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2019 DIGILAW 1343 (HP)

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kumta Devi

2019-09-10

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This appeal at the instance of Insurance Company is directed against the award dated 20.10.2009 passed by the learned Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act (for short the 'Act') whereby he awarded a sum of Rs.6,27,486/- in favour of the respondents/claimants No. 1 to 4. 2. The brief facts of the case are that late Shri Santosh Kumar was employed as a driver by Shri Vinod Kumar in his vehicle No. HP-02-0190. On 21.08.2004, the vehicle was hired by one Shri Dharam Paul and at that time deceased Santosh Kumar was driving the vehicle on the way to Narkanda from Kingal. But unfortunately both of them were murdered and their dead bodies were found lying in Thachru Nallah. FIR No. 76/2004 came to be registered and was stated to be pending investigation. Since, the murder took place during the course of employment of Santosh Kumar, therefore, the claimants had filed the claim petition under Section 22 of the Act. 3. The owner contested the petition by filing reply wherein preliminary objections raised to the effect that the application was vague, incomplete, illegally framed, not according to the law and rules of Workmen's Compensation or the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, the same deserved to be dismissed. On merits, it was admitted that the vehicle in question was being driven by Santosh Kumar who was murdered and perhaps the murder may have taken place due to some enmity. 4. The appellant-Insurance Company filed a separate reply wherein it raised preliminary objections to the effect that the application was not maintainable as the death of Santosh Kumar had not taken place due to any accident during the course of employment, rather he was murdered by someone due to some old enmity outside the vehicle. In addition thereto, objection regarding maintainability of the petition on account of there being no legal valid agreement of insurance between the owner and the Insurance Company. In addition thereto, various other preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal to decide the case were also raised. 5. However, learned Tribunal after framing issues and recording evidence, allowed the petition as aforesaid, constraining the Insurance Company to file the instant appeal. 6. On 16.11.2010, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. 5. However, learned Tribunal after framing issues and recording evidence, allowed the petition as aforesaid, constraining the Insurance Company to file the instant appeal. 6. On 16.11.2010, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether in spite of the clear case set up by the claimants that deceased Shri Santosh Kumar while employed as driver was murdered and since his death was not resultant to any accident arising out of or in the course of the employment, the claim was covered within the provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claimants were entitled to claim any compensation? 2. Whether due to bouncing of the premium cheque, since premium amount was not credited in the account of insurer and the policy of insurance stood cancelled from the date of its inception, any liability for payment of compensation money, by indemnification of owner of vehicle could be foisted on the insurer? Question No. 1 7. Before proceeding to decide this question, it has to be borne in mind that the Workmen's Compensation Act now substituted with Employees' Compensation Act is a socially welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependents, in case of death of workmen due to accident caused during and in the course of employment. 8. Adverting to the facts, it is not in dispute that not only the driver Santosh Kumar but even the hirer of the vehicle i.e. Shri Dharam Paul had both been murdered. The legal representatives of Dharam Paul had filed petition under Section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act and was awarded compensation. The award passed by the learned MACT was assailed by the Insurance Company i.e. appellant herein by way of FAO No. 537 of 2008 on the same and similar ground as taken in the instant appeal, however, the appeal was dismissed vide a detailed judgment dated 18.12.2015, titled as United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sh. Talaru Ram & Ors., (2017) ACJ 425. The insurance Company assailed this Judgment before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, the same also came to be dismissed. 9. Therefore, I see no reason as to why the LRs of Santosh Kumar, who are similar situate as to the LRs of Dharam Paul, should be denied compensation or else it would be a case of invidious discrimination. The insurance Company assailed this Judgment before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, the same also came to be dismissed. 9. Therefore, I see no reason as to why the LRs of Santosh Kumar, who are similar situate as to the LRs of Dharam Paul, should be denied compensation or else it would be a case of invidious discrimination. After all, the objects of both the enactments i.e. Workmen's Compensation Act and Motor Vehicles Act are beneficial enactments operating in the same field and, hence the judicially accepted interpretation of the word death in the Workmen's Compensation Act is fully applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act, as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi (Smt.) and others versus New India Assurance Col. Ltd. and another, (2000) 5 SCC 113 , as would be evident from para 15, which reads as under:- "15. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended before us that since the Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word death and the legal interpretations relied upon by us are with reference to the definition of the word death in the Workmens Compensation Act the same will not be applicable while interpreting the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act, because according to her, the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends that on the facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the driver and the stealing of the auto-rickshaw. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the object of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts is to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours, we are supported by Sec. 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence the judicially accepted interpretation of the word death in the Workmen's Compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also." 10. That apart, whether the murder of the deceased was an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi's case (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court therein drew distinction between a "murder", which is not an accident and "murder", which is an accident. