JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the following reliefs have been sought for : “(i) “for quashing of the order dated 16.02.2017 (Annexure12), passed by the Learned Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh (Respondent No.2), in Land Restoration Revision No.62/2013, whereby & where under the revision preferred by the petitioners has been dismissed and the order dated 02.08.2013, passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh (Respondent No.3), in S.A.R. Appeal No.22/2013 and order dated 21.06.2013, passed by the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Ramgarh, S.A.R. Case No.14/2012-13 were upheld: (ii) For quashing of the order dated 02.08.2013 (Annexure-09), passed by the Learned Deputy Commissioner, Ramgarh, in restoration Appeal Case No.22/2013, whereby and where under the appeal preferred by the petitioners has been dismissed in cryptic manner, without considering the facts & circumstances of the case: (iii) For quashing of the order dated 21.06.2013 (Annexure-07), passed by the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Ramgarh in Land Restoration Case No.14/2012-13, whereby & where under the land of the petitioners situated in Mouja Kaitha, Thana No.85, P.S.: Ramgarh, Khata No.19, Plot No.773, Area 1 acre restored in favour of Ramjatan Munda (Respondent No.5), U/s 46 & 4A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, without considering the show-cause filed by the petitioners and on erroneous consideration saying that the order passed in Title Suit by the Civil Court having no value i.e., the erroneous consideration of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, which is not tenable in the eye of law:” 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is that the landed property in question pertaining to Plot No.773, measuring an area of 2.22 acres under Khata No.19, Village-Kaitha, Police Station and Thana-Ramgarh was recorded in the names of Jaylal Munda & Ghujja Munda and both are sons of Bhukhlal Munda during the last survey & settlement operation. The said Ghujja Munda approached Hitlal Mahto for some money and for that in order to create security, a piece of land of an area of 1.00 acres towards East of Plot No.773 under Khata No.19 as has been indicted in the Title Suit No.926 of 1964 has been given in possession of the petitioners, in consequence thereupon, a title suit was filed being Title Suit No.926 of 1964 by the recorded tenant on 30.11.1964 for seeking the relief of declaration of right over the suit land, the defendants/the petitioner herein be evicted from the suit land. The said title suit has culminated into a compromise decree vide decree signed on 27.01.1965. Thereafter, the Hitlal Mahto applied for mutation before the revenue authority which was registered as Mutation Case No.321 of 1965-66 which was allowed and accordingly the name of the petitioners has been entered in the rent register i.e., Register-II of Ramgarh Anchal, District Hazaribag (now, District-Ramgarh) and since then the petitioners are making payment of rent in token thereof and the rent receipts are being issued but after lapse of substantial period, an application was filed by the respondent No.6 on 23.08.2012 under the provision of Section 46 (4-A) of the C.N.T. Act, 1908 which was registered as Land Restoration Case No.14 of 2012-13. The Deputy Collector Land Reforms has issued notice upon the petitioners who on its service has appeared and filed reply rebutting the claim of the respondent No.6 inter alia on the ground that the restoration application has been filed beyond the period of limitation and the possession has been confirmed by way of decree passed in Title Suit No.926 of 1964 but the original authority has passed order of restoration, against which, the petitioners have filed appeal before the Deputy Commissioner which has also been dismissed and thereafter, the petitioner has filed revision before the Commissioner North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag which has also been dismissed, against which, the present writ petition has been filed inter alia on the following grounds : (i) The authorities have not considered the question of limitation; (ii) The petitioners have came in possession at least from the year 1964 and thereafter the competent court of civil jurisdiction in a decree on compromise which establishes the petitioners to be in possession of the land and as such the application filed by the respondent No.6 for restoration of the land in question is without any basis and contrary to the decree passed in title suit on compromise in Title Suit No.926 of 1964. 3. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned G.A.-IV appearing for the State of Jharkhand as also Mr. Ayush Aditya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.6, have defended the orders inter alia on the ground and by taking aid of the stand taken by the State in the counter affidavit that there is no infirmity in the impugned order for the reason that there is complete embargo of transfer of land under the provision of C.N.T. Act, 1908 and since the transfer said to have been made in between the tribal and non-tribal, therefore, there cannot be any transfer as per the provision made under Section 46 of the Act, 1908. The question of limitation as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioners, has been taken into consideration by the authorities which has been answered against the petitioner on the ground that the document upon which the petitioners have given much reliance i.e. decree passed in compromise by the competent court of civil jurisdiction, has been disbelieved on the ground that the decree in a case pertaining to illegal transfer of land in between tribal and non-tribal which is the subject matter of the Act, 1908, will be said to be fraud upon the statute since that has been adopted for the purpose of frustrating the very object of the Act, 1908 which creates complete bar in transfer of the land in between tribal to non-tribal. 