ORDER : ABDUL MOIN, J. 1. Heard Sri Kapil Dev, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Lalit Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/Bank. 2. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:-- "i. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, thereby the impugned order dated 14.1.2008 passed by opposite party No. 2, as contained in Annexure No. 1, to the extent that, in the impugned order dated 14.1.2008, it has been mentioned that "no pay and allowances, will be paid for the period she remained dismissed from service, that is, from 7.7.2003 to 14.1.2008", be quashed. (i)(a). Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the impugned order dated 26.2.2018, passed by Opposite Party No. 2, as contained in Annexure No. 11, to the writ petition. ii. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the opp-par-ties, to make the payment of back pay and allowances for the period of dismissal of the petitioner from 7.7.2003 to 14.1.2008 and also continuity of service, as such, on account of her reinstatement in service vide order dated 14.1.2008, contained in Annexure No. 1, and all other consequential benefits on account of her exoneration and reinstatement, forthwith. iii. Issue such other order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner; and; iv. award the costs of the petition-in favour of the petitioner." 3. The case, in brief, as set forth by the petitioner is that the petitioner had been dismissed from service on account of her conviction in a criminal case. The dismissal order dated 7.7.2003 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the petition. The petitioner was subsequently acquitted by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 17.8.2007 on the basis of benefit of doubt. A copy of the judgment and order dated 17.8.2007 is Annexure-3 to the petition. The dismissal order dated 7.7.2003 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the petition. The petitioner was subsequently acquitted by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 17.8.2007 on the basis of benefit of doubt. A copy of the judgment and order dated 17.8.2007 is Annexure-3 to the petition. Upon acquittal, the petitioner submitted a representation to the respondents for her reinstatement in pursuance to which the respondents passed the order dated 14.1.2008, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the petition, by which she was reinstated with a rider that no pay and allowance would be paid for the period she remained out of employment i.e. from 7.7.2003 to 14.1.2008. In pursuance to the order dated 14.1.2008, the petitioner submitted joining on 15.1.2008. On the said date itself i.e. 15.1.2008, the petitioner was suspended. In the suspension order dated 15.1.2008 it was provided that the Bank is proceeding to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner was issued with a charge sheet and after the petitioner participated in the inquiry, she was exonerated vide order dated 20.5.2011, a copy of which is Annexure-7 to the petition. After her exoneration, the present petition has been filed for the aforesaid reliefs. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner has taken voluntary retirement on 31.8.2012. 4. During pendency of the petition, the petitioner filed an affidavit before the Bank that she was not in any gainful employment during the period she was out of employment and thus prayed for being given the back wages. 5. This Court vide order dated 13.2.2018 required the respondents/Bank to take a decision in the matter which resulted in the respondents/Bank passing the order dated 26.2.2018 deciding her representation and ordering that the petitioner is not entitled for any wages/allowances or consequential benefits for the period 7.7.2003 to 14.1.2008. The said order dated 26.2.2018 has also been challenged by the petitioner through an amendment application which has been allowed by the Court. 6. The said order dated 26.2.2018 has also been challenged by the petitioner through an amendment application which has been allowed by the Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while seeking to challenge order dated 14.1.2008 to the extent it does not grant pay and allowances from the date of dismissal till her joining and the subsequent order dated 26.2.2018, contends that once the petitioner was acquitted by the High Court, consequently it would be deemed that the petitioner was never convicted in the criminal case and hence her dismissal order dated 7.7.2007 gets patently vitiated. Subsequent thereto, the respondents proceeded to hold an inquiry for the same charges which had resulted in her conviction but after due inquiry she was exonerated and hence her exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings would entail payment of full back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of her joining on the post. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the regulations governing the terms and conditions of the employees of the Bank known as Aryavart Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 Regulations), a copy of which has been filed as Annexure CA-3 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondents/Bank. It is contended that Regulation 29 of the 2006 Regulations provides that full pay and allowances shall be admissible only if the officer or employee is acquitted of all charges or satisfies the Competent Authority, in case of his release from detention or his detention being set aside by the Competent Court, that he had not been guilty of improper conduct resulting in his detention. Placing reliance on the aforesaid Regulations, it is contended that once the petitioner has been reinstated in service and in disciplinary proceedings she has also been completely exonerated, consequently the natural corollary would be that the petitioner is entitled for pay and allowances for the aforesaid period. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2019 In re Raj Narain v. Union of India decided on 1.4.2019 (Reported in AIR Online 2019 SC 155). 8. On the other hand, Sri. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2019 In re Raj Narain v. Union of India decided on 1.4.2019 (Reported in AIR Online 2019 SC 155). 8. On the other hand, Sri. Lalit Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents/Bank, on the basis of averments contained in the counter affidavit, argues that Regulation 29 of the 2006 Regulations provides for full back wages only to those officers or employees who are treated on duty during such period. It is contended that by means of the impugned order dated 14.1.2008, the petitioner has not been treated on duty and consequently she would not be entitled for the back wages. Sri Shukla has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh reported in (2004) 1 SCC 121 : ( AIR 2004 SC 1005 ) to contend that as the dismissal of the petitioner was occasioned on the ground of her conviction in die criminal case which subsequently resulted in the petitioner being acquitted yet the Bank cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which it could not avail services of the petitioner. Reliance has also been placed by Sri. Shukla on the judgment cited by the petitioner herself i.e. in the case of Raj Narain (supra) to contend that even if the petitioner has been acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt yet as the dismissal of the petitioner was on account of her own conduct, consequently the Bank cannot be liable to pay for the period she was out of employment. 