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2019 DIGILAW 1343 (JHR)

Siddique Ansari v. State of Jharkhand

2019-07-25

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 13.08.2015, passed in Board Case No. 18 of 2010 by the Additional Member, Board of Jharkhand, Ranchi has been assailed, whereby and whereunder, the order passed by the original as well as the appellate authority, the Respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, who has allowed an application filed under Section 16 sub-section (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 has been reversed. 2. The brief facts, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, is that 20 Decimals of land in Plot No. 551 under Khata No. 7 of Mouza-Badalpur, Police Station-Tundi, District-Dhanbad had been sold by one Smt. Halima Khatoon (Respondent No. 5) in favour of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by executing a Sale Deed No. 5215, dated 25.09.2002, which has been objected to by the petitioner on the ground that the land in question is just adjacent to the boundary of the property situated in North Side of the land in question and, therefore, he has right to preemption, as provided under Section 16 sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 and hence, he has got the right first to purchase the said landed property, but having not done so, he has filed an application under the provision of Section 16, sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Dhanbad, as being L.C. Case No. 18/2002-03, who after coming to the conclusive finding by holding therein, that the petitioner is a co-sharer and the nature of land is agricultural one, therefore, it has been held that the petitioner is having pre-emptory right and accordingly, order has been passed for transfer of the said land in favour of the petitioner. The Respondent Nos. The Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have preferred an appeal against the order passed in L.C. Case No. 18/02-03 before the Additional Collector being L.C. Appeal No. 80 of 2003, who has also refused to differ with the finding recorded in L.C. Case No. 18/2002-03, therefore, the respondents have approached before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, assailing the order, passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms as also the Additional Collector, Dhanbad and thereafter, the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand vide order dated 17.07.2006, passed in a revision petition being Revision No. 31 of 2005, has set aside the order passed by the appellate authority and remitted the matter back before the Additional Collector, Dhanbad with a direction to pass a speaking order on two issues. In pursuance thereto, the Additional Collector has passed a fresh order on 08.02.2010, but the finding recorded by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms has been refused to be reversed and therefore, the respondent no. 5 has again approached before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand at Ranchi as being Revision No. 18 of 2010 against the order passed by the Additional Collector in L.C. Appeal No. 80 of 2003 as well as order passed in L.C. Case No. 18 of 2002-03 has been set aside against which the present writ petition has been filed. 5 has again approached before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand at Ranchi as being Revision No. 18 of 2010 against the order passed by the Additional Collector in L.C. Appeal No. 80 of 2003 as well as order passed in L.C. Case No. 18 of 2002-03 has been set aside against which the present writ petition has been filed. It is the case of the petitioner that he has got pre-emptory right over the property in question, which, ought to have been sold out in his favour by the Respondent No. 5, but, having not done so, the condition stipulated under the provision of Section 16 sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 has grossly been violated and taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the original authority i.e. the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Dhanbad while exercising the original jurisdiction to deal with an application, filed under Section 16 subsection 3 of the Act, 1961 by taking into consideration the status of the petitioner of being a co-sharer and the nature of land being agricultural and to that effect, the finding has also been recorded by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad under its appellate jurisdiction twice, but the Member, Board of Revenue, while reversing the finding of the Additional Collector has not acted properly since there is specific finding recorded by the Additional Collector with respect to fulfillment of the conditions i.e. the status of the petitioner of a co-sharer and therefore, the said order suffers from infirmity and, accordingly, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 3. Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, learned A.C. to Sr. S.C.