JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Plaintiff is the appellant, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court whereby the suit was ordered to be dismissed by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court, has filed the instant appeal. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the "plaintiff" and the "defendants". 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff was residing alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar. On 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 P.M. the defendant came to her house and started abusing her and also started hurling stones at her as a result whereof arm of the plaintiff was fractured and the matter was reported to the police. The defendant was prosecuted before the criminal court. It was alleged that on account of the plaster, the plaintiff could not work for 45 days and it was her husband, who was working as mason had to abandon his work to do the household work. She also claimed to have incurred expenditure on medical treatment. It was lastly averred that because of the acts of the defendant, she had suffered physical and mental pain and also financial loss as such she was entitled to recover a sum of Rs.70,000/- as damages from the defendant. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement wherein he raised various preliminary objections and have also averred that he had not pelted stones upon the plaintiff nor he abused and prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 16.01.2002:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.70,000/- on account of damages as alleged? OPP 2. Whether this suit is not maintainable? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of party? OPD 4. Relief. 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for Rs.50,000/- with future interest at the rate 6% constraining the defendant to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, which came to be allowed vide judgment and decree passed to this effect on 14.10.2008. 6. OPD 4. Relief. 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for Rs.50,000/- with future interest at the rate 6% constraining the defendant to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, which came to be allowed vide judgment and decree passed to this effect on 14.10.2008. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal, which was admitted by this Court on 12.12.2008 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the learned first Appellate Court has committed an error by adopting an erroneous approach to the suit by setting aside decree passed by learned trial Court on the ground that there is no cause of action and non-joinder of parties when the plaintiff/appellant had cause of action against the wrong doers/tort feasers severally or jointly? 2. Whether it is necessary for the appellant, who is the claimant in suit, to implead every person guilty of tort/wrong so long as the party against whom the suit is pressed is one of the tort feasers acting in concert? 3. Whether a complete and effective relief granted by learned Trial Court which has no possibility of the decree becoming in executable or infructuous can be set aside merely on the ground of non-joinder of party of some of the wrong doers who are family members as son and wife of respondent/defendant and had committed the illegal act of causing injury to the appellant/plaintiff in concert? Questions No. 1 to 3 7. Since, all these questions are intrinsically interlinked and interconnected, therefore, they are taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by way of a common reasoning. 8. It is vehemently argued by Ms. Seema K. Guleria, learned counsel for the plaintiff that since the defendant was one amongst the joint tortfeasors, therefore, the suit as filed against him was very much maintainable. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the meaning of "tortfeasors": 9. Two or more persons become joint tortfeasors (wrongdoers) by either committing a tort in concert or by the principle of vicarious liability (as in the case of master and servant or principal and agent). Under the Law of Torts, joining wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the whole of the damages. Two or more persons become joint tortfeasors (wrongdoers) by either committing a tort in concert or by the principle of vicarious liability (as in the case of master and servant or principal and agent). Under the Law of Torts, joining wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the whole of the damages. Where the liability is joint and several, the person aggrieved has the choice of suing either of the joint tortfeasors or both of them. But, where only one of the tortfeasors (master) is sued, not on the ground that he committed any wrong, but on the ground that he is vicariously liable for the tort committed by the other tortfeasor (servant), then to make the master liable, it is necessary to prove that the servant (who is not sued) acted in the course of employment and acted negligently. 10. Salmond in his Treatise on torts, states thus (18th Edition, page 417 et sequens): "Where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers, those wrong doers may be either joint or independent tortfeasors. Persons are to be deemed joint tortfeasors within the meaning of this rule whenever they are responsible for the same tort-that is to say, whenever the law for any reason imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. This happens in at least three classes of cases namely, agency, vicarious liability and common action.... In order to be joint tortfeasors they must in fact or in law, have committed the same wrongful act... The injuria as well as the damnum must be the same." "Joint wrongdoers are jointly and severally responsible for the whole damage. That is to say, the person injured may sue any of them separately for the full amount of the loss; or he may sue all of them jointly in the same action, and even in this latter case the judgment so obtained against all of them may be executed in full against any of them." 11. In Black's Dictionary, 'Joint and several liability' is defined as follows: "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together, at his opinion". 