JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the order dated 31.08.2018 passed in Title Suit No.22/12 by which the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rejected. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioners as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is that they have instituted a suit against the respondents being Title Suit No.22 of 2012 seeking therein the following reliefs: “(i) A declaration of the Plaintiffs' right, title and interest over the suit property; (ii) Recovery of possession of the suit Plot No.1 and confirmation of possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit plot no.198; (iii) A mandatory Injunction direction the defendants to dismantle and remove the house and structure standing on suit plot No.1 and restore the same to its original character; (iv) Costs of the suit; (v) Such other or reliefs, the Plaintiffs are entitled to in equity and justice.” 3. The respondents have appeared after calling upon by the trial court and filed the written statements wherein the plea has been taken that the suit is barred under Section 63 of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act, 1949 (in short the SPT Act, 1949) and the trial court after taking into consideration the said aspect of the matter has rejected the amendment petition by coming to the conclusion that any order passed under Section 23 of the SPT Act, 1949 which pertains to the provision of exchange either by the court of Deputy Commissioner or by the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer empowered in this behalf and against the order passed under Section 23 of the SPT Act, 1949, appeal will lie under Section 57 and therefore, the trial court was of the view that since the order passed under Section 23 of the SPT Act which has been sought to be brought on record by way of amendment, is appealable, therefore, the same cannot be incorporated by making it part of the pleading. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, learned counsel for the petitioners while assailing the aforesaid order has taken inter alia the following grounds: (i) it is not in dispute that an order passed under Section 23 of the SPT Act is appealable under Section 57 of the SPT Act but it does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as would appear from the provision of Section 63 of the SPT Act, 1949 since therein, there is no absolute bar not to entertain the suit against the order passed under the provision of the SPT Act, 1949 but this aspect has not been appreciated by the trial court while dealing with the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. (ii) the argument has been advanced when a specific issue has been raised with respect to the question of limitation as to whether the amendment can be allowed if the original suit cannot be filed against the instrument if barred by limitation as would appear from the order dated 11.07.2019 passed in the instant writ petition and answering the same it has been submitted that in assailing the orders passed in a Settlement Case No.08/1952-53 and Rev. Misc. Case No.178/1979-80, there is no question of limitation and as such even on this ground although the said ground has not been agitated before the trial court but the same, on such ground, the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 cannot be rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhulabhai and Ors. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 and an order passed by Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of Tarini Marandi Ors. vs. Lakshmi Mahto Ors., in Civil Revision No.36 of 1998. 5. Mr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 and an order passed by Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of Tarini Marandi Ors. vs. Lakshmi Mahto Ors., in Civil Revision No.36 of 1998. 5. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned counsel who has been directed by this Court to assist the Court as would appear from the order dated 06.07.2019, has submitted that even there is no period of limitation prescribed, it cannot be said that the Limitation Act, 1963 will not be applicable due to the reason that if no provision of limitation specifically has been provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 the other issues whether subjected to limitation or not would be dealt with under the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein the period of limitation for filing a suit is three years and therefore, the period of three years would be material aspect of the matter for entertaining a suit. His further submission is that since the period of limitation would be three years and the suit is of the year 2012 while the amendment petition is of the year 2018, therefore, if the amendment would be allowed, it will relate back to the date of filing of the suit i.e., sometime in the year 2012, therefore, the prayer would be treated to be of the year 2012 and since the declaration to declare the instrument created by way of Settlement Case No.08/1952-53 and the order dated 07.10.1980 in Rev. Misc. Case No.178/1979-80 is way back prior to the period of three years and therefore, it will be said to be barred by limitation and it is settled position of law that if the fresh suit cannot be entertained if subjected to the period of limitation the same cannot be allowed to be incorporated by way of amendment. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned counsel who has been directed to assist the Court and appreciating their rival submissions, the fact which is not in dispute in this case is that a title suit for declaring plaintiffs' right, title and interest over the suit property, recovery of possession of the suit plot No.1 and confirmation of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit plot No.198, a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to dismantle and remove the house and structure standing on the suit plot No.1 and restore the same to its original character has been filed. 