JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. State has preferred present appeal against acquittal of respondents by learned Additional Sessions Judge (I) Kangra at Dharamshala vide judgment dated 30.11.2011 passed in sessions trial No. 8-N of 2010, title State vs. Rajeev Singh and others, in case FIR No. 245 of 2009, dated 19.7.2009 registered at Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra, under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. 2. In instant case, Ranju Bala deceased wife of accused No.1 had succumbed to her injuries on 20.7.2009 after suffering 80-90% burn injuries in an attempt to commit suicide by putting herself on fire after pouring kerosene oil upon her on 19.7.2009. Marriage of accused No.1 and Ranju Bala (deceased) had taken place in the year 2003. Accused No. 2 Kushal Dev and accused No. 3 Jamuna Devi are parents-in-laws of Ranju Bala (deceased) whereas accused No. 4 Seema Devi is her sister-in-law (Nanad). 3. Case of the prosecution is that on 19.7.2009 a telephonic information was received from Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Nurpur in police station Nurpur calling police for further action informing that a female was brought to hospital for treatment in burning case. After reducing the said information into writing, by recording GD entry No. 13 (A) at 10.05 AM, PW16 ASI Mukesh Kumar along with PW7 HC Govind Pal and C.Budhi Singh (not examined) rushed to hospital. On finding critical condition of patient, PW16 telephonically informed PW12 SHO Kamaljit about it with request to reach hospital along with Tehsildar. On his application Ext.PW1/B, at 10.40 AM, PW1 Dr. Suman Saksena vide her opinion Ext.PW1/C, opined that patient was fit to make statement. PW12 SHO along with PW4 Ms. Kavita Thakur Tehsildar came to hospital and Tehsildar verified from doctor (PW1) about fitness of patient to make statement and on getting answer in affirmative, persons gathered in the room were turned out by SHO and in presence of PW1 doctor, PW4 Tehsildar and PW12 SHO Kamaljit, PW16 ASI Mukesh Kumar recorded statement of Ranju Bala deceased, who had put thumb impression on said statement Ext.PW4/A as she was not able to sign. The said statement was certified by PW4 Tehsildar in writing. The said statement was certified by PW4 Tehsildar in writing. Thereafter, ruka was prepared by making endorsement Ext.PW16/A on statement of Ranju Bala deceased and sent to Police Station through C. Budhi Singh for registration of FIR whereupon FIR Ext.PW11/A was registered by PW11 ASI Ramesh Kumar, followed by endorsement Ext.PW11/B on ruka and handing over the case file to Budhi Singh for delivering it to Investigating Officer. 4. After examination, PW1 referred Ranju Bala deceased to Zonal Hospital, Dharamshala for further treatment and expert opinion by surgeon. She issued MLC Ext.PW1/A deferring her opinion to be given after observation till three weeks and expert opinion by surgeon. As per this MLC, Ranju Bala was brought to hospital by attendants and in column of name of relative or friend, name and relation of accused is mentioned as 'husband Rajiv’. Time of arrival in hospital was recorded as 10 AM. In history given by Ranju Bala, (deceased), PW1 has recorded that she poured kerosene oil on herself and put herself on fire at about 9 AM in morning and that after her marriage in 2003, her in-laws and husband used to harass her and she had one daughter and one son and age of younger child is four years. It is also noted on MLC that patient was conscious, but in pain and agony, oriented to person and time and responding well to the questions asked and that odour of kerosene oil, singing of hair, tags of pantees and writ was also attached to the body. Superficial burn injuries approximately 80-85% were noticed on her body. It has also come on record that Ranju Bala was shifted to Raavi Multi Speciallity Hospital Pathankot on 19.7.2009. As per certificate Ext.PW2/A issued by PW2 Dr. Suhael Zahur, she was admitted in the said hospital at 12.15 PM with 95% burns and had expired on 20.7.2009 at 6.20 AM. 5. Postmortem of deceased was conducted at 1 PM on 20.7.2009 by PW3 Dr. Shiv Darshan Singh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Nurpur. According to post mortem report, total percentage of burns was around 85-90% and there were burn marks over mouth and cause of death was hypovolemic shock and death. Probable duration between injury and death was between 12-24 hours and probable time between death and postmortem was 6-12 hours. 6. Shiv Darshan Singh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Nurpur. According to post mortem report, total percentage of burns was around 85-90% and there were burn marks over mouth and cause of death was hypovolemic shock and death. Probable duration between injury and death was between 12-24 hours and probable time between death and postmortem was 6-12 hours. 6. PW3 Dr.Shiv Darshan Singh had also examined accused Rajiv on 19.7.2009 at 2.30 PM and issued MLC Ext.PW3/C noticing following injuries on his body:- 1. Blebs over right forearm and hand two were over right hand and two were over forearm. 2. Superficial burns over all four finger tips and base of themb on left hand. According to him, injuries sustained by accused Rajiv were possible while extinguishing the fire. 7 Prosecution has examined 16 witnesses to establish its case, whereafter after recording of evidence under Section 313 Cr.P.C., respondents/accused have not chosen to lead any evidence in their defence. 8. PW1 Dr. Suman Saxena, has treated the victim at the first stage, and PW2 Susheel Jahoor has treated her in Ravi Multi Specialty Hospital at Pathankot where the victim had expired on the same day at 6.20 PM. PW3 Dr. Shiv Darshan Singh, Medical Officer, has conducted the postmortem of deceased. PW3 has also examined accused Rajeev Singh on 19.7.2009 at about 2-30 PM and had found injuries on his body, which according to his opinion, were possible while extinguishing the fire. 9. The factum of burning of victim and followed by her death on the next day in Ravi Multi Specialty Hospital and postmortem of her body by PW3 in Civil Hospital, Nurpur and medical examination of accused Rajeev Singh by PW3 are not in dispute. Therefore, their statements in this regard are not necessary to be discussed. 10. PW6 Rajinder Sahoga has taken the photographs of burnt articles lying in the house of accused persons after the incident and he had also taken photographs of dead body of Ranju Bala, which have been placed on record as Ext.P1 to Ext.P12 along with negatives Ext.P13 to Ext.P24. He has also witnessed the memo Ext.PW6/A along with PW7 HC Govind Pal with regard to seizure of empty bottle, matchstick and burnt clothes etc. He has also witnessed the memo Ext.PW6/A along with PW7 HC Govind Pal with regard to seizure of empty bottle, matchstick and burnt clothes etc. PW7 Govind Pal has corroborated the seizure of matchstick Ext.P5, burnt piece of cloth Ext.P6 and one bottle Ext.P27 vide memo Ext.PW6/A. PW9 Khaidi Ram MHC at the relevant point of time, had sent the parcels through PW10 HC Yashpal to Regional FSL Dharamshala vide Road Certificate Ext.PW9/A and after handing over the same in RFSL Dharamshala PW10 HC Yash Pal handed over the receipt thereof Ext.PW10/A to PW9 HC Khaidi Ram. PW11 ASI Ramesh Kumar, after receiving ruka Ext.PW4/A from PW16 ASI Mukesh Kumar, had registered FIR Ext.PW11/A and after making endorsement Ext.PW11/B on ruka had sent the file back to PW16 SI Mukesh Kumar. 