JUDGMENT A. M. Dhavale, J. - The original applicant has filed this revision challenging the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge, Parbhani in D.V. Appeal No. 17 of 2017 dt. 09.04.2018 and judgment of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Parbhani in Misc. Cri. Case No. 284 of 2011. dt. 23.03.2017. 2. Respondent No. 1 is father-in-law of the petitioner and respondent is her brother-in-law who is advocate. The petitioner married to one Anil son of respondent No. 1 on 20.04.1996 and thereafter cohabited with him at the house of respondent No. 1 at Parbhani. The husband of respondent No. 1 is serving at Latur as Sales Tax Inspector. The petitioner is residing along with her 2 children at Aurangabad. She filed application u/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as "DV Act") in the court at Aurangabad, through the Protection Officer and claimed three reliefs. (i) She and her children should be allowed to reside in the shared household at Parbhani by order of residence u/s 19. (ii) Protection u/s 18. (iii) Order for compensation u/s 23. 3. The applicant has argued in-person efficiently. It is her case that, she was residing with her husband in the house of joint family at Parbhani. She resided there from 1996-2011 and it being a shared household, she should be permitted to reside there and necessary restraint order should be passed u/s 19 of the DV Act. She also claimed that, as per the partition between her husband and inlaws, there was ancestral land allotted to her husband. The mutations were accordingly effected and when she was trying to cultivate the same, the respondents were obstructing her. In spite of orders of this Court, they were not allowing her to cultivate those lands. In consonance with these main reliefs, there is also prayer for compensation. Learned advocate Shri. Milind Patil argued that, the house at Parbhani is not ancestral house. It was purchased by respondent No. 1 in the name of respondent No. 2, who and husband of the petitioner were minor. According to him, the husband of the petitioner joined as Sales Tax Inspector and the petitioner was travelling along with him at various places like Jalna, Latur, Nanded and Aurangabad. She has no differences with husband. She resided after the marriage in the house at Parbhani only for two days. According to him, the husband of the petitioner joined as Sales Tax Inspector and the petitioner was travelling along with him at various places like Jalna, Latur, Nanded and Aurangabad. She has no differences with husband. She resided after the marriage in the house at Parbhani only for two days. Since the house does not belong to joint family, it is not the shared household. The respondents have filed special suit bearing No. 92/2010 for declaration of ownership of respondent No. 1 to the house and the same has been decreed in favour of the respondents. The applicant submitted that, she has preferred appeal against the same and the decree has been stayed. The respondents claimed that, the dispute regarding the agricultural lands is not a case of domestic violence and, therefore, the application filed under Domestic Violence Act was not maintainable. It is the property dispute between the respondent and the husband of the petitioner. 4. In the trial Court, the petitioner herein examined herself and produced the documentary evidence. The respondents examined Ajay Thanedar, Sunil Chopade and respondent No. 2 himself. The applicant-in-person filed written notes of arguments and relied on number of rulings. The learned trial Judge held that, there was no domestic relationship between the petitioner and the respondents. The petitioner has relied on compromise decree passed in Reg. Civil Suit No. 455 of 1970, whereby the disputed land was allotted to her husband. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the said decree has been set aside and the suit claiming declaration of ownership filed by respondent No. 1 has been decreed. The ld. trial Judge held that, it was a property dispute which cannot be converted into domestic violence case. The applicant challenged this judgment before District Jude, Parbhani. The learned Ad-hoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Parbhani dismissed the appeal. 5. Considering the nature of dispute raised, the main issues for my consideration are : (a) Whether the house at Shivaji Nagar, Parbhani is a shared household and whether the petitioner has right of residence therein? (b) Whether the dispute relating to the agricultural land is a case of domestic violence and is governed by Section 18 of DV Act? 6. Considering the nature of dispute raised, the main issues for my consideration are : (a) Whether the house at Shivaji Nagar, Parbhani is a shared household and whether the petitioner has right of residence therein? (b) Whether the dispute relating to the agricultural land is a case of domestic violence and is governed by Section 18 of DV Act? 6. After hearing the arguments, I noticed that, lot of evidence was led and the issue revolved around the question whether the petitioner was residing in the house in Shivaji Nagar for few days or for long tenure upto 2011. The applicant in-person argued that, there is sufficient documentary evidence to show that she along with her children was residing there till 2011. This is not much significant but even otherwise the applicant did not produce more reliable school record and she and her husband gave evasive answers regarding school of her children which indicates that she was not residing at Parbhani for substantial period. The birth certificate and other documents only indicate that she was occasionally visiting Parbhani and residing there sometimes. 