7. The respondents/defendants on being called upon have appeared and filed their written statements wherein the plea of Section 63 of the SPT Act has been taken which provides about the bar to institute a suit in any order passed in a proceeding pertaining to SPT Act, 1949. 8. The petitioner thereafter has filed a petition under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking therein the amendments by making addition in the relief portion of the plaint after clause “1” as “further declaration that the orders of S.D.O. Passed in settlement case No.8 of 1952-53 and order dated 7.10.1980 in Rev.Misc.Case No.178/1979-80 was illegal and without jurisdiction.” 9. The defendant has objected to such petition and after consideration of rival submissions on the petition, the trial court has passed an order on 31.08.2018 by dismissing the aforesaid amendment petition stating inter alia therein that the orders passed by the S.D.O. in Settlement Case No.08/1952-53 and Rev. Misc. Case No.178/1979-80 is only to be challenged before the Deputy Commissioner and not before the civil court. 10. The aforesaid order is under challenge on the grounds as has been agitated by the petitioner as referred hereinabove. 11. This Court before going to the legality and propriety of the impugned order deem it fit and proper to refer the provision of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads hereunder as:- “[17. 10. The aforesaid order is under challenge on the grounds as has been agitated by the petitioner as referred hereinabove. 11. This Court before going to the legality and propriety of the impugned order deem it fit and proper to refer the provision of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads hereunder as:- “[17. Amendment of pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.]” It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the object and scope of an amendment is to allow the party either the plaintiff or the defendant to make addition in the plaint or in the written statement, as the case may be, if there is any subsequent development or thing which ought to have been incorporated in the plaint or in the written statement could not have been incorporated inspite of due diligence so that the party may not suffer and there may not be any multiplicity of proceeding but this scope is subject to certain conditions, which are: (i) the nature of suit is not allowed to be changed ; (ii) the party seeking the amendment prior to the amendment in the C.P.C. i.e. prior to 01.07.2002 there was blanket provision of allowing the amendment at any stage of the proceeding but after the said amendment a condition has been inserted that the amendment can be allowed at any stage of the trial but subject to the condition that the party either the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, will be able to satisfy that in spite of due diligence the amendment could not have been brought on record, meaning thereby, the party is to satisfy the court that in spite of all sincere endeavors taken, the said fact could not have been brought on record and if the court will be satisfied with the reason amendment can be allowed at any stage even before the pronouncement of the judgment ; (iii) the condition is that since the amendment if allowed, will relate back to the date of filing of the suit, therefore, the period of limitation is also to be taken into consideration by the trial court, meaning thereby, if a fresh suit cannot be filed, if subjected to the period of limitation as applicable it cannot be allowed by allowing the amendment to that effect ; (iv) Further condition that if any statement has been made either in the plaint or in the written statement and if the party wants to resile from the said statement, the amendment could not be allowed, meaning thereby, the admission made either in the plaint or in the written statement, cannot be allowed to be deleted by way of the amendment petition. These conditions have been dealt with in the catena of decision taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court some of which needs to refer hereunder as: In the case of Rajkumar Gurawara vs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Anr., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 364 , in the case of Revajeetu Builder and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and Sons and Ors., reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . The scope of allowing the amendment under the aforesaid provision has been changed after the amendment brought in the Code of Civil Procedure w.e.f. 01.07.2002 wherein it has been enacted by adding provision namely no application for amendment of the pleading shall be allowed after the trial has been commenced unless the Court comes to conclusion that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter, reference in this regard be made judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chander Kanta Bansal Vs.Rajinder Singh Anand reported in (2008) 5 SCC 117 , in the case of Sumesh Singh Vs. Phoolan Devi & Ors. reported in (2009) 12 SCC 689 and in the case of Abdul Rehman & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Ruldu & Ors. reported in (2012) 11 SCC 341 . It is settled position of law that when amendment introduces a claim on a new cause of action, the amendment shall be effected from the date of amendment and it will relates back to the date of institution of the original suit, this has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Siddalingamma and Anr. vs. Mamtha Shenoy, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 561 . It is also settled proposition of law that if any amendment is to be dissolute if afresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of L.J.Leach and Co. Ltd., & Anr. Vs. Messrs. Jairdine Skinner and Co Respondents. reported in (1957) SCR 438, in the case of T.N. Alloy Foundary Co. Ltd. Vs. T.N. Electricity Board & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 392 , Ashutosh Chaturvedi Vs.Prano Devi Alias Parani Devi & Ors. reported in (2008) 15 SCC 610 , and in the case of Ravajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy and Sons & Ors. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . 12. Ltd. Vs. T.N. Electricity Board & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 392 , Ashutosh Chaturvedi Vs.Prano Devi Alias Parani Devi & Ors. reported in (2008) 15 SCC 610 , and in the case of Ravajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy and Sons & Ors. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . 12. This Court further before proceeding to look into the legality and propriety of the order deem it fit and proper to deal with the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India has to be dealt with in two fields i.e., under the constitutional mandate as has been incorporated in the Indian Constitution wherein Article 227 confers power upon the High Court to act with power of supervision and superintendence upon all the courts or tribunals situated within the territorial jurisdiction of such High Court that is the constitutional mandate. Apart from that, after the amendment having been brought in the Code of Civil Procedure, the revisional power as provided under Section 115 of the C.P.C. has been curtailed and has been conferred upon Article 227 of the Constitution of India to deal with, by looking into the legality and propriety of the order if the order is interlocutory in nature. 13. The Articles 226 & 227 are parts of the Constitution of India which define the power of High Courts. Article 226 empowers the High Courts to issue to any person or authority including the Government (in appropriate cases), directions, orders or writs including writ in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrnto and certiorari, or any of them. The High Court is conferred with this power of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Article 227 determines that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction (except a court or forum of law related to armed forces). Article 227 determines that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction (except a court or forum of law related to armed forces). The High Court, can under Article 227 : (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts; (d) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the scope, power and difference between Articles 226 & 227, in the case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chader Rai & Ors., reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 after putting reliance upon the other Constitution Bench's judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, one of which was, Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors. vs. Radhikabai W/o Anandrao Banapurkar & Anr., reported in 1986 Supp SC 401 which laid down the power, scope and difference between Articles 226 & 227. This Court is only considering the scope of Article 227 since the matter pertains with respect to the power conferred upon the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to Tribunals as well. The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. In the case of Surya Devi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down the difference between Articles 226 & 227 by holding therein that the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court (Article 226), exercise of supervisory jurisdiction (Article 227) is not an original jurisdiction and in this regard, it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. The issue decided in the case of Surya Devi (supra) has been referred to the larger Bench in the case of Radhe Shyam & Anr. The issue decided in the case of Surya Devi (supra) has been referred to the larger Bench in the case of Radhe Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors., reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 wherein the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that in the judicial proceeding the provision of Article 227 will only be invoked. Further in the said judgment it has been held that the power of Article 227 wherein the High Court can exercise as a corrective writ jurisdiction forum, meaning thereby, if the High Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India comes to the conclusion that any error has been committed by the trial Court, the views can be substituted by the High Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India so that the order which has been passed and found to suffer from any illegality, the same can be substituted by passing a fresh order but that power is not available to the High Court under Article 226 since if the High Court comes to the conclusion that there is any error in the order, the same can be quashed by issuing any type of writ and it would be remitted before the authority for taking a fresh decision, meaning thereby, the views cannot be substituted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it is for the reason that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is see as to whether the authorities are following the rules or statutory power conferred upon them and if they are flouting it, the High Court will quash the order and remit it before the authority for passing a fresh order in accordance with law. 14. It is in the background of this legal aspect the question which has been agitated by the petitioner while pointing out the illegality in the impugned order has been appreciated by this Court wherefrom this Court is in agreement with the submission/ground agitated by the petitioners regarding the absolute bar of a proceeding for initiating a suit under the provision of CPC at the garb of Section 63 of the SPT Act, 1949. Reference of Section 63 of SPT Act, 1949 needs to be made which reads hereunder as : “63. Reference of Section 63 of SPT Act, 1949 needs to be made which reads hereunder as : “63. Bar to suits.