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that if the dominant intention of the felonious act as to kill any person, then such killing is not accidental murder but a murder simpliciter. However, if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder. Para-10 of the Judgment is relevant and is reproduced here under:- "10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that murder, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a murder which is not an accident and a murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a murder which is not an accident and a murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder, but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder." 11. The facts in Rita Devi's case (supra) were that the deceased was employed as a driver in autorickshaw for ferrying passengers on hire. On the fateful day, auto rickshaw was parked in the rickshaw stand at Dimapur where some unknown persons hired the rickshaw for journey. As to what happened on that day is not known. It is only on the next day that the police was able to recover the body of the deceased but the auto rickshaw was never traced out. The owner of the auto rickshaw claimed compensation from the Insurance Company for the loss of auto rickshaw. The heirs of the deceased claimed compensation for the death of the driver on the ground that the death occurred on account of accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held the murder to be accidental murder as is evident from para - 14 of the judgment, which reads as under:- "14. Applying the principles Laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto-rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare-paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto-rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto-rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto-rickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto-rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto-rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto-rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto-rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing theft of the auto-rickshaw." 12. However, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would still argue that it was on account of enmity that the driver Santosh Kumar was murdered and Dharam Paul only paid the price on account of he being an hirer of the taxi, therefore, the case of the claimants is not covered by the judgment in Rita Devi's case (supra). 13. I find no merit in this contention as a purposive interpretation has to be given to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 14. The workmen in this case was present at the spot and his death occurred only because of his employment. It is only in the course of his employment that he alongwith Dharam Paul had been travelling to Narkanda from Kingal and was murdered at Narkanda. Therefore, his presence at the spot is arising out of and in the course of employment only. Since, he died at the spot, this Court is of the opinion that in this case, the manner of his death whether it is by a murder or an accident is really immaterial. 15. In addition thereto, neither the owner nor the Insurance Company have led any evidence regarding the murder of Santosh Kumar on account of enmity. 16. Lastly and more importantly, it would be noticed that in the instant case, not only Santosh Kumar and Dharam Pal were murdered, but even the vehicle was stolen, which in itself is a clear indicator that perhaps both these persons had been murdered in order to steal the vehicle. Once that be so, then the question raised in this petition is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi's case (supra) because the cause of murder originally was not intended and appears to have been caused in furtherance of the felonious act of stealing the vehicle, and, thus is an accidental murder. The substantial question No. 1 is accordingly answered against the appellant. Question No. 2 17. The substantial question No. 1 is accordingly answered against the appellant. Question No. 2 17. It is vehemently contended by Shri Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate that Insurance Company could not be fasten with the liability as the cheque issued by the owner was dishonoured and, therefore, no valid contract of insurance came into existence. However, I find no merit in this contention. Record reveals that the Insurance Policy Cover Note No. 191116 was issued by the Insurance Company and vehicle No. HP-02- 0190 was insured by them. However, such insurance was cancelled on 23.09.2004 but as the accident already took place on 21.08.2004. Therefore, since the Insurance Policy was valid on the date of accident, therefore, the appellant-Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability only on the ground that the policy so issued had been subsequently cancelled on account of dishonour of cheque. 18. In taking this view, I am fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Rula and others, (2000) AIR SC 1082, wherein it was held that the insurer has to intimate the owner by way of notice about the cancellation of Insurance Policy and if the accident occurred between the period till the cancellation is conveyed it is the insurer, who is liable. 19. It shall be apposite to reproduce para-11 of the judgment, which reads as under:- "11. This decision, which is 3-judge Bench decision, squarely covers the present case also. The subsequent cancellation of the Insurance Policy in the instant case on the ground that the cheque through which premium was paid was dishonoured, would not affect the rights of the third party which had accrued on the issuance of the Policy on the date on which the accident took place. If, on the date of accident, there was a Policy of Insurance in respect of the vehicle in question, the third party would have a claim against the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle would have to be indemnified in respect of the claim of that party. Subsequent cancellation of Insurance Policy on the ground of non-payment of premium would not affect the rights already accrued in favour of the third party." 20. The issue again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deddapa and others vs. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Subsequent cancellation of Insurance Policy on the ground of non-payment of premium would not affect the rights already accrued in favour of the third party." 20. The issue again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deddapa and others vs. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) AIRSCW 7948, wherein the same principles as the above were laid down, as would be evident from paras 26 to 28, which read as under:- "26. We are not oblivious of the distinction between the statutory liability of the Insurance Company vis-a-vis a third party in the context of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act and its liabilities in other cases. But the same liabilities arising under a contract of insurance would have to be met if the contract is valid. If the contract of insurance has been cancelled and all concerned have been intimated thereabout, we are of the opinion, the insurance company would not be liable to satisfy the claim. 27. A beneficial legislation as is well known should not be construed in such a manner so as to bring within its ambit a benefit which was not contemplated by the legislature to be given to the party. In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries, (1985) AIR SC 278, this Court held : "We do not doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but where such beneficial .legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme." We, therefore, agree with the opinion of the High Court. 28. However, as the appellant hails from the lowest strata of society, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, we should, in exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct the Respondent No.1 to pay the amount of claim to the appellants herein and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle viz., Respondent No.2, particularly in view of the fact that no appeal was preferred by him. We direct accordingly." 21. We direct accordingly." 21. Similar reiteration of law can be found in a subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case title United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmamma and others, (2012) AIRSCW 2657, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after discussing the law in issue in detail held that if cancellation order is not made or if the accident occurred till the cancellation order is made and conveyed, the insurer would be liable. 22. It shall be apposite to reproduce para - 19 of the Judgment, which reads as under:- "19. In our view, the legal position is this : where the policy of insurance is issued by an authorized insurer on receipt of cheque towards payment of premium and such cheque is returned dishonoured, the liability of authorized insurer to indemnify third parties in respect of the liability which that policy covered subsists and it has to satisfy award of compensation by reason of the provisions of Sections 147(5) and 149(1) of the M.V. Act unless the policy of insurance is cancelled by the authorized insurer and intimation of such cancellation has reached the insured before the accident. In other words, where the policy of insurance is issued by an authorized insurer to cover a vehicle on receipt of the cheque paid towards premium and the cheque gets dishonored and before the accident of the vehicle occurs, such insurance company cancels the policy of insurance and sends intimation thereof to the owner, the insurance company's liability to indemnify the third parties which that policy covered ceases and the insurance company is not liable to satisfy awards of compensation in respect thereof." 23. The aforesaid judgments, in turn, have been followed by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rukshana and others, (2015) 2 ShimLC 753 . This substantial question of law is accordingly decided against the appellant. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This appeal at the instance of Insurance Company is directed against the award dated 20.10.2009 passed by the learned Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act (for short the 'Act') whereby he awarded a sum of Rs.6,27,486/- in favour of the respondents/claimants No. 1 to 4. 2. JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This appeal at the instance of Insurance Company is directed against the award dated 20.10.2009 passed by the learned Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act (for short the 'Act') whereby he awarded a sum of Rs.6,27,486/- in favour of the respondents/claimants No. 1 to 4. 2. The brief facts of the case are that late Shri Santosh Kumar was employed as a driver by Shri Vinod Kumar in his vehicle No. HP-02-0190. On 21.08.2004, the vehicle was hired by one Shri Dharam Paul and at that time deceased Santosh Kumar was driving the vehicle on the way to Narkanda from Kingal. But unfortunately both of them were murdered and their dead bodies were found lying in Thachru Nallah. FIR No. 76/2004 came to be registered and was stated to be pending investigation. Since, the murder took place during the course of employment of Santosh Kumar, therefore, the claimants had filed the claim petition under Section 22 of the Act. 3. The owner contested the petition by filing reply wherein preliminary objections raised to the effect that the application was vague, incomplete, illegally framed, not according to the law and rules of Workmen's Compensation or the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, the same deserved to be dismissed. On merits, it was admitted that the vehicle in question was being driven by Santosh Kumar who was murdered and perhaps the murder may have taken place due to some enmity. 4. The appellant-Insurance Company filed a separate reply wherein it raised preliminary objections to the effect that the application was not maintainable as the death of Santosh Kumar had not taken place due to any accident during the course of employment, rather he was murdered by someone due to some old enmity outside the vehicle. In addition thereto, objection regarding maintainability of the petition on account of there being no legal valid agreement of insurance between the owner and the Insurance Company. In addition thereto, various other preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal to decide the case were also raised. 5. However, learned Tribunal after framing issues and recording evidence, allowed the petition as aforesaid, constraining the Insurance Company to file the instant appeal. 6. On 16.11.2010, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. 5. However, learned Tribunal after framing issues and recording evidence, allowed the petition as aforesaid, constraining the Insurance Company to file the instant appeal. 6. On 16.11.2010, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether in spite of the clear case set up by the claimants that deceased Shri Santosh Kumar while employed as driver was murdered and since his death was not resultant to any accident arising out of or in the course of the employment, the claim was covered within the provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claimants were entitled to claim any compensation? 