11 PW13 Gangesh, six years old son of deceased, is only eye witness to the incident. Whereas, PW5 Balwant Singh (father of deceased) and PW14 Jeevan Jyoti (sister of deceased) have deposed about maltreatment by in-laws to the deceased. PW16 ASI Mukesh Kumar has recorded the dying declaration Ext.PW4/A under the supervision of PW4 Kavita Thakur Tehsildar and PW12 Inspector Kamlajit and PW14 Jeevan Jyoti were also present at that time in the hospital. PW12, PW13, PW15 and PW16 only would be relevant for adjudication of prosecution case as other official witnesses are only link witnesses associated during the investigation for completion thereof. Besides them, for arriving at the final conclusion, depositions of PW4 Kavita Thakur, PW5 Balwant Singh and PW14 Jeevan Jyoti is also required to be considered. 12 One more witness PW15 Dr. Rajpal, examined by prosecution to prove the treatment of deceased with respect to her mental ailment in the year 2004, is also a relevant for final adjudication. 13 Other evidence on record, with respect to maltreatment by her husband, is deposition of PW5 Balwant Singh and PW14 Jeevan Jyoti and to corroborate the said evidence of cruelty and harassment on the part of in-laws, PW15 Rajpal has been examined. 14 PW5 has alleged the maltreatment to victim because of insufficient dowry with further allegation that her father-in-law used to ask her to leave his house constructed by him and he has further stated that he used to pay Rs. 14 PW5 has alleged the maltreatment to victim because of insufficient dowry with further allegation that her father-in-law used to ask her to leave his house constructed by him and he has further stated that he used to pay Rs. 10,000-20,000/- to his daughter and her husband for five years and despite that accused persons did not stop maltreating her and two years prior to incident victim was beaten up by her sister-in-law and mother-in-law and shunted out from the house whereupon victim had taken shelter in the house of her elder sister PW14 Jeevan Jyoti, married in the same village, and on receiving the telephonic call regarding the incident, he and his wife along with 3-4 persons had come to house of his elder daughter and, after seeing the condition of his younger daughter, had taken her to the hospital of PW15 Dr.Rajpal at Pathankot and after recovery, victim had returned to parental house and wherefrom she was sent along with her husband, however, on account of her continuous harassment by accused, his daughter had taken extreme step for ending her life by pouring kerosene oil on her in July, 2009. There is improvement in his statement as he has admitted that he did not disclose the police about incident of beating his daughter by her sister-in-law and forcing the victim to leave the house. He has also admitted that his daughter and her husband along with children used to reside in second storey and were having their separate kitchen and whenever he used to visit his daughter, he did not meet her parents-in-laws and sister-in-law. 15 PW14 Jeevan Jyoti has also given general statement with respect to harassment and ill-treatment by in-laws of victim with one specific incident alleged to have taken place two years ago from the date of her committing suicide. But she has added one more fact that accused Rajeev was also accompanying her sister when she was left at her home, whereafter she was taken for treatment to PW15 Dr. Rajpal. She has also added that sister-in-law of the victim used to demand money from her sister and her father-in-law used to ask to leave the house belonging to him. Rajpal. She has also added that sister-in-law of the victim used to demand money from her sister and her father-in-law used to ask to leave the house belonging to him. According to her, PW13 Gangesh had informed her at about 8-15 AM, on the day of incident, about happening by stating that his mother was weeping and saying that her father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law were about her and she would end her life and thereafter, sister-in-law of victim had come on line and had informed her about burning of her sister. 16 The fact of payment of Rs.10,000-20,000/- has come on record for the first time in the statement of PW5 Balwant Singh and allegations of maltreatment alleged in statements of PW5 Balwant Singh and PW14 Jeevan Jyoti are general in nature except with respect to one incident alleged to have happened two years ago from the incident and according to these witnesses victim was ousted from the house by her sister-in-law and mother-in-law but according to PW5, victim had taken shelter in the house of her elder sister, whereas according to PW14, accused Rajeev, husband of victim, was accompanying her sister when she came to her house after the incident. It has also come in evidence of both these witnesses that after that incident, victim was taken to hospital at Pathankot for treatment through PW15 Dr. Rajpal, who is none-else but MD Psychiatry in Raj Pal Neuro Psychiatric Hospital, Laimini Road, Pathankot. 17 The marriage of victim had taken place in the year 2003. PW15 in his examination-in-chief has stated that, as per alleged history given to him by the victim, victim was brought to his hospital in the year 2003 with acute stress disorder, since one day earlier to 16th of March on account of family conflict with her sister-in-law and as per his examination, patient was mute, not responding to his questions and was not in a position to tell the exact cause as what had happened. However, she had responded to treatment and was calm and composed. According to him, patient was having a stiffness of the body and was diagnosed finally as a case of historical neurosis sub type conversion reaction. He has endorsed subscribing OPD prescription slip and treatment Ext.PW8/B. He has further deposed that the lady was in above stated situation due to family conflict and domestic violence. According to him, patient was having a stiffness of the body and was diagnosed finally as a case of historical neurosis sub type conversion reaction. He has endorsed subscribing OPD prescription slip and treatment Ext.PW8/B. He has further deposed that the lady was in above stated situation due to family conflict and domestic violence. In cross examination, he has admitted that it is not mentioned in Ext.PW8/B that since when the patient was suffering from mental illness, but he has stated that it was told to him that she was suffering such ailment one day prior to coming to OPD and according to him, such ailment can develop within any span of time. In the prescription slip, he has mentioned the ailment of victim as catatonic plus. He has stated that it is one of symptom of schizophrenia and persons suffering from such diseases has abnormalities of two extreme types, excitably over activity on the one hand and bizarre posturing with abnormal muscle tone, vaxy flexibility on the other and it is serious psychiatric illness and schizophrenia behaviour refers splitting of mind which means total disorientation of thinking, mute, perception, judgment, contact with the reality insight and abstract and concrete thinking and people suffering from hysteria become upset, excited and unable to control their feelings. He has admitted that as per Modi, catatonia is one of variety of schizophrenia and patient in the state of wild excitement is