JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL, J. 1. By way of this appeal, appellant/plaintiff has challenged the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2015, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Shimla, H.P., vide which, learned Trial Court has dismissed the suit for recovery alongwith interest by way of damages filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the respondents/ defendants and also the judgment and decree dated 29.03.2018, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge-II, Shimla, H.P. whereby learned Appellate Court while upholding the findings returned by learned Trial Court, dismissed the appeal filed by the present appellant. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are that plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5.00 Lac as damages against the present respondents/ defendants. Plaintiff’s case was that he was working as senior Correspondent in a reputed national daily “The Hindu”. He owned landed property in the State of Himachal Pradesh and belonged to a reputed family of erstwhile Koti State. He was having bright prospects and was enjoying good status in the society. Defendants were also journalists stationed at Shimla. On account of professional rivalry, defendants intended to malign the plaintiff. With a common intention, defendants hatched a conspiracy against the plaintiff without any reasonable and probable cause and filed a false and frivolous complaint against the plaintiff which culminated into FIR No. 310, dated 12.10.2004, for commission of offence of criminal trespass and prevention of damage to public property. As per plaintiff, he alongwith some other members of the Press Club, Shimla had filed a suit on 11.10.2004 for injunction, against defendants No. 1 and 3 and others for restraining the defendants in the said suit from holding the election of Press Club of Shimla as also for not declaring the results of the same. As a counter blast, defendants No. 1 and 2 filed a criminal complaint against the plaintiff allegedly on the basis of an incident stated to have occurred on 10.10.2004. The complaint was addressed to Senior Superintendent of Police and contained his endorsement dated 12.10.2004. Said criminal complaint pertained to dispute qua election of the Press Club. Same was publicized widely in social, political and media circles, which not only tarnished the image of the plaintiff but also lowered down his estimation in the eyes of the society. The complaint was addressed to Senior Superintendent of Police and contained his endorsement dated 12.10.2004. Said criminal complaint pertained to dispute qua election of the Press Club. Same was publicized widely in social, political and media circles, which not only tarnished the image of the plaintiff but also lowered down his estimation in the eyes of the society. Defendants being Journalists were instrumental in planting the concocted version in a section of the press. On account of frivolous prosecution having been initiated against the plaintiff, he had to apply for anticipatory bail. He had to engage battory of lawyers. He remained under constant tension till he was finally acquitted after a period of about 1 ½ years. On account of the stress which he went through because of the criminal prosecution that stood initiated against him, he developed hemorrhoids, hypertension, depression, insomnia, which not only resulted in his ill health but also disturbed his family life and also disturbed his professional performance. It also lowered his social status. According to the plaintiff, defendants in furtherance of common intention and with the object to harass, insult and humiliate as also mentally torture the plaintiff had set up a false case without any reasonable and probable cause against him. According to the plaintiff, defendants tried their best to implicate him but their version was not supported by the majority of the prosecution witnesses. Plaintiff thus claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 5.00 Lac as damages alongwith interest as prayed for in the plaint. 3. Defendants No. 1 to 4 filed their written statement denying the claim of the plaintiff. In their written statements they took the stand that the case as set up by the plaintiff was completely incorrect and false. The information which was given to the police was based upon true facts and the police after investigating the veracity of the information and satisfying itself about the commission of the offence put the plaintiff to trial by filing the challan. Defendants denied the allegation of the plaintiff that the election of the Press Club were held in an illegal manner. As per them, plaintiff had failed in his design to disrupt the elections which took place in October, 2004. There was no malice against the plaintiff nor any false case was reported against him to the police by the replying defendants. As per them, plaintiff had failed in his design to disrupt the elections which took place in October, 2004. There was no malice against the plaintiff nor any false case was reported against him to the police by the replying defendants. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled for any damages as the suit was filed by the plaintiff on account of professional rivalry. Defendants No. 3 and 4 additionally also took the stand that the suit filed against them was not maintainable as they had not filed any criminal complaint whatsoever against the plaintiff. 4. By way of replication, plaintiff reiterated his stand and denied the stand taken by the defendants in the written statements. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following Issues: 1. Whether the defendants maliciously had prosecuted the plaintiff, as alleged? ..OPP 2. If Issue No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation, as claimed? ...OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? ..OPP 4. Whether no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff? ..OPD 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? ..OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit? ..OPD 7. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? 8. Relief. 6. The Issues so framed were answered as under on the basis of the evidence which was led by the respective parties in support of their respective contentions: Issue No. 1: No. Issue No. 2: No. Issue No. 3: Yes. Issue No. 4: No. Issue No. 5: No. Issue No. 6: No. Issue No. 7: No. Relief: The suit is dismissed as per the operative part of the judgment. 7. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 31.08.2015. Learned Court held that in a suit for malicious prosecution, plaintiff has to prove and establish (a) That criminal proceedings were instituted and continued against the plaintiff by the defendants; (b) That there was no reasonable or probable cause for the defendants to institute those proceedings; (c) That institution of such proceedings was malicious and (d) Those proceedings ended in favour of the plaintiff. 8. 8. After discussing the evidence led by the respective parties, learned Trial Court held that evidence led by the plaintiff was weak, fragile and self serving, inconsistent, infirm as compared to the evidence led by the defendants. Learned Trial Court held that nature of the testimony of the plaintiff while appearing as a witness in the Court as PW2 did not find corroboration even from the statement of PW8 Dr. Anupama Singh and the statements of other witnesses so examined by him. Learned Trial Court further held that plaintiff had miserably failed to establish that the complaint Ext. DW1/A was filed by the defendants falsely and without any probable cause and reason and that defendants got published news items in newspapers about lodging of the FIR just to malign his character and lower down his reputation in the society and that same had caused loss and damage to him both bodily as well as mentally. It held that in the absence of good evidence of the plaintiff on record, it could be safely concluded that plaintiff had not been able to prove that false and malicious allegations were leveled against him by the defendants by setting the criminal law into motion, causing loss and damage to his reputation without any plausible cause and reason. 9. In appeal, the findings returned by learned Trial Court were upheld. Learned Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court held that learned Trial Court had appreciated the facts and evidence on record in its correct perspective. Learned Appellate Court upon appreciation of evidence on record as also the judgment passed by learned Trial Court returned the findings that in the facts of the case, it could not be said with a definite opinion that when plaintiff came to know that his as well as names of some other persons were excluded from the voter list and when he was not allowed to file his nomination papers, he did not manhandle the Election Officer or issued threats as alleged by the defendants. Learned Appellate Court took notice of the fact that defendants had taken the plea that they had given information to the police based on true facts and thereafter, police after investigating the veracity of the facts, prepared the challan and presented the same in the Court. Learned Appellate Court took notice of the fact that defendants had taken the plea that they had given information to the police based on true facts and thereafter, police after investigating the veracity of the facts, prepared the challan and presented the same in the Court. It held that there was no merit in the contention of the plaintiff that because defendants No. 1 and 2 after filing the FIR did not appear before the Court intentionally as witnesses, same demonstrated that they had initiated the criminal prosecution just to harass him. Learned Appellate Court held that perusal of the zimni orders passed by the Trial Court in criminal trial demonstrated that summons and bailable warrants, which were issued to defendant No. 1 remained un-executed several times, and on this count, prosecution’s evidence was closed by the order of the Court, and therefore, it could not be said that defendant No. 1 intentionally did not appear before the learned Trial Court or criminal complaint was filed with the police without any reasonable and plausible cause. Learned Appellate Court also held that admittedly elections to the Press Club Shimla took place on 11.10.2004 whereas FIR was lodged with the police on 12.10.2004. It held that case of defendants No. 1 and 2 was that the complaint was filed after the elections in their capacity as office bearers of Press Club Shimla. Learned Appellate Court also held that FIR was registered and challan was filed after the facts mentioned in the complaint were verified by the police. It also observed that in the cross examination of defendant No. 1, it could not be elucidated from him that the complaint was filed against the plaintiff without any justifiable and probable cause. On these grounds, learned Appellate Court held that oral as well as documentary evidence led by plaintiff as also defendants demonstrated that plaintiff had failed to prove necessary ingredients to prove his case for malicious prosecution. It also held that there was nothing on record to demonstrate and prove that defendants No. 1 and 2 had filed the complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of which FIR was registered, with a malicious intent or they purposely did not take steps for the prosecution of the plaintiff in the criminal trial. It also held that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the newspapers clippings/cuttings Ext. It also held that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the newspapers clippings/cuttings Ext. PW4/A were published in 'Dainik Bhasker’ at the instance of the defendants just to lower down his reputation in the estimation of others known to him. On these bases, learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 10. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiff filed the present appeal which was admitted by the Court on 22.04.2019 on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the findings of the Ld. Trial Court as well as first Appellate Court are result of complete misreading/misquoting of the evidences and material on record as it is against the settled position of law.” 