12. In Black's Dictionary, 'Joint and several liability' is defined as follows: "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together, at his opinion". 12. In Shawcross on Motor Insurance (2nd Edition), it is observed thus: "Joint tortfeasors, that is, those persons who together incur responsibility in respect of the same wrongful act, whether by way of vicarious responsibility or by way of common action in a wrongful activity were at common law jointly and severally responsible for the whole of the damages sustained by the injured party. At common law, this gave the latter the right to choose whether he should seek to take one or all of the joint wrongdoers liable in an action, but once he had obtained judgment against those sued he could not proceed against the others...." 13. Joint tortfeasors, as per 10th Edn. Of Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, have been described as under: Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tortfeasors, within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of action against each of them is the same, namely, that the same evidence would support an action against them individually... Accordingly, they will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for which they are responsible because the law imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at the same time. This occurs in case of (a) agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c) where a tort is committed in the course of a joint act, whilst pursuing a common purpose agreed between them." 14. The precise question came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 273 , wherein after relying upon the definition of joint tortfeasors in Charlesworth & Percy on negligence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court enumerated the possibility regarding the fixation of liability of concert tortfeasors, which reads thus:- 22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1 In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1 In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. 22.2 In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-a-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. 22.3 In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to determine inter se extent of negligence between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of the payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. 22.4 It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award. 15. However, the moot question is whether the claim of the plaintiff is, in fact, against a joint tortfeasors or is individually directed against the defendant alone. For deciding this question it would be necessary to take a look at the pleadings in the suit. 16. It would be necessary to advert to paras 3, 4 and 7 of the plaint which reads thus:- 3. That on 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 PM while plaintiff was alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar defendant without reasonable and sufficient cause threw stones upon her and abused her in filthy language. This was caused by the defendant due to old enmity with the family of Shri Bhag Mal. That on 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 PM while plaintiff was alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar defendant without reasonable and sufficient cause threw stones upon her and abused her in filthy language. This was caused by the defendant due to old enmity with the family of Shri Bhag Mal. Similarly in the year 1995 the defendant alongwith his wife Smt. Kaushalya Devi and his son Shri Rajinder on 30.11.1995 at about 8:30 AM entered in the house of plaintiff and gave sever beatings to her and her husband and the matter was reported to the local police and police sent a case to Sub Divisional Magistrate (Rural), Shimla under the provisions of Section 107, 151 Cr.P.C. which was decided on 07.04.1997 and the Sub Divisional Magistrate directed the defendant to keep peace and harmony in the locality. 4. That due to throwing of stones plaintiff suffered serious injuries in her body including arm fracture. Defendant also threw a big stone upon the head of plaintiff but it struck against her right arm and it resulted in a big bone fracture. Defendant also threw stones over the lintel of the house of plaintiff and threatened plaintiff and other members of family including her father-in-law to threw away from the property in dispute. In fact, defendant is acting on the instance and guidance of one Shri Ram Krishan son of Shri Deep Ram who is in litigation with father-in-law of plaintiff. Immediately after the incident the plaintiff reported the matter to the police at Police Station, Dhalli and police got examined plaintiff from the Doctor who has issued Medico-Legal-Certificate. The doctor also put a plaster on the arm of plaintiff for a period of 45 days. Due to this fracture the plaintiff was prevented from doing her routine duties towards the family members and also to do other family affairs. The husband of the plaintiff Shri Sukh Dev is working as Mason/Carpenter and is getting Rs.200/- per day as wages. Due to fracture in the arm of plaintiff her husband could not attend his work from 22.05.2000 onwards for a period of about two months. He was looking after plaintiff and her family members. Plaintiff has suffered physically, monetarily and mentally. Due to fracture in the arm of plaintiff her husband could not attend his work from 22.05.2000 onwards for a period of about two months. He was looking after plaintiff and her family members. Plaintiff has suffered physically, monetarily and mentally. Defendant after the said incident and matter being reported to the local police has still giving threats to the plaintiff and her family members and threatened that they will suffer in case they take any legal action against him. In fact, the defendant want to threw away the plaintiff and her husband from the property of her father-in-law and he intend to occupy the same and he is being helped in this work by Shri Ram Krishan. Defendant is giving threats to the children of plaintiff who are school going while coming back from the school. Plaintiff apprehends danger to her life and lives of her family members and property. 