– No suit shall be entertained in any Court to vary, modify or set aside, either directly or indirectly, any order of the Deputy Commissioner in any application which is cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner under this Act and every such order shall, subject to the provisions of this Act relating to appeal and revision, be final : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in matters in which it had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act.” It is evident from the provision made therein that no suit shall be entertained in any Court to vary, modify or set aside, either directly or indirectly, any order of the Deputy Commissioner in any application which is cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner under this Act and every such order shall, subject to the provisions of this Act relating to appeal and revision, be final. The proviso to the provision will have paramount importance since the same provides that nothing contained in this section shall bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in matters in which it had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act. This proviso provides that there is no absolute bar so far as entertaining a suit, if the jurisdictional error is there. The said provision specifically provides that the Civil Court will have jurisdiction if the issue pertains to jurisdictional error, meaning thereby, if the dispute is on fact, the provision provided under the SPT Act, 1949 against an order passed, if appealable, the appeal will lie and not the suit but that will not be applicable if the said order is having jurisdictional error. This fact has also been dealt with by Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of Tarini Marandi Ors. (supra) wherein by taking into consideration the provision of Section 63 of SPT Act, 1949 it has been laid down by taking aid of Section 9 of the CPC as also putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.R. Chawla and Ors. (supra) wherein by taking into consideration the provision of Section 63 of SPT Act, 1949 it has been laid down by taking aid of Section 9 of the CPC as also putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.R. Chawla and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 162 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that where a statute purports to curb and curtail the pre-existing common law right and purports to Oust the jurisdiction of the Court so far remedy against the order passed under such statute is concerned then in such cases, the Courts have to be more vigilant, while examining the question as to whether an adequate redressal machinery has been provided, before which the person aggrieved may agitate his grievance and therefore, it has been held therein that in view of the provision of Section 63 of the SPT Act, 1949, the suit will absolutely be barred subject to jurisdictional error. Therefore, the trial Court while dealing with Section 57 of the SPT Act, 1949 wherein the provision of appeal has been provided as against the order passed under Section 23 of the SPT Act, 1949 has refused to allow the amendment petition perhaps on the pretext that the alternative remedy of appeal is available. The trial Court ought to have proceeded by dealing with the provision of Section 63 of SPT Act, 1949 that even in case of availability of remedy of appeal as provided under Section 57 of the SPT Act, 1949 whether a suit can be entertained or not but having not done so, this Court is constrained to hold that the trial Court has not applied its judicial mind properly in dealing with the said petition. 15. This Court, since is sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is also a Court of corrective jurisdiction, has directed to hear the petitioners on the issue of limitation as to whether the instrument created way back in 1952-53 and 1979-80 can be allowed to be corporated by way of amending the prayer by incorporating it in the original plaint of the suit filed in the year 2012. 16. 16. As has been referred hereinabove, one of the conditions for entertaining the amendment petition under Order VI Rule 17 is also to look into the period of limitation on the principle that if the fresh suit cannot be filed to be barred by limitation, the same cannot be allowed by allowing the petition under Order VI Rule 17. 17. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no period of limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 but as would appear from going across the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where there is no specific provision providing any period to invoke the jurisdiction of Court by any particular provision, Article 137 will be applicable, which reads hereunder as : Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 137 Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division. Three years When the right to apply accrues. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the period of limitation provided there is of three years, and therefore, it is not correct to say that when there is no entry made either of the provisions contained in Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, no other provision is available rather for such situation, Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963, it can well be said that the period of limitation would be three years, therefore, the amendment if allowed to be incorporated to seek a direction by incorporating the prayer to declare the instrument created in Settlement Case No.08/1952-53 and order dated 07.10.1980 passed in Rev. Case No.178/1979-80, it will hopelessly hit by the period of limitation since the amendment petition although has been filed in the year 2012 and if it will be allowed, it will relate back to the date of filing of the suit, therefore, the said instrument ought to have been questioned by the petitioner within three years when the cause of action arose i.e., in between the period from 2009-2012 and if it would be allowed to be challenged that would be after the period of more than 60 years, therefore, on this ground the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 to seek amendment to that effect is being declared to be improper and accordingly the said petition is rejected, accordingly the order passed by the trial Court is substituted and modified to the extent indicated hereinabove. 18. In view thereof, the writ petition is disposed of.