JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J. 1. Heard Mr. Bhanu Kumar and Mr. O.P. Tiwari, counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Rajiv Sinha, A.S.G.I. for the respondent Union of India. 2. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 04.8.2000, passed in a Departmental Proceeding, whereby husband of the petitioner has been punished and order of dismissal has been passed. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 11.01.2001 of the Appellate Authority by which said order of dismissal was confirmed. 3. The case in hand has a chequered history. Husband of the petitioner earlier moved before the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 3216 of 2003, which was dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction with liberty to the petitioner to approach an appropriate court. As stated in the present writ petition, husband of the petitioner, Late Hawa Singh, died during pendency of the case in the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi. Against that order, petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to take such steps, as are available to them, before appropriate forum. Thereafter, this writ petition has been preferred. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 12.02.2000, husband of the petitioner with some other personnel of C.I.S.F. was sent on Election Duty at Vikram Ganj Assembly Area, Bihar. After their duty was over, as no vehicle was made available by the officers, husband of the petitioner and other such personnel faced acute difficulty on their way back and could reach their barracks in the morning only. Husband of the petitioner, when roll call was taken on 13.02.2000 at 6 p.m., started quarrelling with the Inspector and threatened that the petitioner will shoot the Inspector, who was taking the roll call. After preliminary enquiry, on 26.2.2000, Charges were framed against the petitioner. Said charges are as follows: “Force No. 932293783, Ct. Hawa Singh D.Coy at present Head Quarter Company, CISF, Unit CCL, Kargali, Bokaro (Bihar) was deputed for discharge of this duty in Company No. 742 during Bihar Assembly Election, 2000. On 13.2.2000 at 18.00 hrs. Constable Hawa Singh during Roll Call, spoke excitedly that he shall shoot Inspector H. Gangiah, Company Commander. As being member of disciplined Armed Force, this act on his part exhibits serious misconduct, misbehave and gross indiscipline. On 13.2.2000 at 18.00 hrs. Constable Hawa Singh during Roll Call, spoke excitedly that he shall shoot Inspector H. Gangiah, Company Commander. As being member of disciplined Armed Force, this act on his part exhibits serious misconduct, misbehave and gross indiscipline. He is charged accordingly.” Thereafter, regular Departmental Proceeding was initiated in which the petitioner was provided the opportunity to defend himself and in the enquiry report, charges against the petitioner was stated to be proved. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the charges, inflicted punishment of removal of the petitioner from service vide order dated 04.8.2000. Husband of the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority on 23.8.2000. He also filed supplementary appeal on 05.10.2000. After considering all the aspects, the appellate court, vide order dated 11.01.2001, affirmed the order of punishment. Thereafter, husband of the petitioner filed revision before the revisional authority and the revisional authority dismissed revision of the petitioner and thereafter, mercy petition was also filed in which no relief was granted. It is pertinent to point out here that revisional order dated 23.8.2001 is not under challenged in this writ petition. Mr. Bhanu Kumar, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, assailed the impugned orders of removal on two grounds. The first is that said orders are biased and second is that the order of removal from service is disproportionate to the charges. Thus, this Court needs to consider as to whether any case of ‘bias’ is made out in the facts and circumstances of the matter or not and whether the punishment of removal is disproportionate to the charges. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to certain paragraphs of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Union of India and submits that in the counter affidavit it is admitted that the person, who is the complainant, has been asked to enquire the matter at the preliminary stage and on this ground, it is argued that in the preliminary enquiry, a person who is the complainant, has been asked to enquire into the matter and as such case of ‘bias’ is proved. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the case of KUMAON MANDAL VIKAS NIGAM LTD. vs. GIRJA SHANKAR PANT AND OTHERS reported in (2001) 1 SCC Page 182, particularly in Paragraph No. 26, 28 and 36, which is quoted as under: “26. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the case of KUMAON MANDAL VIKAS NIGAM LTD. vs. GIRJA SHANKAR PANT AND OTHERS reported in (2001) 1 SCC Page 182, particularly in Paragraph No. 26, 28 and 36, which is quoted as under: “26. “Bias” in common English parlance means and implies-predisposition or prejudice. The Managing Director admittedly, was not well disposed of towards the respondent herein by reason wherefor, the respondent was denuded of the financial power as also the administrative management of the department. It is the selfsame Managing Director who levels thirteen charges against the respondent and is the person who appoints the enquiry officer, but affords a pretended hearing himself late in the afternoon on 26.11.1993 and communicates the order of termination consisting of eighteen pages by early evening, the chain is complete: prejudice apparent: bias as stated stands proved. 28. Mathew, J. in Parthasarathi case observed: (SCC pp. 465-66, para 16) “16. The tests of ‘real likelihood’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’ are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right-minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the inquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances form which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v Lannon (WLR at p.707]. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.” 36. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v Lannon (WLR at p.707]. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.” 36. Having discussed the issue as above in the contextual facts, we do feel it expedient to record that the action of the Managing Director in the matter of withdrawal of authority as noticed above and subsequent introduction of charges, in particular, the last of the charges as noted above and the further factum of issuance of an eighteen-page letter of termination on the selfsame date and within a few hours after the pretended hearing was given, cannot but be ascribed to be wholly and totally biased.” To substantiate his next line of argument of proportionality of the punishment, he submits that it is not a case of moral turpitude. It is well known that the members of disciplined Force have to function in extreme conditions and under lot of pressure, which might be the reason as to why husband of the petitioner, being perturbed due to the fact that vehicle was not provided to carry the members of the Force to their barracks, had uttered some words, which he ought not to have used against his superior, but, taking into consideration what he is alleged to have said, it cannot be said that charges against him are serious enough to draw such a harsh punishment. Counsel for the petitioner further argues that now the husband of the petitioner is no more and the wife is pursuing this writ petition. Counsel for the petitioner relying on the case of RAGHUBIR SINGH vs. GENERAL MANAGER HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 , Paragraph Nos. 38, 41 and 43, submits that the rule of “Doctrine of proportionality” is there for ensuring preservation of the rights of the workman. The principle of “Doctrine of Proportionality” is a well recognised principle to ensure that the action of the employer against employees/workmen does not impinge their fundamental and statutory rights and said important doctrine has to be followed by the employer at the time of taking disciplinary action against their employees/workmen to satisfy the Principles of Natural Justice and safeguard the rights of employees/workmen. He further submits that in the facts of the present case, aforesaid doctrine should have been applied because so far as the order of termination is concerned, it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. Further submission is that in view of the law laid down in the RAGHUBIR SINGH vs. GENERAL MANAGER HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR, order of removal is disproportionate to the charges and needs to be interfered with. So far as the enquiry is concerned, he argues only one point that the second show cause has not been issued to the petitioner. 5. Per contra, learned Rajiv Sinha, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, to rebut the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, draws the attention of this Court to Rule 36 of Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 and relying on the Rule 36 (22) (II), he submits that in view of Rule 36 (22) (ii) of CISF Rules, 2001, there is no requirement of issuing second show cause. Further submission is that so far as the Departmental Proceeding is concerned, it is according to law as the petitioner was provided full opportunity to be heard and as such there is no procedural defect in the said proceeding. On the point of impugned orders being biased as the preliminary enquiry was conducted by the complainant himself, learned A.S.G.I. argues that so far the preliminary enquiry is concerned, it is immaterial as to who conducts the preliminary enquiry. He further argues that as the main enquiry is conducted by an independent person, therefore, the case is not made out that the punishment order is biased. On query from this Court as to whether to make out a case of ‘malafide’ or ‘bias’, has the petitioner made any person a respondent by his name, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner replies that no such-person by name has been arrayed as a party respondent in this writ petition. It is a well settled principle of law that if a person is making allegation of ‘malafide’ or ‘bias’, name of the person concerned have to be arrayed as respondents. Therefore, in view of the above discussions, this Court comes to the finding that case of ‘bias’ is not made out and thus, on the first point, case of the petitioner fails. Mr. Therefore, in view of the above discussions, this Court comes to the finding that case of ‘bias’ is not made out and thus, on the first point, case of the petitioner fails. Mr. Sinha, appearing for the respondent Union of India, relies upon the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs. DILER SINGH, reported in (2016) 13 SCC Page 71, Paragraph Nos. 24, 25 and 26 and submits that as a member of the disciplined Force, petitioner was expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in fancy. He further relies on the case of CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE vs. ABRAR ALI reported in (2017) 4 SCC page 507 Para 14, 16 and 19 and submits that in the present case, punishment is proportionate to the nature of misconduct and as such the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court may interfere on the ground of disproportionality of punishment to the charges is not tenable. 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, this Court comes to the finding that so far as the allegation of ‘bias’ is concerned, that could not be proved in this case as discussed above. However, so far as the ground of disproportionate punishment is concerned, looking to the charges, this Court is inclined to interfere as the punishment appears to be disproportionate to the nature of misconduct and shocks the conscience of this Court, but, as the revisional order is not under challenge in this writ petition, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. 7. This writ petition stands dismissed.