herself and PW 3 stated such facts to police as to whatever they had seen and whatever they knew about the occurrence. She also deposed that the accused-appellant used to torture the deceased. But, she did not remember the month. She also stated that she herself and PW 3 stated such facts to police as to whatever they had seen and whatever they knew about the occurrence. She also deposed that the accused-appellant used to torture the deceased. Such evidence of the PW 2 remained intact in the cross-examination also. 15. PW 3, Smti Jomiya Pulu, has corroborated the evidence of PW 2. She has deposed that at about 2.30 am, on 10-10-2013, the accused-appellant came to her house and requested her to give him the key of the motorcycle of her husband so that he could go to a pharmacy and get some medicines for his wife as his wife was ill. She gave the key of the motorcycle to the accused-appellant and thereafter, at about 3.40/3.50 am, the accused again came to her house and told her that his wife was very serious. He requested her to go and see his wife in his house. Accordingly, she went to the house of the accused-appellant with PW 2. Then, this witness and the PW 2 found the wife of the accused-appellant lying dead on their bed in their house. She also noticed injuries all over the body of the deceased. She checked the pulse of the deceased but found her dead. At that time, the accused-appellant was behind her, but, later on, he went out from the place of occurrence. 16. PW 4, Shri Milon Mepo, is the husband of PW 2. As per his evidence, on the date of occurrence, the accused-appellant visited to his house at about 7.30 pm. After about 15/20 minutes, his wife/deceased also came there and they went out together from his house. Thereafter, he went to sleep. Next morning, coming near his house the accused-appellant was shouting that he had quarrel with his wife and asking him to go and see his wife in his house. PW 2 came back from the house of the accused-appellant and told him that the wife of the accused-appellant already expired. 17. The evidence of PW 5 is that the accused-appellant is her son and about 10/11 months back (deposed on 23-09-2014), he had killed his wife. She has further deposed that she did not witness the occurrence although she was present in the house in a different room. 17. The evidence of PW 5 is that the accused-appellant is her son and about 10/11 months back (deposed on 23-09-2014), he had killed his wife. She has further deposed that she did not witness the occurrence although she was present in the house in a different room. Supporting the evidence of the PW 2 and PW 3, she deposed that they told her in the morning in her room itself that her daughter-in-law had expired. Then she went to the room of her daughter-in-law and found her lying dead. In her cross-examination, by the prosecution (as she was declared hostile by the prosecution), this witness stated that on the day before the date of occurrence, she advised the accused-appellant not to beat the deceased. She also deposed that the deceased was beaten to death by the deceased. It is her further evidence that on the day before the date of occurrence, the deceased was beaten up by the accused-appellant with a bamboo stick. However, in her cross-examination by the defence, this PW 5 deposed that she was not aware whether the accused-appellant was in his room on the date of occurrence. 18. PW 6, Shri Regaso Pulu, is the husband of PW 3. PW 3 told him that the accused-appellant came to his house and requested for the key of the motorcycle to go to medical as his wife was seriously ill. His wife (PW 3) gave the key of the motorcycle to the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant had taken the key of the motorcycle from PW 3 at about 2.00/3.00 am. 19. The evidence of PW 7, Lina Menjo, who happens to be the childhood friend of the deceased, came to the place of occurrence after hearing about the occurrence and had seen injuries over the body on the deceased. She has not implicated the accused-appellant with the occurrence. She has no knowledge about the occurrence. 20. PW 9, Shri Odo Mimi, has also not implicated the accused-appellant in his evidence. 21. The evidence of PW 10, Shri Cash Linggi, is to the effect that he heard the occurrence from his brother (PW 1) and, thereafter, went to the place of occurrence and he found police already arrived there. He had seen the dead body with injuries. He is also a witness to the seizure of material exhibits 1 to 6. 22. The evidence of PW 10, Shri Cash Linggi, is to the effect that he heard the occurrence from his brother (PW 1) and, thereafter, went to the place of occurrence and he found police already arrived there. He had seen the dead body with injuries. He is also a witness to the seizure of material exhibits 1 to 6. 22. The evidence of PW 12 is also not very relevant in view of the fact that he has not implicated the accused-appellant. 23. PW 11, Shri Nathan Michichi, is the witness to the seizure of weapon of offence, vide P. Exh-3, and this fact is not discarded by the defence. PW 11 even was not subjected to cross-examination on the fact of seizure of the seized weapon of offence. 24. PW 13, Shri Saneep Kumar Singh, was the Magistrate, who had recorded the confessional statement of the accused-appellant, vide P. Exh. 7 and his evidence will be discussed at later point of time. 25. PW 14, Mr. M. Mili, is the Investigating Police Officer. He has narrated about the investigation of the case from endorsement of investigation to him till the laying of the charge-sheet. He has also proved the seizure made, vide P. Exh. 3 and seized the weapon, which was exhibited in the Court, vide P. Exhs. 2, 3 and 4. It has also come out from the evidence of this witness that the accused surrendered before the police station. 