JUDGMENT : Ashok Kumar Gaur, J. 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-Management challenging the order dated 16.11.2016 passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter shall be referred to as "the Tribunal"). The Tribunal while passing the impugned order has set aside the order dated 20.07.2013 terminating the services of the respondent-employee. The Tribunal has also given direction to reinstate the respondent-employee with continuity in service with all consequential benefits including salary and allowances. 2. The present writ petition is a result of protracted litigation between the parties and the earlier history of the litigation is required to be noted down by this court. 3. The respondent-employee, who was working as a Teacher in the petitioner's Institution, was issued a chargesheet dated 05.03.2009 wherein two charges were levelled against her. The charge No. 1 was in respect of writing a letter to the Chairman of Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), New Delhi whereby reputation of the Institution was said to be maligned. The petitioner-Management felt that the respondent-employee with malicious intention against the Management and the Principal of Institution had written the said letter and thereby committed a serious misconduct which necessitated a disciplinary action. 4. The charge No. 2 was in respect of helping the daughter of the respondent-employee in writing correct answers during examination and the daughter of the respondent-employee was said to have been allowed by the respondent-employee to use whitener during examination and terming such action, the petitioner-Management thought that the respondent-employee committed a serious misconduct and the same was unbecoming of a Teacher of a prestigious school. 5. The respondent-employee had submitted her reply to the chargesheet and the same was not found to be satisfactory and departmental enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry report dated 27.04.2009 and after an explanation being called from the respondent-employee, the petitioner-Management imposed punishment of 'removal from service' vide order dated 25.06.2009. 6. The respondent-employee had filed Appeal No. 30/2009 before the Tribunal challenging the punishment order dated 25.06.2009. The Tribunal by the order dated 25.02.2010 allowed the appeal of the respondent-employee and set aside the punishment order dated 25.06.2009 and the respondent-employee was held entitled to be reinstated back in service with all consequential benefits of continuity in service, payment of salary and other allowance, etc. 7. The Tribunal by the order dated 25.02.2010 allowed the appeal of the respondent-employee and set aside the punishment order dated 25.06.2009 and the respondent-employee was held entitled to be reinstated back in service with all consequential benefits of continuity in service, payment of salary and other allowance, etc. 7. The petitioner-Management had felt aggrieved against the order of the Tribunal dated 25.02.2010 and they challenged the same by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4007/2010 and this court disposed of the writ petition, filed by the petitioner-Management, vide order dated 02.11.2012 with liberty to hold disciplinary proceedings, as per the procedure prescribed under the law or any procedure prescribed under the Rules, framed by the petitioner's institution. The court further found that the respondent-employee would not be entitled to get salary for the intervening period and if the enquiry concluded in favour of the respondent-employee, then she was to be entitled for the wages during the intervening period and if the result of enquiry was against her, then she was not to be entitled for wages for the intervening period. The holding of enquiry was left to the wisdom of the petitioner-Management. 8. The respondent-employee felt aggrieved against order of the Single Bench of this court dated 02.11.2012 and she filed intra-court appeal being D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1654/2012 and the Division Bench disposed of her intra-court appeal with certain terms and conditions, as were agreed between the parties. The petitioner-Management was directed to change the Enquiry Officer and he was not to be connected with the employer-school. The enquiry was to be concluded with an outer limit of two months and the respondent-employee was directed to cooperate with the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner-Management was directed to pay full salary to the respondent-employee from the date of order of the Single Bench dated 02.11.2012. The petitioner-Management was granted liberty not to assign any work to the respondent-employee. 9. The petitioner-Management decided to conduct fresh enquiry, as per the directions of the court and one Mohan Lal Pareek was appointed as Enquiry Officer. 10. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted the Enquiry Report on 21.06.2013. The respondent-employee filed a representation against the said Enquiry Report and the petitioner-Management vide punishment order dated 20.07.2013 decided to remove the respondent-employee from service. 11. 10. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted the Enquiry Report on 21.06.2013. The respondent-employee filed a representation against the said Enquiry Report and the petitioner-Management vide punishment order dated 20.07.2013 decided to remove the respondent-employee from service. 11. The appeal filed by the respondent-employee has been allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 16.11.2016, as stated in the earlier paragraphs. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the petitioner-Management was prejudice against the respondent-employee and the entire exercise of holding enquiry was an eye-wash and drama. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the allegation of committing serious misconduct by permitting the use of whitener to correct answers of daughter of the respondent-employee, could not have been the subject matter of enquiry as one letter dated 11.12.2008 (filed with the rejoinder before the Tribunal) was addressed by the respondent-employee to the Principal making a request to change her duty. The Principal is alleged to have neither changed the duty of the respondent-employee nor changed the sitting arrangement of daughter of the respondent-employee as she was assigned Invigilator duty in the same classroom. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that prejudice in the mind of the petitioner-Management was apparent and since timely action was not taken on the letter dated 11.12.2008, submitted by the respondent-employee, the entire procedure of passing the punishment order dated 20.07.2013 suffers from mala fide intention of the petitioner-Management. 12. The Tribunal has also rejected the submission of the petitioner-Management that in the present case Rule 64 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-Aid and Service Conditions, Etc.) Rules, 1993 has not been followed. The Tribunal has held that for invoking jurisdiction under the Rules, 1993, the filing of application under Section 64 of Rules, 1993 is not mandatory. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Management Mr. Prahlad Singh has raised following submissions before this Court:- (a) The Tribunal has committed illegality in passing the impugned order only on the ground of mala fide or prejudice of the petitioner-Management against the respondent-employee to implicate her in the departmental proceedings and then to further punish her. (b) The pleadings of mala fide were not at all taken before the Tribunal neither in the memo of appeal, which was filed against the punishment order nor any case was made out of assailing the action, on the ground of biasness or mala fide. (b) The pleadings of mala fide were not at all taken before the Tribunal neither in the memo of appeal, which was filed against the punishment order nor any case was made out of assailing the action, on the ground of biasness or mala fide. (c) The basis for passing the impugned order by the Tribunal was letter dated 11.12.2008, said to be written by the respondent-employee, for changing her duty. Counsel submitted that the said letter was not admitted by the petitioner-Management, during the enquiry proceedings and the Enquiry Officer had clearly observed in his report that the petitioner-Management had denied receipt of such letter by the respondent-employee. Counsel submitted that in absence of admission of letter, which was marked as Exhibit D-64, during the course of enquiry, the Tribunal could not have relied upon such letter in respect to change of duty of the respondent-employee. (d) The respondent-employee had nowhere challenged the findings of Enquiry Officer to be perverse and in absence of challenge to the findings of Enquiry Officer, the Tribunal could not have substituted its own finding as an appellate authority. (e) The Tribunal while passing the impugned order has failed to take into account that there were two charges, which were serious in nature, against the respondent-employee and charge No. 1 was with regard to writing letter to the higher authorities, maligning the reputation and prestige of the Principal and the Institution. Counsel submitted that charge No. 1 was proved against the respondent-employee and the Tribunal has not given any finding in respect of the charge No. 1. (f) Assuming though not admitting that finding in respect of charge No. 2 of the Enquiry Officer was not found to be proved by the Tribunal but the Tribunal in face of finding on charge No. 1, could not have given clean-chit to the respondent-employee and could not have set aside the punishment order. (g) In a case, where allegations are levelled of mala fide action on the part of any authority, necessary pleadings including impleadment of such party is imperative. The charge of mala fides is further required to be proved by leading cogent evidence and only on surmises and conjectures, the charge of mala fide cannot be treated to be proved. (g) In a case, where allegations are levelled of mala fide action on the part of any authority, necessary pleadings including impleadment of such party is imperative. The charge of mala fides is further required to be proved by leading cogent evidence and only on surmises and conjectures, the charge of mala fide cannot be treated to be proved. (h) The act of respondent-employee of writing letters to the senior officers of CBSE and different authorities, maligning reputation and prestige of the Principal and the Institution and further permitting use of unfair means in examination to her daughter, are major misconduct, as per the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the petitioner's Institution and as such adequate punishment was imposed upon the respondent-employee by the petitioner-Management. (i) The respondent-employee except making bald allegations that the procedure of enquiry not being followed, nowhere pleaded and proved that the petitioner-Management was biased or it had acted in a mala fide manner against the respondent-employee. 14. Mr. Prahlad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner-Management, has placed reliance on the Apex Court judgment in State of Bihar & Anr. Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS & Anr. reported in 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 222. The portion of the judgment, on which reliance has been placed, is reproduced as under:- "49. The focal point from the above background is whether the charge-sheets are vitiated by the alleged mala fides on the part of either of the complainant R.K. Singh or the Investigating Officer G.N. Sharma. In Judicial Review of Administrative Action S.A. de Smith, (3rd edn. at p. 293) stated that: "The concept of bad faith ... in relation to the exercise of statutory powers ... comprise dishonesty (or fraud) and malice. A power is exercised fraudulently if its repository intends to achieve an object other than that for which he believes the power to have been conferred. His intention may be to promote another public interest or private interest. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise... The administrative discretion means power of being administratively discreet. It implies authority to do an act or to decide a matter a discretion". His intention may be to promote another public interest or private interest. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise... The administrative discretion means power of being administratively discreet. It implies authority to do an act or to decide a matter a discretion". The administrative authority is free to act in its discretion if he deems necessary or if he or it is satisfied of the immediacy of official action on his or its part. His responsibility lies only to the superiors and the Government. The power to act in discretion is not power to act ad-arbitrium. It is not a despotic power, nor hedged with arbitrariness, nor legal irresponsibility to exercise discretionary power in excess of the statutory ground disregarding the prescribed conditions for ulterior motive. If done it bring the authority concerned in conflict with law. When the power was exercised mala fide it undoubtedly gets vitiated by colourable exercise of power. 50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive; and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. 51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand." 15. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand." 15. Reliance is further placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment passed by this Court in Avinash Mathur Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2001 (4) WLC 470 and the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- "3. It is well to remember that there is a presumption of a Government servant, working bona fidely. There could be no presumption about working mala fidely. It is held that it is easy to allege mala fides, against a public servant, but it is very difficult, to prove it. It is to be imbibed that if an allegation of mala fide, is made against a public servant, then, he is required to be impleaded in the array of respondents, in person, by name, as a party, in addition to his impleadment, in his official capacity, in a writ petition, so that against whom mala fides are alleged, may get an opportunity, to rebut the allegations of mala fides. In the present case, the petitioner has not impleaded the reporting officer, by name, in the array of respondents, separately, after impleading him, in his official capacity, giving him an opportunity, to rebut the allegations of mala fides, alleged against him, by the petitioner, therefore, the plea of mala fides, against the reporting officer, is not acceptable, and it is hereby repelled." 16. Mr. Ankit Sethi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-employee made following submissions:- (a) The findings recorded by the Tribunal do not require any interference by this court while exercising powers under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. (b) All the pleas were raised before the Tribunal to nullify the order of punishment and the Tribunal after considering the pleadings of the parties has come to the conclusion that the petitioner-Management had not acted in bona fide manner, while passing the punishment/removal order. (c) From the pleadings of the respondent-employee a clear case of mala fide/arbitrary exercise of power by the petitioner-Management was made out and accordingly, the Tribunal had passed the order. (c) From the pleadings of the respondent-employee a clear case of mala fide/arbitrary exercise of power by the petitioner-Management was made out and accordingly, the Tribunal had passed the order. (d) The petitioner-Management had committed violation of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules, 1993 and proper committee was also not constituted to hold enquiry against the respondent-employee and as such without proper approval of the competent authority, the punishment order is vitiated. (e) The writ petition which has been filed before this court nowhere assails the findings of the Tribunal and the memo of grounds, which have been pleaded in the writ petition, nowhere reflect the legal submissions which are sought to be raised during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Management. 17. Counsel for the respondent-employee placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Director of Education and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 541 and the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- "40. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent-School is a recognized private school and the appellant is an 'employee' in terms of Section 2(h) of the DSE Act. Chapter IV of the DSE Act provides for the terms and conditions of services of an employee of a recognized private school. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act contemplates that no employee of a recognized private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall their services be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director of Education, Delhi. In the instant case, the respondent-Managing Committee, before terminating the services of the appellant did not comply with the said mandatory provision of Section 8(2) of the DSE Act. The learned counsel for the appellant further contends that the notice regarding termination of service was served on the appellant on 07.01.2003, and as on that date, the aforesaid statutory provision was valid and binding. 41. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a substantive right provided for safeguarding the conditions of services of an employee. The termination of services of the appellant without obtaining prior permission of the Director, renders the action of the respondent-School as void. 41. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a substantive right provided for safeguarding the conditions of services of an employee. The termination of services of the appellant without obtaining prior permission of the Director, renders the action of the respondent-School as void. The learned counsel contends that when statutory provisions provide a procedure to do an act in a particular manner, it should be done in that very manner or not at all. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors.; "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: "...where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law." 18. Counsel further placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Smt. S.R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 1979 SC 49 and the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- "5. We have made a mention of the plea of malice which the appellant had taken in her writ petition. Although she made an allegation of malice against V.D. Vyas under whom she served for a very short period and got an adverse report, there is nothing on the record to show that Vyas was able to influence the Central Government in making the order of premature retirement dated March 26, 1976. Although she made an allegation of malice against V.D. Vyas under whom she served for a very short period and got an adverse report, there is nothing on the record to show that Vyas was able to influence the Central Government in making the order of premature retirement dated March 26, 1976. It is not therefore the case of the appellant that there was actual malicious intention on the part of the Government in making the alleged wrongful order of her premature retirement so as to amount to malice in fact. Malice in law is, however, quite different. Viscount Haldane described it as follows in Shearer and another v. Shield, (1914) AC 808 at p. 813:- 'A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore be guilty of malice in law, although, so far the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently." Thus malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse or for want of reasonable or probable cause." 19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material on record. 20. This court is primarily concerned with the reasoning assigned by the Tribunal while allowing the appeal filed by the respondent-employee. The Tribunal has relied upon the letter dated 11.12.2008, said to be written by the respondent-employee informing the Principal to change her duty as Invigilator on account of her daughter appearing in examination in a particular class-room where duty was assigned to the respondent-employee. This court finds that before the Enquiry Officer letter dated 11.12.2008 was produced by the respondent-employee and the same was shown at S. No. 4 in the list of documents filed by the respondent-employee and it was marked as Exhibit D-64. The petitioner-Management had not admitted few documents including the Exhibit D-64. The Enquiry Officer had further recorded that the said letter requesting for change of duty was not admitted and the same was also not found to be proved. 21. The petitioner-Management had not admitted few documents including the Exhibit D-64. The Enquiry Officer had further recorded that the said letter requesting for change of duty was not admitted and the same was also not found to be proved. 21. This court finds that the respondent-employee has not assailed the findings of Enquiry Officer in respect of the said letter dated 11.12.2008. 22. So far as the submissions of learned counsel for the respondent-employee that the respondent-employee had assailed findings of the Enquiry Officer and further that the said document, which was an important piece of evidence was wrongly not admitted or not found proved by the Management are concerned, this court finds that the findings of the Enquiry Officer can be challenged if the same are perverse or based on no material or any evidence which is produced, was discarded without any justification. In the present case, the respondent-employee did not raise this plea that the document/letter written by her was received by the petitioner-Management and yet they did not change her duty. The defence taken by the respondent-employee has not been proved during enquiry proceedings and the same was also not assailed before the Tribunal in specific terms. 23. This court finds substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Management that in connection with the findings recorded by the Tribunal, in respect of mala fide actions of the petitioner-Management, no pleadings were taken in the entire memo of appeal by the respondent-employee. With reference to ground 'I' in the memo of appeal raised by counsel for the respondent-employee, this court finds that the respondent-employee had only alleged that she was not provided with proper documentation and order sheets which she requested from time to time, during enquiry and this action of the petitioner-Management was termed as "mala fide action" and on that basis the punishment order was sought to be quashed. This court finds that for recording the plea of mala fides, the Tribunal ought to have considered the relevant pleadings and in absence of any specific allegation of mala fides of a particular person, the Tribunal could not have recorded a finding that the punishment order was passed due to mala fide intention of the petitioner-Management. 24. This court finds that for recording the plea of mala fides, the Tribunal ought to have considered the relevant pleadings and in absence of any specific allegation of mala fides of a particular person, the Tribunal could not have recorded a finding that the punishment order was passed due to mala fide intention of the petitioner-Management. 