destructive, violent and abusive and may impulsively assault anyone without the slightest provocation and may make homicidal or suicidal attempts and in such cases, auditory hallucinations frequently occur leading to violent behaviour and sometimes, such patient also destroys himself. However, he has explained that such symptoms are found in cases of major mental disorder schizophrenia subtype catatonics, but in Ext.PW8/B these symptoms are not there and that word catatonics can also be used in case of typhoid, biochemical disturbances etc. Further he has admitted that medicines prescribed in Ext.PW8/B are for release of stress and minor psychiatric problem. According to him, catatonics mentioned in Ext.PW8/B was mild. 18. In Ext.PW4/A, according to victim, after becoming fed up with the behaviour of her in-laws, she had told her husband that she would die, whereupon her husband had asked her to die and out of anger, she poured kerosene oil on her and put herself on fire. According to him, catatonics mentioned in Ext.PW8/B was mild. 18. In Ext.PW4/A, according to victim, after becoming fed up with the behaviour of her in-laws, she had told her husband that she would die, whereupon her husband had asked her to die and out of anger, she poured kerosene oil on her and put herself on fire. PW13 Gangesh has also stated that there was quarrel between his father and mother, which resulted into the commission of suicide by his mother, but he has also admitted that his father had gone to bring meals from his aunt (Tai), living in the first floor (ground floor of the house), which was not liked by his mother. It has also come in statement of PW3 Dr. Shiv Darshan Singh that injuries found on body of accused Rajeev are possible during extinguishing the fire and PW13 Gangesh has corroborated the said attempt by his father in his statement. Other accused persons/respondents are not living with family of deceased since long. Existence of separate accommodation and kitchen of the family of victim has also been admitted by her father PW15 Balwant Singh. Deposition of PW15 also indicates that victim was suffering some psychiatric disorder. According to PW5 and 14, the said disorder had developed two years ago of incident on account of ill-treatment of in-laws. The incident had taken place in the year 2009, therefore, the alleged disorder, according to PW5 and PW14, had developed in 2006 or 2007, whereas it has come in the deposition of PW15, as also evident from evidence of PW8, that victim was under treatment since 2003-2004. Marriage of victim and accused Rajeev was solemnized in the year 2003. Exact date has not been brought on record. Even otherwise, the date of treatment given by PW15 in Ext.PW8/B does not corroborate the alleged mental duress and stress on account of ouster of victim from the house of in-laws, alleged to have taken place, two years prior to incident. As treatment record is of 2004, whereas time of alleged incident, as per statement of PW5 and PW14, becomes 2006-07. 19. As treatment record is of 2004, whereas time of alleged incident, as per statement of PW5 and PW14, becomes 2006-07. 19. Dying declaration Ext.PW4/A is heavily relied upon by prosecution whereas accused are disputing its veracity on the grounds that it was not recorded by Magistrate himself, PW1 has not certified it by making signature thereupon, there is over writing/addition by Investigating Officer on said statement, there is discrepancy in statement giving reference of cane of kerosene, whereas from spot bottle of kerosene was recovered and also that it was tutored by PW4 Tehsildar, as with 80-90% burn injuries neither Ranju Bala was able to make statement nor to put her thumb impression on said statement and therefore they disputed volunteer ness, truthfullness and trustworthiness of this statement. 20. The Apex Court in Umakant and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2014) 7 SCC 405 held that “20. The philosophy of law which signifies the importance of a dying declaration is based on the mexim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire, which means, “no one at the time of death is presumed to lie and he will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. Though a dying declaration is not recorded in the court in the presence of the accused nor is it put to strict proof of cross examination by accused, still it is admitted in evidence against the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible in evidence. The dying declaration does not even require any corroboration as long as it inspires confidence in the mind of the court and that it is free from any form of tutoring. At the same time, dying declaration has to be judged and appreciated in the light of surrounding circumstances. The whole point in giving lot of credence and importance to the piece of dying declaration, deviating from the rule of evidence is that such declaration is made by the victim when he/she is on the verge of death. 21. In spite of all the importance attached and the sanctity given to the piece of dying declaration, the courts have to be very careful while analying the truthfulness, genuineness of the dying declaration and should come to a proper conclusion that the dying declaration is not a produce of prompting or tutoring. 22. The legal position about the admissibility of a dying declaration is settled by this Court in several judgments. 22. The legal position about the admissibility of a dying declaration is settled by this Court in several judgments. This Court in Atbir vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 9 SCC 1 , taking into consideration the earlier judgments of this Court in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 has given certain guidelines while considering a dying declaration: (Atbir case, SCC pp. 8-9, para 22) “(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity, such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” (at pp 413-414) 21. In Vijay Pal vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2015) 4 SCC 749 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:- “18. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 , the Constitution Bench has held thus: "3. In Vijay Pal vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2015) 4 SCC 749 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:- “18. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 , the Constitution Bench has held thus: "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross33 examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite." 19. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite." 19. The aforesaid judgment makes it absolutely clear that the dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice, provided the communication is positive and definite. There cannot be any cavil over the proposition that a dying declaration cannot be mechanically relied upon. In fact, it is the duty of the Court to examine a dying declaration with studied scrutiny to find out whether the same is voluntary, truthful and made in a conscious state of mind and further it is without any influence. 