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2019 DIGILAW 1370 (ALL)

Prayas Buildcon (P) Ltd. v. State of U. P.

2019-05-17

P.K.JAISWAL, RAJNISH KUMAR

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri. Samir Rohtagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri. Q.H. Rizvi, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 1, Sri. Madan Mohan Pandey and Sri. Shobit Mohan Shukla, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3/Lucknow Development Authority. 2. Writ Petition No. 12081 (MB) of 2009 is directed against an order dated 20.5.2009 passed by the Vice-Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow acting as Special Nazul Officer as well as on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh rejecting the application dated 22nd March, 2007 seeking conversion of leasehold rights into freehold of Nazul Land situated at Mohalla Hasanganj Par Ward Nishatganj, Lucknow which was conveyed through the letter dated 1.10.2009 issued by the opposite party No. 2/Nazul Officer, Lucknow. 3. In the PIL, the petitioners therein prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 not to grant permission for conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights owned by the respondent No. 3 and therefore, we vide order dated 19.04.2019 directed for listing of PIL along with Misc. Bench No. 12081 of 2009. 4. Facts are similar and identical in both the writ petitions, therefore, they were heard together and are being disposed of by passing the common order. 5. Briefly stated the facts are that after 1857, pursuant to Lord Canning's Notifications, the survey proceedings in order to identify the persons occupying the land started and this survey stood concluded by 1862 when the settlement map and Khasra were notified under the authority of the then Government. During the survey, it was found that there were abandoned sites or the Estates of the people who did not return to occupy it and such abandoned Estates were treated as Nazul property for being provided back to the people on lease as per Nazul Policy. In 1862, the first settlement relating to the land in Lucknow came into effect. The Nazul Department of the then Government of United Provinces granted lease in respect of the land admeasuring 72 Bigha 16 Biswa 11 Biswansi and 18 Kachwansi situated in Purwa Imam Baksh Mohalla Hasanganj Par situated in Municipality of Lucknow to M/s. Upper India Couper Paper Mils Company Ltd. The said lease was duly acknowledged by a registered Lease Deed dated 2nd May, 1944 executed by the Government of United Provinces in the Nazul Department. The period of lease commenced with effect from the first day of the month of April, 1942. The yearly rent fixed was Rs. 3,641 and annas 8 only. The aggregate period of lease is ninety years subject to the enhancement of lease rent by 50% each on expiry of thirty years. The lease was granted for building purpose. 6. For the purposes of disposal of building site in the city of Lucknow relating to Nazul land, the Nazul Officer, Lucknow has been acting on behalf of earlier Government of United Provinces now the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The lease in respect of the entire land was executed by the Nazul Officer on behalf of the Government of United Provinces in the Nazul Department for building purposes in favour of UIC. By virtue of the Government Orders issued by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, in Lucknow the Vice Chairman, LDA was made as its designated authority (Special Nazul Officer on behalf of the State Government) to deal with the matters relating to the conversion of leasehold rights into freehold relating to Nazul Land. 7. The original lessee, after expiry of initial period of 30 years which came to an end sometime in the year 1972, prayed for renewal of the lease and they had deposited the enhanced premium of the annual rent and further amount towards premium of enhanced rent before expiry of the period of the span of second 30 years. In fact, it is admitted to the respondents also that the requisite premium has already been deposited for the period upto the year 2032 i.e., the entire tenure of the lease. The lease itself contemplates the occasion wherein there may be an assignment and transfer of the rights. The only criteria it puts forth is the payment of lease rent. In fact, it is admitted to the respondents also that the requisite premium has already been deposited for the period upto the year 2032 i.e., the entire tenure of the lease. The lease itself contemplates the occasion wherein there may be an assignment and transfer of the rights. The only criteria it puts forth is the payment of lease rent. It mentions as follows:- "AND ALSO will not without the previous consent in writing of the said Nazul Officer, erect or suffer to be erected on any part of the said demised premises any building other than and except the buildings hereby covenanted already erected, AND will not without such consent as aforesaid make any alteration in the plan or elevation of the said buildings or make any sub-division of the said demised premises so as to construct more than one building on a specified plot though a building may be shared by more than one person provided that such shares shall be jointly and severally responsible to the Government of the United Provinces for the rent hereby reserved AND also that the lessee, his assignee, or transferee will not transfer his rights under this demise until he has paid off all the arrears of rent due from him to the lessor on the date of such assignment or transfer under these presents, AND THAT if the lessee, his assignee, or transferee makes any assignment or transfer Without first paying of all the arrears of rent due from him to the lessor, such assignee or transferee, shall also be equally liable for all the arrears of rent due on the date of such assignment or transfer....." 8. It is evident from the Lease Deed and the terms contained therein relating to the leasehold property, the rate of annual rent, its deposit and the period are predefined and predetermined and nothing has been resolved for the lessor including any right to alter or modify the aforesaid terms of lease. The period of lease as is evident therefrom when calculated for ninety years expires in the year 2032. At the time of execution of the Lease Deed on 2.5.1944, the stamp duty paid thereon was for the full term of ninety years. The annual lease rent in terms of the lease including enhancement already stood paid/deposited in advance with the lessor for the full term i.e. till 2032. 9. At the time of execution of the Lease Deed on 2.5.1944, the stamp duty paid thereon was for the full term of ninety years. The annual lease rent in terms of the lease including enhancement already stood paid/deposited in advance with the lessor for the full term i.e. till 2032. 9. On 23.1.2007, the original lessee, M/s. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd. through its Managing Director executed the registered Deed of assignment of leasehold rights in the land and sale of construction in respect of the property comprising 1,11,482.72 sq. mtrs. for valuable consideration being a part of the aforesaid Nazul Land which was the subject-matter of the registered Lease Deed dated 2.5.1944 executed in favour of Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd. situated in Purwa Imam Baksh Mohalla Hasanganj Par, Lucknow and delivered possession to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter applied for mutation of its name in respect of the land comprised in the Deed of assignment and sale, before the competent authority. The name of the petitioner was duly mutated in the records maintained by the Nazul Department as conveyed by the Lucknow Development Authority through Naib-Tahsildar vide letter dated 19.2.2007 (Annexure - 1 to the petition) by accepting the division. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted building plans for constructing the buildings in the aforesaid property acquired by them on 22nd February, 2007. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for conversion of its leasehold rights into freehold in respect of 75,000 sq. mtrs. of leasehold land under self-assessment scheme and deposited a sum of Rs. 6,46,87,500/- in the shape of demand draft dated 22.3.2007 (Annexure - 5 to the writ petition) with the Nazul Officer, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow. On 8.6.2007, the Nazul Officer/Secretary of the Lucknow Development Authority gave its No Objection for the aforesaid proposed construction by the petitioner. The Nazul Officer further acknowledged in the said No Objection Certificate that the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 6,46,87,500/- under self-assessment scheme seeking conversion of leasehold rights into freehold in respect of 75000 sq. mtrs. of the aforesaid leasehold land and with an undertaking that within a period of ninety days from the date of issue of demand letter by the Nazul Officer, the petitioner shall deposit the balance amount (Annexure - 6 to the writ petition). 