JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. 1. This appeal by the insurance company is directed against the award dated 7.11.2017 passed by the Commissioner for Employee's Compensation-cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, Cuttack (Commissioner) in E.C Case No. 342-D/2014 whereby and whereunder the Commissioner awarded an amount of Rs. 5,56,775/- as compensation and directed the insurance company to pay the same within thirty days, failing which, the same shall carry interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident till payment. 2. The brief facts of the case, which are relevant to dispose of the appeal, are: One Dillip Kumar Mohanta was working as a helper in a Bolero Pick-up bearing registration number OR-04-L-2555. On 6.6.2014, the vehicle was proceeding from Kendrapara to Cuttack. On the way near Chandolgada at about 6.30 P.M. the driver parked the vehicle and directed the helper to take tiffin. While he was crossing the road, all of a sudden, an unknown vehicle dashed him and fled away, as a result of which he sustained grievous injuries on his person and shifted to SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack for treatment. While undergoing treatment, he died in the hospital. Post-mortem was conducted over the dead body. Mangalabag Police Station U.D. Case No. 848 of 2014 was registered. With this factual scenario, the claimants-respondents filed E.C. Case No. 342-D of 2014 before the Commissioner for Employee's Compensation-cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, Cuttack claiming compensation of rupees eight lakhs. It was pleaded that the deceased was 20 years old at the time of accident. 3. Opposite parties 1 and 3 entered appearance and filed separate written statements. Opposite party no. 1 in his written statement admitted the employment and accidental death of the deceased Dillip Kumar Mohanta. It was stated that the deceased was getting Rs. 5,000/- per month towards wages. Offending vehicle was validly insured with the opposite party no. 3. Opposite party no. 3 insurer filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the petition. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, the Commissioner struck three issues. To substantiate the case, the claimants adduced evidence. No evidence was adduced by the opposite parties. On an anatomy of the pleadings and the evidence, the Commissioner came to hold that the deceased was a workman. He was 21 years old at the time of death. He was earning Rs. 5000/- per month. Held so, it awarded an amount of Rs. No evidence was adduced by the opposite parties. On an anatomy of the pleadings and the evidence, the Commissioner came to hold that the deceased was a workman. He was 21 years old at the time of death. He was earning Rs. 5000/- per month. Held so, it awarded an amount of Rs. 5,56,775/- and directed the insurer to pay the same to the claimants within thirty days, failing which, the same shall carry interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident till payment. 5. Heard Mr. Subrat Satpathy, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3. 6. Mr. Satpathy, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the accident did not arise in course of and out of the employment of the deceased and as such, the insurer is exonerated from its liability. There was no casual connection between the employment and the accident. Under Sec. 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short "the M.V Act"), the insurer is not liable to pay any compensation. To buttress the submission, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of General Manager, B.E.S.T Undertaking, Bombay vs. Mrs. Agnes, (1964) AIR SC 193, Mackinnon Machenzie and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak, (1969) 2 SCC 607 , Mamtaj Bi Bapusab Nadaf and Others vs. United India Insurance Company and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 536 and Leela Bai and Another vs. Seema Chouhan and Another, Civil Appeal No. 931 of 2019 and SLP (C) No. 5576 of 2017. 7. Per contra Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 3 submitted that the accident occurred in course of and out of the employment of the deceased. The claimants are entitled to interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Prasad and Another, (2001) 9 SCC 395 , Manju Sarkar and Others vs. Mabish Miah and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 21 , Saberabibi Yakubbhai Shaikh and Others vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 298 and the decision of this Court in the case of the Divisional Manager, M/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Sagarika Bhoi and Others, FAO No. 135 of 2017 disposed of on 9.8.2017. 8. Ltd. and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 298 and the decision of this Court in the case of the Divisional Manager, M/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Sagarika Bhoi and Others, FAO No. 135 of 2017 disposed of on 9.8.2017. 8. An identical matter came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Senior Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Suresh Kumar Behera and Another, FAO No. 526 of 2018 disposed of on 18.02.2019. This Court held: "8. The seminal points that falls for consideration are (i) What is the true meaning of the expressions "arising out of and in the course of employment" appearing in Sec. 3(1) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 and (ii) Whether the doctrine of notional extension can be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case? 9. Section 3(1) of the Employee's Compensation Act, which is the hub of the issue, is quoted hereunder: "If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter." 10. Proviso appended thereto provides for exclusion of the liability of the employer specified therein. 11. Proviso to Sec. 147 of the M.V Act was the subject-matter of consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sorumai Gogoi and Others, (2008) 2 TAC 5 (SC). The Apex Court held: "15. Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, however, mandatorily provides for obtaining insurance cover by the owner of a vehicle. Proviso appended thereto reads as under: "Provided that a policy shall not be required:- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee: (a) engaged in driving the vehicle. (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle. (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle. (ii) to cover any contractual liability." 16. The sine qua non for invoking the proviso appended to Section 147 is that the employee must be engaged in driving the vehicle. Death or bodily injury must occur arising out of or in the course of his employment. The 1923 Act or the 1988 Act, therefore, would be applicable only if the conditions precedent laid down thereunder are satisfied." 12. Mrs. Agnes is a locus classicus on the subject. The Apex Court held that under Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (in short "W.C. Act"), the injury must be caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question, when does an employment begin and when does it cease, depends upon the facts of each case. But the Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the "down tool" signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case. As employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his tools but also when he used the means of access and, egress to and from the place of employment. It was further held that though the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment developed in the context of specific workshops, factories or harbours, equally applies to such a bus service the doctrine necessarily will have to be adapted to meet its peculiar requirements. 