20. At this juncture, we may quote a passage from Babulal v. State of M.P (2003) 12 SCC 490 wherein the value of dying declaration in evidence has been stated:- "7. ... A person who is facing imminent death, with even a shadow of continuing in this world practically non-existent, every motive of falsehood is obliterated. The mind gets altered by most powerful ethical reasons to speak only the truth. Great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying person because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person. The maxim is "a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth" (nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri). Mathew Arnold said, "truth sits on the lips of a dying man". The general principle on which the species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and mind induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth; situation so solemn that law considers the same as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice." 21. Dealing with the oral dying declaration, a two-Judge Bench in Prakash V. State of M.P. (1992) 4 SCC 225 has stated thus: (SCC p.234, para 11) "11. ... Dealing with the oral dying declaration, a two-Judge Bench in Prakash V. State of M.P. (1992) 4 SCC 225 has stated thus: (SCC p.234, para 11) "11. ... In the ordinary course, the members of the family including the father were expected to ask the victim the names of the assailants at the first opportunity and if the victim was in a position to communicate, it is reasonably expected that he would give the names of the assailants if he had recognised the assailants. In the instant case there is no occasion to hold that the deceased was not in a position to identify the assailants because it is nobody's case that the deceased did not know the accused [pic]persons. It is therefore quite likely that on being asked the deceased would name the assailants. In the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court has accepted the dying declaration and we do not think that such a finding is perverse and requires to be interfered with." 22. Thus, the law is quite clear that if the dying declaration is absolutely credible and nothing is brought on record that the deceased was in such a condition, he or she could not have made a dying declaration to a witness, there is no justification to discard the same. In the instant case, PW-1 had immediately rushed to the house of the deceased and she had told him that her husband had poured kerosene on her.” 22. In Gulzari Lal vs. State of Haryana (2016) 4 SCC 583 the Supreme Court has held:- “14.The learned counsel further placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Tarachand Damu Sutar v. The State of Maharashtra, wherein it was held as under: “21… A dying declaration is not to be believed merely because no possible reason can be given for accusing the accused falsely. It can only be believed if there are no grounds for doubting it at all. 15. Further reliance has been placed on the judgement of this Court in Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur AIR 1962 SC 130 , wherein it was held as under: “20. It can only be believed if there are no grounds for doubting it at all. 15. Further reliance has been placed on the judgement of this Court in Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur AIR 1962 SC 130 , wherein it was held as under: “20. There can be no dispute that the dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction however, such a dying declaration has to be proved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and truthful and further that the matter thereof must be in fit medical condition to make it. 16. The learned counsel further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Nanhar & Ors. v. State of Haryana[3], wherein the Division Bench of this Court opined as under : (S p. 432,para 33) “33… The dying declaration should be such, which should immensely strike to be genuine and stating true story of its maker. It should be free from all doubts and on going through it, an impression has to be registered immediately in mind that it is genuine, true and not tainted with doubts…” 17. Further, the reliance was placed in the case of P. Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006)3 SCC 161 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that: (SCC p.166, para 14) “14. Indisputably conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone but therefore the same must be wholly reliable. In a case where suspicion can be raised as regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion, it is trite, is no substitute for proof. If evidence brought on record suggests that such dying declaration does not reveal the entire truth, it may be considered only as piece of evidence in which event conviction may not be rested only on the basis thereof. The question as to whether a dying declaration is of impeccable character would depend upon several factors; physical and mental condition of the deceased is one of them… 21. We find no infirmities with the statements made by the deceased and recorded by the Head Constable Manphool Singh (PW-7). A valid dying declaration may be made without obtaining a certificate of fitness of the declarant by a medical officer. We find no infirmities with the statements made by the deceased and recorded by the Head Constable Manphool Singh (PW-7). A valid dying declaration may be made without obtaining a certificate of fitness of the declarant by a medical officer. The law regarding the same is well-settled by this Court in the decision of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 , wherein this Court observed thus: "3. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." 23. Mere presence of relatives at the time of recording dying declaration cannot be made basis to discard the said statement unless it is proved that dying declaration is tutored. Hon’ble Apex Court in Rakesh and another vs. State of Haryana (2013) 4 SCC 69 held “13……..Though, in the evidence, it has come on record that few of the relatives were standing in the ward, in view of the assertion of the Magistrate (PW10) who recorded her statement, mere presence of some of the close relatives would not affect the contents of the declaration. 20. The claim that there was wrong description of names in the dying declaration and some of the relatives were present at the time of recording of the dying declaration are not material contradictions which would affect the prosecution case.” In Satish Chandra and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2014) 6 SCC 723 it is held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that “32……Primarily, two objections are raised questioning the veracity of this dying declaration. It is stated that Sunita was tutored before she made the statement as it was made in the presence of the family members of the deceased and Appellant 2 was made to sit outside when the statement was being recorded. Secondly, it is not recorded in the form of questions and answers. On the facts of this case both these contentions are to be rejected. 33. It is clear that the Executive Magistrate took due precautions and even obtained the certificate about the state of health of Sunita before recording her statement. He has entered the witness box as PW2 and deposed to this effect. There is nothing on record which would indicate that Sunita may have been tutored by her mausa. Nothing could be pointed out to show that after reaching the hospital, she had occasion to meet her mausa and he got an opportunity to tutor her……” 24. Minor discrepancies in dying declaration do not render it doubtful. In Deepak Verma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2011)10 SCC 129 the Hon’ble Apex Court held:- “36. The last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the dying declaration of Kamini Verma which became the basis of registering the first information report itself was forged and fabricated. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the very foundation of the prosectuion story itself being shrouded in suspicious circumstances, must lead to the inevitable conclusion that appellant-accused have been falsely implicated in the crime in question….. 37. The learned counsel for the appellants also invited the Court’s attention of Exts. PW11/C, PW23/A and PW26/A so as to point out a number of discrepancies. It was submitted that there are a number of cuttings/overwritings of the time at which the endorsements on the dying declaration of Kamini Verma were recorded….. 38. Additionally, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the language of the dying declaration itself shows, that the same was not a voluntary statement made by Kamini Verma, but actually the handiwork of ASI Jog Raj, PW26 who had recorded the aforesaid statement. In this regard learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that various words and observations were used in the dying declaration were used in the dying declaration, which are in use of police personnel (and/or advocates), but not in the use of common persons……. 39. In this regard learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that various words and observations were used in the dying declaration were used in the dying declaration, which are in use of police personnel (and/or advocates), but not in the use of common persons……. 39. We have considered the last submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. There can be no doubt that there are certain discrepancies in the time recorded in the dying declaration. Additionally, there can also be no doubt that certain words which are not in common use have found place in the dying declaration made by Kamini Verma. Despite the aforesaid, we find no merit in the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant…… 40. …….The question of doubting the dying declaration made by Kamini Verma could have arisen if there had been other cogent evidence to establish any material discrepancy therein.” 25. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and another vs. State of Karnataka (2014) 5 SCC 730 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:- "15……The recording of Pradeep’s statement by a constable (PW30) as dictated by PW36 (PSI) in this situation riased many questions. The trial Court found this absurd…… 18. The sanctity is attached to a dying declaration because it comes from the mouth of a dying person. If the dying declaration is recorded not directly from the actual words of the maker but as dictated by somebody else, in our opinion, this by itself creates a lot of suspicion about credibility of such statement and the prosecution has to clear the same to the satisfaction of the court…….” 26 In Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 120 the Hon’ble Apex Court has also held that “14. We are not at all impressed by any of these submissions. There are a large number of decisions that have been cited before us by learned counsel for the State where persons with 90% burns have given a dying declaration and that has been accepted. For example, in Amit Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2010) 12 SCC 285 the victim had 90% burns and yet her statement was accepted. This Court noted, inter alia, that the victim did not unfairly implicate anybody who had not participated in the crime. For example, in Amit Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2010) 12 SCC 285 the victim had 90% burns and yet her statement was accepted. This Court noted, inter alia, that the victim did not unfairly implicate anybody who had not participated in the crime. This Court relied on ten principles governing a dying declaration as mentioned in Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 to conclude that there was no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration given by the victim in that case. 15. Similarly, in Govindappa v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533 the victim had 100% burn injuries and yet she was found to be in a fit state of mind to give her statement and affix her left thumb impression on the statement. The dying declaration was accepted by this Court on the evidence of the doctor that the victim was in a position to talk. 16. In Sukanti Moharana v. State of Orissa, (2009) 9 SCC 163 , the victim had 90 to 95 per cent burn injuries covering 90 to 95 per cent body surface and yet her dying declaration was accepted after considering the principles laid down in Paniben. 17. In Kamalavva v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 614 , reference was again made to Paniben. It was noted that the doctor who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration had attached a certificate to the effect that it was recorded in his presence. This Court rejected the technical objection regarding the non-availability of a certificate and endorsement from the doctor regarding the mental fitness of the deceased. It was held that the view taken by this Court in numerous decisions is that this is a mere rule of prudence and not the ultimate test as to whether or not the dying declaration was truthful or voluntary. 18. In Satish Ambanna Bansode v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 217 , the victim had 95% superficial to deep burns and after referring to Paniben, her dying declaration was accepted by this Court. 19. Insofar as the case before us is concerned, we may only note that there is no format prescribed for recording a dying declaration. Indeed, no such format can be prescribed. Therefore, it is not obligatory that a dying declaration should be recorded in a question answer form. 19. Insofar as the case before us is concerned, we may only note that there is no format prescribed for recording a dying declaration. Indeed, no such format can be prescribed. Therefore, it is not obligatory that a dying declaration should be recorded in a question answer form. There may be occasions when it is possible to do so and others when it may not be possible to do so either because of the prevailing situation or because of the pain and agony that the victim might be suffering at that point of time. 20. It is also not obligatory that either an Executive Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate should be present for recording a dying declaration. It is enough that there is evidence available to show that the dying declaration is voluntary and truthful. There could be occasions when persons from the family of the accused are present and in such a situation, the victim may be under some pressure while making a dying declaration. In such a case, the Court has to carefully weigh the evidence and may need to take into consideration the surrounding facts to arrive at the correct factual position.” (at pp. 125-126) 27 In Ramakant Mishra alias Lalu and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 8 SCC 299 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:- “7. The defence has rested very heavily nay, almost entirely, on the alleged Dying Declaration attributed to the deceased. The admissibility of a Dying Declaration as a piece of evidence in a Trial is governed by Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 