JUDGMENT : Sreenivas Harish Kumar, J. Defendant No.1 in O.S.3678/2018 on the file of LXIII Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, has preferred this appeal challenging the order dated 25.08.2018 passed on application, I.A.I filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 2. The first respondent in this appeal became institution member of the appellant on 20.5.2010. The respondents 2 to 5 were nominated by the first respondent for using the facilities available to an institution member. The period of institutional membership was twenty years and membership was subject to fulfilling certain conditions of the bye-laws of the appellant club. One of the conditions was that the institution must be functional and in this regard member has to provide or furnish annual report certified by a chartered accountant to show that the company is in existence and it is carrying on its business. It was brought to the notice of the appellant that the first respondent became non-functional by closing its oil industry. It also owed a huge amount of money to the State Bank of Mysuru. Therefore the Executive Committee of the appellant on the basis of the information provided to it, kept the membership of the first respondent under suspension by issuing a notice on 21.3.2018. The respondents came to know about this when the notice of suspension was displayed on the notice board of the appellant. Challenging this suspension order, the respondent instituted a suit seeking declaration that the institution membership accorded to the plaintiff with effect from 15.6.2010 is operative and binding on the appellant club and the order of suspension dated 21.3.2018 is null and void and for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with using the facilities of the club by its nominees. Along with the plaint the respondents made an application for grant of temporary injunction restraining the club from preventing the nominees of the club from using the facilities of the club. 3. The learned trial judge upon assessing the materials placed before it, came to conclusion that keeping the first respondent's membership under suspension was not in accordance with the bye-laws. The documents placed by the first respondent show that the company is in existence. The oil unit of the company might have been closed, but its other units namely, wind power generation and leasing of the warehouses have not been closed. The company has not become defunct. The documents placed by the first respondent show that the company is in existence. The oil unit of the company might have been closed, but its other units namely, wind power generation and leasing of the warehouses have not been closed. The company has not become defunct. Just because the oil industry was closed, it cannot be said that the company closed all its business activities. The Executive Committee of the club proceeded on a misconception. The membership was kept under suspension without affording opportunity to the member to show that its company is still functioning. There is violation of principles of natural justice. Prima facie case is thus made out. Balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiff company. The order of suspension causes great hardship in the sense that right of a member of the club has been violated and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to an order of temporary injunction. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the first respondent was accorded with institution membership on certain terms and conditions. The membership was for a period of twenty years. As long as institution membership is in force, the company or the institution must be functional and in order to show that it is functional and profitably engaged in a business, it must produce annual report certified by a chartered accountant. The first respondent closed down the oil industry. It was brought to the notice of the appellant. The first respondent also owed huge sum of money to the State Bank of Mysuru. The first respondent was called upon to submit documents to show that it has not become defunct. It failed to produce materials before the committee. The first respondent flouted the bye-laws and therefore the first respondent had to be kept under suspension. 5. It is further argument of the appellant's counsel that if the appellant is really aggrieved by the order of suspension, Rule 19.15.6 provides for preferring an appeal to the Appeals Committee. The respondents have not availed this opportunity. The induction of the first respondent as a institution member of the appellant club is nothing but a contract; it is bound by the bye-laws and therefore the plaintiff could not have filed the suit. Suit is premature. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.P. DAVER VS. LODGE VICTORIA, (1963) AIR SC 1144. The induction of the first respondent as a institution member of the appellant club is nothing but a contract; it is bound by the bye-laws and therefore the plaintiff could not have filed the suit. Suit is premature. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.P. DAVER VS. LODGE VICTORIA, (1963) AIR SC 1144. Suit itself is not maintainable. The trial Court has misread the point that the respondents approached the Civil Court without availing the remedy provided to them under the bye-laws. Conclusion of the trial Court and the discretion exercised by the trial Court that balance of convenience and hardship lies in favour of the respondents is a wrong finding and therefore appeal is to be allowed. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents argues that the trial Court has given cogent reasons for granting an order of injunction. The first respondent company has not become defunct. It might have closed its oil industry, but it is carrying on business in other sectors, namely, wind power generation and leasing of warehouses. By writing letters dated 29.03.2018, 04.04.2014, 24.04.2018, 10.05.2018 and 23.05.2018, it was brought to the notice of the executive committee that the company still exists and is carrying on its business in wind power generation and leasing of warehouses. Therefore keeping the membership of the first respondent under suspension is against to bye-laws. He also argues that one of the relatives of respondent Nos.2 to 4 is also a member who is having vengeance against them and it was at his instance the appellant initiated action on frivolous grounds. The trial Court has made observation of this effect in the impugned order. His further argument is that the entire action taken by the appellant in keeping the first respondent under suspension is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The trial Court has clearly observed this aspect of the matter. When discretion has been rightly exercised for granting temporary injunction, the appellate Court should not interfere. Therefore he argued for dismissal of the appeal. 