10. 6,46,87,500/- under self-assessment scheme seeking conversion of leasehold rights into freehold in respect of 75000 sq. mtrs. of the aforesaid leasehold land and with an undertaking that within a period of ninety days from the date of issue of demand letter by the Nazul Officer, the petitioner shall deposit the balance amount (Annexure - 6 to the writ petition). 10. The original Lessee/Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd. also deposited the partition fees to the tune of Rs. 1,500/- on 10.4.2007 in the Nazul Department, Lucknow. 11. The petitioner vide letter dated 5.1.2007 enquired from Mukhya Nagar Niyojak, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow with respect to the use of the land compromised in the Building Plans submitted by the petitioner. On 11.1.2007, the said Authority informed that a part of land comprising 75000 sq. mtrs. was for the commercial land use and rest of the area is for the 'park' and 'open space'/'green belt' in the Master Plan 2021. The building plan submitted by the petitioner was examined by the Technical Committee of Lucknow Development Authority in its meeting held on 29.3.2007 and approval of the same was granted. On 8.5.2007, the Senior Executive Engineer of the opposite party No. 3 directed the petitioner to complete certain formalities, i.e., the petitioner was required to submit a freehold deed in respect of the land comprised in the Building Plans which was to the extent of 75000 sq. mtrs. Except to submit a freehold deed, the petitioner completed all other statutory formalities as required by the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. The petitioner also got its name duly mutated in respect of the aforesaid property in question acquired through the registered Deed of assignment of leasehold rights in respect of the land and sale of consideration in the records of Nagar Nigam, Lucknow. 12. On 30.6.2007, the petitioner also deposited strengthening charges to the tune of Rs. 10,09,473/- with Nagar Nigam, Lucknow (Annexure - 13 to the writ petition). Till 22.4.2008 the petitioner obtained 17 numbers of No Objection Certificates from various departments with respect to the building plans as required by the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 and incurred huge expenditure in respect thereto. In spite of completion of all formalities, no letter of demand indicating balance amount to be deposited by the petitioner towards conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights was issued. 2 and 3 and incurred huge expenditure in respect thereto. In spite of completion of all formalities, no letter of demand indicating balance amount to be deposited by the petitioner towards conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights was issued. On 1.10.2009, the petitioner received a letter from the opposite party No. 2 that its application seeking conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights was rejected vide order dated 20.5.2009 on the ground that the land in question is subject matter of dispute of SLP No. 18734 of 2008, Lucknow Development Authority v. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Ltd. before Hon'ble Supreme Court and the land in question is most suitable for the purposes of development of affordable Housing in respect of Economically Weaker Sections, Low Income Group and Medium Income Group by looking into their paying capacity. In this backdrop, the writ petition has been filed with the following prayers:- (i) Issue an appropriate Writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 20.05.2009 passed by the Vice-Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority, the Opposite Party No. 3 as conveyed through the letter dated 01.10.2009 after summoning the original in this Hon'ble Court. (ii) Issue appropriate Writ, Order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Opposite Parties more particularly, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the opposite party No. 1, the Vice-Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority, the opposite party No. 3 and the Nazul Officer, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow the opposite party No. 2 to perform their statutory obligations so as to proceed and complete the process of conversion of leasehold rights in respect of the land in question into freehold in favour of the petitioner by requiring the petitioner to deposit the balance amount within such day and time to be fixed after indicating it through demand letter and complete it by the execution and registration of freehold Deed in respect of the same in favour of the petitioner according to law and as per policy within a time framed to be fixed by this Hon'ble Court. (iii) Issue appropriate Writ, order or direction including in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties for not to interfere in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land in question as mentioned in Paragraph Nos. (iii) Issue appropriate Writ, order or direction including in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties for not to interfere in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land in question as mentioned in Paragraph Nos. 1 to 3 above of the petition or dispossessing the petitioner therefrom by acting illegally or pursuant to the impugned action as contained in Paragraph Nos. 15 to 18 of the Writ Petition. (iv) Issue such other appropriate Writ Order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may kindly deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case in favour of the Petitioner against the Opposite Parties. (v) Costs of the Petition may kindly be awarded to the Petitioner against the Opposite Parties. 13. The main ground of attack of the aforesaid orders is that initially, the original lessee/Upper India Couper Paper Mills Ltd., had made an endeavour to get its right converted into freehold and the said request having been turned down was assailed by the original lessee by filing Writ Petition bearing No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 before this Court. After due contest, the said writ petition was allowed vide judgment and order dated 23.5.2008, wherein the co-ordinate of this Court held that the lease in respect of land in question was subsisting and did not expire while the period of lease was upto the year 2032. It was also held that the building plan submitted by the Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd. was wrongfully rejected. 14. The Division Bench of this Court after appreciating the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties gave the following findings which read as under:- "The next question is as to whether any such condition could have been imposed by the LDA, while sanctioning the building plans for getting the leased property converted into free hold and on the presumption that the same would be got done by the petitioners, the building plans could have been sanctioned, if otherwise, the petitioners were not to be treated as the owners or the lawful occupants of the land having any title for making constructions over the same on the alleged plea of the respondents that the term of the lease had expired and the same having not been renewed, they were not entitled to raise any constructions. Section 15 of the Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 vests power with the LDA to sanction and approve the building plans for any development work or scheme, without which sanction no development activity can be undertaken. An application has to be moved for obtaining requisite permission for undertaking any development over any land within the limits of the development authority and on necessary enquiry being made by the LDA, building plans are either sanctioned or refused. Before refusing sanction, opportunity is to be given to the applicant for removing the defects or objections and consequently orders are passed. The entire scheme of Section 15 does not say anywhere that a lessee cannot ask for permission for raising construction over leased land, unless, of course, terms of the lease do not permit such constructions to be raised over the land leased. There is no such plea that the lease executed in favour of the petitioners did not permit raising of construction over the leased property. Sub-clause (9) of Section 15 gives power to the Vice Chairman to cancel any permission, in case the Vice Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted as a consequence of material misrepresentation or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, but while doing so, he has to afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned person before adverting to passing of