26. In view of the evidence on record, we have already mentioned that there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge also convicted the accused-appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 27. It is a settled principle that in order to prove a charge in a criminal trial by circumstantial evidence, prosecution needs to prove each and every circumstance solidly beyond all reasonable doubt and the circumstances must be in such a chain, which unerringly leads to the conclusion, consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The Apex Court in Hanumant Vs. The Apex Court in Hanumant Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1953 SC 343, dealing with the nature of proof required to establish a criminal charge by circumstantial evidence observed as under: "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence in of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and pendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 28. The above principle has been constantly followed by the Apex Court in a catena of subsequent judgments. In Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 , the Apex Court laid down the following golden principles for proof of a criminal charge which solely rests on circumstantial evidence: "152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. V. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. They should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 29. Keeping in view the above principle to prove a criminal charge by circumstantial evidence, let us now consider the evidence brought on record, to see, how far the circumstances have been proved solidly beyond all reasonable doubt." 30. The learned trial Court, in paragraph 37 of the judgment, has enumerated the circumstances, which were considered to be sufficient to hold the accused guilty of murder of his wife/deceased. Para 37 is quoted below for convenience: "37. And therefore, as the facts that (1) the accused and the deceased on the night of incident were present in their house, (ii) they were heard quarrelling on that by the PW 2, Mrs. Rukmini Pulu, (iii) the accused came to the house of PW 3, Mrs. Jomiya Puluearly in the morning of the offence asking key of the motorcycle for bringing medicine for the deceased (iv) both Mrs. Jomiya Pulu and Mrs. Rukmini Pulu, on being informed by accused, visited the PO and seen the deceased with injuries on her bed have been clearly established and corroborated by the confessional statements of the accused recorded under section 164 IPC wherein he confessed to have killed his deceased wife, I, in absence of any explanation by the accused in regards to injuries found on the deceased, find these circumstantial evidences sufficient to hold the accused guilty of killing his deceased wife." 31. On a meticulous examination of the evidence, we find that following circumstances to hold the accuseds-appellant guilty of committing murder of his wife: a. The evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 makes it clear that the accused-appellant told them, at about 2.00/2.30 am, that his wife was seriously ailing; therefore, they were requested to visit his house. On a meticulous examination of the evidence, we find that following circumstances to hold the accuseds-appellant guilty of committing murder of his wife: a. The evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 makes it clear that the accused-appellant told them, at about 2.00/2.30 am, that his wife was seriously ailing; therefore, they were requested to visit his house. Such evidence makes it unequivocally clear that the accused-appellant was with his deceased wife in his residence at the relevant time of the occurrence. Both these witnesses went to the house of the accused-appellant at about 3.40/3.50 am and found his wife lying dead with multiple injuries on her body. Such evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 that at the time they were requested to visit his house, the accused-appellant knew about the injuries sustained by his deceased wife. b. The evidence of PW 2 makes it clearly appear that sometime after she was requested to visit the house of the accused-appellant, the accused-appellant came to their house and requested her to provide him the key of the motorcycle for going out to purchase medicine for his wife. This is also a circumstance leading to the inference that the accused was aware of serious condition of his deceased wife due to the injuries sustained by her. c. PW 5 is the mother of the accused-appellant. They live in different rooms of the same house. As per her evidence-in-chief; she did not witness the occurrence and came to know about the occurrence only from PW 2 and PW 3. But, the prosecution declared her hostile and subjected to cross-examination; she stated that she had asked the accused-appellant, on the day before the date of occurrence, not to beat the deceased. She also stated that disobeying her, the accused-appellant assaulted the deceased on 08.10.2013 with a bamboo stick. She has also admitted that she stated to the police that her daughter-in-law died as the accused-appellant had beaten her. Such evidence of PW 5, although she was declared hostile, can be relied upon. The settled law is that if some part of the evidence of the hostile witness can be relied upon, the Court can act upon the same. In the instant case, the PW 5 has admitted to have stated before the police that the accused-appellant had beaten the deceased to death. Even during her cross-examination by the defence, this fact remains intact. In the instant case, the PW 5 has admitted to have stated before the police that the accused-appellant had beaten the deceased to death. Even during her cross-examination by the defence, this fact remains intact. From such evidence of PW 5, it is found that the accused-appellant had beaten up his wife to death and that the accused-appellant used to beat her up off and on, which are also circumstances and can be linked with other circumstances narrated above to constitute a chain. d. From the evidence on record it has also come out that the accused-appellant was with the deceased wife at the relevant time of occurrence in his own house and yet he has not given any explanation as to how the deceased sustained the injuries leading to her death, as required by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It has also come out from the evidence discussed above, particularly, the evidence of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 6 that the accused-appellant was beating up his wife from the evening till the raw dawn next day in his house and that they were together. While PW 2 and PW 3 went to his house at about 3.40/3.50 pm, he was also there. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categorical in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. Reiterating the law laid down in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Anjan Kumar Sarma Vs. State of Assam, Crl. App 560/2014, dated 23.05.2017, held that in a case where the other links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the guilt of the accused, the circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In the absence of proof of other circumstances, the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation cannot be made the basis of conviction. Thus, absence of explanation from the accused can be an incriminating circumstance only when the other circumstances point towards the guilt of the accused. Therefore, failure on the part of the accused-appellant to explain as to how his wife/deceased sustained injuries leading to her death is an additional link, which completes the chain of circumstances enumerated in para 28 above. 32. The circumstances indicted above, in Sub-para (a) to (d) of para 31 constitute a chain so complete ruling out a reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused-appellant. It has come out from the circumstances that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused-appellant. There cannot be any hypothesis except the guilt of the accused-appellant, the circumstances being conclusive in nature. 33. So far the confessional statement is concerned, which the learned Court below has referred to as one of the circumstances for holding the accused-appellant guilty, we have examined the same as well as the evidence led by PW 13, the Magistrate, who had recorded the confessional statement. 34. 33. So far the confessional statement is concerned, which the learned Court below has referred to as one of the circumstances for holding the accused-appellant guilty, we have examined the same as well as the evidence led by PW 13, the Magistrate, who had recorded the confessional statement. 34. It appears from the order, dated 12.10.2013, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class that the accused was arrested on 10.10.2013 and was produced before him on 12.10.2013. Thereafter, he was remanded for 14 days' police custody. It has further appeared from the order, dated 25.10.2013 that the accused-appellant was produced before the learned Magistrate on that day after the police remand period was over and he was sent to judicial custody till 08.11.2013, fixing, of course, 30.10.2013, for recording his confessional statement. The order, dated 30.10.2013 shows that the accused was produced before the learned Magistrate and his statement was recorded. Thereafter, he was ordered to be sent back to lockup. It appears from such order that on 30.10.2013, the accused was brought before the learned Magistrate straightway from jail custody, and thereafter, his confessional statement was recorded. 35. There is no instance in the record at all that he was warned about the consequence of making a confessional statement. There is even no mention in the aforesaid record as well as in the confessional statement format itself that the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, recording the confessional statement, ascertained as to whether the accused-appellant was free from influence of police and whether he made the confessional statement voluntarily and on his own free will. It also does not appear from the orders in the aforesaid record of the case that the accused-appellant was given time for reflection before recording his confessional statement, vide Exh. P7. 36. To appreciate such fact, let us reproduced the column 6 of the format for recording confession and how column 6 was filled up by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class: "6. In order to ascertain whether the accused is prepared to make a statement of his own free will, he is next examined as follows." This column was filled by the learned Magistrate as follows: "Educational background: Till Class Xth" 37. In order to ascertain whether the accused is prepared to make a statement of his own free will, he is next examined as follows." This column was filled by the learned Magistrate as follows: "Educational background: Till Class Xth" 37. The learned Magistrate is not found to have ascertained as to whether the accused-appellant was making the confessional statement on his own free will by keeping the said column blank in respect of the relevant queries and filled up the same, as indicated above, with some irrelevant query as regards educational qualification of the accused-appellant. 38. In the case of the Shankaria Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1978) 3 SCC 435 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is well settled that a confession, if voluntarily and truthfully made, is an efficacious proof of guilt. Therefore, when in a capital case the prosecution demands a conviction of the accused, primarily on the basis of his confession recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC, the court must apply the twin test: (i) Whether the confession was perfectly voluntary? (ii) If so, whether it is true and trustworthy? 39. It was further held in Shankaria (supra), that satisfaction of the first test is a sine qua non for its admissibility in evidence. If the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise such as is mentioned in Section 24 of the Evidence Act, it must be excluded and rejected brevi manu. In such a case, the question of proceeding further to apply the second test, does not arise. If the first test is satisfied, the court must, before acting upon the confession, reach at a finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid canon of universal application. Even so, one broad method which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. Even so, one broad method which may be useful in most cases for evaluating a confession may be indicated. The court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test. 40. It was further held in Shankaria (supra) that satisfaction of first test is a sine qua non for its admissibility in evidence. The confession, vide Exh. P7, in the absence of any certificate that it was voluntarily made after he was given all required precaution and sufficient time for reflection, cannot be said to be voluntary one. We have already discussed that there is no evidence on record that the confessional statement, made vide Exh. P7, was voluntary. 