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are not sustainable in the eyes of law for the following reasons- (a) Both the learned Courts below erred in not appreciating that though the law was set in motion by defendants No. 1 and 2 despite this defendant No. 1 did not appear as a witness in the criminal proceedings which demonstrated that the proceedings were initiated with malicious intent. (b) the findings returned by the learned Courts below that plaintiff had failed to prove malice were perverse findings as evidence on record produced by the plaintiff clearly proved the same; (c) learned Courts erred in not appreciating that all the ingredients necessary to satisfy the factum of lodging of criminal complaint against the plaintiff by defendants being an act of malicious prosecution stood proved and findings to the contrary returned by the learned Courts below were a result of misreading and misappreciation of evidence on record. No other point was urged. 12. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents argued that there was neither any mis-appreciation nor any misreading of evidence on record by the learned Courts below and as there was no merit in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the same was rightly dismissed by the learned Trial Court and learned Appellate Court also committed no irregularity or illegality in dismissing the appeal filed against the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court by the plaintiff. 13. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below as well as the record of the case. 14. 13. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below as well as the record of the case. 14. A perusal of the plaint demonstrates that the case of the plaintiff was that he was working as a senior Correspondent in a reputed national daily. He was having bright prospects as he was enjoying a very good status in the Society. Defendants were also Journalists stationed at Shimla. With an intent to malign the plaintiff, a conspiracy was hatched by them, leading to filing of a false/frivolous complaint against the plaintiff without any reasonable and probable cause, which led to the registration of FIR No. 310 dated 12.10.2004 for criminal trespass and prevention of damage to public property against the plaintiff. The complaint was filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 as a counter blast to a civil suit which was filed by the plaintiff alongwith other members of the Press Club of Shimla on 11.10.2004 against defendants No. 1 and 3 alongwith others for injunction for restraining the defendants from holding the election of Press Club of Shimla and further directing them not to declare the results of the same. 15. It is settled law that in order to succeed in a suit for damages filed for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has to establish the following: (a) plaintiff was unjustly made to suffer criminal charges by the defendants; (b) proceedings terminated in favour of plaintiff; (c) absence of reasonable and probable cause of the criminal prosecution must be established ; and (d) it must be shown that defendants instituted the prosecution maliciously, for which the plaintiff suffered damage. 16. In the present case, there are concurrent findings returned by learned Courts below against the appellant/ plaintiff that he failed to prove the necessary ingredients to succeed in a case of malicious prosecution. 17. 16. In the present case, there are concurrent findings returned by learned Courts below against the appellant/ plaintiff that he failed to prove the necessary ingredients to succeed in a case of malicious prosecution. 17. At this stage itself, I would like to address one of the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant that the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below were liable to be set aside on the ground that learned Courts erred in not appreciating that adverse inference should have been drawn of the facts that (a) none of the defendants appeared before the Criminal Court during the pendency of the criminal Trial as witnesses; and (b) some of the defendants did not enter into the witness box in the civil suit. 18. I have already mentioned the ingredients which plaintiff has to prove in a Court of law in order to succeed in case filed for malicious prosecution. The factum of the complainants’ purportedly not appearing before the learned Trial Court as witnesses is of no consequence for deciding suit for malicious prosecution. I say so for the reason that it was for the prosecution to prove its case before the learned Criminal Court and the effect of relevant witness (s) being examined or not being examined was a factor to be taken into consideration by the learned Criminal Court. It is not in dispute that the trial ended in acquittal of the plaintiff. Therefore, nonappearance of complainants as witness in the criminal case is a closed chapter now and the suit for malicious prosecution could not have been allowed solely on the ground that because the complainants did not appear as witnesses before the Criminal Court, therefore, adverse inference has to be drawn and suit has to be decreed. 19. Similarly, as far as the effect of non-appearance of some of the defendants in the witness box in the civil suit is concerned, the same also ipso facto cannot be said to be a factor, on the basis of which, learned Trial Court was bound to have had allowed the suit, as is the contention of the appellant. 19. Similarly, as far as the effect of non-appearance of some of the defendants in the witness box in the civil suit is concerned, the same also ipso facto cannot be said to be a factor, on the basis of which, learned Trial Court was bound to have had allowed the suit, as is the contention of the appellant. Before drawing any adverse inference on account of any of the defendants not appearing before the learned Trial Court, the Court was to be satisfied that the plaintiff had been able to establish all the ingredients which are necessary to succeed in a case for damages on account of malicious prosecution. 