any order of cancellation. So far the sanction of original building plans is concerned, permission was duly granted by the LDA, after being satisfied about right and title of the petitioners over the land in question and after removal of all objections, that too after a long drawn litigation, reference of which has been made above, but to mention for the purpose, the most relevant amongst them are the two writ petitions filed by the petitioners; one for getting a direction issued to the LDA to consider the sanction of building plans and the other one for releasing the building plans, which were already sanctioned. The permission to the original building plans under Section 15 was granted by the LDA with full knowledge and information that it was a lease deed with given terms, by virtue of which the petitioners were in possession of the same and had submitted their building plans for carrying out the development work, that too again in pursuance of the permission granted by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2348 of 1979 with an obligation upon the petitioners to clear of the dues of U.P. Financial Corporation from the sale proceeds. Thus, it cannot be said that permission was granted by the LDA without full knowledge and information of the facts on which the permission was sought for. On the aforesaid facts, the permission was not refused under Section 15 (2) but was granted by a specific order. That being so, there cannot be a case that the petitioners obtained permission as a result of any misrepresentation or any fraudulent statement made by them or any incorrect information having been furnished. The LDA granted permission with full knowledge and with open eyes to the present revised building plans also after knowing the terms and conditions of the lease and the status of the petitioners. Thus, on the ground that since the lease has not been renewed, the building plans could not have been cancelled under Section 15(9) of the Act nor, as a matter of fact, the plans have been cancelled on this ground, though the respondents have made an unsuccessful attempt by raising such a plea, just to defend the impugned order. Not to repeat, that the cancellation order was passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners, though it is the statutory requirement that cancellation order be passed after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. It also could not be clarified by the respondents that in what manner and under which authority, the LDA could have imposed the condition of depositing Rs. 1.30 crores to the State Government, that too within a given time while sanctioning the building plans, as under the provisions of the Urban Planning and Development Act, there is no such provision which permits the LDA to insist for conversion of leased rights into free hold right before granting sanction. 1.30 crores to the State Government, that too within a given time while sanctioning the building plans, as under the provisions of the Urban Planning and Development Act, there is no such provision which permits the LDA to insist for conversion of leased rights into free hold right before granting sanction. It was for the State Government to see that whether the property should be converted into free hold or not but putting a condition which was foreign to the Act and the Rules for the purpose, was in itself a totally uncalled for condition, not supported by any law and which the petitioners had to abide under the circumstances beyond their control for getting the building plans sanctioned. If any amount was to be recovered towards the processing charges for conversion of the leased land into free hold, the State Government ought to have made a demand and raised such objections and in case of violation on the part of the petitioners to either satisfy the objections or to meet the demand, the request for conversion either could have been refused or accepted. But in such an event also, right of construction over the leased land could not have been defeated. Either the sanction could have been granted by the LDA having full knowledge of the status of the petitioners and the leased land or could have been refused, but it could not have been made a ground for cancellation, once the LDA had granted permission after conscious deliberations. The respondents' alternative defence is that since the lease hold rights of the petitioners came to an end in the year 1972 after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, unless the lease was actually renewed or the lease hold rights had been converted into free hold rights, the petitioners could not be treated to be the owners of the land having title for using it or for making constructions over the same and, therefore, the orders impugned are perfectly legal and valid. The plea that the petitioners were not having right over the land in question on the date of sanction of building plans for want of renewal of the lease, as already observed above, has to be tested on the terms of the lease and also on the conduct of the parties. The plea that the petitioners were not having right over the land in question on the date of sanction of building plans for want of renewal of the lease, as already observed above, has to be tested on the terms of the lease and also on the conduct of the parties. The relevant covenant of the lease deed of the nazul land which became effective from 1.4.1942 recites as under: ".............and the possession of which has been delivered to the lessee; TOGETHER with all rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever to the said plot of land belonging or in anywise appertaining TO HOLD the premises hereby demised unto the lessee for the term of thirty years renewable upto an aggregate period of 90 (Ninety) years subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% after passing 30 years from the 1st (First) day of April, 1942..............." The lease was granted for building purposes. The petitioners had admittedly deposited the enhanced rent for the period upto 2032, though a renewed lease deed has not been executed. The conduct of the parties leave no scope of doubt that they worked under the bona fide impression that by depositing the enhanced amount of premium, the lease stands extended and fact of the matter also is that the petitioners had performed their part of obligation, what they could have done for renewal of the lease and the State Government also did not object to their continuance over the property in question as lessee and, therefore, it is not open for them to say now that the petitioners are not the lawful occupants of the premises. The relevant terms of the lease deed are (i) the period of the lease commenced from the first day of April 1942; (ii) the aggregate period of lease is 90 years, i.e. initially for a period of 30 years renewable, subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% each on the expiry of 30 years twice; and (iii) the lease was granted for building purposes. The lease deed thus, contained therein all the terms relating to the leased property, including the rate of annual rent, the conditions of renewal and the aggregate period for which the lease is granted. The terms are predefined and predetermined and nothing has been reserved for the lessor, including any right to alter or modify the aforesaid terms of the lease. The terms are predefined and predetermined and nothing has been reserved for the lessor, including any right to alter or modify the aforesaid terms of the lease. Though in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 6, it is stated in Para 3 that at the time of execution and registration of the lease deed on 2nd May, 1944, the stamp duty paid thereon was for the full term of 90 years and that at present the annual lease rent in terms of the lease already stood paid/deposited in advance with the lessor for the full term i.e. till 2032, there is no denial by the respondents to the fact that the stamp duty was paid for the full period of 90 years, even in the supplementary counter affidavit filed in reply to the rejoinder affidavit. A plea, however, has been taken that the lease deed has not been renewed and the petitioners have deposited lease rent upto 2032 directly in the treasury of the State Government without any intimation to the Nazul department. The aforesaid plea also stands negated by the fact that the building plans were submitted by the petitioners initially in pursuance of the directives issued by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2348 of 1979 filed against the U.P. Financial Corporation and others, wherein objections were raised by the LDA that 'no objection certificate' by the Nazul department was not then received by the LDA. This objection finds place in letter dated 28.8.85 issued by the LDA. The Special Nazul Officer of the Nazul department vide letter dated 12.8.83 had informed the