32, as a whole, enunciates the exceptions to the rule of non-admissibility of hearsay evidences, eventuated out of necessity to give relevance to the statements made by a person whose attendance cannot be procured for reasons stipulated in the section. Postulating the essential ingredients to define what exactly would constitute a hearsay is an arduous task, and since we are only concerned with one of its exceptions, we should forbear entering into the entire arena. The risks while admitting a Dying Declaration and the statements falling within the domain of Section 32(1) run higher in contrast to other sundry evidences, and this entails a huge bearing on their admissibility and credibility. The risks while admitting a Dying Declaration and the statements falling within the domain of Section 32(1) run higher in contrast to other sundry evidences, and this entails a huge bearing on their admissibility and credibility. Such statements are neither made on oath nor the maker of the statement would be available for cross-examination nor are they made under the influence of the supremacy and the solemnity of the court-room. This is the reason why this Court has consistently underlined the necessity to examine this specie of evidence with great circumspection and care. However, once a Dying Declaration is held to be authentic, inspiring full confidence beyond the pale of doubt, voluntary, consistent and credible, barren of tutoring, significant sanctity is endowed to it; such is the sanctitude that it can even be the exclusive and the solitary basis for conviction without seeking any corroboration. At this juncture, it is worthwhile noting that the sanctity attached to a Dying Declaration springs up from the rationale that a person genuinely under the sense of imminent death would speak only the truth. 8. In addition to the Dying Declaration, which is only one of the species of the genus of Section 32(1), there could be other statements, written or verbal, which also would be encompassed within the sweep of this section, and at this point the Indian law drifts from the English law. This is further evident from the usage of phraseology in the section, embracing not only statements made about "cause of death" but also about "any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death", whether or not the person making the statement was under "expectation of death". These statements could be in the form of a suicide note, a letter, a sign or a signal, or a product of any reliable means of communication; their genuineness and credibility shall, of course, be reckoned by the Court entertaining the concerned matter. A Dying Declaration enjoys a higher level of credence vis-a-vis any other statement abovementioned, which is on account of the former being made in the "contemplation of death". "Contemplation of death" is the primal factor to segregate Dying Declarations from other statements. A Dying Declaration enjoys a higher level of credence vis-a-vis any other statement abovementioned, which is on account of the former being made in the "contemplation of death". "Contemplation of death" is the primal factor to segregate Dying Declarations from other statements. But no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down to confine the contemplation within the circumference of few hours or a few days in which death of the maker of the statement must happen so as to elevate that statement to the level of a Dying Declaration. Moreover, the state of mind of the maker would also be material in discerning completely as to whether the maker was mentally fit to make the statement and whether the maker actually could have contemplated death. 9. Definition of this legal concept found in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) justifies reproduction: “Dying Declarations - Statements made by a person who is lying at the point of death, and is conscious of his approaching death, in reference to the manner in which he received the injuries of which he is dying, or other immediate cause of his death, and in reference to the person who inflicted such injuries or the connection with such injuries of a person who is charged or suspected of having committed them; which statements are admissible in evidence in a trial for homicide (and occasionally, at least in some jurisdictions, in other cases) where the killing of the declarant is the crime charged to the defendant. Shepard v. United States,78 L.Ed. 196. Generally, the admissibility of such declarations is limited to use in prosecutions for homicide; but is admissible on behalf of accused as well as for prosecution. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death is not excluded by the hearsay rule (the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(2): “Statement under the Belief of imminent Death”) 10. When a person makes a statement while being aware of the prospect that his death is imminent and proximate, such a statement assumes a probative value which is almost unassailable, unlike other statements which he may have made earlier, when death was not lurking around, indicating the cause of his death. When a person makes a statement while being aware of the prospect that his death is imminent and proximate, such a statement assumes a probative value which is almost unassailable, unlike other statements which he may have made earlier, when death was not lurking around, indicating the cause of his death. That is to say that a person might be quite willing to implicate an innocent person but would not do so when death is knocking at his door. That is why a Dying Declaration, to conform to this unique specie, should have been made when death was in the contemplation of the person making the statement/declaration. In the case before us, the statement, if made by the deceased, would qualify to be treated as a Dying Declaration because she was admitted in the hospital, having sustained 90-95 per cent burn injuries, and because of this grave burn injuries, she would be expecting to shortly breathe her last. 11. The central question, however, remains as to whether the alleged Dying Declaration attracts authenticity. Since the prosecution has succeeded in showing/proving by preponderance of probability that a dowry death has occurred, the burden of proving innocence has shifted to the accused. It appears to us to be unexceptionable that whenever a person is brought to a hospital in an injured state which indicates foul-play, the hospital authorities are enjoined to treat it as a medico-legal case and inform the police. If the doctor, who has attended the injured, is of the opinion that death is likely to ensue, it is essential for him to immediately report the case to the police; any delay in doing so will almost never be brooked. The police in turn should be alive to the need to record a declaration/statement of the injured person, by pursuing a procedure which would make the recording of it beyond the pale of doubt. This is why an investigating officer (I.O.) is expected to alert the jurisdictional Magistrate of the occurrence, who in turn should immediately examine the injured. When this procedure is adopted, conditional on the certification of a doctor that the injured is in a fit state to make a statement, a Dying Declaration assumes incontrovertible evidentiary value. We cannot conceive of a more important duty cast on the Magistrate, since the life & death of a human being is