JUDGMENT : K.S. Mudagal, J. This regular second appeal of defendant Nos.1 and 4 arises out of judgment and decree dated 03.11.2014 in R.A.No.83/2010 passed by II Additional District & Sessions Judge, Davanagere. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 01.07.2010 passed by Senior Civil Judge, Harihar in O.S.No.164/2003. By the said judgment and decree, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for partition and separate possession of her 1/7th share in the suit schedule properties. 3. Respondent No.1 was plaintiff. Appellant Nos.1 and 2 were defendant Nos.1 and 4. Respondent No.2 were defendant No.2. Respondent Nos.3 to 6 were legal representatives of deceased defendant No.3 Majjige Manjappa. Defendant No.5 in the suit was wife of propositus Majjige Murigeppa. 4. For the purpose of convenience, parties will be referred to henceforth with their ranks before the trial Court. 5. Subject matter of the suit were as follows: (i) Land bearing Survey No.18/2(a) measuring 1 acre 12 guntas; (ii) Survey No.18/2/b) measuring 1 acre 11 guntas; (iii) Survey No.16/P4 measuring 1 acre of Haralapura village, Harihar; (iv) House bearing No.133 measuring 30' x 40' of Harihar Town; (v) Vacant site bearing No.186 measuring 22' x 80' of Harihar Town. 6. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Basavarajappa @ Rajappa the husband of plaintiff were sons of Majjige Murigeppa. Defendant No.5 was wife of Majjige Murigeppa. Couple had one daughter by name Manjula. Basavarajappa @ Rajappa died on 08.07.1992. Murigeppa died in the year 1995. 7. Plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No.164/2003 contending that: (i) Suit schedule properties were ancestral joint family properties of Murigeppa and his sons; (ii) There was no partition in the joint family properties; (iii) Plaintiff's husband Basavarajappa had 1/5th share in the suit schedule 'B' & 'C' properties; & (iv) Defendants denied her share, therefore she seeks partition. 8. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 filed written statement beyond prescribed time and the same was rejected by the trial Court. They did not question the said order. 9. Defendant No.4 filed separate written statement. 8. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 filed written statement beyond prescribed time and the same was rejected by the trial Court. They did not question the said order. 9. Defendant No.4 filed separate written statement. His defence was as follows: (i) He denies that defendant Nos.1 to 3 and Basavarajappa constituted joint family and suit properties were joint family properties at the time of his death; (ii) In the year 1980, family owned only the house property and site shown as schedule 'C' property; (iii) Plaintiff's husband Basavarajappa received Rs.500/- in lieu of his share and separated from the family in the year 1980 and to record the transaction he executed memorandum of partition on 01.12.1980; (iv) Therefore, there was already division in the family so far as plaintiff's husband; (v) His father sold plaint schedule 'B' item No.1's land under Ex.D1 and Ex.D2 registered sale deeds dated 22.01.1966 and 07.05.1974 to one G.Kotrabasappa. Therefore said properties were not available when plaintiff's husband separated from the family in the year 1980. (vi) Subsequently himself and defendant Nos.1 to 3 purchased the said land under registered sale deeds Ex.D4 and Ex.D5 dated 12.11.1981 and 17.07.1989 out of their funds in the name of their father Murigeppa. Therefore, the said properties were their absolute properties and plaintiff is not entitled to any share; & (vii) Suit is barred by time. 10. On the basis of such pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the genealogy is complete? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that 'B' & 'C' schedule properties are joint family properties and further proves that she is in joint possession and enjoyment of them? 3. Whether the defendants prove that husband of plaintiff had separated from the joint family on 1.12.1980? 4. Whether the defendants prove that Sy.No.18/2(a) & 2(b) are not the properties of joint family as pleaded in para 7(v) of the written statement? 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Smt.Manjula as pleaded in para 10 of the written statement? 6. Whether the suit is hit by Art.110 of Limitation Act? 7. What order or decree? 11. The parties adduced evidence. Plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and on her behalf, Ex.P1 to Ex.P6 were marked. Defendant No.1/DW.1 was examined as power of attorney holder of defendant No.2. One Gowdra Jayamma was examined as DW.2. On behalf of defendants, Ex.D1 to Ex.D17 were marked. 12. 7. What order or decree? 11. The parties adduced evidence. Plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and on her behalf, Ex.P1 to Ex.P6 were marked. Defendant No.1/DW.1 was examined as power of attorney holder of defendant No.2. One Gowdra Jayamma was examined as DW.2. On behalf of defendants, Ex.D1 to Ex.D17 were marked. 12. The trial Court after hearing the parties decreed the suit granting 1/7th share as aforesaid on the following grounds: (i) Ex.D3 evidencing the alleged partition between plaintiff's husband and defendants requires registration and was inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, that cannot be looked into; (ii) Partition under Ex.D3 was not proved: (iii) Defendants have failed to prove that defendant Nos.1 to 4 have repurchased plaint schedule item No.1 land; (iv) As partition between parties were not proved, properties purchased subsequently in the name of Murigeppa get the character of joint family properties; (v) There was daughter and wife of Murigeppa and they also ought to be given share. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled for 1/7th share. 13. Challenging the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, appellants filed RA No.83/2010 before the II Additional District & Sessions Judge, Davanagere. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal concurring with the reasoning and findings of the trial Court. 14. This Court admitted the aforesaid appeal for consideration of the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the Courts below were justified in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for partition of 1/5th share ignoring Ex.D3 dated 1.12.1980 which is the document of recording of earlier oral partition and the same has been acted upon by the parties, including the revenue authorities? (ii) Whether the Courts below were justified in disbelieving Ex.D3-relinquishment deed as inadmissible in the evidence for want of registration when the said document is only the recording of earlier partition between the parties? (iii) Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that items A, B and C of the schedule were also joint family properties having regard to the fact of acquisition of these items under registered sale deed in 1981 and 1989 subsequent to severance of the status of plaintiff's husband in the joint family as per Exs.D4 and 5? (iv) Whether the Courts below were justified in granting decree of partition of 1/7th share in view of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohan Singh and others Vs. (iv) Whether the Courts below were justified in granting decree of partition of 1/7th share in view of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohan Singh and others Vs. Zile Singh and others, (1988) AIR SC 881? 