petitioners that the lease of the land in question is for a period of 90 years, of which rent has been increased by 50% and has been deposited, therefore, renewal of the lease deed is not required. The learned counsel for the respondents tried to dispute the genuineness of this document which is dated 12.8.83 and which bears the signatures of an officer of the Nazul department but could not substantiate the aforesaid plea. The learned counsel for the respondents tried to dispute the genuineness of this document which is dated 12.8.83 and which bears the signatures of an officer of the Nazul department but could not substantiate the aforesaid plea. There is another document on record dated 18.6.84, namely, the 'no objection certificate' issued by the Nazul department, in which it has been stated that the lease has been given for residential/commercial purposes and wherein against Column No. 5, which makes a query that whether the lease is required to be renewed or not and when it is to be renewed and in whose name and when renewal is to take place, the word 'direct' has only been mentioned. Certain other queries were again made saying that 'no objection certificate' may also be obtained from the acquisition department. In the year 1983, the LDA and the Special Land Acquisition Officer along with State of Uttar Pradesh made an attempt to interfere with the possession of the petitioners over their four Settling Water Tanks established over a portion of the leasehold land, otherwise than by due process of law, which compelled the petitioners to file a regular suit No. 291 of 1983 for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants of the said suit, namely, the aforesaid parties, in perpetuity, to dispossess the petitioners and a declaration was also sought in their favour. The LDA filed a separate written statement, while the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the State of U.P. contested the suit by filing joint written statement. The case was contested by the defendants to the suit, namely, the State of U.P., LDA and the Special Land Acquisition Officer saying that the lease was for a period of 30 years and in the absence of renewal deed, the petitioner No. 1 ceased to possess rights pursuant to the lease deed in respect of the leasehold land. The learned Civil Judge, Malihabad, Lucknow considered the submissions and adjudicated the the controversy and while deciding the issue No. 6, it was specifically held that it was a lease for a period of 90 years and as per the terms of the lease deed, the Company was liable to pay 50% enhanced rent on the expiry of 30 years, which was deposited. It was further held that after the expiry of next 30 years, there will be further 50% enhancement in the rent. It was further held that after the expiry of next 30 years, there will be further 50% enhancement in the rent. It was held that the plaintiff Company (petitioner No. 1) was already depositing the enhanced rent which was being duly accepted by the concerned department, therefore, it was wrongly urged by the defendants (respondents) that the period fixed in the lease deed expired. The lease deed subsists and is valid till 2032 as the petitioner has been depositing the enhanced lease rent, a fact which was not disputed by the respondents. The certified copy of the aforesaid judgment has been brought on record. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the LDA preferred first civil appeal bearing number 89 of 1985 before the High Court at Lucknow, wherein a specific ground was taken in the memo of appeal challenging the finding of the lower court that the payment of rent by the plaintiff (petitioners) after the expiry of the period of lease, amounting to the renewal of the lease, is wrong. The High Court finally disposed of the said first civil appeal by issuing a direction to the effect that the LDA shall not interfere with the possession and use of the petitioner No. 1 in respect of four Settling Water Tanks of the paper mills in question. However, the finding recorded by the trial court on the points in controversy raised by the LDA, State of U.P. and another, that the lease was only for 90 years, was not upset or set aside by the High Court. The said judgment is also brought on record. Subsequently, it appears that some clarification was sought for, by the LDA saying that the dispute related only to the four Settling Water Tanks and did not relate in respect of the passage and parts of the metal street which goes from Outram road to the Municipal Sullage Farm and the judgment be confined to that position only, which clarification was not opposed to, by the petitioners and was accepted by the High Court. In the 'no objection certificate' along with the report of the Nazul Officer submitted on 19.4.93 on the building plans/housing plans submitted on behalf of the petitioners, in Column-5, the Special Nazul Officer stated that the lease was for a period of 90 years, while giving answer, as to whether the lease was to be renewed or not and when it is to be renewed. In column No. 1 it was stated that the lease commenced with effect from 1st April, 1942 and also gave the name of the lessee i.e. the petitioners. In Column 9, it was stated that the old constructions were to be demolished and group housing were proposed to be constructed and accordingly 'no objection certificate' alongwith the report dated 19.4.93 was submitted. The report was duly signed and given by the Special Nazul Officer on 21.1.94. One more glaring feature is that the State Government itself issued notifications for acquisition of the land in question on 25.8.86 and 1.9.86 under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, meaning thereby that the land was treated to be the land of the petitioners under the lease deed even after the expiry of the first phase of 30 years, as otherwise, if the land belonged to the State Government, there was no question of issuing any notifications of acquisition of the land, as there could not have been any acquisition proceedings for acquiring their own land by the State Government. Not only this, the land was also released/exempted from acquisition by the State Government by exercising powers under Section 48 of the Act by issuing notification on 30.6.93. On denotifying the land from acquisition, the LDA also required the petitioner Company to give an affidavit that it would not claim any damages and compensation against the LDA for their actions concerning the acquisition and withdrawal of the land from the acquisition proceedings. All the aforesaid facts on record, clearly prove that the plea of the respondents that the petitioners were not the lessee of the land after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, in the absence of renewed lease deed, was never accepted, nor could be substantiated even in the present petition. All the aforesaid facts on record, clearly prove that the plea of the respondents that the petitioners were not the lessee of the land after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, in the absence of renewed lease deed, was never accepted, nor could be substantiated even in the present petition. Apart from this, the conduct of the State Government in acquiring the land and then releasing it in favour of the petitioner Company also supports the plea that the respondents did recognise the right of the petitioners throughout as lessee. The original building plans, as already stated earlier, were not being considered for being sanctioned and after sanction, they were not being released, therefore, writ petition was filed, in which orders were passed in favour of the petitioners. Pertinent to mention here is that the original building plan was placed in a meeting, before the Board of LDA, attended by the Commissioner, Lucknow Division & Chairman, LDA, the Housing Commissioner, U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, the Vice Chairman, LDA, the District Magistrate, Lucknow, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow the Special Secretary, Finance, Government of U.P., The Special Secretary, Housing, Government of U.P., the Chief Country & Town Planner, U.P, the Chief Engineer, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Lucknow and the Secretary, LDA. The Board granted approval to the building plans of the Company in the said meeting held on 27th November and 2nd December, 1993. In this approval, no condition for getting the land converted into free hold was imposed. The said documents have also been brought on record and in reply to the said averments made in the rejoinder affidavit, the respondents in Para 17 of the supplementary counter affidavit, admitted that the LDA Board had passed the resolution for sanction of building plan on receipt of 'no objection certificate' from the Nazul department. There is a clear admission on the part of the respondents in Para 17 of the supplementary