JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder the order dated 19.11.2018 passed by the Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in L.C. Revision No. 44 of 2017 has been assailed by which the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92 has been directed to be enforced. 2. Before going with the reasons for assailing the aforesaid order as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the brief facts of the case needs to be reflected herein. A proceeding has been initiated by filing an application before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms invoking the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authority as conferred under Section 16 (3) of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, the same on contest, has been decided in favour of the private respondent vide order dated 23.06.1993 directing for execution of the sale deed in favour of the opposite party nos.8 and 9 against which appeal was filed before the Additional Collector, Giridih as also revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna but in appeal the order of original authority confirmed by the revisional authority has reversed the finding of the original revenue authority passed in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92 as also appellate authority, which was confirmed by the writ Court but the same was reversed in an order. The private respondents have filed an application before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Giridih in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92 for execution of the sale deed in favour of the legal heirs of the original pre-emptors and vide order dated 13.05.2015 the Deputy Collector Land Reforms directed the legal heirs of late Abdul Hamid to execute the sale deed in favour of the legal heirs of the original pre-emptors within 30 days of the order, appeal against the aforesaid order was filed which was dismissed vide order dated 29.04.2017 and ultimately the matter went before the revisional authority, the Member, Board of Revenue, wherein the order was passed on 19.11.2018 in L.C. Revision No. 44 of 2017, showing no reason to differ with the order dated 13.05.2015 passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms against which present writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. D.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following issues: (i) The order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in an application under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 cannot be said to be a decree and therefore, the period of limitation of 12 years as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act for execution of the order passed therein will not be applicable. (ii) The Act, 1961 being special legislation will be governed from its own provision without being covered with the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. (iii) The order passed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 even on other count would not be executable after lapse of period of three years as per the provision of Article 137 of the Act, 1963 where there is no specific provision provided to be covered under the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act, 1963. (iv) The original order dated 23.06.1993 passed in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92 although has been assailed before the appellate/revisional/High Court having not granted any ad interim stay, therefore, the decree ought to have been executed within the period prescribed under the provision of Sub section 3 of Section 16 of the Act, 1961 and if it has not been executed the preemptors ought to have made an application for its execution without waiting for the outcome either the appeal or the revision or the litigation pending before the High Court under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. (v) The order passed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 cannot be treated to be decree therefore, is not covered under the provision of Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Mr. J.F. Toppo, SC (L&C) for the State of Jharkhand while on the other hand has argued vehemently opposing the grounds agitated by the petitioners in assailing the impugned order. 4. Mr. J.F. Toppo, SC (L&C) for the State of Jharkhand while on the other hand has argued vehemently opposing the grounds agitated by the petitioners in assailing the impugned order. His submission is mainly based upon sub section 3 of Section 16 of the Act, 1961 which provides that in case an application if allowed under Section 16(3), the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period specified in the order and if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed under Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be, so far as may be followed. He, therefore submits that when the provision of Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable for enforcement for an order passed under the provision of Section 16(3) then the argument as has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it will not come under the entry made under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 rather it is only the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable is not correct, herein the original order was passed on 23.06.1993 by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92 which ultimately attained its finality by an order passed by Division Bench of this Court in intra Court appeal being LPA No. 319 of 2001 decided on 29.11.2002, therefore the period of limitation of 12 years as provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable counting it from 29.11.2002 since the application has been made by the pre-emptors on 31.10.2014 which is within the period of 12 years. So far as submission of applicability of provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, the same is not fit to be considered in view of the provision of Order XXI Rule 34 of the CPC, as has been stipulated under Section 16 (3) (iii) of the Act, 1961 and the moment procedure for execution as has been provided under Order XXI Rule 34 of the CPC has been made applicable in an order passed in application under Section 16 (3) (iii) of the Act, 1961, it cannot be said that it will not come under the entry made under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. So far as contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that there was no interim stay passed by the higher forum against the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms dated 23.06.1993 in L.C. Case No. 25 of 1991-92, the question of principle of merger will come into play and when the matter is pending before the higher forum, the limitation would be counted from the day if confirmed. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submission, this court before looking into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, deem it fit and proper to go through the legal proposition which is involved for consideration of the present case. Section 16 (3) of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, reads as under: “16(3)(i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of this Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made, the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat as the case may be, shall be evicted, from land and possession thereof shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten percent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure, prescribed in Order XXI, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed.” It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the enactment has been made conferring right upon co-sharer or the raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred making him entitled within 3 months of date of registration of the document and the preemptor to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed, with condition that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. The Collector on receipt of such application will pass an appropriate order after calling upon other side. In case the application is allowed and the Collector has passed an order direction the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering the document of transfer within a period to be satisfied in the order and if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure, prescribed, in Order XXI, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be followed. The provision of Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be referred, which reads as under: “34. The provision of Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be referred, which reads as under: “34. Decree for execution of document, or endorsement of negotiable instrument - (1) Where a decree is for the execution of a document or for the endorsement of a negotiable instrument and the judgment-debtor neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the decree- holder may prepare a draft of the document or endorsement in accordance with the terms of the decree and deliver the same to the Court. (2) The Court shall thereupon cause the draft to be served on the judgment-debtor together with a notice requiring his objections (if any) to be made within such time as the Court fixes in this behalf. (3) Where the judgment-debtor objects to the draft, his objections shall be stated in writing within such time, and the Court shall make such order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit. (4) The decree-holder shall deliver to the Court a copy of the draft with such alterations (if any) as the Court may have directed upon the proper stamp-paper if a stamp is required by the law for the time being in force; and the Judge or such officer as may be appointed in this behalf shall execute the document so delivered. (5) The execution of a document or the endorsement of a negotiable instrument under this rule may be in the following form, namely:- "C.D. Judge of the Court of (or as the case may be) for A.B. in a suit by E.F. against A.B." and shall have the same effect as the execution of the document or the endorsement of the negotiable instrument by the party ordered to execute or endorse the same. (6) (a) Where the registration of the document is required under any law for the time being in force, the Court, or such officer of the court as may be authorised in this behalf by the Court, shall cause the document to be registered in accordance with such law. (b) Where the registration of the document is not so required, but the decree-holder desires it to be registered, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit. (b) Where the registration of the document is not so required, but the decree-holder desires it to be registered, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit. (c) Where the Court makes any order for the registration of any document, it may make such order as it thinks fit as to the expenses of registration.” The aforesaid provision stipulates that where a decree is for execution of a document or for endorsement of a negotiable instrument and judgment debtor neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the decree holder may prepare a draft of the document or endorsement in accordance with terms of decree and deliver the same to the court and the court shall thereupon will proceed by causing the draft to be served to the judgment debtor together with notice required to be made within such time as the court fixes on his behalf and in case the judgment debtor objects to the draft his objection shall be stated in writing and the Court shall make such order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit. The decree- holder shall deliver to the Court a copy of the draft with such alterations, and thereafter the Court will proceed for executing the decree which is the subject matter. The definition of decree has also been agitated, therefore, the same also needs to be referred, which as per the definition in Section 2 (2) reads as under: “2(2) The decree has been defined which means to formal expression of adjudication by conclusively determining the rights of the parties of the matter in controversy in the suit.” So far as fact in hand is concerned as has been recorded herein above that the impugned order dated 19.11.2018 has been questioned since an order passed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 on 23.06.1993 has been sought to be executed by making an application