9. Heard learned counsel for the contesting parties and perused the record. 10. From a perusal of record and the arguments as raised by learned counsel for the contesting parties, it clearly comes out that the petitioner had been dismissed from service on 7.7.2003 on account of her conviction in a criminal case. The petitioner was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 17.8.2007. The petitioner submitted a representation to the respondents/Bank for her reinstatement and in pursuance thereof she was reinstated in service vide order dated 14.1.2008. The petitioner was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 17.8.2007. The petitioner submitted a representation to the respondents/Bank for her reinstatement and in pursuance thereof she was reinstated in service vide order dated 14.1.2008. The respondents/Bank refused to pay the pay and allowances to the petitioner of the period from the date of her dismissal till her joining in pursuance to the order dated 14.1.2008. In the departmental inquiry which was conducted by the Bank, she was exonerated through an order dated 20.5.2011. The only question that thus remains now would be the payment of pay and allowances for the period from the date of dismissal of the petitioner till the date she was acquitted by the High Court. The said issue is no longer res-integra taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Raj Narain (supra) passed after considering the earlier judgment in the case of Jaipal Singh (supra) over which reliance has also been placed by Sri. Lalit Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents/Bank. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (supra) has held as under:-- "5. This Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore ( AIR 1997 SC 1802 ) (supra) considered the case of an employee who sought back wages for the period he was kept out of duty during the pendency of a criminal case for his involvement in an offence under Section 302, IPC. The claim of the Petitioner therein was that he was entitled to full wages on his acquittal by the Criminal Court. This Court rejected the said submission by holding that the question of payment of back wages would arise only in case of termination of service, pursuant to findings recorded in a departmental enquiry. In the event of the dismissal order being set aside by the Court, the delinquent employee would be entitled to claim back wages as he was unlawfully kept away from duty by the employer. This Court was-of-the opinion that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing a departmental inquiry. The employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail. Subsequent acquittal by an. This Court was-of-the opinion that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing a departmental inquiry. The employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail. Subsequent acquittal by an. Appellate Court would not entitle him to claim back wages. 6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) was followed by this Court in Union of India and Others v. Jaipal Singh (supra) to refuse back wages to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the Petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the Appellant endeavored to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the judgment in Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh (supra) has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with, full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious. 7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the Appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The Appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983. 7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the Appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The Appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983. It is clear from the record that the Appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry. Thereafter, the Respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the Appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21.10.1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the I.A., we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003. Further, the Appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987. 11. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003. Further, the Appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (AIR Online 2019 SC 155) (supra) has categorically held that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing, a departmental inquiry inasmuch as the employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail and subsequent acquittal by the Court would not entitle him to claim back wages. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that an employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the prosecution against her was malicious. The Bank had no role in the matter. Consequently, in case the petitioner remained out of employment on account of her conviction in criminal case which subsequently resulted in she being acquitted by the High Court on the basis of benefit of doubt, thus following the dictum of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (supra), the Bank cannot be asked to pay the back wages and allowances for the period the petitioner remained out of employment on account of her conviction in criminal case. However, since the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, she would become entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of acquittal till the date of her reinstatement, in this case from 17.8.2007 to 14.1.2008. It goes without saying that appropriate orders are to be passed as per the 2006 Regulations by the respondents/Bank pertaining to the period of dismissal of the petitioner till her reinstatement. As such, when the impugned orders dated 14.1.2008 and 26.2.2018 are seen in the context of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (supra), this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the same. 12. As such, when the impugned orders dated 14.1.2008 and 26.2.2018 are seen in the context of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (supra), this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the same. 12. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussions, no case for interference is made out with the impugned orders dated 14.1.2008 and 26.2.2018. At the same time, considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain (supra), as the petitioner had been acquitted on 17.8.2007 and was reinstated only on 14.1.2008 and in pursuance thereof joined on 15.1.2008, as such she would be entitled for wages/salary from the date of her acquittal i.e. 17.8.2007 till her reinstatement i.e. 14.1.2008. The said wages/salary shall be paid to the petitioner by the respondents within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Further the respondents shall also pass appropriate orders as per regulations pertaining to the period of the dismissal of the petitioner i.e. from 7.7.2003 to 14.1.2008 within the aforesaid period of two months. 13. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.