counter affidavit about the approval of the original building plans being granted by the LDA Board for sanctioning the building plans and that too on receipt of the 'no objection certificate' by the Nazul department. The situation with respect to the right, title and interest of the petitioners over the land in question, did not change when the present revised building plans were submitted and even thereafter, which position remains the same, till date. The situation with respect to the right, title and interest of the petitioners over the land in question, did not change when the present revised building plans were submitted and even thereafter, which position remains the same, till date. It is also relevant to mention that Nazul policy regarding the conversion of leasehold rights into freehold, in respect of Nazul land, was under suspended animation till 18.4.05. The Government pursuant to the notification dated 19.4.05 lifted the animated suspension and required the authorities to act as per the Nazul policy contained in Government order dated 10.12.02 for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold and in the meantime, since sufficient time had passed and the petitioners wanted to develop their property in best possible way and since it was necessary and practical to have more parking in the project, the revised building plans were submitted by the petitioners before the LDA on 8.4.04, relating to Group Housing Project basically to increase the parking provisions from 553 cars sanctioned earlier to 1117 cars. This resulted in reducing the number of towers from 22 to 20, as were previously sanctioned. The petitioners willingly gave up these flats so that the residents of the flats have more parking and open spaces. These revised plans took about 13 months and were released only on 5.5.05. The petitioners had performed their part of the obligation and the State Government as well as the LDA, both continued to reel under the same premise accepting the lease hold rights of the petitioners, though at times, they disputed the same but could not succeed. The respondents also took a plea that the entire action of sanction of building plans was a result of collusion between the officers/officials of the LDA, may be the State Government and the petitioner Company, because of which an enquiry was got conducted by the State Government and that on the basis of the said enquiry F.I.Rs. have been lodged against the petitioner No. 2, the then Vice Chairman of the LDA along with Chairman and Managing Director of M/s. Arif Industries Limited. We are not concerned with the enquiry aforesaid nor with the action taken in pursuance of that enquiry as they are not under challenge before us, but we do take notice of the fact that merely by making enquiry and lodging F.I.Rs. We are not concerned with the enquiry aforesaid nor with the action taken in pursuance of that enquiry as they are not under challenge before us, but we do take notice of the fact that merely by making enquiry and lodging F.I.Rs. against certain persons, the factual and legal position cannot be changed and that though we do not find it necessary to delve on the plea of the petitioner that all such action has been taken when there has been change in the Government in May, 2007, but we do observe that by mere change in the Government, all actions taken in the erstwhile regime, cannot be presumed to have been taken illegally, fraudulently or maliciously, unless, of course, such connivance and violation of rules, laws and norms is found established. The plea aforesaid of the respondents, even otherwise, looses all relevance, in view of the categorical stand taken by them, that even if the petitioners were not having any subsisting right over the leased land on the date of applying for sanction of building plans, the said shortcoming could have overcome, in case they had got the lease hold land converted into free hold. Sri D.K. Upadhyaya, learned Chief Standing Counsel, made it clear that under the policy of the State Government and in accordance with the relevant Government orders, even a trespasser could get his right perfected over the Nazul land, if he gets it converted into free hold. That being the settled and admitted legal position, all effort of the respondents to establish, that the building plans could not have been sanctioned, in the absence of a revised lease deed having been executed, becomes wholly irrelevant and meaningless. In the case of Purshottam Dass Tandon and others v. State of U.P. Lucknow and others, AIR 1987 Alld. 56, a Division Bench of this Court, considering the case of such lessees who were granted lease of nazul land by the Government and who continued over the land after expiry of the leased period and no action for revocation of lease having been taken by the Government, have been found to be entitled to get the fresh lease executed. 56, a Division Bench of this Court, considering the case of such lessees who were granted lease of nazul land by the Government and who continued over the land after expiry of the leased period and no action for revocation of lease having been taken by the Government, have been found to be entitled to get the fresh lease executed. While considering the denial of renewal of lease of the lessees of nazul land in Allahabad and considering that whether the lessees had any right in law to get their leases renewed and could they invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel or claim being put at par with those whose leases had been renewed either because of Article 14 or under Administrative Law, applying the rule of election, the Court observed that 'In law where a person, having two alternative courses of actions mutually exclusive chooses to adopt one and rejects the other expressly or impliedly then he is said to have elected to chose one. He is subsequently precluded from adopting the course which he intended to reject. It is known as doctrine of election. Like estoppel it is also child of equity. It is founded on the principle that one should not be permitted to approbate and reprobate that estoppel to prevent a person from falling a victim to what would have otherwise resulted in injustice to him and unfair advantage to other. In Chapter XIII of Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner II Edition page 314, the principle is explained thus: "Where A, dealing with B, is confronted with two alternatives and mutually exclusive courses of action in relation to such dealing, between which he may make his election and A so conducts himself as reasonably to induce B to believe that he is intending definitely to adopt the one course, and definitely to reject or relinquish the other and B in such belief alters his position to his detriment, A is precluded, as against B, from afterwards resorting to the course which he has thus deliberately declared his intention of rejecting;" The Court further observed that 'If the land is needed or building has to be demolished in public interest for general welfare, probably no exception can be taken as the interest of the individual has to be sacrificed for the Society. But asking the lessee to vacate land or remove Malwa for no rhyme or reason but because the State was the owner cannot be accepted to be in consonance with present day philosophy and thinking about role of State.' The High Court held that the State Government was bound to renew the lease held by Purshottam Dass Tandon in accordance with the covenant for renewal. The State of U.P. and others preferred special leave petition against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed on 14.1.87 refusing to interfere with the decision of the High Court. There it was a case where Government had issued orders for renewal of the lease on fresh terms and conditions and it was not the case like the present one, where the petitioner stands on an entirely different and better footing. The terms of the petitioners' lease are well defined and predetermined. Nothing was reserved for the lessor to alter or amend or modify the terms of the lease for getting the term of the lease renewed on the expiry of 30 years. At the time execution of lease deed, stamp duty for complete 90 years had also been paid. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and on reading and seeing the tenor of the lease deed, it can safely be held that the petitioners are and continue to be the lessees and lawful occupants of the land in question and want of execution of renewed lease deed would not defeat their right nor they loose their rights as lessee over the land in question, moreso, when it is the own case of the respondents, that if the property is converted into free hold, then the petitioners would continue to be the rightful owners of the property in question. In fact, on deposit of full stamp duty for the total aggregate term of 90 years at the time of execution of the lease deed and on fulfilling the unalterable predetermined conditions for renewal of the lease after the expiry of the first phase of 30 years, and thereafter also after the expiry of the second phase of 30 years, viz. deposit of enhanced rent, there was no requirement to have a renewed lease deed executed." 