7. The applicant relied on Roma Rajesh Tiwari v. Rajesh Dinanath Tiwari (Writ Petition No. 10696 of 2017) decided at Principal Seat of this Court (Coram : Smt. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J.) on 12.10.2017. In para 18 of the said judgment, it is observed thus: 18. In this case, admittedly, till the dispute started between the Petitioner and Respondent, both of them were very much residing in the flat at Mulund and, therefore, as they have lived together in the said flat as a ''couple'', as a ''husband and wife'', in a domestic relationship, it becomes her ''shared household'', as stated in the definition of Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In such a situation, whether the said flat belongs to or owned by the Respondent- husband, is totally irrelevant. As stated above, Section 19(a) of the D.V. Act makes it clear that, whether or not the Respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household, the Court can pass a residence order, restraining the Respondent from dispossessing, or, in any other manner, disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person - Petitioner-wife herein. Therefore, much emphasis laid by the Family Court on the fact that the flat at Mulund belongs to the Respondent''s father and not to the Respondent, is totally misplaced . Therefore, much emphasis laid by the Family Court on the fact that the flat at Mulund belongs to the Respondent''s father and not to the Respondent, is totally misplaced . The question of title or proprietary right in the property is not at all of relevance , when the provisions of the D.V. Act; especially Section 19 thereof, are to be considered. As a matter of fact, it needs to be emphasized that, as the wife''s right to reside in the matrimonial home was being defeated on this very ground that the house does not belong to the husband or does not stand in his name, this D.V. Act was brought in the Statute Book with the specific and clear language and the unequivocal Clause that the ''title of the husband or that of the family members to the said flat'' , is totally irrelevant. It is also irrelevant whether the Respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household. The moment it is proved that it was a shared household, as both of them had, in their matrimonial relationship, i.e. domestic relationship, resided together there and in this case, upto the disputes arose, it follows that the Petitioner-wife gets right to reside therein and, therefore, to get the order of interim injunction, restraining Respondent-husband from dispossessing her, or, in any other manner, disturbing her possession from the said flat. 8. Further reliance was placed on Shalini v. Kishor and others,2015 CJ(SC) 724 . In this case, the appellant got married to respondent No. 1 on 08.05.1990. After birth of one child Shantanu, she was driven away from her matrimonial house in 1992 and thereafter she was residing with her maternal uncle and was getting maintenance allowance. She had filed HMP in the court of CJSD, Amravati for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. The said suit was decreed but the decree was stayed by the appellate Court. After coming into force the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, she filed the complaint under the said Act before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Amravati for various reliefs including a right of residence. The application was allowed. Interim maintenance was granted and direction was issued to provide shared household. After coming into force the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, she filed the complaint under the said Act before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Amravati for various reliefs including a right of residence. The application was allowed. Interim maintenance was granted and direction was issued to provide shared household. The respondents had challenged the maintainability of the application on the ground that the husband and wife were residing separately from the date much prior to the Domestic Violence Act coming into force. The reliance was placed on V. D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183 , to hold that when the wife was having no child after thirty one years, she was required to reside alone at the age of 63 without any need of subsistence. The order of protection from residence was rightly passed and no interference was called for. It was held that, the act of respondents was squarely within the ambit of Section 3 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. Similarly, reliance was placed on Saraswathy v. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712 , wherein the wife was driven out of the matrimonial house 14 years back. It was held that, the provisions of Domestic Violence Act were applicable. 9. The applicant has also relied on the judgment in Bhanote''s case referred to herein above. The applicant relied on Ms Aradhana Walkade v. Mr. Chandrashekhar Vaidya & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 126 of 2013) decided on 13th February, 2014 by this Bench at Goa (Coram : Justice Mridula Bhatkar). In that case, the party had obtained divorce and no order for maintenance was passed at the time of decree of divorce in HMP No. 43 of 2009 dt. 24.02.2010. The husband was paying Rs. 25,000/- for daughter out of love but it was stopped. Thereafter proceedings u/s 12 were filed. Maintainability of the said application was challenged on the ground that, the petitioner was not legally wedded wife and not residing in a shared household. The said finding was upheld by the Sessions Court. Referring to the phrase ''the parties have at any point of time lived together in shared household'' and relying on Smt. Bharati Naik Vs. Shri. Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar, (2011) ALLMR(Cri) 224 ], it was held that, the phrase would apply to both existing relationship as well as past relationship and cannot be restricted to the existing relationship. Referring to the phrase ''the parties have at any point of time lived together in shared household'' and relying on Smt. Bharati Naik Vs. Shri. Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar, (2011) ALLMR(Cri) 224 ], it was held that, the phrase would apply to both existing relationship as well as past relationship and cannot be restricted to the existing relationship. It was held that the act of respondents was within the purview of economic abuse. The father showed readiness to pay Rs. 25,000/- per month to the daughter and the statement was accepted and the parties were left to approach the JMFC for other reliefs, if any. 10. Learned Advocate Shri. Milind Patil for the respondents relied on S. R. Batra and another v. Smt. Taruna Batra, (2007) AIR SC 1118 , particularly para 23 to 29. 11. As far as right of residence is concerned, provisions of shared household reads as under : - 19. Residence orders.- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order- (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. 2(s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. 12. On carefully reading these provisions, the order for residence can be passed u/s 19 only in respect of a shared household even if the respondent has no legal or equitable interest in the household. The definition of the shared household shows following properties as shared households. (a) where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent. (b) and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent (c) or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity (d) and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. 13. Admittedly, the house does not belong nor it is tenanted to the petitioner or her husband. 14. It is claimed that, it is a joint family property, however, there is no pleading and evidence to show that it was a joint family property. 15. In Roma Tiwari''s case (supra), reliance was placed on the last limb of definition of shared household "irrespective of whether the respondent or aggrieved person has any right, title or interest to hold that ownership of the house is irrelevant" but it is to be read along with the earlier provision namely such household must belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a Member. If the property belongs to the joint family of which the respondent is a Member then, even if the applicant and the respondents both having no title or right or interest in the shared household can claim a right of residence. The same cannot be claimed in respect of the property owned by father-in-law, mother-in-law or any other relative of the husband exclusively. This is clear from the following observations of the Apex Court in S. R. Batra v. Tarun Batra''s case (supra), para 23 to 29 read thus: 23. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batgra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household. 24. We cannot agree with this submission. 25. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband''s father, husband''s paternal grand parents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband''s relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband''s relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd. 26. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband''s in-laws or other relatives. 28. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband''s in-laws or other relatives. 28. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a ''shared household'' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ''shared household''. 29. No doubt, the definition of ''shared household'' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society. 16. The view is followed in following cases; (a) In Kolli Babi Sarojini And Others vs Kolli Jayalaxmi And Another, (2015) ALLMR(Cri)(Jou) 178 , it is held that, as per definition of aggrieved person, complainant should have domestic relationship with the respondent to be treated as aggrieved person. It was further held that, if the disputed property was self-acquired property of the petitioner''s brother in-law and there is title dispute, the court under Domestic Violence Act cannot go into the title dispute. Hence, the petition would not be maintainable. (b) Urmila v. Ramesh Chander, (2018) AllMR(Cri)(Jou) 158 . In this case the wife claimed relief of residential accommodation in house owned by grand father of her husband. It was found that, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent was member of Hindu Coparcenery''s family and said house was property of Hindu Undivided Family. Therefore, it was held that, the house cannot be said to be shared household and respondent cannot claim right of residence in the said house. It was found that, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent was member of Hindu Coparcenery''s family and said house was property of Hindu Undivided Family. Therefore, it was held that, the house cannot be said to be shared household and respondent cannot claim right of residence in the said house. It was also observed that, when the petitioner was working in a school at Sonepeth and therefore her claim for residence in house at Gangana is not bonafide and has been made to cause harassment. (c) In Nita Mittal vs. Kanta Mittal, (2009) 6 AllMR(Jou) 1 , the daughter in law claimed right to live in the house of husband'' parents against their consent and wishes. It was held that, a woman has her right of maintenance against her husband or sons or daughters. She can assert her rights, if any, against the property of her husband, but she cannot thrust herself against the parents of her husband, nor can claim a right to live in the house of parents of her husband, against their consent and wishes. 