20. In the present case, as I have already mentioned hereinabove, there are concurrent findings returned by both the learned Courts below that the plaintiff has not been able to prove that the criminal proceedings were initiated on account of any malicious intent. In other words, learned Courts below have held that plaintiff failed to place on record evidence to demonstrate that the complaint which led to the registration of the FIR was filed with malicious intent. Incidentally, a perusal of the record demonstrates that the complaint was not filed by all the defendants, who stood impleaded in the suit. It is the own case of the plaintiff that the complaint was only filed by defendants No. 1 and 2. If it is so, then it is not understood as to how the suit for damages on account of malicious prosecution was maintainable against the remaining defendants when admittedly even as per plaintiff they did not set into motion the process of law culminated into lodging of FIR and a subsequent criminal trial. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record demonstrates that the plaintiff was not able to establish that complaint Ext. DW1/A indeed was filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 without any probable cause and in fact, with the malicious intent, as a result of criminal conspiracy which was hatched alongwith other defendants. There is nothing on record from which it can be inferred that either the newspaper clippings/cuttings, which are on record as Ext. PW4/A and PW4/B or press release Ext. PW4/D were got published by the defendants with the intent to cause loss to the reputation of the plaintiff or cause mental and physical harassment to him. There is nothing on record from which it can be inferred that either the newspaper clippings/cuttings, which are on record as Ext. PW4/A and PW4/B or press release Ext. PW4/D were got published by the defendants with the intent to cause loss to the reputation of the plaintiff or cause mental and physical harassment to him. In fact, it is apparent from the pleadings of the parties as also the evidence which is on record that there were disputes and differences between the parties and some incident did take place resulting in the lodging of the complaint. Simply because a complaint was filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 on the basis of which an FIR was lodged and simply because the trial which ensued from lodging of the FIR ultimately resulted in the acquittal of the plaintiff, does not ipso facto means that the complaint was filed by the defendants No. 1 and 2 maliciously. Learned Appellate Court also while upholding the findings returned by the learned Trial Court has given clear and categoric findings in this regard. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that the statement of some witnesses of the defendants have been wrongly interpreted by the learned Appellate Court would per se not render the entire judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court as also learned Appellate Court bad in law. This I say for the reasons that the fact of the matter remains that even during the course of the arguments in the present appeal, on the strength of the evidence on record, learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to substantiate that the prosecution which stood launched against the plaintiff on the basis of complaint filed by defendants No. 1 and 2, was on account of any malice. 21. Yes this Court is not oblivious to the fact that in the Criminal trial, plaintiff was acquitted. However, it is settled law that judgments of Criminal Courts are only conclusive for the purpose of showing that the prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff and in a case for damages for malicious prosecution, findings of the criminal Court are not evidence of malice or absence of reasonable or probable cause. The Civil Court has to go into all the evidence and decide whether any such malice or cause existed or not. (See Suparti vs. Shamshudin, AIR 1928, ALL 337). The Civil Court has to go into all the evidence and decide whether any such malice or cause existed or not. (See Suparti vs. Shamshudin, AIR 1928, ALL 337). 22. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra (Smt.), (2009) 13 Supreme Court cases 729, has held that judgment of a criminal Court is not binding in civil proceedings. 23. It is settled law that action for malicious prosecution is not favoured in law but a better way of expressing the idea is to say that the action should be properly guarded and its true principles strictly adhered to since public policy favours the exposure of a crime which a recovery against a prosecutor obviously tends to discourage. It is highly desirable that those reasonably suspected of crime be subjected to the process of criminal law for the protection of society. It is necessary that the citizen be accorded immunity for bona fide efforts to bring anti-social members of society to the bar of justice. All the restricts resulting from these various interests and principles of social policy are reflected in the usual formula for the tort of malicious prosecution that the plaintiff must show (a) that proceedings had been instituted against him, (b) for an offence which was groundless as evidenced by the successful termination of the proceedings in his favour, and (c) which were instituted against him by the defendants without probable cause and from malicious motives. (See S.T. Sahib vs. N.Hasan Ghani Sahib, AIR 1957 Madras 646). 24. Thus, it is evident that to be successful in a suit for malicious prosecution, it is imperative for the plaintiff to show that the proceedings were instituted against him for an offence which was groundless as evidenced by the successful termination of the proceedings in his favour and which were instituted against him by the defendant without probable cause and from malicious motives. Acquittal of accused in criminal case itself cannot be taken to be a proof of the fact that prosecution launched was malicious. In other words, mere fact that there has been acquittal in the criminal case will not automatically prove malicious prosecution because what is relevant to succeed in a civil suit for seeking damages for malicious prosecution is that it must be found that a criminal complaint case or an FIR was initiated without reasonable and probable cause. In other words, mere fact that there has been acquittal in the criminal case will not automatically prove malicious prosecution because what is relevant to succeed in a civil suit for seeking damages for malicious prosecution is that it must be found that a criminal complaint case or an FIR was initiated without reasonable and probable cause. (See Deepak Rathaur & Another versus Sh. Shashi Bhushan Lal Dass, RSA No. 1/2016, decided on 23.09.2016, by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi at New Delhi). 25. As to what malice is and what are the parameters which would guide suit claiming damages on account of malicious prosecution, I would like to refer to judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board vs. Dilip Kumar Ray, AIR 2007 Supreme Court 976, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “14. Malice and Malicious Prosecution as stated in the Advance Law of Lexicon, 3rd Edition by P. Ramanatha Aiyar read as follows: "Malice - Unlawful intent Will; intent to commit an unlawful act or cause harm, Express or actual malice is ill will or spite towards the plaintiff or any indirect or improper motive in the defendant's mind at the time of the publication which is his sole or dominant motive for publishing the words complained of. This must he distinguished from legal malice or malice in law which means publication without law full excuse and does not depend upon the defendant's state of mind. The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. II. Reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights. Ill will: wickedness of heart. This sense is most typical in non legal contexts". "Malice means in law wrongful intention. It includes any intent which the law deems wrongful, and which therefore serves as a ground of liability. Any act done with such an intent is, in the language of the law, malicious, and this legal usage has etymology in its favour. The Latin malitia means badness, physical or moral - wickedness in disposition or in conduct - not specifically or exclusively ill-will or malevolence; hence the malice of English law, including all forms of evil purpose. design, intent, or motive. But intent is of two kinds, being either immediate or ulterior, the ulterior intent being commonly distinguished as the motive. The Latin malitia means badness, physical or moral - wickedness in disposition or in conduct - not specifically or exclusively ill-will or malevolence; hence the malice of English law, including all forms of evil purpose. design, intent, or motive. But intent is of two kinds, being either immediate or ulterior, the ulterior intent being commonly distinguished as the motive. The term malice is applied in law to both these forms of intent, and the result is a somewhat puzzling ambiguity which requires careful notice. When we say that an act is done maliciously, we mean one of the two distinct things. We mean either that it is done intentionally, or that it is done with some wrongful motive." "Malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all elements of justification, excuse or recognized mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an actual intent to cause the particular harm which is produced or harm of the same general nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result. The Model Penal Code does not use 'malice' because those who formulated the Code had a blind prejudice against the word. This is very regrettable because it represents a useful concept despite some unfortunate language employed at times in the effort to express it." "Malice" in the legal acceptance of the word is not confined to personal spite against individuals but consists in a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. In its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. 'Malice", in its legal sense, does not necessarily signily ill- will towards a particular individual, but denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Therefore, the law implies malice where one deliberately injures another in an unlawful manner. Malice means an indirect wrong motive. “Malice” in its legal sense means, malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause." Malice, in ordinary common parlance, means ill-wiIl against a person and in legal sense, a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or reason. “Malice” in its legal sense means, malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause." Malice, in ordinary common parlance, means ill-wiIl against a person and in legal sense, a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or reason. It is a question of motive, intention or state of mind and may be defined as any corrupt or wrong motive or personal spite or ill will. “Malice” in common law or acceptance means ill-will against a person, but in legal sense it means a wrongful act alone intentionally without just cause or excuse. It signifies an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse or an action determined by an improper motive. "MALICE", in common acceptation, means, ill will against a person; but in its legal sense, it means, a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. Malice in its common acceptation, is a term involving stint intent of the mind and heart, including the will; and has been said to mean a bad mind; ill-will against a person; a wicked or evil state of the mind towards another; an evil intent or wish or design to vex or annoy another; a wilful intent to do a wrongful act; a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person or as intent to do a wrongful act; a condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief. "MALICE" means wickedness of purpose, or a spiteful or malevolent design against another; a purpose to injure another; a design of doing mischief, or any evil design or inclination to do a bad thing, or a reckless disregard to the rights of others, or absence or legal excuse, or any other motive than that of bringing a party to justice. "The meaning of the term malice in English law, his been a question of much difficulty and controversy; and those who made through the many disquisitions on the subjects in text- books and judicial opinions are almost tempted to the conclusion that the meaning varies almost infinitely, and that the only sense which the term can safely be predicated not to have in ant given legal context is that which it has in popular language, viz., spite or ill-will. It certainly has different meanings with respect to responsibility for civil wrongs and responsibility for crime; and even with respect to crime it has a different sense according as it is used with reference to murder, libel, or the capacity of an infant to commit crime, expressed by the rule malitia supplet act item." (Ency. of the Laws of England). Ordinarily, the absence of reasonable and probable cause in instituting a proceeding which terminates in favour of the plaintiff, would give rise to the inference of malice. MALICE has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However, wrong- headed a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be initiator of a malicious prosecution. MALICE means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive - that is to say an intend to use the legal process in question for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. It means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill-will; it may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. MALICE in fact is malue animus indicating that action against a party was actuated by spite or ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives. Malice: hatred: aversion: antipathy: enmity: Repugnance: ill-will: rancour: malevolence: Malignity: malignancy. Hatred is a very general term. Hatred applies properly to persons. It seems not absolutely involuntary. It has its root in passion, and may be checked or stimulated and indulged. Aversion is strong dislike. Aversion is a habitual sentiment, and springs from the natural taste or temperament which repels its opposites, as an indolent man has an aversion to industry, or a humane one to cruelty. Antipathy is used of causeless dislike, or at least one of which the cause cannot be defined. It is found upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous. Enmity is the state of persona! opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as "a bitter enemy." Repugnance is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. Ill-will is a settled bias of the disposition. It is found upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous. Enmity is the state of persona! opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as "a bitter enemy." Repugnance is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. Ill-will is a settled bias of the disposition. It is very indefinite, and may be of any degree or strength. Rancour is a deep seated and lasting feeling of ill-will. It preys upon the very mind of the subject of it. While enmity may be generous and open, rancour is malignant and private. Malice is that enmity which can abide its opportunity of injuring its object, and pervert the truth or the right, or go out of its way, or shape course of action, to compass its ends. "Malevolence commences with some idea or evil belonging to and connected with the object; and it settles into a permanent hatred of his person and of everything relative to him" - (Gogan) Malignity is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. It is malice the most energetic, inveterate, and sustained. Malice in fact. "Malice in fact" means express malice. MALICE IN FACT OR ACTUAL MALICE, relates to the actual state or condition of the mind of the person who did the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not established by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case. Malice in fact implies a desire or intention to injure, while malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest purpose. Malice in law. 'Malice in law" means implied malice. "MALICE IN LAW" simply means a depraved inclination on the part of a person to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by his injurious acts. Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India ( AIR 1979 SC 49 , 51). MALICIOUS. Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India ( AIR 1979 SC 49 , 51). MALICIOUS. Done with malice or an evil design; wilful; indulging in malice, harboring ill-will, or enmity malevolent, malignant in heart; committed wantonly, wilfully, or without cause, or done not only wilfully and intentionally, but out of cruelty, hostility of revenge; done in wilful neglect of a known obligation. "MALICIOUS" means with a fixed hate, or done with evil intention or motive; not the result of sudden passion. Malicious abuse of civil proceedings. In general, a person may utilize any form of legal process without any liability, save liability to pay the costs of proceedings if unsuccessful. But an action lies for initiating civil proceedings. Such as action, presentation of a bankruptcy or winding up petition, an unfounded claim to property, not only unsuccessfully but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and resulting in damage to the plaintiff. (Walker) Malicious abuse of legal process. A malicious abuse of legal process consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by order of Court - the malicious perversion of a regularly issued process, whereby an improper result is secured. There is a distinction between a malicious use and a malicious abuse of legal process. An abuse is where the party employs it for some unlawful object - not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it. Malicious abuse of process. Wilfully misapplying Court process to obtain object not intended by law. The wilful misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ. An action for malicious abuse of process lies in the following cases, A malicious petition or proceeding to adjudicate a person an insolvent, to declare a person lunatic or to wind up a company, to make action against legal practitioner under the Legal Practitioners Act, maliciously procuring arrest or attachment in execution of a decree or before judgment, order or injunction or appointment of receiver, arrest of a ship, search of the plaintiff's premises, arrest of a person by police. Malicious abuse of process of Court. Malicious abuse of process of Court. Malicious act Bouvier defined a malicious act as "a wrongful act, intentionally done, without cause or excuse." A malicious act is one committed in a state of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief--a wrongful act intentionally done, without legal justification or excuse. 'A malicious act is an act characterised by a preexisting or an accompanying malicious state of mind. Malicious Prosecution--Malice. Malice means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or illwill. It may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. The principles to be borne in mind in the case of actions for malicious prosecutions are these:Malice is not merely the doing a wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that the defendant was actuated by mains animus, that is to say, by spite of ill- will or any indirect or improper motive. But if the defendant hod reasonable or probable cause of launching the criminal prosecution no amount of malice will make him liable for damages. Reasonable and probable cause must be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet and reasonable man; 'malice' and 'want of reasonable and probable cause.' have reference to the state of the defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of criminal proceedings and the onus rests on the plaintiff to prove them. OTHER DEFINITIONS OF "MALICIOUS PROSECUTION". "A judicial proceeding instituted by one person against another, from wrongful or improper motive and without probable cause to sustain it." "A prosecution begun in malice, without probable cause to believe that it can succeed and which finally ends in failure." "A prosecution instituted wilfully and purposely, to gain some advantage to the prosecutor or thorough mere wantonness or carelessness, if it be at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor, and without probable cause." "A prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or is bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy." The term "malicious prosecution" imports a causeless as well as an ill-intended prosecution. 'MALICIOUS PROSECUTION" is a prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or its bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy. In malicious prosecution there are two essential elements, namely, that no probable cause existed for instituting the prosecution or suit complained of, and that such prosecution or suit terminated in some way favorably to the defendant therein. 1. The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause. 2. The cause of action resulting from the institution of such a proceeding. Once a wrongful prosecution has ended in the defendant's favor, lie or she may sue for tort damages - Also termed (in the context of civil proceedings) malicious use of process. (Black, 7th Edn., 1999) "The distinction between an action for malicious prosecution and an action for abuse of process is that a malicious prosecution consists in maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas an abuse of process is the employment of legal process for some purpose other than that which it was intended by the law to effect - the improper use of a regularly issued process. For instance, the initiation of vexatious civil proceedings known to be groundless is not abuse of process, but is governed by substantially the same rules as the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings." 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious Prosecution S. 2, at 187 (1970). The term 'malice,' as used in the expression "malicious prosecution" is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual, but of malus animus, and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. As a general rule of law, any person is entitled though not always bound to lay before a judicial officer information as to any criminal offence which he has reasonable and probable cause to believe has been committed, with a view to ensuring the arrest, trial, and punishment of the offender. This principle is thus stated in Lightbody's case, 1882, 9 Rettie, 934. This principle is thus stated in Lightbody's case, 1882, 9 Rettie, 934. "When it comes to the knowledge of anybody that a crime has been committed a duty is laid on that person as a citizen of the country to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime, and if he states, only what he knows and honestly believes he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is after all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to establish liability the pursuer must show that the informant acted from malice, i.e., 'not in discharge of his public duty but from an illegitimate motive, and must also prove that the statements were made or the information given without any reasonable grounds of belief, or other information given without probable cause; and Lord SHAND added (p. 940): "He has not only a duty but a right when the cause affects his own property." Most criminal prosecutions are conducted by private citizens in the name of the Crown. This exercise of civic rights constitutes what with reference to the la of libel is termed a privileged occasion: but if the right is abused, the person injured thereby is, in certain events, entitled to a remedy. (See H. Stephen, Malicious Prosecution, 1888; Builen and Leake, Prec. P1., Clerk and Lindsell. Torts, Pollock, Torts; LQR. April 1898; Vin., Abr., tit. "Action on the Case" Ency. of the Laws of England.) "MALICIOUS PROSECUTION" means that the proceedings which are complained of were initiated from a malicious spirit, i.e, from an indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice. [10 CWN 253 (FB)] The performance of a duty imposed by law, such as the institution of a prosecution as a necessary condition precedent to a civil action, does not constitute "malice". (Abbott v. Refuge Assurance Co., (1962) 1 QB 432). "Malicious prosecution" thus differs from wrongful arrest and detention, in that the onus of proving that the prosecutor did not act honestly or reasonably, lies on the person prosecuted." (per DIPLOCK U in Dailison v. Caffery, (1965) 1 QB 348)). (Stroud, 6th Edn., 2000). 