-III appearing for the State-Respondent has submitted that the Additional Collector, even on remand has not given a conclusive finding based on the cogent evidence, since the petitioner has failed to establish his status, as a co-sharer and the status of a co-sharer has been accepted merely on the ground that the petitioner has not produced any relevant document to establish this fact and therefore, his submission is that when the petitioner is claiming to be a co-sharer, it is his onus to establish his status of a co-sharer. Further, it has been submitted that the Additional Collector, while passing a fresh order, has also not given any specific finding regarding the nature of the land to be agricultural land, as recorded in the revisional survey in the year 1997 and therefore, there is no proper consideration of the issues and without doing so, the ingredient as stipulated under the provision of Section 16, sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 has been found to be established i.e. of co-sharer and the nature of land being agricultural, therefore, the Member, Board of Revenue after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has rightly reversed the order passed by the Additional Collector, which cannot be interfered with. 4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and on appreciation of their rival submission, this Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deem it fit and proper to refer to the provision of Section 16, sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961, which reads hereunder as :- “16.Restricton on future acquisition by transfer etc.-(3) (i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of this Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transfer or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed : Provided that no such application shallbe entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made, the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision : Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat as the case may be, shall be evicted, from land and possession thereof shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten percent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refused to comply with the direction, the procedure, prescribed in Order XXI, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed.” It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the said provision has been enacted in order to give a pre-emptory right to the co-sharer to purchase the property, if he is willing to do so, but subject to the condition that the nature of the land must be an agricultural one, therefore, before making the provision of the Act, 1961 applicable, the conditions stipulated therein, is required to be fulfilled i.e. of co-sharer and the nature of the land to be an agricultural one. The definition of land also needs to be referred herein, which have been defined in Section 2 (f) of the Act, 1961, which reads hereunder as:- “2 (f) “land” means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture and includes land which is an orchard, Kharhur or pasturage or [forest land or] [also the land] perennially submerged under water] or the homestead of land-holder; Explanation I.-“Homestead” means a dwelling house for the purpose of living or for the purpose of letting out on rent together with any courtyard, compound, attached garden, orchard and out-building and includes any outbuilding for the purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and any tank, library and place of worship appertaining to such dwelling house.” It is evident from the definition of land, which means that which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture and includes land which is an orchard, Kharkhur or pasturage or [forest land or] [also the land] perennially submerged under water] or the homestead of land holder and the “Homestead” has been defined under Explanation I, which means a dwelling house is for the purpose of living or for the purpose of letting out on rent together with any courtyard or a compound, attached garden and orchard out-building for the purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and any tank, library and place of worship appertaining to such dwelling house. This Court also deems it fit and proper to refer certain authoritative pronouncements on consideration of the provision of Section 16, sub-section (3) of the Act, 1961. Reference with respect to the applicability of the provision of Section 16, sub-section (3) thereof, which could be made applicable, if the land is agriculture in nature of the judgment rendered in the case of Urmila Devi-Vs.-State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1998 (1) PLJR 758 , wherein, the Hon’ble Court has taken into consideration the recital of the sale deed, which does not show that the nature of the land is agricultural one and also the consideration has been made of lack of evidence, led by the pre-emptor to the effect that the land was and is used for agricultural purposes and even no whisper was made for the adjoining land, which is held by the respondent no. 4, is used for agricultural purposes and, as such, in absence of any evidence to the effect, which cannot be said that the land together with houses, is homestead land within the definition of Section 2 (f) of the said Act. Reference needs to be made of the judgment rendered in the case of Triveni Singh-Vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2007 (4) PLJR 109 , wherein, the Hon’ble Court has taken into consideration the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Patna High Court rendered in the case of Syed Fakir Mohammad-Vs.