13. Sec. 3(1) of the Employee's Compensation is pari-materia to Sec. 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Sec. 3(1) of the W.C. Act was the subject-matter of consideration before the Apex Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd. The Apex Court held: "5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. Sec. 3(1) of the W.C. Act was the subject-matter of consideration before the Apex Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd. The Apex Court held: "5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it." The words "arising out of employment" are understood to mean that "during the course" of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered." In other words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression "arising out of employment" is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of these factors the workman is brought within the scene of special danger the injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. vs. Highley Lord Sumner laid down the following test for determining whether an accident, arose out of the employment: There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate applicable, because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is generally of some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yea, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. If yea, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. To ask if the cause of the workman was within the sphere of the employment, or was one of the ordinary risks of the employment, or reasonably incidental to the employment, or conversely, was an added peril and outside the sphere of the employment, are all different ways of asking whether it was a part of his employment, that the workman should have acted as he was acting or should have been in the position in which he was, whereby in the course of that employment he sustained injury. 6. In the case of death caused by accident the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the course of employment. But this does not mean that a workman who comes to court for relief must necessarily prove: it by direct evidence. Although the onus of proving that the injury by accident arose both out of and in the course of employment rests upon the applicant these essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference. On the one hand the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate inference." 14. In Ram Prasad, the accident took place on account of lightning. The contention put-forth on behalf of the appellant was that the mishap of death of Smt. Gita due to lightning is an act of God and therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay compensation. The contention was repealed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The State of Rajasthan filed appeal before the High Court. Learned Single Judge affirmed the award of the Commissioner. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment. The matter travelled to the Apex Court. Taking a cue from Ibrahim Mohammed Issak, the Apex Court held that the view taken is that the concept of the liability under the Act is wide enough to cover a case of this nature inasmuch as death had taken place arising as a result of accident in the course of employment. 15. The matter travelled to the Apex Court. Taking a cue from Ibrahim Mohammed Issak, the Apex Court held that the view taken is that the concept of the liability under the Act is wide enough to cover a case of this nature inasmuch as death had taken place arising as a result of accident in the course of employment. 15. In Manju Sarkar, Sajal Sarkar, husband of the appellant no. 1 was the driver of the truck bearing registration number TR-01-B-1689 under the employment of respondent nos. 1 and 2. On the way the driver noticed some mechanical trouble in the truck and got down to make arrangement for repair of the vehicle. He met with an accident and sustained grievous injuries. While he was taken to hospital, he succumbed to the injuries. The Apex Court applied the principle of notional extension and held that the Sajal Sarkar met with an accident in course of his employment. 16. In Leela Bai, the deceased was a bus driver of the bus. He met with an accidental death while he was coming down the roof of the bus after taking dinner at about 8.30 p.m. The deceased had returned to bus terminus at 7.30 p.m. The question arose before the Apex Court was whether the death occurred during the course of, and arising out of the employment. Taking a cue from Agnes and Sanju Sarkar, the Apex Court applied the doctrine of notional extension and accordingly compensation was awarded. 17. On a survey of the decisions of the various High Courts and the Apex Court, this Court in the case of the General Superintendent, Talcher Thermal Station vs. Smt. Bijuli Naik, (1993) 76 CutLT 699, succinctly stated the principles. This Court held: "4. The pre-conditions for attracting the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act are that death or injury must be caused to a workman; the said injury must have been caused by accident; and the accident must have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. A causal connection between the employment and the injury caused by the accident must exist. If after looking at the entire facts, a fair inference can be drawn that the employment caused the injury, then the employer would be liable to pay the compensation. A causal connection between the employment and the injury caused by the accident must exist. If after looking at the entire facts, a fair inference can be drawn that the employment caused the injury, then the employer would be liable to pay the compensation. The liability under Section 3(1) of the Act would accrue, if it is established that an injury has been caused to a workman and the accident arose out of and in course of his employment. xxx xxx xxx The general principles are that (i) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment; (ii) the onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to, or aggravated, the injury; (iii) it is not necessary that the workman must be actually working at the time of his death or that death must occur while he was working or had just ceased to work and (iv) where the evidence is balanced, if the evidence shows a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed. But where the accident involved a risk common to all humanity and did not involve any peculiar or exceptional danger resulting from the nature of the employment, or where the accident was the result of an added peril to which the workman, by his own conduct, exposed himself and which peril was not involved in the normal performance of the duties of his employment, then the employer will not be liable under Section 3 of the Act." 18. In Smt. Sagarika Bhoi, the workman died due to snake bite. This Court held that the accident arose out of and in course of the employment of the deceased. xxx xxx xxx 20. The next question crops up as to whether Commissioner is justified in awarding interest @ 12% per annum? 