7. That the cause of action arose to the plaintiff against the defendant on 22.05.2000. 17. A perusal of the relevant portion of the plaint extracted above, leave no matter of doubt that the plea of the plaintiff is not founded against the action of joint tortfeasors or wrongdoers but is founded against an individual action of the defendant alone. 18. Proceeding further, it would be noticed that the foundation of the plaintiff is the FIR Ext.PW6/A & B, however, in case the FIR is minutely scrutinized, it would be revealed that there are no allegations against the defendant therein and rather it has been specifically alleged in the FIR that one Paramjit had hurled stone at the plaintiff. 19. That apart, it would be noticed that when the trial of the FIR culminated into a charge-sheet, it was then that the defendant was also arraigned as an accused and after full-fledged trial, the defendant was acquitted of the case. 20. Even though the learned counsel for the plaintiff would vehemently argue that the contents of the FIR or the final judgment cannot be taken into consideration, however, I really do not find any substance in such contention. It was the plaintiff, who herself had placed strong reliance on the FIR in the trial whereof the defendant was ultimately acquitted. 20. Even though the learned counsel for the plaintiff would vehemently argue that the contents of the FIR or the final judgment cannot be taken into consideration, however, I really do not find any substance in such contention. It was the plaintiff, who herself had placed strong reliance on the FIR in the trial whereof the defendant was ultimately acquitted. No doubt, the FIR of its own cannot be taken into consideration as a substantive piece of evidence, however, once it is relied upon by the plaintiff to support the case, then the FIR cannot be ignored and likewise even the outcome of the FIR can be ignored. 21. Apart from above, no doubt the learned Trial Court awarded damages to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- to the plaintiff but there was no virtual material on the basis of which the learned Trial Court could have done so. There was no proof or document produced by the plaintiff to prove the injury, no prescription slip, no bills and only one cash memo that too of the year 1995 was produced, whereas the incident in question alleged to have taken place in May, 2000. 22. Lastly, it would be noticed that the FIR in question was against the wife and the son of the defendant and defendant, in fact, was arraigned as an accused at a later stage. 23. As regards substantial question No. 3 it needs to be noticed that the learned first Appellate Court has not at all dismissed the suit for non-joinder of party as claimed by the plaintiff rather the suit has been dismissed on merits. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal, consequently, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Plaintiff is the appellant, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court whereby the suit was ordered to be dismissed by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court, has filed the instant appeal. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the "plaintiff" and the "defendants". 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff was residing alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the "plaintiff" and the "defendants". 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff was residing alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar. On 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 P.M. the defendant came to her house and started abusing her and also started hurling stones at her as a result whereof arm of the plaintiff was fractured and the matter was reported to the police. The defendant was prosecuted before the criminal court. It was alleged that on account of the plaster, the plaintiff could not work for 45 days and it was her husband, who was working as mason had to abandon his work to do the household work. She also claimed to have incurred expenditure on medical treatment. It was lastly averred that because of the acts of the defendant, she had suffered physical and mental pain and also financial loss as such she was entitled to recover a sum of Rs.70,000/- as damages from the defendant. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement wherein he raised various preliminary objections and have also averred that he had not pelted stones upon the plaintiff nor he abused and prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 16.01.2002:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.70,000/- on account of damages as alleged? OPP 2. Whether this suit is not maintainable? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of party? OPD 4. Relief. 5. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for Rs.50,000/- with future interest at the rate 6% constraining the defendant to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, which came to be allowed vide judgment and decree passed to this effect on 14.10.2008. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal, which was admitted by this Court on 12.12.2008 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal, which was admitted by this Court on 12.12.2008 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the learned first Appellate Court has committed an error by adopting an erroneous approach to the suit by setting aside decree passed by learned trial Court on the ground that there is no cause of action and non-joinder of parties when the plaintiff/appellant had cause of action against the wrong doers/tort feasers severally or jointly? 2. Whether it is necessary for the appellant, who is the claimant in suit, to implead every person guilty of tort/wrong so long as the party against whom the suit is pressed is one of the tort feasers acting in concert? 