on 31.10.2014. This Court is not repeating the argument which has been agitated by the learned counsel for the parties taken as ground to assail/defend, rather is answering the aforesaid submission hereunder as. 6. The question which is first to be answered, as to whether an order passed by the revenue authority under the provision of Section 16 (3) of the Act, 1961 is decree or not? 6. The question which is first to be answered, as to whether an order passed by the revenue authority under the provision of Section 16 (3) of the Act, 1961 is decree or not? As would appear from the definition of sub-section 2 of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the definition of decree has been stipulated which provides that the formal expression of adjudication made by the Court by adjudicating the issues which is the subject matter of the suit. The question of adjudication depends upon the rival grounds as has been agitated by the parties is paramount to be considered before holding the order to be decreed. It is evident from the provision of the Act, 1961 more particularly the provision as contained under Section 16(3) thereof that a right has been conferred in favour of the raiyat or the co-sharer to make an application for getting the land which is situated adjacent to his land to be registered in his favour if the other co-sharer is intend to sale it off, the same would be entertained by the revenue authority and on being called upon the other co-sharer is required to be appeared and on appearance an adjudication is to be made with respect to the question of declaring and meeting out the two ingredients i.e. whether the proposed preemptors is a co-sharer or the adjoining raiyat or not and if the revenue authority comes to the conclusion/finding that he is the co-sharer or the adjoining raiyat and on the basis of adjudication, order is to be passed directing the other co-sharer to register the land in his favour, meaning thereby an adjudication is to be made as provided in pursuance to the provision under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. The fact about the nature of the order treated to be decree or not can also be gathered from Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 where the legislation provides that if any order is passed by the Collector which requires to be executed within the period as provided under Section 16(2) but if the party against whom the order passed is not executing, the procedure under Order XXI Rule 34 would be followed, meaning thereby the legislation is very pertinent about the provision as to what would be process for executing an order if not executed within the period of three months as provided under sub section 3 of Section 16 of the Act, 1963 and the procedure as laid under Order XXI Rule 34 is to be followed which also suggests that the nature of order passed by the revenue authority under Section 16(3) would be of a decree as per the definition made under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The contention pertaining to applicability of Article 136 or 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the Act, 1963) is also one of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. This Court has examined the case in hand and in that respect also has found that subsection 3 of Section 16 provides for following the procedure as laid down under Order XXI Rule 34 which does suggest that it will not come under the provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act rather it will be under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and as such the period of limitation would be 12 years, therefore, the argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is held to be not acceptable. 8. Now the question is that the period of limitation of 12 years will be counted from which day, as has been argued by the learned counsel from the day of original order dated 23.06.1993 has been passed while revenue authority has taken it from date of the order passed by this Court in intra Court appeal on 29.11.2002 in L.P.A. No. 319 of 2001. In the context of the applicability of the provision of Limitation Act, 1963 and counting the period of limitation herein the period of 12 years as provided under Article 136, the requirement of Limitation Act in the matter of enforcement of a decree is the date on which the decree becomes enforceable or capable of being enforced. This issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hameed Joharan (D) and Others vs. Abdul Salam (D) and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3404 wherein a preliminary decree for partition was passed on 08.06.1969 and a final decree thereon was passed on 20.11.1970. The suit being a partition, the parties were under an obligation to furnish the stamp paper for drafting of the final decree and it is on 28.02.1972, the District Court, issued notice to the parties to furnish stamp paper and granted time till 17.03.1972 but the decree holder did not furnish any stamp paper and as such no decree was drafted or finalized. It is true that notice to furnish stamp paper was issued on 28.02.1972 and the time granted was up to 17.03.1972 but by itself will not take it out of the purview of Article 136 as regards the enforceability of the decree, furnishing of stamped paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant decree holder and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to putting a stop to the period of limitation being run, thus no one can take advantage of his own wrong. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one’s own failure cannot but be said to be not acceptable and therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the light of the aforesaid factual aspect has been pleased to come to the conclusion that the decree was capable of being enforced on an from 20.11.1970 and the 12 years period ought to be counted therefrom. Herein admittedly the original order has been passed on 23.06.1993 against which appeal has been preferred but dismissed vide order dated 18.01.1996. Herein admittedly the original order has been passed on 23.06.1993 against which appeal has been preferred but dismissed vide order dated 18.01.1996. The revision has been preferred which has been allowed vide order dated 22.03.1999 against the said order writ petition has been filed before this Court (C.W.J.C. No. 1269/1999) but dismissed vide order dated 01.05.2001 which was challenged in intra Court appeal (L.P.A No. 319/2001) and the application of preemption filed under Section 16(3) of the Act was allowed vide order dated 29.11.2002. Thus the original order being reversed by two concurrent forums but ultimately said application was allowed on 29.11.2002. There for it is not a case of concurrent finding and hence what has been argued on behalf of the petitioner as to the execution application ought to have been filed immediately after three months is not acceptable since the original order although has been confirmed by the appellate authority but reversed by revisional authority and confirmed by the writ Court but subsequently in intra Court appeal the original order has been affirmed as on 29.11.2002 hence the application for execution of the order could not have been filed. This Court at this juncture needs to refer certain proposition in this regard to the effect as to from which date the limitation would start. When there has been an appeal from the original decree the period of limitation for execution of such decree has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree even though the original decree was confirmed, reference in this regard be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Suresh Chandra Dey, 1932 AIR (PC) 165 wherein the question fell for consideration that the period of limitation would count from the day of the original decree passed by the original court or from the day when the decree has been passed by the appellate court. “It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. “It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced.” The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Others vs. Ram Saroop Singh and Others, AIR 1963 Patna 412 (FB) wherein the question has been decided in the aforesaid judgment, the starting point of limitation would be the date of disposal of the appeal or the decree passed by the original court and by answering the same the Hon’ble Patna High Court of its Full Bench has been pleased to hold “that the starting point of limitation under Art. 182(2) was 12.05.1959 and not 27.09.1955 when the execution was dismissed and, therefore, the second execution was well within time as it was made within three years from the date of disposal of the appeal from the preliminary decree which was in essence an appeal from the final decree. It is well settled that the words the final decree or order in Art. 182(2) has not been used in contradistinction to the preliminary decree or order of the appellate Court. Therefore the final decree or order in Art. 182 clause (2) means final disposal of the appeal, whether the appeal is from a preliminary decree or a final decree.” The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyama Pada Choudhary vs. Saha Choudhury and Co. and Others, AIR 1976 Calcutta 122 has been pleased to hold about the starting point of limitation and that would be the date of the decree of the appellate court and it will be said to be enforceable from the date when the appellate court passed the decree. The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Most. and Others, AIR 1976 Calcutta 122 has been pleased to hold about the starting point of limitation and that would be the date of the decree of the appellate court and it will be said to be enforceable from the date when the appellate court passed the decree. The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Most. Munni Devi vs. Viswakarma Mandir Trust, (1998) 3 BLJR 2185 has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 thereof that if a decree is being questioned before the appellate court and the same has been assailed before the 1st appellate court but the decree is being set aside against which the 2nd appellate court is restored the decree passed by the original court, the execution levied by computing the period of limitation from the date of second appellate decree is proper. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Ghanshyambhai K. Sathwara vs. Sonubhai Baliram Patil and Others, AIR 2006 Gujarat 109 wherein the ground of pendency of suit in not filing execution and the plea that the decree became non executable of expiry of 12 years period of limitation has been held to be untenable. Further reference needs to be made of an order passed by this Court in the case of Dharam Gope @ Dharam Mahto vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 1 JCR 365 there from also it is evident that the period of limitation for execution of order passed under Section 16 (3) of the Act would be twelve years. 9. In view of the aforesaid position of law here in the facts of the case since the order passed by the original authority has attained its finality on 29.11.2002, therefore, the period of limitation would be counted from 29.11.2002 and since the execution case has been filed within twelve years as such counting it from 29.11.2002, the execution case would be said to be within time. 10. 10. This Court is of the view that on the basis of detailed discussion as has been made hereinabove, there is no infirmity in the order dated 19.11.2018 passed in L.C. Revision No. 44 of 2017, warranting any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing the writ of certiorari for the reason that the condition precedent is to be looked into by the High Court that if the order is without jurisdiction or the same has been passed without following the fundamental right but no such reason has been made out in the instant writ petition. It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 , Nagendra Nath vs. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos. 12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. 12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: ..........power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways vs. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose vs. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J. as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 11. In view thereof, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.