4. The authorities, therefore, have come out with the specific finding that the document pertaining to the title suit, cannot be given any reliance since it itself is void. Further the authorities have came to the conclusive finding that save and except the document pertaining to the title suit, no other evidence has been produced by the petitioners showing the date of coming in possession of the land in question and therefore, by answering the issue of limitation the order of restoration has been passed. It has further been submitted that even accepting the stand taken by the petitioners with respect to the claimed possession over the land in question at least from the year 1964 but as would appear from the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Ramgarh wherein there is reference of Rent Fixation Case No.06/08-09/08/08-09 in which an order was passed for fixation of rent basis upon which the rent receipt was received up to the year 2011-12, therefore, the issue of continuous possession over the land in question as has been agitated by the petitioners, cannot be accepted in view of the order passed in rent fixation cases. It has further been submitted that the fact about the aforesaid rent fixation cases have not been disputed by the petitioners since no averment has been made either in the show cause filed before the original authority or before the appellate or revisional authority taking ground in assailing the order passed by the original authority, therefore, there is no continuous possession and even if the possession is from the year 1964 it will be said to be discontinued sometime in the year 2008-09 and as such the point of limitation would be considered from the year 2008-09 and since the application has been filed in the year 2012, therefore, the period of limitation as provided under Section 46 since is of 12 years, hence if the application would be said to be within the period of limitation and hence, it cannot be said that any infirmity has been caused in passing the impugned orders. Lastly, they have submitted that there is concurrent finding of three consecutive authorities, therefore, when fact finding has been arrived at by three consecutive authorities, the writ court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if interferes, it will be treated to be exercising the power of the appellate court and therefore, the impugned order may not be interfered with. 5. This Court having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their arguments and going across the documents annexed by the parties in their affidavits, deem it fit and proper first to deal with the object and scope of C.N.T. Act, 1908. The C.N.T. Act, 1908 has been enacted in order to look into the interest of the people residing in the schedule and non-schedule areas. The fact about the status of respondent No.6 is not in dispute which is of the raiyat, therefore, this Court is not dealing with this issue but however, the question which is necessary to be dealt with is the provision of Section 46 of the C.N.T. Act, 1908, which reads hereunder as: “[46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by raiyat. Restrictions on transfer of their right by raiyat. – (1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof, – (a) by mortgage or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years, or (b) by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent : Provided that a Raiyat may enter into a ‘bhugut bundha’ mortgage of his holding or any portion thereof for any period not exceeding seven years or if the mortgagee be a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (B&O Act VI of 1935) for any period not exceeding fifteen years : Provided further that – (a) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is [a member of the Scheduled Tribes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift or will to [another person, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and], who is a resident within the local limits of the area of the police station within which the holding is situate; (b) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale exchange, gift, will or lease to another person who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, Backward Classes] and who is a resident within the local limits of the district within which the holding is situate; (c) any occupancy-Raiyat may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof to a society or bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1935), or to the State Bank of India or a bank specified in column 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970) or to a company or a corporation owned by, or in which less than fifty-one per cent of the share capital is held by the State Government or the Central Government or partly by the State Government, and partly by the Central Government, and which has been set up with a view to provide agricultural credit to cultivators; and (d) any occupancy-Raiyat, who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes or Backward classes, may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof by sale, exchange gift, will, mortgage or otherwise to any other person.] (2) A transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof under sub-section (1) shall be binding on the landlords. (3) No transfer of contravention of sub-section (1), shall be registered or shall be in any way recognised as valid by any Court, whatever in exercise, of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. [(3-A) Notwithstanding contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Deputy Commissioner shall be a necessary party in all suits of a civil nature relating to any holding or portion thereof in which one of the parties to the suits is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and the other party is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes.] (4) At any time within three years after the expiration of the period or which a Raiyat has under clause (a) of sub-section (1) transferred his right in his holding or any portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the application of the Raiyat put the Raiyat into possession of such holding or portion in the prescribed manner. [(4-A) (a) The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) : Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof: Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter. (b) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that there was no contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) in making such transfer, he shall reject the application and may award such costs to the transferee to be paid by the transferor as he may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit. (c) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that such transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), he shall annul the transfer and eject the transferee from such holding or portion thereof, as the case may be and put the transferor in possession thereof : Provided that if the transferee has constructed any building or structure, such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before the commencement of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969 (President's Act 4 of 1969) he may notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, validate such a transfer made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), if the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion, as the case may be, of equivalent value, in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor. (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect the validity of any transfer (of otherwise invalid) of a Raiyat's right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide before the first day of January 1908 in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of 'Manbhum', or before the first day of January 1909, in the district of 'Manbhum'. (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect the validity of any transfer (of otherwise invalid) of a Raiyat's right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide before the first day of January 1908 in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of 'Manbhum', or before the first day of January 1909, in the district of 'Manbhum'. [(6) In this Section [and in Section 47], – (a) “Scheduled Castes” means such castes, races or tribes as are specified in Part II of the Scheduled to the Constitution (Schedules Castes) Order, 1950; (b) “Scheduled Tribes” means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are specified in Part II of the Scheduled to the Constitution (Schedules Tribes) Order, 1950; and (c) “Backward clauses” means such classes of citizens as may be declared by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be socially and educationally backward].” The aforesaid provision thus provides that there is restriction on transfer of the rights by the raiyats. There can be transfer of land but it can be in between the tribal people falling within the same police station but that too with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner as stipulated to be granted by the Deputy Commissioner but there cannot be any transfer from tribal to non-tribal. Section 4(A) to Section 46 of the Act, 1908 although was not in the original statute of the year 1908 rather it has been inserted by way of Act 11 of 1976 whereby and whereunder the Deputy Commissioner has been conferred with the power to conduct an inquiry on his own motion or on application filed before him by occupancy raiyat in order to see as to whether the transfer is in contravention of the provision contained under Section 46 as under Clause (A) to second proviso to sub-section (1) provided that such application cannot be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy tenant within a period of 12 years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof and further the same can be done only by providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties. The first proviso to sub-section (4-A) to Section 46 of the Act, 1908 stipulates the period of limitation of 12 years in entertaining an application for annulling the transfer. The first proviso to sub-section (4-A) to Section 46 of the Act, 1908 stipulates the period of limitation of 12 years in entertaining an application for annulling the transfer. It is not in dispute that the provision of Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act is beneficial and the legislative intention is to extend protection to a class of citizens who are not in a position to keep their property to themselves in the absence of protection, therefore, when the legislature is extending special protection to the named category, the Court has to give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which would work out the protection and enable the sphere of protection to be effective. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pandey Oraon vs. Ram Chander Sahu & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 77, pr.7, which reads hereunder as: “7. The provision is beneficial and the legislative intention is to extend protection to a class of citizens who are not in a position to keep their property to themselves in the absence of protection. Therefore, when the legislature is extending special protection to the named category, the court has to give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which would work out the protection and enable the sphere of protection to be effective than limit by (sic) the scope. In fact, that exactly is what has been said by a three Judge bench of this Court in almost a similar situation in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka and what was said by a three Judge bench followed by a later decision of this Court in Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra. To the same effect is the observation of this Court in Gamini Krishnayya v. Guraza Seshachalam. The House of Lords in D(a minor) v. Bershire County Council said that broad and liberal construction should be given to give full effect to the legislative purpose. To the same effect is the observation of this Court in Gamini Krishnayya v. Guraza Seshachalam. The House of Lords in D(a minor) v. Bershire County Council said that broad and liberal construction should be given to give full effect to the legislative purpose. We would, therefore, in the facts and circumstances appearing in this case, hold that the authorities under the Act were justified in extending the provision of Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act to the situation which emerged and the High Court took a wrong view in limiting the concept of transfer to the statutory definition in the T.P. Act and holding that Section 71-A was not applicable in a case of this type. On this basis, it must follow that the action of the statutory authority was justified and the conclusion of the Full Bench must not be sustained. We accordingly allow the appeal and reverse the decision of the High Court.” The petitioner since is taking the ground of compromise decree to show the date of dispossession but the issue of decree passed by the competent court of civil jurisdiction fell for consideration before this Court in several cases and this Court has came to conscious finding with respect to that a decree passed in a suit on compromise will be treated to be fraud upon the statute, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Ratan Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 