2. Whether due to bouncing of the premium cheque, since premium amount was not credited in the account of insurer and the policy of insurance stood cancelled from the date of its inception, any liability for payment of compensation money, by indemnification of owner of vehicle could be foisted on the insurer? Question No. 1 7. Before proceeding to decide this question, it has to be borne in mind that the Workmen's Compensation Act now substituted with Employees' Compensation Act is a socially welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependents, in case of death of workmen due to accident caused during and in the course of employment. 8. Adverting to the facts, it is not in dispute that not only the driver Santosh Kumar but even the hirer of the vehicle i.e. Shri Dharam Paul had both been murdered. The legal representatives of Dharam Paul had filed petition under Section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act and was awarded compensation. The award passed by the learned MACT was assailed by the Insurance Company i.e. appellant herein by way of FAO No. 537 of 2008 on the same and similar ground as taken in the instant appeal, however, the appeal was dismissed vide a detailed judgment dated 18.12.2015, titled as United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sh. Talaru Ram & Ors., (2017) ACJ 425. The insurance Company assailed this Judgment before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, the same also came to be dismissed. 9. Therefore, I see no reason as to why the LRs of Santosh Kumar, who are similar situate as to the LRs of Dharam Paul, should be denied compensation or else it would be a case of invidious discrimination. The insurance Company assailed this Judgment before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, the same also came to be dismissed. 9. Therefore, I see no reason as to why the LRs of Santosh Kumar, who are similar situate as to the LRs of Dharam Paul, should be denied compensation or else it would be a case of invidious discrimination. After all, the objects of both the enactments i.e. Workmen's Compensation Act and Motor Vehicles Act are beneficial enactments operating in the same field and, hence the judicially accepted interpretation of the word death in the Workmen's Compensation Act is fully applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act, as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi (Smt.) and others versus New India Assurance Col. Ltd. and another, (2000) 5 SCC 113 , as would be evident from para 15, which reads as under:- "15. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended before us that since the Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word death and the legal interpretations relied upon by us are with reference to the definition of the word death in the Workmens Compensation Act the same will not be applicable while interpreting the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act, because according to her, the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends that on the facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the driver and the stealing of the auto-rickshaw. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the object of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts is to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours, we are supported by Sec. 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence the judicially accepted interpretation of the word death in the Workmen's Compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also." 10. That apart, whether the murder of the deceased was an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi's case (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court therein drew distinction between a "murder", which is not an accident and "murder", which is an accident. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that if the dominant intention of the felonious act as to kill any person, then such killing is not accidental murder but a murder simpliciter. However, if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder. Para-10 of the Judgment is relevant and is reproduced here under:- "10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that murder, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a murder which is not an accident and a murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a murder which is not an accident and a murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder, but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder." 11. The facts in Rita Devi's case (supra) were that the deceased was employed as a driver in autorickshaw for ferrying passengers on hire. On the fateful day, auto rickshaw was parked in the rickshaw stand at Dimapur where some unknown persons hired the rickshaw for journey. As to what happened on that day is not known. It is only on the next day that the police was able to recover the body of the deceased but the auto rickshaw was never traced out. The owner of the auto rickshaw claimed compensation from the Insurance Company for the loss of auto rickshaw. The heirs of the deceased claimed compensation for the death of the driver on the ground that the death occurred on account of accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held the murder to be accidental murder as is evident from para - 14 of the judgment, which reads as under:- "14. Applying the principles Laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto-rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare-paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto-rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto-rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto-rickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto-rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto-rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto-rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto-rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing theft of the auto-rickshaw." 12. However, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would still argue that it was on account of enmity that the driver Santosh Kumar was murdered and Dharam Paul only paid the price on account of he being an hirer of the taxi, therefore, the case of the claimants is not covered by the judgment in Rita Devi's case (supra). 13. I find no merit in this contention as a purposive interpretation has to be given to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 14. The workmen in this case was present at the spot and his death occurred only because of his employment. It is only in the course of his employment that he alongwith Dharam Paul had been travelling to Narkanda from Kingal and was murdered at Narkanda. Therefore, his presence at the spot is arising out of and in the course of employment only. Since, he died at the spot, this Court is of the opinion that in this case, the manner of his death whether it is by a murder or an accident is really immaterial. 15. In addition thereto, neither the owner nor the Insurance Company have led any evidence regarding the murder of Santosh Kumar on account of enmity. 