24. This court finds that if any action of employer or any person/authority, on the ground of mala fide is challenged, then it requires specific details for enabling the court to make an enquiry into the facts and, therefore, the allegations need to be supported with attendant circumstances. The allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than proved and very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. The mala fide cannot be presumed but has to be proved. In case of allegations of mala fide, the particular officer/authority against whom mala fide has been alleged, needs to affirm the same by counter affidavit. 25. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors. reported in 2006 SCC (L&S) 47 has considered the nature and mode of proof and duty of court to consider the mala fide action, if it is alleged by a party. The extract of the judgment, relevant for the present purpose, is reproduced hereunder:- "21. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man's mind, for that is what the employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficulty is not lessened when one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the law that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. It is not the law that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. (S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab). It cannot be overlooked that burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demand proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. (See Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar)." 26. This court finds difference between malice and mala fide. In law malice means a wrongful act intentionally performed but without just cause, the term 'mala fide' includes malice and yet an ulterior motive to cause injury to someone. The difference lies in degree only and mala fide means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. 27. This court finds that the plea of mala fide has to be proved from attendant facts and record of the case and proof has to be of necessity, indirect i.e. circumstantial. It is, thus, clear that mere averments of mala fides is not enough. This must be supported by facts and in somewhat overwhelming details interwoven to indicate a bad motive or intention to cause deliberate prejudice. This court further finds that allegation of mala fide is a serious thing that requires sufficient particulars and in absence of same, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry on mala fide. 28. This court further finds that the Tribunal has not given any finding in respect of the charge No. 1 which was found to be proved against the respondent-employee. 28. This court further finds that the Tribunal has not given any finding in respect of the charge No. 1 which was found to be proved against the respondent-employee. The Tribunal, without setting aside the findings on charge No. 1 arrived against the respondent-employee, could not have proceeded to hold that the charge No. 2 was not proved against the respondent-employee due to mala fide intention of the petitioner-Management and she could not have been exonerated only on account of giving her clean-chit in respect of the charge No. 2. This court finds that if the punishment order was based on the finding of two charges, proved against the respondent-employee, the necessary findings were also required to be given in respect of both the charges and the Tribunal has not addressed itself with respect of the allegations of maligning the reputation and prestige of the Principal and the petitioner's Institution, as contained in charge No. 1. 29. This court further finds that the Tribunal was required to look into correctness of the order passed by the disciplinary authority or the procedure, which is required for holding enquiry, has been properly followed or not. The Tribunal has not given any finding in respect of any violation of principle of natural justice or depriving the respondent-employee to defend herself in proper manner before the Enquiry Officer. This court finds that in absence of such reasoning and finding, the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 30. So far as the reliance placed by the counsel on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is concerned, the principle decided by the Apex Court is not applicable in the present case. The question of seeking prior approval of the Director is not relevant in the present matter as the impugned order, in the present case, has been passed on the ground of malafide action of the petitioner-Management in initiating enquiry against the respondent-employee. The issue of seeking prior approval of the Director is not required to be considered by this court in the present matter. 31. So far as the reliance placed by the counsel on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. S.R. Venkataraman (supra), this court finds that the Apex Court has made a difference between malice in law and malice in facts. 31. So far as the reliance placed by the counsel on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. S.R. Venkataraman (supra), this court finds that the Apex Court has made a difference between malice in law and malice in facts. The Apex Court, in the facts of the case, found that nothing on record was found that a particular person was influencing the decision of the Central Government for passing the order of premature retirement. The Apex Court did not find malice in the facts to be proved and only distinction was drawn between the malice in fact and malice in law. The present case is not a case of malice in law but malice in facts. In that view of the matter, this court finds that the facts of the case relied upon by counsel for the respondent-employee and the facts of the case in hand are totally different and the judgments rendered by the Apex Court, with due respect, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 32. In the result, the writ petition filed by the petitioner-Management is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal dated 16.11.2016 is quashed and set aside. No costs.