-Sheikh Salahuddin and others reported in 1975 PLJR 1 (FB) in which the Full Bench of this Court has clearly held that the effect of the Act, 1961 and particularly Sections 2 (f), 2 (g) and 16 (3) are interpreted to the effect that the homestead of land holders will not attract the doctrine of pre-emption. In the case of Mukhi Mali-Vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1979 BBCJ 151 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court has clearly expounded that transferor is not a land holder, therefore, principles of pre-emption would not apply. Similarly in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav & Another-Vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. In the case of Mukhi Mali-Vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1979 BBCJ 151 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court has clearly expounded that transferor is not a land holder, therefore, principles of pre-emption would not apply. Similarly in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav & Another-Vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 848 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held that the landless person cannot be denied of his right to become landowner just because of the pre-emption The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Triveni Singh (Supra), on the basis of the aforesaid ratio, laid down by the Hon’ble Patna High Court has discussed the jurisdiction of the revisional Court in making interference with the fact finding recorded by the original authority as also the appellate authority and it has been held, therein, that the fact finding recorded by the court of appeal can only be disturbed and interfered with by the Revisional court, provided, there is inherent lacunae in the procedure or palpable wrong on the face of the record or there is manifest injustice, resulting therefrom or it is perverse as no prudent man would reach to such a conclusion. In the judgment rendered in the case of Kapil Mahato-Vs-The State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2007 (4) 4 JLJR 198, this Court while discussing the purpose behind enactment of law of preemption has been pleased to hold that the land of pre-emption is to facilitate agriculture by co-sharer/adjoining raiyat and as such, a co-sharer and adjoining raiyat has a superior right over the land than the adjoining raiyat, who purchased the land for non-agricultural purpose. In the case of Udai Narain Singh & Ors.-Vs-The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2008 (2) PLJR 409 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court at paragraph 18 has been pleased to hold as under :- “It is well-known that earlier customary law of preemption has been incorporated in the Act to make it statutory right. reported in 2008 (2) PLJR 409 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court at paragraph 18 has been pleased to hold as under :- “It is well-known that earlier customary law of preemption has been incorporated in the Act to make it statutory right. However, by a catena of decisions, rendered by this Court and the Supreme Court, it is now well settled that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and it can be defeated by any legitimate means by the purchaser.” The provision of Section 16 (3) incorporated in the Act is obviously with an intention to prevent fragmentation of land and to facilitate consolidation. With this intention, the legislature created a statutory right in favour of an adjoining raiyat or a co-sharer to stake a claim to pre-empt any land or piece of land sold adjoining to this land. Hence, purchase of two small pieces of land of same plot by two separate sale deeds on the same day in effect amounts to fragmentation and obviously defeats the intention of the legislature and is clearly an attempt to defeat the right of the adjoining raiyat or co-sharer to set up his claim of pre-emption. In the light of this statutory provision, contending therein, the ingredient of consideration of the finding recorded by the authorities and which has been appreciated by the authorities, is to be scrutinized by this Court. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner has made an application under the provision of Section 16, sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 claiming his status of a co-sharer and claiming the land in the nature of agricultural one which was sold out by the Respondent No. 5 in favour of the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, the said application having been entertained by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, as an original authority, and he, after coming to the finding that the petitioner is a co-sharer and the nature of the land is agricultural one, has passed an order, holding the pre-emptory right of the petitioner. 3 and 4, therefore, the said application having been entertained by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, as an original authority, and he, after coming to the finding that the petitioner is a co-sharer and the nature of the land is agricultural one, has passed an order, holding the pre-emptory right of the petitioner. The order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in L.C. Case No. 18/02-03 has been assailed in an appeal before the Additional Collector, Dhanbad being L.C. Appeal No. 80 of 2003, preferred by the purchaser, but the same has been dismissed against which revision has been preferred before the Board of Revenue, being case No. 31/2005, wherein, the Revisional authority being not convinced with the finding recorded by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad has, found as under:- “1. Page 4 of the copy of the order of the DCLR that has been annexed as Annexure ‘5’ to the petition relates to the spot verification done by the DCLR. The DCLR specifically states that were conflicting claims relating to the boundary to the north and east of the disputed land. The DCLR does not record any conclusion. However, at page 10 of the copy of the same order the DCLR relies upon the same site verification to declare the applicant under Section 16 (3) 1 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) to be the adjoining raiyat at the boundary of the disputed plot to the north and to the east. How has the DCLR come to this conclusion without analyzing the claims and counter claims made at the time of spot verification? 