16. Lastly and more importantly, it would be noticed that in the instant case, not only Santosh Kumar and Dharam Pal were murdered, but even the vehicle was stolen, which in itself is a clear indicator that perhaps both these persons had been murdered in order to steal the vehicle. Once that be so, then the question raised in this petition is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rita Devi's case (supra) because the cause of murder originally was not intended and appears to have been caused in furtherance of the felonious act of stealing the vehicle, and, thus is an accidental murder. The substantial question No. 1 is accordingly answered against the appellant. Question No. 2 17. The substantial question No. 1 is accordingly answered against the appellant. Question No. 2 17. It is vehemently contended by Shri Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate that Insurance Company could not be fasten with the liability as the cheque issued by the owner was dishonoured and, therefore, no valid contract of insurance came into existence. However, I find no merit in this contention. Record reveals that the Insurance Policy Cover Note No. 191116 was issued by the Insurance Company and vehicle No. HP-02- 0190 was insured by them. However, such insurance was cancelled on 23.09.2004 but as the accident already took place on 21.08.2004. Therefore, since the Insurance Policy was valid on the date of accident, therefore, the appellant-Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability only on the ground that the policy so issued had been subsequently cancelled on account of dishonour of cheque. 18. In taking this view, I am fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Rula and others, (2000) AIR SC 1082, wherein it was held that the insurer has to intimate the owner by way of notice about the cancellation of Insurance Policy and if the accident occurred between the period till the cancellation is conveyed it is the insurer, who is liable. 19. It shall be apposite to reproduce para-11 of the judgment, which reads as under:- "11. This decision, which is 3-judge Bench decision, squarely covers the present case also. The subsequent cancellation of the Insurance Policy in the instant case on the ground that the cheque through which premium was paid was dishonoured, would not affect the rights of the third party which had accrued on the issuance of the Policy on the date on which the accident took place. If, on the date of accident, there was a Policy of Insurance in respect of the vehicle in question, the third party would have a claim against the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle would have to be indemnified in respect of the claim of that party. Subsequent cancellation of Insurance Policy on the ground of non-payment of premium would not affect the rights already accrued in favour of the third party." 20. The issue again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deddapa and others vs. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Subsequent cancellation of Insurance Policy on the ground of non-payment of premium would not affect the rights already accrued in favour of the third party." 20. The issue again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deddapa and others vs. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) AIRSCW 7948, wherein the same principles as the above were laid down, as would be evident from paras 26 to 28, which read as under:- "26. We are not oblivious of the distinction between the statutory liability of the Insurance Company vis-a-vis a third party in the context of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act and its liabilities in other cases. But the same liabilities arising under a contract of insurance would have to be met if the contract is valid. If the contract of insurance has been cancelled and all concerned have been intimated thereabout, we are of the opinion, the insurance company would not be liable to satisfy the claim. 27. A beneficial legislation as is well known should not be construed in such a manner so as to bring within its ambit a benefit which was not contemplated by the legislature to be given to the party. In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries, (1985) AIR SC 278, this Court held : "We do not doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but where such beneficial .legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme." We, therefore, agree with the opinion of the High Court. 28. However, as the appellant hails from the lowest strata of society, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, we should, in exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct the Respondent No.1 to pay the amount of claim to the appellants herein and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle viz., Respondent No.2, particularly in view of the fact that no appeal was preferred by him. We direct accordingly." 21. We direct accordingly." 21. Similar reiteration of law can be found in a subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case title United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmamma and others, (2012) AIRSCW 2657, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after discussing the law in issue in detail held that if cancellation order is not made or if the accident occurred till the cancellation order is made and conveyed, the insurer would be liable. 22. It shall be apposite to reproduce para - 19 of the Judgment, which reads as under:- "19. In our view, the legal position is this : where the policy of insurance is issued by an authorized insurer on receipt of cheque towards payment of premium and such cheque is returned dishonoured, the liability of authorized insurer to indemnify third parties in respect of the liability which that policy covered subsists and it has to satisfy award of compensation by reason of the provisions of Sections 147(5) and 149(1) of the M.V. Act unless the policy of insurance is cancelled by the authorized insurer and intimation of such cancellation has reached the insured before the accident. In other words, where the policy of insurance is issued by an authorized insurer to cover a vehicle on receipt of the cheque paid towards premium and the cheque gets dishonored and before the accident of the vehicle occurs, such insurance company cancels the policy of insurance and sends intimation thereof to the owner, the insurance company's liability to indemnify the third parties which that policy covered ceases and the insurance company is not liable to satisfy awards of compensation in respect thereof." 23. The aforesaid judgments, in turn, have been followed by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rukshana and others, (2015) 2 ShimLC 753 . This substantial question of law is accordingly decided against the appellant. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.