AIR Jhar R 777 wherein this Court has been pleased to hold that if any title is being claimed by way of compromise decree passed in title suit, the same will be nullity in the eye of law in view of complete embargo of transfer of land from tribal to non-tribal as per the provision of Section 46 of Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, therefore, it would be ab initio illegal and invalid. The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the aforesaid issue, has gone across the intent and scope of the Act, 1908 which restrains the transfer of land from tribal to non-tribal and if it would be allowed to be transferred by virtue of a suit and decree on compromise, the same would be nothing but an overreaching instrument to frustrate the very object of the Act, 1908. It is further evident from Section 46 as contained under sub-section (3-A) thereof, that the Deputy Commissioner has been made a necessary party in all suits of a civil nature relating to any holding or portion thereof in which one of the parties to the suit is member of the schedule tribes and the other party is not a member of the schedule tribe. This provision does suggest that in a suit filed before the competent court of civil jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner has to be a party and in absence thereof, if any decree is being passed, it will be said to be nullity due to misjoinder of party. 6. This Court on the basis of aforesaid legal position has examined the factual aspect wherefrom it is evident that a restoration application has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of the competent authority as provided under Section 46(4-A) of the Act, 1908 by making an application to that effect on 23.08.2012 upon which the motion has been made of initiation of a proceeding recorded as Restoration Case No.14/12-13. Upon noticed, the petitioners have appeared and taken the defence substantiating the fact about the legal transfer and the restoration application has been said to be barred by limitation since according to the petitioners, the land has been transferred in their favour at least in the year 1964 and since the restoration application has been filed in the month of August, 2012, therefore, since it is after more than 50 years hence, the same will be said to be barred by limitation since the first proviso to Section 46 (4-A) provides for filing restoration application within 12 years. 7. The original authority has passed an order disbelieving the decree passed in the Title Suit No.926 of 1964 on the ground that the decree has been passed on compromise and that too without impleading the Deputy Commissioner as a party to the proceeding. So far as this finding is concerned, this Court is of the view that after going across the provision of Section 46 which makes complete bar in transfer of land from tribal to non-tribal, however, the land has been transferred but the question herein is that whether the decree passed in the compromise title suit can be said to be conclusive proof of the date of transfer or confer any title upon the petitioners on the basis of that. This Court is nowhere in dispute that when there cannot be any transfer of land from tribal to non-tribal and if it would be allowed to be transferred, it will be nothing but said to be in complete contradiction to the object and scope of the Act and rightly said in the judgment referred hereinabove that it will be fraud upon the statute, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pandey Oraon vs. Ram Chander Sahu (supra) therefore, is concurring with the view taken by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms so far as the disbelieve shown in the decree passed by the competent court of civil jurisdiction in Title Suit No.926 of 1964 so far as it concerns with creating title in favour of the petitioner. 8. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that he is also putting reliance upon the said decree to consider the date of transfer since the suit has been filed by the raiyat, therefore, it will be said to be in possession of the petitioners from the year 1964 but this contention has been discarded by the original authority and it has rightly been discarded, it is for the reason that when the creation of document from right of his inception has been suspicious and not in accordance with law, no reliance can be placed upon the said document which de-hores the rules. Further for the reason that if any instrument has been created and it is illegal from its inception, no reliance can be placed upon such document and if any reliance would be allowed to be placed it will be nothing but contrary to the principle that the illegality will be allowed to be perpetuated while the legal position is that the illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and the moment it comes to the notice of the authority, the illegality has to be set at right. 9. 9. When the document has not been relied upon by the authority, there is no question of considering the date of possession as because when the entire instrument has been said to be suspicious it will be said to be without any legal sanctity and if one part would be allowed to be accepted, it will be said to be a probate and reprobate, meaning thereby, one instrument cannot be allowed to be accepted and simultaneously to be rejected. 10. So far as the other aspect of the matter of the period of limitation of 12 years is concerned, it transpires from the order passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms that the respondent No.6 has placed reliance upon a proceeding initiated by way of rent fixation case being Rent Fixation Case No.06/08-09/08/08-09 in which appropriate order has been passed in favour of the respondent No.6 for fixation of rent basis upon which the State has issued land rent receipt up to the year 2011-12 which does suggest that even accepting the petitioners' contention that they were in possession since the year 1964 but it cannot be said to be in continuous possession in view of the fact that in between the period 2008-12, they will be said to be not in possession of the land in question and hence, the question would be that the period of limitation would be counted from 1964 or from the year 2008. The answer of this Court is that the period of limitation would be counted from the year 2008 since once the petitioners have been said to be dispossessed, the earlier possession as has been claimed will lost its force and the same would be said to be superceeded from the subsequent dispossession, therefore, the period of limitation is to be counted from the year 2008 and since the application has been filed for restoration in the Month of August, 2012, therefore, it will be said to be within the period of 12 years and as such the same is within time as provided under the first proviso to Section 46 (4-A) of the Act, 1908. Even otherwise the petitioners who are claiming possession on the basis of compromise decree, the same cannot be said to be acceptable date of possession since the said very document itself is not a legal and void document as because the decree on compromise held to be fraud upon the statute and when there is intent of fraud, no reliance can be placed on the said document since fraud vitiates every thing, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Devendra Kumar vs. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 & 18, which reads hereunder as : “13. It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p. 712) “… No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 14. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu this Court has observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law.” 15. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., it has been held as under: (SCC p. 553, para 20) “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 16. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh this Court observed that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has not lost temper over all these centuries. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana. 17. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh this Court observed that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has not lost temper over all these centuries. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana. 17. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi this Court held that “misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud”, and further held: (SCC p. 327, para 18) “18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.” The said judgment was reconsidered and approved by this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav. 18. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented themselves. In such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. In Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran this Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, observed as under: (M. Bhaskaran case, SCC p. 104, para 6) If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer.” 11. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the fact about the rent fixation case has never been brought on record, therefore, they have not been provided with the opportunity, but this argument is not acceptable to this Court for the reason that if such plea which now is being taken by the petitioners before the Writ Court having not been taken before the appellate or revisional authority, the same is not available to him to raise this point before this Court, it is for the reason that the writ Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari is required to see the legality and propriety to be tested from the very face of the order and nothing else and if it comes to the notice of the High Court that there is perversity or the order is without jurisdiction or the order is passed contrary to the statutory provision, the interference can be shown by issuing writ of certiorari by quashing the said order but the fact about the fixation of rent having not been agitated by the petitioners either before the appellate or revisional authority, this Court cannot allow the same to be agitated herein. 12. The order passed by Deputy Collector Land Reforms has been challenged before the Deputy Commissioner who has concurred with the view of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, however, the argument has been advanced by the petitioners that the Deputy Commissioner has passed a mechanical and cryptic order but as would appear from the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and there is no dispute about the legal position that the appellate authority is not required to pass a well detailed order rather sufficient brief reason is required to be passed, it is evident from the order passed by the appellate authority wherein reference of Title Suit No.926 of 1964 has been made said to have been passed on the basis of compromise and after taking into consideration the settled position of law that no person can acquire any right on the basis of oral or unregistered deed of sale and therefore, declined to interfere with the finding along with the conclusion recorded by the Deputy Collector. 13. 13. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner has been assailed before the revisional authority in exercise of power conferred under Section 215 of the Act, 1908 who has passed a well reasoned order after discussing each and every aspect of the matter, not in detail but in brief with assigning reason and therefore, this Court is of the view that there is concurrent finding of three consecutive authorities and hence, based upon the fact finding, if any interference would be shown disturbing the fact finding it will be said to be exceeding the jurisdiction of the High Court since the High Court in that circumstances will act as an appellate court and that is not the jurisdiction of the writ court rather the jurisdiction of writ court is only to appreciate the illegality and propriety of the order based upon the fact finding and if there is any perversity in the finding, the same can be well interfered with but no such reason is available showing interference with the impugned orders. 14. In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the orders passed by the three consecutive authorities as have been impugned in this writ petition, requires no interference, accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. 15. It is also in dispute that the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under which provision the representation has been filed to look into the finding of the Labour Court is very limited as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 SC 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sawarn Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In the case of Thansingh Vs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 16. In consequence thereof, interlocutory applications, if any, also stands disposed of.