2.The DCLR at page 10 of the same order referred to above has concluded that the applicant under Section 16 (3) 1 of the Act was also a co-sharer under the Muslim Personal Law. I find this a strange conclusion. I wonder which Section of the muslim Personal Law grants the status of a co-sharer to the applicant under the Act. 3.While the DCLR at page 4 of the annexed copy of his order refers to claims and counter claims made by the interested parties relating to adjacency, at page 11 the DCLR categorically states that the vendees do not have any land adjoining the disputed land. It is not clear as to how the DCLR has reached this conclusion. 3.While the DCLR at page 4 of the annexed copy of his order refers to claims and counter claims made by the interested parties relating to adjacency, at page 11 the DCLR categorically states that the vendees do not have any land adjoining the disputed land. It is not clear as to how the DCLR has reached this conclusion. The DCLR also mentions that no evidence has been produced by the vendees to show that the vendees are raiyats of land adjoining the disputed land. The DCLR appears to have overlooked the law since the onus to prove that the vendee is not a raiyat of the adjoining land lies upon the applicant under Section 16 (3) 1 of the Act. 4. The DCLR at page 11 of the copy of the same order concludes that the applicant under the Act did not accept the offer of sale made to him by the vendor because of which the vendor sold the land to the vendees. There is no evidence on record to support his claim. Using the same yardstick it can also be said that there is no evidence to disprove the claim of the vendor. 5. The vendees-petitioners also claims that neither the vendor, vendee nor the applicant are agriculturists and, therefore, do not come to the category of raiyats. I do not find any reference to this issue in the orders of the Lower Courts.” The matter has been remanded to the Additional Collector, Dhanbad with a direction to pass a speaking order on all the issues mentioned above. The Additional Collector has passed a fresh order on 08.02.2010, but taken the same view, as was taken in earlier order by rejecting the appeal against which again a revision was preferred before the Member, Board of Revenue in which the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms and the Additional Collector have been set aside. The legality and propriety of the order, passed by the revisional authority is under scrutiny before this Court by way of the instant writ petition. The legality and propriety of the order, passed by the revisional authority is under scrutiny before this Court by way of the instant writ petition. As would appear from the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, dated 17.07.2006 (Annexure-5), five issues have been framed pointing out the infirmity committed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms to the effect that the Deputy Collector Land Reforms specifically states that whether conflicting claims relating to the boundary to the North and East of the disputed land, but the Deputy Collector Land Reforms does not record any conclusion. However, at page 10 of the copy of the same order, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms relies upon the same site verification to declare the applicant under Section 16 (3) 1 of the Act, 1961 that if adjoining raiyat at the boundary of the disputed plot to the North and to the East, but how has the Deputy Collector Land Reforms has come to this conclusion without claims and counter claims, made at the time of the spot verification. The said issues have been dealt with by the appellate authority in its order dated 08.02.2010, while discussing the issues, the reliance has been placed upon the cadastral survey khatiyan, wherefrom it would transpire to the appellate authority that the original Khatiyani raiyat were Dhansu Mian etc., the seller Halima Khatoon is the successor of Dhansu Mian, which has been found evident from the genealogical table brought on record in L.C. Case No. 18/2002-03 or its perusal, the seller namely, Halima Khatoon is the daughter of Habib Mian, who is son of Dhansu Mian therefore, reaches to the conclusion that the pre-emptor is the co-sharer, but, before coming to the conclusion, counter claim put forth by the private respondents has not been considered which was the main issue framed by the appellate authority and therefore, the same has been taken into consideration again by the revisional authority by reiterating the stand taken by it in the order that the stand taken by the private respondents in her counter affidavit was not taken into consideration, or rather, it was not examined at all by the court below. In that view of the matter, when the appellate authority has framed a specific issue to get it adjudicated after scrutinizing the claims and counter claims of the parties, but the appellate authority has only considered the claim and not considered the objection, made thereof, hence when the revisional authority is differing with the