of paramount importance. When this procedure is adopted, conditional on the certification of a doctor that the injured is in a fit state to make a statement, a Dying Declaration assumes incontrovertible evidentiary value. We cannot conceive of a more important duty cast on the Magistrate, since the life & death of a human being is of paramount importance. We think that only if it is impossible for the Magistrate to personally perform this duty, should he depute another senior official. Non-adherence to this procedure would needlessly and avoidably cast a shadow on the recording of a Dying Declaration. The prosecution, therefore, would be expected to prove that every step was diligently complied with. The prosecution would have to produce the doctor or the medical authority to establish that on the examination of the injured/deceased, the police had been immediately informed. The I.O. who was so informed would then have to testify that he alerted the Magistrate, on whose non- availability, some responsible person was deputed for the purpose of recording the Dying Declaration. We are not in any manner of doubt that where medical opinion is to the effect that a person is facing death as a consequence of unnatural events, the responsibility of the Magistrate to record the statement far outweighs any other responsibility. There may be instances where there was no time to follow this procedure, but that does not seem to be what has transpired in the case in hand. In cases where some other person is stated to be recipient of a Dying Declaration, doubts may reasonably arise.” 28. It is evident from the aforesaid exposition of law related to dying declaration that though, in certain judgments, Hon’ble Surpeme Court has prescribed procedure to record dying declaration so as to make it reliable and adherence to the said procedure has been strictly warranted, however, in given facts and circumstances, it has also been clarified in numerous judgments that there cannot be a fixed mode/format and procedure for recording dying declaration for relying upon it and dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in case dying declaration found to be volunteer, reliable and trustworthy the same, recorded in any manner or in any form, by any person, can be relied upon to convict accused. 29. 29. As per prosecution case, PW12 Inspector Kamaljit SHO P.S. Nurpur received the telephonic message from Medical Officer Civil Hospital, Nurpur about the arrival of a lady in the hospital for treatment in burning case whereupon he sent PW16 SI Mukesh Kumar to the said hospital and on receiving the message on mobile phone from PW16 SI Mukesh Kumar, requesting him to come along with Magistrate in the hospital, he reached the hospital at 10.15 AM and by that time, PW4 Kavita Thakur, Tehsildar (Executive Magistrate) also reached in the hospital and in her presence statement of victim was recorded by PW16 Mukesh Kumar and said statement Ext.PW4/A was attested by PW4 Kavita Thakur. It is also the case of prosecution that at that time Medical Officer PW1 Dr. Suman Saxena was also present there. 30. It has come in evidence of PW4, PW12 and PW16 that PW4 Tehsildar was putting questions to the victim and statement was being recorded by PW16 Mukesh Kumar on the dictation of PW4 Tehsildar. As per PW1 Dr. Suman Saxena, the victim was answering in Hindi as well as in local language. PW12 has also stated that deceased was giving answers in Hindi, Punjabi and Pahari and these witnesses are silent about presence PW14 Jeevan Jyoti, sister of deceased, at that time, whereas, according to PW14 Jeevan Jyoti, when she reached in hospital, PW4 Tehsildar was questioning the victim and she was giving answers to the same indicates her presence at the time of recording of evidence. In her statement Ext.DX, PW14 Jeevan Jyoti, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., has stated that statement of her sister Ranju Bala was recorded in her presence. It has also come in her evidence that after receiving telephonic call at about 8/8.15 AM she had proceeded to the hospital along with her husband on scooty and had reached in the hospital within 20-25 minutes, which means that she was present in the hospital at least by 9 O’clock. It has also come in her evidence that after receiving telephonic call at about 8/8.15 AM she had proceeded to the hospital along with her husband on scooty and had reached in the hospital within 20-25 minutes, which means that she was present in the hospital at least by 9 O’clock. It has also come in her evidence that when she reached in the hospital, statement of victim was being recorded in the presence of Tehsildar by police, whereas according to PW4 Kavita Thakur, she was called by police at 11.10 AM and thereafter she went to the hospital and it is also the case of prosecution as established on the basis of GD entry Ext.PW12/A proved in the statement of PW12 Kamaljit that police had received the telephonic information from the Medical Officer Civil Hospital Nurpur at 10.05 AM and thereafter PW16 SI Mukesh Kumar had rushed to the hospital. Dying declaration Ext.PW4/A has been stated to have been recorded at 11.30 AM. Therefore, it indicates that PW14 Jeevan Jyoti had reached in hospital prior to the arrival of police as well as Tehsildar, whereas deposition of PW14 Jeevan Jyoti is contrary to that. There are discrepancies and contradictions in statements of witnesses in this regard with respect to the timing of recording Ext.PW4/A and persons in whose presence the said statement was recorded and for which their versions in this regard cannot co-exist as instead of supplementing, depositions of witnesses are demolishing the version of each other. 31. Even if statement Ext.PW4/A is to be considered to have been recorded correctly and in accordance with law and there is no illegality or irregularity in recording the statement of deceased by PW16 SI Mukesh Kumar in presence of PW4 Kavita Thakur, Tehsildar, then also for the evidence on record, as discussed hereinafter, it cannot be relied upon to convict the accused. 32. In the present case, respondents have been charged under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 IPC. Section 306 IPC provides punishment for abetment of suicide. To attract the ingredients of abetment, intention of accused to aid or instigate or to abet the deceased to commit the suicide is necessary. Section 107 of IPC defines the abetment of a thing. Section 306 IPC provides punishment for abetment of suicide. To attract the ingredients of abetment, intention of accused to aid or instigate or to abet the deceased to commit the suicide is necessary. Section 107 of IPC defines the abetment of a thing. Sections 107, 306 and 498-A IPC read as under:- “107 Abetment of a thing-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First – Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place I pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Section 306 IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide-If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” Section 498-A IPC 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation-For the purpose of this secgtion, “cruelty” means- (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 33. The statement Ext.PW4/A does not prove on record that accused persons had either instigated the deceased to commit suicide or had engaged with each other in conspiracy for that purpose or intentionally aided the deceased by any act or illegal omission for committing the suicide. 