15. 'Malice' means and implies spite or ill-will. Incidentally, be it noted that the expression "mala fide" is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. (Stroud, 6th Edn., 2000). 15. 'Malice' means and implies spite or ill-will. Incidentally, be it noted that the expression "mala fide" is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and circumstances. (See Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others. (2000) 5 SCC 630 . 16. The legal meaning of 'malice' is "ill will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action". This is sometimes described as "malice in fact". "Legal malice" or "malice in law" means "something done without lawful excuse". In other words, "it is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others". (See State of A.P. v. Govardhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739 ). 17. The word "malice" in common acceptation means and implies "spite" or "ill will". One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record. In the case of Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens (1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA), the Court of Appeal has reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 L.JQB 463 as below: "For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 LJQB 463 where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and servant by harbouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted his master during his period of service, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser (1825) 1 C&P 673: 4 B&C 247. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser (1825) 1 C&P 673: 4 B&C 247. “Intentionally” refers to the doing of the act; it doe not mean that the defendant meant be spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea of privilage in defamation, malice in fact has to be proved". (See State of Punjab v. U.K. Khann and others (2001) 2 SCC 330 ). 18. Malice in law. "Malice in law" is however, quite different. Viscount Haldane described it in Shearer Shields, (1914) AC 808 as: "A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with the innocent mind: he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far the state of mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently". Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or fro want of reasonable or probable cause. (See S.R. Venkatarcunan v. Union of India (1979) 2 SCC 491 ). 19. Malice-per common law. "Malice" in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in legal sense means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. (See Chairman and M.D., B.P.L. Ltd v. S.P. Gururaja and others JT 2003 (Suppl. 2) SC 515 and Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.F. Gururaja and others (2003) 8 SCC 567 ). 20. While it is true that legitimate indignation does not fall within the ambit of malicious act, in almost all legal inquiries, intention, as distinguished from motive is the all important factor. In common parlance, a malicious act has been equated with intentional act without just cause or excuse. (See Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) v. Stevans (1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)). Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others. (2001) 1 SCC 182 )." 26. In common parlance, a malicious act has been equated with intentional act without just cause or excuse. (See Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) v. Stevans (1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)). Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others. (2001) 1 SCC 182 )." 26. A bare perusal of the averments made in the plaint show that they are extremely vague, lacking in details and after the learned trial judge held that the Board alone was responsible because it was not established that any individual officer was responsible for it and dispute only have been revealed by the high-power enquiry which the court was incompetent to direct, the award for damages is clearly indefensible. The High Court's judgment suffers from various infirmities. Firstly, it has taken a confused view of the matter. It failed to notice that the trial court itself had held "it was highly probable" that the plaintiff was suspended for extraneous reasons. This conclusion is based on surmises and conjectures. This had not been established. As noted above, the High Court noted that the Trial Court itself held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for defamation. But while affirming the judgment and decree, it held that the damages granted for harassment must be read as damages for malicious prosecution causing harassment. To say the least, all the conclusions are confusing, contradictory and do not convey any sense. Looked at from any angle the impugned judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is set aside." In view of discussion held hereinabove, I answer the substantial question of law by holding that it cannot be said that the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below are result of misreading and mis-appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, as this Court does not finds any merit in the present appeal, the same is dismissed accordingly. 27. Pending miscellaneous application, if any, also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.