finding recorded by the Additional Collector with respect to the issue already framed by it in the earlier order, it cannot be said that the finding with respect to the issue No. 1, as has been recorded by the appellate authority, does not suffer with infirmity. The issue No. 1, which pertains to the reference made by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms at page 10 of the order, wherein, it has been concluded that the applicant under Section 16 (3) 1 of the Act, 1961 was also a co-sharer under the Muslim Personal Law, but no conclusive finding has been recorded, as to whether, which Section of Muslim Personal Law grants the status of the co-sharer to the applicant under the Act. The Additional Collector on the order passed on remand has considered it by referring to the genealogical table, holding therein, by establishing the pre-emptor as the co-sharer on the ground of being daughter of one Habib Mian, who happens to be the son of the Khatiyani, namely Dhansu Mian and while making such observation, the reference of Section 63 of the Mohamedan Law has been made, but while considering the said adjudication made by the appellate authority, the Revisional authority has given a finding that on what basis and on what evidences under the provisions of Section 63 of the Mohamedan Law, the Additional Collector has arrived at a conclusion that the O.P. No. 1 is the co-sharer of the Opposite Party No. 2. The difference shown by the revisional authority is on the basis of non-consideration of the provision of Muslim Personal Law and so far as the provision of Section 63 of the Mohamedan Law is concerned, the same speaks otherwise, which has got no relevance with the present case. Rather this Court is constrained to hold that there is no provision to the effect as Section 63, as provided under the Mohamedan Law. Rather this Court is constrained to hold that there is no provision to the effect as Section 63, as provided under the Mohamedan Law. However, the reference of Section 63 containing the definition of shares find mention in the Hanafi Law of inheritance is under Chapter 7 thereof, which stipulates that after payment of funeral expenses, debts and legacies, the first step in the distribution of the estate of a deceased Mohamaden is to ascertain which of the surviving relation belongs to the class of share and which class are not entitled to share of the inheritance and after this is done to proceed to assign their respective shares to such of the sharers as are under the circumstances of the case, entitled to succeed to share, this Court after going across the aforesaid definition is of the view that the same is not relevant for the present one. In that view of the matter, the finding recorded by the Revisional authority, having said to be not answered properly by the appellate authority, cannot be said to suffer from infirmity. The issue No. 3 has been formulated by considering the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms at page 4, which refers to claims and counter claims made by the interested parties relating to adjacency, at page 11, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms categorically states that the vendees do not have any land adjoining the disputed land. It is not clear as to how the Deputy Collector Land Reforms has reached this conclusion. He also mentions that no evidence has been produced by the vendees to show that the vendees are raiyats of land adjoining the disputed land and therefore, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms has been said to have overlooked the law, since the onus to prove that the vendee is not a raiyat of adjoining land lies upon the applicant under Section 16 sub section 3 of the Act. The appellate court has recorded the finding with respect to this issue and it would appear that the appellate authority has only answered the said issue on the basis of the fact that no such evidence has been produced for its confirmation and relied upon paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order, wherein, it has been recorded that the pre-emptor is co-sharer and adjoining raiyat to the disputed land. The Revisional authority while considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter has been pleased to come to the conclusion that the fact about the status of the co-sharer of O.P. No. 1, has been disputed in the counter affidavit, but the said aspect has not been considered and further, there is no mention of boundary in the sale deed of the O.P. No. 1, the pre-emptor purchased it from Isa Bibi then how and on what ground, the O.P. No. 1 could become the adjoining raiyat of the land in dispute. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when a particular issue has been framed by the revisional authority that has to be answered on the basis of the material evidence, but, as would appear from the appellate order that the same has been answered in a very perfunctory manner and even though no evidence has been recorded, which ought to have been produced by the pre-emptor, establishing his right of status of a co-sharer and an adjoining raiyat, even though the finding has been recorded in his favour and hence, the finding recorded to that effect is not proper. So far as the Issue no. 4, as has been framed by the revisional authority to the effect that at page 11 of the copy of the order, passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms that the applicant under the Act did not accept the offer of sale made to him by the vendor because of which the vendor