34. In statement Ext.PW4/A, it is recorded that on 19.7.2009 at about 9 AM husband of victim had started abusing her who was a drunkard whereupon victim had told that his family (her in-laws) had harassed her too much and therefore, she would end her life and in response thereto, her husband had asked her to die and thereafter, victim, out of anger and being tired of in-laws, had put off kerosene oil from a canny upon her and lit the fire and despite her continuous cries and burning to large extent, her husband did not come to save her and thereafter he brought her to hospital and it is further stated that her father-in- law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law and husband also used to abuse and harass her too much. 35. Only eye witness to the incident PW13 Gangesh Kumar, six years old son of couple. After observing him, the trial Court has considered him a competent witness. He in his examination-in-chief has stated that on the day of incident, his mother and father were quarreling with each other in the room in his presence whereas, his sister was playing outside. His father was abusing his mother and mother had started weeping and thereafter his mother went to bathroom and poured kerosene oil out of bottle and set herself on fire, which started from her feet. On crying of his mother, his aunt/Bua Seema came there and Gudia (daughter of Tai) also came and by that time fire had spread upon whole body. He has also stated that his father used to drink in night and, abuse and assault his mother and as and when his aunt Seema came, she also used to abuse his mother. As per his statement, his father came and tried to put off the fire with chappal and thereafter asked him to make a telephonic call to his mausi (PW14 Jeevan Jyoti) and his father dialed to his mausi and he (PW13 Gangesh) talked with her and told that his mother had set herself on fire and thereafter his mother was taken to hospital. In the last he has stated that besides his father, his grandmother, grandfather and bua also used to quarrel with his mother. 36. From the entire evidence on record, it emerges that parents-in-laws along with their another son and unmarried daughter were residing in ground floor, whereas accused Rajeev (husband of deceased), with his family, was residing separately in the first floor and both units were having separate kitchens and separate entry to their residence and on the day of incident, husband and wife (Rajeev and Ranju Bala) were quarreling with each other and in the meanwhile, accused Rajeev went to the ground floor to bring food from family of his brother, which aggravated the anger of Ranju Bala leading to suicidal act of Ranju Bala, whereafter accused Rajeev had tried to extinguish the fire and had taken her to hospital. In statement Ext.PW4/A, Ranju Bala has disclosed that she had attempted to die on account of response of her husband to her threat to die. It has also established on record, by prosecution, itself from document Ext.PW8A and also statement of PW15 Dr. Rajpal Singh that deceased was suffering from psychiatric problem since 2003-2004 and PW15 has noticed symptoms of catatonia in the deceased. Though, he has stated that catatonia was mild in the patient, however, he has admitted that catatonia is a variety of schizophrenia causing wild excitement leading to homicidal or suicidal tendency and patient may cause harm to others or himself. 37. Even if the reason for attempting suicide, as disclosed in Ext.PW4/A, is admitted to be true, it does not meet the requirement of ingredients of abetment as defined under Section 107 IPC as during the hot exchange, to ask to die, in response to the threat to die, cannot be treated as an instigation to commit suicide or a conspiracy for doing the said act or intentionally aiding for commission of suicide by accused Rajeev Kumar. So far as the other accused are concerned, they were living separately for all intends and purposes since long and therefore, their previous conduct, if any, causing harassment to the deceased cannot be treated as an abetment to commit suicide on the date of incident. For absence of ingredients for abetment of suicide, the accused persons cannot be punished for commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 38. For absence of ingredients for abetment of suicide, the accused persons cannot be punished for commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 38. For conviction under Section 498-A IPC there must be cruelty towards the wife by husband or her relatives as explained in the said Section for which a willful conduct of a nature which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman is necessary or harassment with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security is necessary. 39. In the present case, so far as demand is concerned, it was never alleged in statement Ext.PW4/A or otherwise at first instance, however a stray reference of payment of money to deceased and her husband by father of deceased has come in evidence of her father PW5 Balwant Singh, but the said fact was deposed by him in Court for the first time and was not disclosed to police during investigation or any other point of time. PW14 Jeevan Jyoti, sister of deceased, is also silent on this count. Therefore, harassment on account of demand is ruled out. 40. So far as cruelty is concerned, ingredients required to prove it under Section 498-A IPC are also missing. From the statement of PW13 Gangesh and the injuries received by accused Rajeev during extinguishing the fire of deceased, which stands established through medical evidence, it cannot be inferred that accused Rajeev was having any intention to cause death of deceased or drive her to commit suicide. On the basis of evidence, what can be said at all is that there is possibility of strained relations of deceased with other family members of her husband, which had resulted separation of her family from the rest of the family members and accused Rajeev Kumar might be a drunkard and quarrelsome in nature but these facts are not sufficient to hold that accused have committed the offences as charged, more particularly when evidence of PW5 Dr.Rajpal indicates that deceased might have the suicidal tendency and it creates doubt about the cause of suicide as alleged by prosecution. 41. It is settled law that when there is doubt, the benefit of same is to be extended to the accused. 42. 41. It is settled law that when there is doubt, the benefit of same is to be extended to the accused. 42. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, respondents are entitled for benefit of doubt. 43. Respondents have advantage of acquittal by the trial Court fortifying the presumption of innocence in their favour. Prosecution has failed to point out any incriminatory evidence on record against the respondents, not considered by the trial Court. The trial Court has considered the entire evidence on record completely and correctly. There is no illegality, irregularity or perversity in judgement. Acquittal of respondents has neither resulted into travesty of justice nor has caused miscarriage of justice. Therefore, w e find no ground for interference in the impugned judgment. Appeal is dismissed accordingly. Bail/surety bonds furnished by respondents and their sureties are discharged. Record be sent back to the concerned Court.