15. Sri R.Gopal, learned Counsel for appellants seeks to assail the impugned judgment and decree of the Courts below on the following grounds: (i) Burden of proving that suit schedule properties at the time of death of Basavarajappa constituted joint family properties with his brothers and father, was on the plaintiff; (ii) Documents Ex.D11 to Ex.D17 ration card, voter's list show that Basavarajappa was not residing with defendants and Murigeppa since 1979; (iii) Those documents corroborated the contention of defendants regarding partition and regarding Basavarajappa separating from the family prior to 1980; (iv) Ex.D3 is not document of partition presenti and that is only memorandum regarding past partition effected between Basavarajappa and his parental family; (v) Ex.D3 was marked without any objection regarding admissibility ; (vi) Courts below have failed to appreciate the nature and contents of Ex.D3 with reference to Sections 48 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 ; 16. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) Roshan Singh and others v. Zile Singh and others, (1988) AIR SC 881 (ii) K.G.Shivalingappa v. G.S.Eswarappa, (2004) 12 SCC 189 (iii) Veerappa & Ors. Vs. Smt.Halavva & Ors., (2008) 2 KCCR 1015 17. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) Roshan Singh and others v. Zile Singh and others, (1988) AIR SC 881 (ii) K.G.Shivalingappa v. G.S.Eswarappa, (2004) 12 SCC 189 (iii) Veerappa & Ors. Vs. Smt.Halavva & Ors., (2008) 2 KCCR 1015 17. Per contra, Sri D.P.Mahesh, learned Counsel for respondent No.1 seeks to support the judgments of the Courts below on the following grounds: (i) First of all, transaction under Ex.D1 is not proved by examining any witness to the document or the persons who were acquainted with handwriting and signates of witnesses to the document; (ii) Ex.D3 though titled as memorandum of partition, in substance, record of partition/relinquishment of share, therefore it was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration as required under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908; (iii) If once partition set up under Ex.D3 fails, the family and the nature of the properties bear character of joint family and joint family properties; (iv) Contesting defendants failed to prove that they funded purchase of the properties under Ex.D4 and Ex.D5 in the name of Murigeppa; & (v) Merely because plaintiff-widow of coparcener was not made party to O.S.No.46/1996, specific performance suit does not divest her interest in the property, at the most, she has to share her part of liability in repurchasing the property. 18. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments: (i) Kothuri Venkata Subba Rao vs. State of A.P, (1985) 3 APLJ 50 HC] (ii) Pasagadugula Narayana Rao vs. Pasagadugula Rama Murty,2015 SCCOnline(Hyd) 346 19. In this case, relationship between the parties is not disputed. The question was whether there was prior partition under Ex.D3 as contended by defendants. The whole question was whether Ex.D3 is a document recording past transaction of partition or relinquishment of share. 20. Under Ex.D3, executant M.Basavaraj, at one stretch purportedly states that parties to the document were living jointly till date and he finds it difficult to continue in the family. But in the next statement, he purportedly states that in past he took Rs.500/- in lieu of his share and given up interest in properties. In the second page of the document he purportedly states that from the date of document, other parties to the document have become absolute owners of the immovable properties mentioned therein and they can continue enjoying the same absolutely. In the second page of the document he purportedly states that from the date of document, other parties to the document have become absolute owners of the immovable properties mentioned therein and they can continue enjoying the same absolutely. Therefore, document does not clearly state that the transaction recorded under the document was past transaction. 21. It is settled proposition of law that document cannot be interpreted solely based on it's title, but it has to be interpreted based on its substance. Ex.D3 does not specify when the alleged past separation took place, was that some years back, some months back or some days back. Further, though document one place states that the partition was effected previously, nothing was placed on record to show that even prior to Ex.D3 i.e. 01.12.1980, mutations were effected to the landed properties only retaining names of Murigeppa and defendants. 22. Having regard to the recitals of Ex.D3, it cannot be said that, it was memorandum recording past partition between the parties. Under the circumstances, judgments in Roshan Singh's case, K.G.Shivalingappa's case and Veerappa's case relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellants do not advance the case of the appellants. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh, 2019 SCCOnline(SC) 374 [Civil Appeal No.6567/2014 DD 13.03.2019] relying upon the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 in para 26 of the judgment held as follows: "26. .......As per law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; or (ii) Contrary to the law as propounded by the Apex Court; or (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence." (Emphasis supplied) 24. Having regard to the aforesaid judgment and facts stated above, this Court does not find that the findings of the Courts below suffer perversity with regard to appreciation of Ex.D3. If once, partition set up under Ex.D3 is rejected, then family continues to be joint family. 25. Whether defendants funded purchase of the property under Ex.D4 and Ex.D5 is again question of fact and both Courts have concurrently held that such plea is not proved. This Court does not find any ground to interfere with the said findings. 26. So far as reacquisition of the properties of the family in O.S.No.46/1996, plaintiff was not party to the said suit. It is submitted that plaintiff has to share her part of liability in the consideration paid to the agreement holder i.e. plaintiff in O.S.No.46/1996. Plaintiff's counsel submits that plaintiff is ready to bear that. Under the circumstances, parties can work out that in final decree proceedings. 27. For the reasons stated above, substantial questions of law framed by this Court are answered in favour of plaintiff-respondent No.1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.