3. Whether a complete and effective relief granted by learned Trial Court which has no possibility of the decree becoming in executable or infructuous can be set aside merely on the ground of non-joinder of party of some of the wrong doers who are family members as son and wife of respondent/defendant and had committed the illegal act of causing injury to the appellant/plaintiff in concert? Questions No. 1 to 3 7. Since, all these questions are intrinsically interlinked and interconnected, therefore, they are taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by way of a common reasoning. 8. It is vehemently argued by Ms. Seema K. Guleria, learned counsel for the plaintiff that since the defendant was one amongst the joint tortfeasors, therefore, the suit as filed against him was very much maintainable. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the meaning of "tortfeasors": 9. Two or more persons become joint tortfeasors (wrongdoers) by either committing a tort in concert or by the principle of vicarious liability (as in the case of master and servant or principal and agent). Under the Law of Torts, joining wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the whole of the damages. Where the liability is joint and several, the person aggrieved has the choice of suing either of the joint tortfeasors or both of them. Under the Law of Torts, joining wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the whole of the damages. Where the liability is joint and several, the person aggrieved has the choice of suing either of the joint tortfeasors or both of them. But, where only one of the tortfeasors (master) is sued, not on the ground that he committed any wrong, but on the ground that he is vicariously liable for the tort committed by the other tortfeasor (servant), then to make the master liable, it is necessary to prove that the servant (who is not sued) acted in the course of employment and acted negligently. 10. Salmond in his Treatise on torts, states thus (18th Edition, page 417 et sequens): "Where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers, those wrong doers may be either joint or independent tortfeasors. Persons are to be deemed joint tortfeasors within the meaning of this rule whenever they are responsible for the same tort-that is to say, whenever the law for any reason imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. This happens in at least three classes of cases namely, agency, vicarious liability and common action.... In order to be joint tortfeasors they must in fact or in law, have committed the same wrongful act... The injuria as well as the damnum must be the same." "Joint wrongdoers are jointly and severally responsible for the whole damage. That is to say, the person injured may sue any of them separately for the full amount of the loss; or he may sue all of them jointly in the same action, and even in this latter case the judgment so obtained against all of them may be executed in full against any of them." 11. In Black's Dictionary, 'Joint and several liability' is defined as follows: "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together, at his opinion". 12. In Black's Dictionary, 'Joint and several liability' is defined as follows: "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together, at his opinion". 12. In Shawcross on Motor Insurance (2nd Edition), it is observed thus: "Joint tortfeasors, that is, those persons who together incur responsibility in respect of the same wrongful act, whether by way of vicarious responsibility or by way of common action in a wrongful activity were at common law jointly and severally responsible for the whole of the damages sustained by the injured party. At common law, this gave the latter the right to choose whether he should seek to take one or all of the joint wrongdoers liable in an action, but once he had obtained judgment against those sued he could not proceed against the others...." 13. Joint tortfeasors, as per 10th Edn. Of Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, have been described as under: Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tortfeasors, within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of action against each of them is the same, namely, that the same evidence would support an action against them individually... Accordingly, they will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for which they are responsible because the law imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at the same time. This occurs in case of (a) agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c) where a tort is committed in the course of a joint act, whilst pursuing a common purpose agreed between them." 14. The precise question came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 273 , wherein after relying upon the definition of joint tortfeasors in Charlesworth & Percy on negligence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court enumerated the possibility regarding the fixation of liability of concert tortfeasors, which reads thus:- 22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1 In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1 In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. 22.2 In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-a-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. 22.3 In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to determine inter se extent of negligence between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of the payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. 22.4 It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award. 