17. In Inderjeet Kaur v. Baldev Singh and Ors., (2017) AIR(P&H) 76 , it is observed in para 17 which reads thus: 17. On the basis of the evidence so adduced by the parties, House No. 1211, Phase 3B2, SAS Nagar, Mohali was not proved to be an ancestral property, as the appellant has not been able to substantiate her plea that the house in question was purchased by the respondents/plaintiffs by virtue of sale of ancestral property. Therefore, the plea of the ancestral property on the basis of which the appellant claimed her right in the said property is not established. Merely because the appellant is residing in the house since her marriage, it cannot be termed as "shared house" as the suit property has been concluded as selfacquired property of the respondents/plaintiffs. Thus, no substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal and the appellant has no locus standi to file the present appeal. The possession of the respondents/plaintiffs has duly been admitted by the Courts below by passing the judgments and decrees. In this manner, this Court does not find any illegality in the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 18. The possession of the respondents/plaintiffs has duly been admitted by the Courts below by passing the judgments and decrees. In this manner, this Court does not find any illegality in the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 18. In the present case, admittedly the house was purchased by respondent No. 1 in the name of respondent No. 2 when respondent No. 2 was a minor. It is claimed that, there was partition by way of decree in 1970. That time, the house in question was not partitioned. The partition is presumed to be in respect of all joint family properties. The applicant has admitted that the joint family ceased to exist. The pleadings of the applicant are totally silent about the ancestral nature of the house and there is no proper evidence. The applicant claimed that, respondent No. 1 has filed suit and though the said suit for declaration of his ownership has been decreed, the decree has been stayed in the appeal. However, these facts cannot lead to an inference that the suit house is an ancestral house. 19. Pertinently, the petitioner''s husband is gainfully employed and is serving and residing at Latur. The petitioner along with her two children is residing at Aurangabad. It is not a case that, she has no place for residence. She is having good relations with her husband. In the light of these facts, in absence of evidence to show that the suit house at Parbhani was ancestral house, the applicant was not entitled for any relief regarding residence u/s 19. She can claim right to reside with her husband but when she can reside with him at Latur she can''t thrust herself in the house owned and possessed by father-in-law. 20. As far as the agricultural lands are concerned, the petitioner is not directly concerned with the dispute. This land was allotted to her husband in a compromise decree in RCS No. 455/1970. This decree has been challenged in Spl. Civil Suit No. 93 of 2010 and the same has been set aside. The said decree in Spl. Civil Suit has been challenged by the applicant by filing appeal. It is a civil dispute and the parties can approach the civil court for protection of their rights regarding ownership or possession. This decree has been challenged in Spl. Civil Suit No. 93 of 2010 and the same has been set aside. The said decree in Spl. Civil Suit has been challenged by the applicant by filing appeal. It is a civil dispute and the parties can approach the civil court for protection of their rights regarding ownership or possession. Basically it is dispute between respondents and the petitioner''s husband Anil who is son of respondent No. 1 and brother of respondent No. 2. 21. Section 3 defines Domestic Violence Act as follows; 3. Definition of domestic violence.-For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it- (iv) "economic abuse" includes- (a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance; (b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and (c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II.-For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. 22. The dispute between the respondents on the one hand and the husband of the petitioner on the other, cannot be brought under the definition of Domestic Violence Act by the applicant by claiming that she was cultivating the lands and the respondents were obstructing her possession. It is a civil dispute and she can approach the civil court for necessary reliefs. It is a civil dispute and she can approach the civil court for necessary reliefs. Thus the petitioner was not entitled for the reliefs of residence as well as protection with respect to agricultural land belonging to her husband u/s 19 and 18 of DV Act, respectively. She has good relations with her husband and is claiming no relief against him. 23. In the light of these facts, there is no illegality nor any perversity in the orders passed by the courts below and no interference is called for. Hence, the Revision is dismissed. No order as to costs.