15. Thus the question regarding the lease having been lapsed has been settled by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. deposit of enhanced rent, there was no requirement to have a renewed lease deed executed." 15. Thus the question regarding the lease having been lapsed has been settled by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. It is averred that against the said judgment dated 23.5.2008, the Lucknow Development Authority and State of Uttar Pradesh preferred their respective Special Leave Petition(s) Nos. 18734 of 2008 and 10291 of 2010. Both the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed vide order dated 11.9.2013. Thus the entire basis of the impugned order dated 20.9.2009 is vanished and it had no legs to stand. 16. The opposite party No. 1 filed its short counter affidavit on 3.11.2015 and counter affidavit on 19.11.2015. Opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 filed their counter affidavit on 2.8.2011 and three supplementary counter affidavits on 13/15.7.2015, 9.4.2018 and 14.5.2018 respectively. The petitioner filed four rejoinder affidavits and one supplementary affidavit on 12.3.2012, 6.8.2015, 16.11.2015, 30.11.2015 and 22.3.2015 respectively. 17. The stand of the opposite parties is that the land in question at a very strategic location and is worthy being called for use by the State Government for any of the public functions and public essentialities including meeting of housing problems of the people of Lucknow and also ancillary requirement of the city of Lucknow. The terms and conditions of the lease deed dated 1.4.1942 inter alia provided that without consent of the lessor, the original lessee, viz., the Director of Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd., Lucknow would not make any sub-division of the said demised premises. The lessee did not take prior permission from the lessor as was stipulated in the terms and conditions of the lease for transfer of leasehold rights in favour of the petitioner. Such act on the part of the lessee renders the division as well as transfer of leasehold rights as illegal being violative of condition of lease. No renewal of lease was sought by the lessee as required under the terms of the lease deed. As necessary requirement of lease deed had not been fulfilled the application for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights was rightly rejected. Mere deposit of fee cannot be taken as grant of permission for partition of land. 18. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the opposite party Nos. As necessary requirement of lease deed had not been fulfilled the application for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights was rightly rejected. Mere deposit of fee cannot be taken as grant of permission for partition of land. 18. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 on 13.7.2015, they admitted that the area in question was let out by the Government of United Provinces on 1.4.1942 in favour of M/s. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Ltd. for a period of ninety years on the following terms:- "Lease is renewable upto aggregate period of 90 (Ninety) years subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% after each 30 years." 19. After the period of 30 years in the year 1972, the lease holder did not get the lease right renewed and it is in these circumstances that the Lucknow Development Authority had drawn proceedings against the lease holder/lessee. The lessee preferred Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 before this Court. The said writ petition was allowed on 23.5.2008 in which the following directions with respect to renewal of lease were given:- "All the aforesaid facts on record, clearly prove that the plea of the respondents that the petitioners were not the lessee of the land after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, in the absence of renewed lease deed, was never accepted, nor could be substantiated even in the present petition. Apart from this, the conduct of the State Government in acquiring the land and then releasing it in favour of the petitioner Company also supports the plea that the respondents did recognise the right of the petitioners throughout as lessee." 20. It is also stated that the land is situated on 45 meters road and the road is in front of Metro City, breadth of which is 30 meters in Mohalla Purwa Imambux, Hasanganjpur, Lucknow. Under the Master Plan - 2021, the area of the land covered by the said road is 6907 sq. mtr. Apart from this, an area of 12759 sq. mtr. towards the river and last corner of eastern side of the land admeasuring 6057 sq. mtr. being total 18816 sq. mtr. land is shown as park and open space/green belt in the Master Plan. Remaining use of 85766 sq. mtr. land is shown as Up- Nagar Kendra (Sub-City Centre). mtr. Apart from this, an area of 12759 sq. mtr. towards the river and last corner of eastern side of the land admeasuring 6057 sq. mtr. being total 18816 sq. mtr. land is shown as park and open space/green belt in the Master Plan. Remaining use of 85766 sq. mtr. land is shown as Up- Nagar Kendra (Sub-City Centre). It is admitted by the Lucknow Development Authority that no proposal or map in respect of the same is available in Planning Development as per report of Chief Town Planner (Annexure -A1). It is also alleged in para -11 of the said supplementary counter affidavit that while amending the Government Order dated 4.3.2014, the State Government issued certain directions vide Government Order dated 15.1.2015. 21. The petitioner has very categorically stated in the rejoinder affidavit dated 12.3.2012 that under Master Plan - 2021, the land use is SUB-CITY CENTRE', with respect to an area of 75,000 sq. mtr. and rest of area in question is earmarked as "GREENBELT. The Master Plan was finalized after inviting suggestions and objections from the general public. It is not permissible to the opposite party No. 3 to negate the Master Plan while considering the application of the petitioner for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights. 22. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that an application was made in terms of Nazul Policy applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner deposited 1/4th of the total valuation calculated on the basis of Collector's rate so prevalent during the relevant period. The balance 3/4th of the amount or such amount which the opposite parties as per law would claim through the demand notice to be issued to the petitioner and the petitioner would have deposited. The petitioner has always been ready and is still willing to pay/deposit the balance of such amount. The petitioner further undertakes that the area earmarked as "GREENBELT' will also be maintained in absolute conformity to the said land use and not violate the Master Plan - 2021. This issue has already been decided by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 on 23.5.2008 and Special Leave Petitions filed by the State Government and Lucknow Development Authority were dismissed on 11.9.2013. The lease rent of the land stood deposited till 2032 by the predecessor in title, i.e. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Co. This issue has already been decided by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 on 23.5.2008 and Special Leave Petitions filed by the State Government and Lucknow Development Authority were dismissed on 11.9.2013. The lease rent of the land stood deposited till 2032 by the predecessor in title, i.e. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Co. Ltd. with the Nazul Department. The nazul land has also been duly partitioned after deposition of the partition fee by the original lessee on 10.4.2007 with the Nazul Department of the Lucknow Development Authority. The objection on the basis of which the application was rejected is not available to them as per the admissions made by them in the counter-affidavit and supplementary counter affidavits. The land in question was lawfully alienated by the lessee in favour of the petitioner. The action of the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 in rejecting the application for seeking conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights in respect of the land in question is illegal and arbitrary and the opposite parties are bound to comply the order dated 23.5.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court which has been upheld by the Apex Court on 11.9.2013. 23. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the case of the petitioner is similar to the case of M/s. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Company Ltd. Thus the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the judgment and order dated 23.5.2008 passed in Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007. ' 24. Per contra, Sri. M.M. Pandey, learned Counsel for opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that the application for seeking conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights has rightly been rejected. He has also submitted that the lease deed executed in favour of the original lessee has already been expired in 1972. Therefore, the question of conversion does not arise. The petitioner is a stranger to the State Government since the Nazul land was never leased out to the petitioner by the State Government and terms and conditions of the lease deed inter aha provided that without consent of the lessor, the lessee would not make any sub-division of the said demised premises. The petitioner is a stranger to the State Government since the Nazul land was never leased out to the petitioner by the State Government and terms and conditions of the lease deed inter aha provided that without consent of the lessor, the lessee would not make any sub-division of the said demised premises. The condition of lease further provides that any breach of non-observation of conditions of the lease by the lessee would give lessor a right of re-entry upon the said demised premises and as per law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Anand Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. and others [AIR 2014 Allahabad 106] the petitioner did not acquire any vested right to get his application considered on the basis of the policy as existing on the date of making the application. The application for grant of freehold rights is to be considered in accordance with Government's policy as was in existence at the time of consideration and prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 25. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 26. It is not in dispute that the original lessee/Upper India Couper Paper Mills Co. Ltd. was granted lease which commenced with effect from 1.4.1942 for an aggregate period of 90 years, subject to the enhancement of least rent by 50% each on expiry of 30 years. The stamp duty then paid was for the full term of 90 years and annual rent stood paid/deposited in advance with the lessor for the full term i.e. till the year 2032. The aforesaid Lease Deed clearly acknowledged the explicitly as well as implicitly provided for assignment of lease rights by the lessee to any person or entity. A Division Bench of this Court while adjudicating earlier Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 on 23.5.2008 has clearly held that the lease in favour of Upper India Couper Paper Mills Co. Ltd. is valid till 2032. 27. It is also admitted to the opposite parties 2 and 3 that the requisite premium has already been deposited for a period upto 2032, i.e., the entire tenure of the lease. The land of the petitioner has been lawfully assigned to it and the same has been recognized by the Nazul department as they effected the mutation of the subject in the name of the petitioner on 19.2.2007. The land of the petitioner has been lawfully assigned to it and the same has been recognized by the Nazul department as they effected the mutation of the subject in the name of the petitioner on 19.2.2007. No formal renewal of lease was ever necessary. Special Nazul Officer of the Nazul Department, i.e. opposite party No. 16 had clearly acknowledged the validity of the lease over the land in question for a period of 90 years and confirmed that the entire rent stood deposited and there was no necessity of execution of renewal deed. The original lease deed in favour of M/s. Upper India Couper Paper Mills Co. Ltd. provided for assignment of its rights in the subject land since it was pursuant to the assignment in favour of the petitioner in the year 2007 that the Nazul department had recognized the rights of the petitioner through various letters and by granting not less than 17 No Objection Certificates from various State departments. Construction activity was not dependent upon the lease property being converted into freehold and construction could be raised the moment building plans were sanctioned and released. 28. Further, on 8.6.2007, the Nazul Officer, Lucknow Development Authority issued a letter conveying its No Objection to the proposed construction of the petitioner, subject to the petitioner depositing balance charges for conversion from leasehold rights to freehold rights pertaining to the said land in question. The said letter clearly states that for construction of 75000 sq. mtrs. area, the petitioner has already deposited Rs. 6,46,87,500/- towards conversion charges and the mutation in favour of the petitioner has already been affected on 19.2.2007. The grounds mentioned in the rejection letter dated 20.5.2009 make no mention of deficiency in lawful assignment of leasehold rights in favour of the petitioner. The Government of Uttar Pradesh has notified its policies to freehold land upon payment of requisite charges. Thus it can be said that the State Government has always intended that leasehold rights be converted into freehold rights. 29. In terms of the policy applicable at that time in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the petitioner deposited 1/4th of total valuation calculated on the basis of Collector's rate. The petitioner's land being a corner plot, thus an enhancement of 15% was also factored in the calculations. 29. In terms of the policy applicable at that time in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the petitioner deposited 1/4th of total valuation calculated on the basis of Collector's rate. The petitioner's land being a corner plot, thus an enhancement of 15% was also factored in the calculations. No demand letter has ever been issued by the respondent-State Government or Lucknow Development Authority and had the same been issued the petitioner would have willingly deposited the same for conversion from leasehold to freehold. Since no demand having been raised by the State till date, it cannot be said that the petitioner defaulted in any manner so as to deprive its right to get the land converted into freehold, particularly when the petitioner very categorically stated that the petitioner has prepared to pay the amount, whichever is found to be due or whichever is required for processing the application for conversion into freehold. 30. The Full Bench in the case of Anand Kumar Sharma ( AIR 2014 All 106 (FB) (supra), has held in paras 46 and 47 as under:- 46. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the petitioner did not acquire any vested right on making the application on 25/7/2005 to get his application considered on the basis of the policy as existing on the date of making the application. The Government order dated 04/8/2006 was fully applicable w.e.f. 04/8/2006 and no error was committed by the Collector taking into consideration the policy dated 04/8/2006 when the application was rejected on 18/12/2006. The Division Bench judgment in Dr. O.P Gupta's case (2009 (6) ALJ (NOC) 999 (All) (supra) to the extent that it lays down that an application for grant of free hold right is to be considered in accordance with the Government's policy as was existing on the date of application does not lay down the correct law. 47. In view of the foregoing discussions, our answer to the abovenoted two questions are: (1) The application of the petitioner dated 25/7/2005 submitted for grant of free hold right on the basis of the Government Orders dated 01/12/1998 and 10/12/2002 was entitled to be considered in accordance with the Government's policy as was in existence at the time of passing of the order. The Government Order dated 04/8/2006 was rightly relied on by the Collector while rejecting the application on 18/12/2006. The Government Order dated 04/8/2006 was rightly relied on by the Collector while rejecting the application on 18/12/2006. (2) The Division Bench judgment in Dr. O.P. Gupta's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law insofar as it holds that the application for grant of freehold right is to be considered as per the Government policy as was in existence on the date of making application for grant of freehold right." 31. As per supplementary counter-affidavit of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3, regarding construction of affordable housing for EWS and LIG schemes for residential purposes, it would reveal that none of such schemes were proposed in and around the vicinity of the land in question which is the subject-matter of the petition. According to the Master Plan, the land in question has been earmarked for commercial purposes and thus there was no occasion for raising any objections or rejecting the application of the petitioner on the premise that the land in question was required by the opposite parties for residential purposes for it's alleged non-existent schemes. 