15. However, the moot question is whether the claim of the plaintiff is, in fact, against a joint tortfeasors or is individually directed against the defendant alone. For deciding this question it would be necessary to take a look at the pleadings in the suit. 16. It would be necessary to advert to paras 3, 4 and 7 of the plaint which reads thus:- 3. That on 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 PM while plaintiff was alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar defendant without reasonable and sufficient cause threw stones upon her and abused her in filthy language. This was caused by the defendant due to old enmity with the family of Shri Bhag Mal. That on 22.05.2000 at about 2:00 PM while plaintiff was alone at her residence at village Neri Dhar defendant without reasonable and sufficient cause threw stones upon her and abused her in filthy language. This was caused by the defendant due to old enmity with the family of Shri Bhag Mal. Similarly in the year 1995 the defendant alongwith his wife Smt. Kaushalya Devi and his son Shri Rajinder on 30.11.1995 at about 8:30 AM entered in the house of plaintiff and gave sever beatings to her and her husband and the matter was reported to the local police and police sent a case to Sub Divisional Magistrate (Rural), Shimla under the provisions of Section 107, 151 Cr.P.C. which was decided on 07.04.1997 and the Sub Divisional Magistrate directed the defendant to keep peace and harmony in the locality. 4. That due to throwing of stones plaintiff suffered serious injuries in her body including arm fracture. Defendant also threw a big stone upon the head of plaintiff but it struck against her right arm and it resulted in a big bone fracture. Defendant also threw stones over the lintel of the house of plaintiff and threatened plaintiff and other members of family including her father-in-law to threw away from the property in dispute. In fact, defendant is acting on the instance and guidance of one Shri Ram Krishan son of Shri Deep Ram who is in litigation with father-in-law of plaintiff. Immediately after the incident the plaintiff reported the matter to the police at Police Station, Dhalli and police got examined plaintiff from the Doctor who has issued Medico-Legal-Certificate. The doctor also put a plaster on the arm of plaintiff for a period of 45 days. Due to this fracture the plaintiff was prevented from doing her routine duties towards the family members and also to do other family affairs. The husband of the plaintiff Shri Sukh Dev is working as Mason/Carpenter and is getting Rs.200/- per day as wages. Due to fracture in the arm of plaintiff her husband could not attend his work from 22.05.2000 onwards for a period of about two months. He was looking after plaintiff and her family members. Plaintiff has suffered physically, monetarily and mentally. Due to fracture in the arm of plaintiff her husband could not attend his work from 22.05.2000 onwards for a period of about two months. He was looking after plaintiff and her family members. Plaintiff has suffered physically, monetarily and mentally. Defendant after the said incident and matter being reported to the local police has still giving threats to the plaintiff and her family members and threatened that they will suffer in case they take any legal action against him. In fact, the defendant want to threw away the plaintiff and her husband from the property of her father-in-law and he intend to occupy the same and he is being helped in this work by Shri Ram Krishan. Defendant is giving threats to the children of plaintiff who are school going while coming back from the school. Plaintiff apprehends danger to her life and lives of her family members and property. 7. That the cause of action arose to the plaintiff against the defendant on 22.05.2000. 17. A perusal of the relevant portion of the plaint extracted above, leave no matter of doubt that the plea of the plaintiff is not founded against the action of joint tortfeasors or wrongdoers but is founded against an individual action of the defendant alone. 18. Proceeding further, it would be noticed that the foundation of the plaintiff is the FIR Ext.PW6/A & B, however, in case the FIR is minutely scrutinized, it would be revealed that there are no allegations against the defendant therein and rather it has been specifically alleged in the FIR that one Paramjit had hurled stone at the plaintiff. 19. That apart, it would be noticed that when the trial of the FIR culminated into a charge-sheet, it was then that the defendant was also arraigned as an accused and after full-fledged trial, the defendant was acquitted of the case. 20. Even though the learned counsel for the plaintiff would vehemently argue that the contents of the FIR or the final judgment cannot be taken into consideration, however, I really do not find any substance in such contention. It was the plaintiff, who herself had placed strong reliance on the FIR in the trial whereof the defendant was ultimately acquitted. 20. Even though the learned counsel for the plaintiff would vehemently argue that the contents of the FIR or the final judgment cannot be taken into consideration, however, I really do not find any substance in such contention. It was the plaintiff, who herself had placed strong reliance on the FIR in the trial whereof the defendant was ultimately acquitted. No doubt, the FIR of its own cannot be taken into consideration as a substantive piece of evidence, however, once it is relied upon by the plaintiff to support the case, then the FIR cannot be ignored and likewise even the outcome of the FIR can be ignored. 21. Apart from above, no doubt the learned Trial Court awarded damages to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- to the plaintiff but there was no virtual material on the basis of which the learned Trial Court could have done so. There was no proof or document produced by the plaintiff to prove the injury, no prescription slip, no bills and only one cash memo that too of the year 1995 was produced, whereas the incident in question alleged to have taken place in May, 2000. 22. Lastly, it would be noticed that the FIR in question was against the wife and the son of the defendant and defendant, in fact, was arraigned as an accused at a later stage. 23. As regards substantial question No. 3 it needs to be noticed that the learned first Appellate Court has not at all dismissed the suit for non-joinder of party as claimed by the plaintiff rather the suit has been dismissed on merits. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal, consequently, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.