7. I have considered the points of argument. 8. Rule 5.3 of the Bye laws provides for an institution to become a member of the appellant club. Acquiring membership by an institution is subject to certain conditions. Therefore he argued for dismissal of the appeal. 7. I have considered the points of argument. 8. Rule 5.3 of the Bye laws provides for an institution to become a member of the appellant club. Acquiring membership by an institution is subject to certain conditions. The condition relevant for disposal of this appeal is at 5.3.9, which reads as below: "All institutions shall furnish a certificate from a Chartered Accountant certifying the paid up capital, the annual turnover or gross receipts, latest Audited Balance Sheet and profit and loss account". There is a reason behind putting this condition. Since an institution is granted membership for a period of 20 years, to continue the membership, the institution must first show its activities, and a certificate from a Chartered Accountant about the paid up capital, and furnish annual turnover or gross receipts, latest Audited Balance sheet and profit and loss account. These details provide prima-facie proof for the existence of the company or the institution. 9. It is the appellant's case that according to information given to it, the first respondent became non functional by stopping its oil industry. To ascertain this, the appellant required the first respondent to place documents to show that it is carrying on business. 10. It is the case of the appellant that in the instant case, the first respondent failed to furnish the particulars about its existence and therefore the appellant had to proceed further according to Rule 19.15.6. The suspension order is dated 21.03.2018. It is not the case of the first respondent that before passing of suspension order it placed materials before the executive committee of the appellant to show that it was in existence. Rather it addressed to the appellant letters after an order of suspension was passed. The letters are dated 29.03.2018, 04.04.2018, 24.04.2018, 10.05.2018 and 23.05.2018. All these letters are subsequent to passing of the suspension order. It is clear that before passing suspension order, the first respondent did not bring to the notice of the executive committee that it was still functional despite closing of its oil industry. For this reason it has to be stated that the first respondent cannot take shelter under these letters. 11. If Rule 19.15.6 is seen, what becomes clear is, the executive committee has power to take action by keeping a member under suspension pending enquiry. For this reason it has to be stated that the first respondent cannot take shelter under these letters. 11. If Rule 19.15.6 is seen, what becomes clear is, the executive committee has power to take action by keeping a member under suspension pending enquiry. After conclusion of the enquiry if the executive committee takes action in the manner provided under the said rule, the aggrieved party has a right to prefer an appeal to the Appeal Committee questioning the decision of the executive committee. The Appeals Committee comprising of three past presidents may review the decision taken by the Executive Committee. This is the remedy provided to a member. In the instant case, the first respondent approached the Civil Court without availing the remedy provided in the Bye-laws. As has been argued by the appellant's counsel, the suit is premature. When a person acquires membership in an institution like appellant, he is governed by the Bye-laws. It arises out of a contract. In this context, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.P. Daver, supra may be referred to. It has been observed thus: "The source of power of associations like clubs and lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis of which they become members. This contractual origin of rule of expulsion has its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied with. The question whether the doctrine of strict compliance with rules implies that every minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not would render the act of such a body void would depend upon the nature of the rule infringed, namely, whether it is mandatory or directory which depends upon the purpose for which it is made and the setting in which it appears." 12. Therefore, it is to be stated that the suit filed by the respondents without availing the remedy to prefer an appeal in accordance with Rule 19.15.6 may not be maintainable. The trial Court has referred to two documents to come to conclusion that the institution still exists. These letters were produced by the first respondent subsequent to passing of suspension order on 21.03.2018. The trial Court has referred to two documents to come to conclusion that the institution still exists. These letters were produced by the first respondent subsequent to passing of suspension order on 21.03.2018. The Court ought to have examined whether the first respondent did bring to the notice of the appellant that the company was still in existence before passing the suspension order. If such a material had been placed before the Court, probably the trial Court would be justified in coming to conclusion that the first respondent had made out a prima-facie case. Rather referring to documents like letters addressed by the first respondent after 21.03.2018 to arrive at a conclusion that there is prima-facie case is in my opinion error committed by the trial Court. Still the first respondent has remedy, he can approach the Appeals Committee and urge for revoking suspension order. In this view, I come to conclusion that the impugned order needs to be set-aside. Hence the following: ORDER Appeal is allowed. Order dated 25.08.2018 passed by the LXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-64) on IA No.1 in O.S.No.3678/2018 is set-aside. Temporary injunction order is vacated.