32. In para - 5 of the said supplementary counter-affidavit, it has been stated that under the self-assessment scheme, the petitioner had submitted an application for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights in the year 2007 on which a decision was taken in the year 2009 that keeping in view the population growth and to meet out the residential problem particularly of the weaker sections and middle classes, the land is suitable for development of affordable housing colonies for the citizens belonging to the aforesaid classes and it is in these circumstances that at that time, the application of the petitioner was rejected. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 viz., Nazul Officer and Lucknow Development Authority filed a counter affidavit, wherein, all material dates and events were admitted. They admitted that building plan was not released. As per report of Chief Town Planner, they admitted that no proposal or map in respect of development of housing schemes is available in planning department. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 11.9.2013 dismissed the SLP (s) No. 18734 of 2008 and 10291 of 2010 of Lucknow Development Authority as well as State of U.P. respectively. 33. It is not in dispute that earlier the land had been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 11.9.2013 dismissed the SLP (s) No. 18734 of 2008 and 10291 of 2010 of Lucknow Development Authority as well as State of U.P. respectively. 33. It is not in dispute that earlier the land had been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The original lessee challenged the acquisition by filing writ petition No. 6363 of 1986 in the High Court. However, since no award was pronounced in respect of the land of the petitioners for the reason that the LDA could not make the funds available to the State Government for carrying out the acquisition, finally on 17.10.89, the Collector, Lucknow wrote to the LDA that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed and no further proceedings were pending with respect to acquisition at that time. Ultimately, in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land of the petitioners was withdrawn from acquisition on 30.6.93. Now it is too late for the respondent No. 1 to take a stand that the land is useful for the State Government for public purpose. 34. The two grounds mentioned in the order dated 20.05.2009 and 01.10.2009 for rejection of the application of the petitioner seeking conversion of lease hold rights into free hold have been rendered non-existent, infructuous and redundant. Firstly, because the respective SLPs filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 before the Supreme Court stand dismissed on 11.09.2013 and secondly, the respondents No. 2 and 3, in their supplementary counter-affidavit dated 13.07.2015, have categorically admitted that no proposal or map for development of affordable housing scheme in respect of the said land is available in Planning Department as per report of the Chief Town Planner, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. A-1. This report of Chief Town Planner further establishes the fact that the use of the land in question is shown as commercial in the Master Plan of Lucknow, 2021. Thus, the basis for rejection of the application of the petitioner seeking conversion of lease hold rights into free hold did not exist at all. 35. It is also not in dispute that that a sum of Rs. Thus, the basis for rejection of the application of the petitioner seeking conversion of lease hold rights into free hold did not exist at all. 35. It is also not in dispute that that a sum of Rs. 6,46,87,500/- stands deposited by the petitioner being 25% of the amount towards the conversion of the land from leasehold into freehold as per the Self Assessment Policy in vogue at that time. The land in question has already been duly mutated in the records of Nazul Department/LDA as well as the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow. The lease rent of the land stood deposited till 2032 by the predecessor in title, i.e., M/s. UIC with the Nazaul Department and even the total stamp duty on the lease deed stands duly paid. The land in question was sold by the original lessor to the petitioner and the rights therein were assigned to the petitioner. Though the building plans of the petitioner were sanctioned in principle vide letter dated 26.04.2002, the Technical Committee, LDA raised a formal objection of converting the land from leasehold to freehold and for submission of the freehold deed. 36. The lease in question is governed by the terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed. The terms of the lease deed specifically provided that the Assignee/transferee of the lease from the lessee shall also be bound by its terms. When the renewal clause read, "lease is renewable upto aggregate period of 90 (ninety) years subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% after each 30 years," the enhanced amount of lease rent (by 50%) was deposited in time, the division Bench rightly held that the lease stands renewed upto 2032. 37. The entire controversy stands settled by the judgment dated 23.05.2008 passed by this Court and the Special Leave Petitions of the State of U.P. and LDA and others challenging the said judgment were dismissed. The plea above on which the case was decided on 23.05.2008 is binding upon the respondents as a precedent, thus, what has been stated therein has precedential value under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 38. The land of the petitioner has been lawfully assigned to it and the same has been recognized by the Nazul department as they effected the mutation of the subject land in the name of the petitioner on 19.02.2007 by granting number of NOCs from various State departments. 38. The land of the petitioner has been lawfully assigned to it and the same has been recognized by the Nazul department as they effected the mutation of the subject land in the name of the petitioner on 19.02.2007 by granting number of NOCs from various State departments. Further, on 08.06.2007, the Nazul Officer, Lucknow Development Authority issued a letter conveying its no objection to the proposed construction of the petitioner, subject to the petitioner depositing balance charges for conversion from leasehold rights to freehold pertaining to the said land in question. Even otherwise the grounds mentioned in the rejection letter dated 20.05.2009 make no mention of a deficiency in lawful assignment of leasehold rights in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the criteria and assignment has already stand satisfied. Now it is too late to raise all these objections when admittedly the application for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold was rejected only on two grounds, which stand satisfied. 39. For the above-mentioned reasons the orders dated 20.05.2009 and 01.10.2009 are quashed. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 shall proceed for conversion of property to freehold expeditiously in accordance with law in terms of the order dated 23.05.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 9360 (MB) of 2007 and the ratio laid down by Full Bench in the case of Anand Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 2014 All 106 (FB) (Supra). 40. Public interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the Government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social and economic justice which is the signature tune of our Constitution. In the present case, it appears that the PIL has been filed to reconsider the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench on 23.05.2008. APIL filed by the petitioner is involving no public interest. An individual dispute should not be allowed to be converted into a PIL. The petitioner in the present case, has not done proper exercise. Such petitions deserve to be discarded and discouraged so that in future no one can file such petitions. 41. For the aforementioned reasons, Writ Petition No. 12081 (MB) of 2009 is allowed, but without any order as to costs. The petitioner in the present case, has not done proper exercise. Such petitions deserve to be discarded and discouraged so that in future no one can file such petitions. 41. For the aforementioned reasons, Writ Petition No. 12081 (MB) of 2009 is allowed, but without any order as to costs. PIL Civil No. 10697 of 2019 is dismissed with cost of Rs. 25,000/-. The amount of cost of Rs. 15,000/- shall be deposited with High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Lucknow and an amount of cost of Rs. 10,000/- shall be deposited with the Library of Oudh Bar Association within eight weeks.