sold the land to the vendees. There is no evidence on record to support this claim using the same yardstick it can also be said that there is no evidence to disprove the claim of vendor. While answering this issue, the Additional Collector has come to the finding that merely on the presumption and surmises by holding that the contention agitated by the vendee about making offer to the pre-emptor cannot be accepted, in view of the fact that if the offer would have been made and in case of its rejection, there was no occasion for the pre-emptor to file L.C. Case. The said finding is nothing, but based upon the surmises and merely on account of the fact that the L.C. Case has been instituted, it cannot be presumed that offer to purchase the property has been made. The said finding is nothing, but based upon the surmises and merely on account of the fact that the L.C. Case has been instituted, it cannot be presumed that offer to purchase the property has been made. The 05th issue framed by the revisional authority, which pertains to the claim of the petitioners that neither the vendor nor the vendee nor the appellant are agriculturists and therefore, do not come to the category of raiyats, but it has been opined by making reference that there is no reference to this issue in the orders of the Lower Courts and while answering the same, the Additional Collector in its appellate order, has come out with the finding that on the basis of the site inspection, it was found that there is cultivation of vegetables and maize, which was being done by the predecessor in interest of the pre-emptor and, as such, there is no question of not reaching to the conclusion that the pre-emptor is not an agriculturist. To this finding, the Revisional authority has come out with the specific finding that the vendor/vendee or the pre-emptor are not agriculturist and from perusal of Annexure-4 of the Revision application, which is the sketch map of surroundings of the land in dispute, there are village roads in two sides and several houses are situated at different plots in the vicinity of the area and further, from perusal of the sale deed of the petitioner, it is also clear that the land was purchased for construction of house and for business purposes, but while deciding the said issue, neither the original court nor the appellate court has taken it into consideration. This Court with respect to this issue, is of the view by taking the aid of the judgment, rendered in the case, as referred hereinabove that for passing an order under Section 16 sub section 3 of the Act, 1961, the purpose for obtaining the land must be of agriculture and the same, if not reflected from the sale deed, therefore, the nature of the land having been purchased for construction of house, as would appear from the sale deed, the very question of applicability of Section 16 sub section 3 of the Act, 1961 will not be said to be available. The issue of making reference of the nature of the land, is also one of the consideration in the case of Urmila Devi-Vs.-State of Bihar (Supra), wherein, this Court after taking into consideration the sale deed, which does not reflect the nature of the land, is agricultural, has come to the finding that the application under Section 16 sub section 3 of the Act, 1961 is not applicable. This Court after discussing the factual aspect with the legal position, elaborately, hereinabove, is of the view that the pre-emptor has failed to substantiate his claim, attracting the ingredient, as stipulated under the provision of Section 16 sub-section 3 of the Act, 1961 and as would appear from the order, passed by the revisional authority that the land in question is surrounded by roads, having surrounded also by the Pucca construction house and as per the recital of the sale deed, the same has been purchased for the purpose of construction of house and, therefore, is of the view that the nature of land is not agriculture, as has been said to be on the basis of the reference made in the Survey of the year 1997, but, since the application under Section 16 sub section 3 of the Act has been made and therefore, is of the view that the revisional authority has rightly reached to the conclusion that in spite of the particular issues framed to be answered by the appellate authority having not done so, has set aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms and the Additional Collector and while doing so, no infirmity has been committed. In view of the entirety of the facts and circumstances and since the Revisional authority has, after having discussed the factual aspect in detail and considering the non-consideration of the factual aspect, as per the issue framed by it by virtue of the earlier order, has rightly set aside the order, passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms and the Additional Collector. This writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. If a finding of fact is based on no evidence or the authority has acceded his jurisdiction, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477. It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 5. However, as per the ratio decided in the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, jurisdiction to be exercised by the writ Court in issuing writ of Certiorari has been dealt with, as would appear and placing reliance upon the same, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference in the finding recorded by the Revisional authority. 6. Accordingly, this writ petition fails and it is dismissed.