21. In Smt. Sagarika Bhoi, the workman died due to snake bite. This Court held that the accident arose out of and in course of the employment of the deceased. xxx xxx xxx 20. The next question crops up as to whether Commissioner is justified in awarding interest @ 12% per annum? 21. In Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Siby George and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 540 , the short question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court that when the payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 becomes due and consequently what is the point in time from which interest would be payable on the amount of compensation as provided under Section 4-A(3) of the Act? The Apex Court held: "9. Now, coming back to the question when does the payment of compensation fall due and what would be the point for the commencement of interest, it may be noted that neither the decision in Mubasir Ahmed nor the one in Mohd. Nasir can be said to provide any valid guidelines because both the decisions were rendered in ignorance of earlier larger Bench decisions of this Court by which the issue was concluded. As early as in 1975 a four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Shrinivas Sabata directly answered the question. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision it was held and observed as follows:- "7. Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if "personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under subsection (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under Section 19. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under Section 19. What the section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under Section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by Section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. 8. It was the duty of the appellant, under Section 4-A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided by Section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent. He failed to do so. What is worse, he did not even make a provisional payment under sub-section (2) of Section 4 for, as has been stated, he went to the extent of taking the false pleas that the respondent was a casual contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of his negligence. Then there is the further fact that he paid no heed to the respondent's personal approach for obtaining the compensation. It will be recalled that the respondent was driven to the necessity of making an application to the Commissioner for settling the claim, and even there the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and prevailed on the respondent to file a memorandum of agreement settling the claim for a sum which was so grossly inadequate that it was rejected by the Commissioner. In these facts and circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty." The Apex Court further held: "12. The decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four Judge Bench and in Valsala by a three Judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two Judges. The decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four Judge Bench and in Valsala by a three Judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two Judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir." 22. In Saberabibi Yakub Bhai Shaikh, the Commissioner awarded compensation of Rs. 2,13,570/- with interest 12% per annum from the date of accident and penalty. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the award the Insurance Company filed first appeal before the High Court. The High Court directed the Insurance Company to pay interest on the amount of compensation from the date of adjudication of claim application. A further direction was issued that the excess amount towards interest, if any, deposited by the Insurance Company be refunded to it. The award of the Commissioner was modified to that extent. The claimants filed SLP before the Apex Court. A contention was raised by the appellant that the judgment of the High Court is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Siby George and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 540 . Taking a cue from the celebrated judgment in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 , the Apex Court held: "10. We have perused the aforesaid judgment. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. This Court considered the earlier judgment relied upon by the High Court and observed that the judgments in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mubasir Ahmed, (2007) 2 SCC 349 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mohd. Nasir, (2009) 6 SCC 280 were per incuriam having been rendered without considering the earlier decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 . In the aforesaid judgment, upon consideration of the entire matter, a four-judge Bench of this Court had held that the compensation has to be paid from the date of the accident. 11. In the aforesaid judgment, upon consideration of the entire matter, a four-judge Bench of this Court had held that the compensation has to be paid from the date of the accident. 11. Following the aforesaid judgments, this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Siby George and others (supra) reiterated the legal position and held as follows: "11. The Court then referred to a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Alavi and approved it insofar as it followed the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo. 12. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four-judge Bench and in Valsala K. by a three-judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two Judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K. were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir. 13. In the light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K. it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. The decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K. do not express the correct view and do not make binding precedents." 9. Admittedly the deceased was a helper in the Bolero Pickup bearing registration number OR-04-L-2555. The driver parked the vehicle and instructed him for taking tiffin. At about 6.30 P.M. while he was crossing the road, an unknown vehicle dashed him. There was casual connection between the employment of the deceased workman and his accidental death. The doctrine of notional extension is applicable to the facts scenario. 10. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Behera, the irresistible conclusion is that there was casual connection between the employment of the deceased and his accidental death. The accident arose in course of and out of employment of the deceased. The claimants are entitled to interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident. 11. The accident arose in course of and out of employment of the deceased. The claimants are entitled to interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident. 11. Resultantly the appeal is dismissed, since the same does not involve any substantial question of law. There shall be no order as to costs.