41. That being so, the prosecution failed to prove the first of the twin test mentioned above, and; therefore, Exh. P7, the confessional statement, is not admissible in evidence to constitute a circumstance in the chain of circumstances. 42. The learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant to cause death of his wife and had there been intention on his part, he would not have used only bamboo stick to beat his wife. He has further submitted that the post occurrence conduct of the accused-appellant also indicates that he did not intend to kill his wife. According to the learned Amicus Curiae, the accused-appellant went to pharmacy, on a motorcycle, for purchasing medicines for his wife. Had there been intention on his part, he would not have tried to procure medicines for her treatment. Therefore, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that as there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant, his conviction be converted to one under Section 304-II of the IPC and he be dealt with leniently in respect of punishment. The learned Amicus Curiae has also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Surujali Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2005 (Supp) GLT 146. The learned Amicus Curiae has also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Surujali Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2005 (Supp) GLT 146. On examination of the said decision, it is found that the facts of the said case and the facts of the present case are not same. 43. In Surujali (supra), the injuries could not be ascertained due to decomposition of the dead body and the doctor also could not give any opinion as regards the cause of death of the deceased. But in the instant case, the doctor has very specifically stated, in his evidence, that the cause of death of the deceased was due to multiple injuries and abrasions/bruises sustained by her. He has specifically narrated the injuries sustained by the deceased 2 which have already been mentioned while reproducing the evidence of PW 8, in paragraph 10 above. 44. In view of the aforesaid submission made by the learned Amicus Curiae, we need to examine as to whether the act of the accused amounts to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In this regard, we have considered the post mortem examination report (P. Exh. 6) and the evidence of the autopsy doctor (PW 8). 45. We have already noticed that, apart from the other injuries, spleen was ruptured and all the injuries show evidence of vital reactions. The injuries sustained by the deceased and specifically mentioned at paragraph 10 above, read in combination with the evidence of the autopsy doctor (PW 8), clearly indicate that the injuries sustained by the deceased come within the ambit of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. Clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC reads as follows: "Thirdly - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." 46. In the case of Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1958 SC 465 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 Thirdly of the IPC:- Firstly, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 47. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virsa Singh (supra), held that once the four elements, as aforesaid, are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Section 300 Thirdly of the IPC. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. 48. In view of the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased and unprovoked attack on deceased made by the appellant he is found guilty of committing an act falling under Section 300 Thirdly of the IPC and it amounts to murder. 48. In view of the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased and unprovoked attack on deceased made by the appellant he is found guilty of committing an act falling under Section 300 Thirdly of the IPC and it amounts to murder. On perusal of the impugned judgment in this regard and it is found that the learned Sessions Judge, Tezu, has appreciated the evidence in correct perspective and arrived at a proper finding on facts and law. Thus, no interference on the order recording conviction of the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 302 IPC is called for. 49. That apart, the substantive sentence imposed upon the accused-appellant, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is the statutorily prescribed minimum one requiring no interference. The fine of Rs. 5,000/- imposed upon him for the said offence also found to be appropriate. The learned Court below, however, did not mention as to what would be the sentence in the event of default in payment of the fine by the accused-appellant. Therefore, this Court directs that the accused-appellant shall suffer simple imprisonment for three months, in default of payment of fine of Rs. 5,000/-, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 50. So far the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, on examination of the evidence on record, it is not found that there is any such evidence led by the prosecution implicating the accused-appellant with the commission of offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence imposed upon the accused-appellant for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. 51. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. 52. Send down the LCR with a copy of this judgment and order. 53. Also send a copy of the judgment to the Superintendent of District Jail, Tezu, for furnishing to the accused appellant. 54. This Court records its appreciation for the assistance rendered by learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. P. Taffo. Learned Amicus Curiae be paid an amount of Rs. 7,500/-, as remuneration/honorarium.