JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Anjani Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellant, Shri Vinay Krishna Tripathy for the Central Board of Secondary Education and Shri Anil Kumar Singh for the respondent D.A.V. College. 2. The appeal is directed against the impugned judgment dated 29th of July, 2019 whereby the learned Single Judge has declined relief to the appellant on the termination of her tenure assignment as a teacher in the D.A.V. college on the ground that the order is not stigmatic and that mala fides could not be established. 3. Shri Anjani Kumar submits that the learned Single Judge, while appreciating the facts on record, did not consider the personal malice alleged of the 3rd respondent which also went to the extent of alleging that the appellant was not allowed to continue on account of a caste prejudice. 4. On the issue relating to the maintainability of the petition, learned counsel submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly held the petition to be maintainable, but has erroneously construed the facts so as to dismiss the petition on the ground of absence of mala fides and bias as alleged on behalf of the appellant. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the writ petition itself was not maintainable as the institution did not fall within the definition of either a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution or an “Authority” as understood under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. Apart from this, even assuming for the sake of arguments that such a writ petition was maintainable, the appellant had no right to continue inasmuch as the tenor of appointment was a simple contractual engagement for a fixed term with no permanency attached to the post. In such circumstances, the claim of continuance as a matter of right was not tenable. 7. Thirdly, it is submitted that the allegations of mala fides have been clearly denied by the answering respondents and there was no material, much less a substantial material, to substantiate the same. 8. We have considered the submissions raised and on the issue of maintainability we find that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Shrivastava & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.9166 of 2013) was in respect of a school which was on the grant-in-aid of the State. 9. 8. We have considered the submissions raised and on the issue of maintainability we find that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Shrivastava & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.9166 of 2013) was in respect of a school which was on the grant-in-aid of the State. 9. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Director of Education & Ors., reported in (2016) 6 SCC 541 was an institution where there was a consideration of a statutory control in favour of an employee as envisaged under Article 8(2) of the Delhi Education Act, 1973. The third decision, on which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant is the judgment in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia V. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331. 10. We are of the considered opinion that the 1st two cases referred to above stand on a different footing, inasmuch as one of the cases involved the control of the State on account of the institution being on the grant-in-aid list whereas the other case clearly indicated a semblance of a statutory control under the Delhi Education Act, 1973. These two ingredients in the present case are completely absent and, therefore, the ratio of the said decisions would not be attracted with regard to the facts of the present case. There is no material to demonstrate that there is any statutory control over the service conditions of the appellant or even otherwise she was receiving any emoluments from State funds. Learned counsel submits that the institution has been established on the land of the Bihar State Power Holding Company Limited which is a Government Company. A mere arrangement allowing a society to run an institution for the benefits of its employees will not automatically make the institution an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as a subsidiary of the Power Holding Company. Even otherwise, as stated above, in the absence of any such control either by the State or otherwise, the said principle would not be attracted. 11. Coming to the third judgment in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra), we would like to mention that after the said judgment was delivered, the Apex Court came up with the judgment in the case of Committee of Management, Delhi Public School & Anr. Vs. 11. Coming to the third judgment in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra), we would like to mention that after the said judgment was delivered, the Apex Court came up with the judgment in the case of Committee of Management, Delhi Public School & Anr. Vs. M.K. Gandhi & Ors., reported in (2015) 17 SCC 353 holding that a writ petition in such a matter would not be maintainable. We are, therefore, bound by this later decision rendered by the Supreme Court on the issue apart from the findings and observations recorded by us hereinabove. 12. Coming to the issue of the tenor of appointment, the same remains undisputed that the appointment was contractual and for a fixed period. This, therefore, does not confer any consequential rights on the appellant to claim continuance in the institution. 13. On mala fides, suffice it to say that the appellant has made an improvement before the High Court as it appears that when she had sent a legal notice to the institution which is part of the record of the writ petition, no such allegations had been made. It is, therefore, apparent that the allegations of mala fides have been made passingly without any substantive material to support the same. Hence, this plea is also not tenable. Even otherwise mala fides or allegations of the like nature are more easily made than proved. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant then urged that apart from this the appellant has been put to a great disadvantage not only with regard to her employment, but also with regard to the education of her child which was an additional benefit by virtue of her employment. 15. In the background above, it is open to the appellant to approach the institution for any benevolent consideration and any such consideration by the institution can be made independently irrespective of the findings recorded by us hereinabove. 16. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations.