JUDGMENT : Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J. The appellant-Corporation has come up questioning the judgement dated 8th January, 2019 in this intra-court appeal contending that the learned Single Judge overlooking the terms and conditions of the Bank Guarantee for Bid Security as contained in Appendix V to the Request for Proposal has arrived at an incorrect conclusion that the invoking of the Bank Guarantee by the appellant was unjustified. The learned Single Judge on the second issue pertaining to black listing the Company also has erroneously set aside the order impugned contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement. 2. Shri Lalit Kishore, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant advanced his submissions urging that the Corporation was well within its authority under the documents executed by the respondent-petitioner to invoke the Bank Guarantee as the respondent-petitioner refused to sign the agreement after the Letter of Award was issued in its favour and was also acknowledged by the respondent-petitioner. This clearly amounted to a failure on the part of the respondent-petitioner as a successful bidder to comply with the terms and conditions contained in the Bidding Documents. It is urged that the Bidding Documents clearly stipulated the execution of a formal agreement after the letter of award, but the respondent-petitioner voluntarily for no default on the part of the Corporation decided to withdraw and not sign the agreement. Consequently, it was not open to the respondent-petitioner to bring about any challenge to the action taken by the appellant-Corporation. 3. Shri Sanjay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner urged that the appellant-Corporation had concealed the fact of an earlier agreement relating to the same subject matter dated 9th January, 2010 that was continuing with one M/s. A2Z, and that had not been cancelled, with regard to which two writ petitions had been filed, namely, CWJC No.15855 of 2011 and CWJC No.4117 of 2012 and two LPAs arising out of the said writ petitions, namely, LPA No.729 of 2013 and LPA No.1104 of 2012. The thrust of the arguments is that the project involved a heavy investment and was a high risk financial venture, but without disclosing this background about the project involving the same subject matter, the Corporation virtually by suppressing these material facts made a deliberate misrepresentation by not disclosing the same either in the Request For Proposal documents or in the advertisement or at any stage of the proceedings prior to the issuance of the letter of award. The respondent-petitioner was kept in dark about the same and which litigation had a direct impact on the new contract and, therefore, the respondent-petitioner was well within its rights to seek withdrawal before signing of the formal agreement. Thus, according to the respondent-petitioner, it was in the said background that the respondent-petitioner was compelled to seek refund of its security amount and to drop out from the negotiations any further. It is also urged that the order of black listing is without any justification and clearly in teeth of the ratio of the judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, the learned Single Judge on both counts has rightly allowed the writ petition directing the appellant-Corporation to refund the bid security amount that has been encashed by it through a bank guarantee and has further rightly quashed the decision of the appellant-Corporation relating to the black listing of the respondent-Company. 4. We have perused the records and in view of the submissions advanced at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error in proceeding to quash the decision of the appellant-Corporation black listing the respondent-petitioner. We are in complete agreement with the findings recorded to that effect and we accordingly uphold the said part of the judgement of the learned Single Judge. 5. Thus, the only issue that now survives for consideration is the bone of contention regarding the encashment by the appellant of the Bank Guarantee offered by the respondent-petitioner towards the bid security amount. 6. 5. Thus, the only issue that now survives for consideration is the bone of contention regarding the encashment by the appellant of the Bank Guarantee offered by the respondent-petitioner towards the bid security amount. 6. Before we delve into the background of the case in order to assess the respective arguments of either side, it would be apt to mention that pursuant to the impugned judgement of the learned Single Judge, the respondent-petitioner made efforts for realisation of the amount from the appellant-Corporation, but at the initial stage when we had heard the matter on 8th April, 2019, an interim order was passed to the following effect:- Re: I.A. No. 2 of 2019 There is a delay of 49 days in filing of this appeal which has been explained and sufficient cause has been shown. We, accordingly, condone the delay and treat the appeal to be within time. I.A. No. 2 of 2019 stands allowed accordingly. Re: L.P.A. No. 449 of 2019 The appeal questions the order passed by the learned Single Judge in a matter which arises out of the invoking of a Bank Guarantee and also involves interpretation of the clauses of the agreement where the respondent's plea has been accepted that there was no clause for forfeiture of the security bid amount and accordingly the Bank Guarantee could not have been invoked. We had taken up the matter and today Shri Anurag Saurav has appeared on behalf of the respondent-petitioner who prays that the matter be taken up on 16th of April, 2019. One of the preliminary issues that has to be considered before proceeding with the matter is as to whether such an action of the invoking of the Bank Guarantee could be a justiceable cause in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for which the Court has come across the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board Vs. Larsen and Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited and another, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 46 . Learned counsel for the respondent petitioner prays that this issue had not been raised before the learned Single Judge, yet the matter may be adjourned to enable the learned counsel to give a reply to the same. Larsen and Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited and another, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 46 . Learned counsel for the respondent petitioner prays that this issue had not been raised before the learned Single Judge, yet the matter may be adjourned to enable the learned counsel to give a reply to the same. We have considered the submissions raised and the matter requires scrutiny on this score as the issue touches the question of entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and exercise of discretion there under by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, we provide that no further coercive steps shall be entertained at the instance of the respondent-petitioner. Put up on 16th of April, 2019 under the heading “For Admission”. 7. While passing the interim order, we had called upon the learned counsel for the parties to address the Court as to whether a writ petition would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the action of invoking of a Bank Guarantee in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board (Supra). The case was adjourned. Thereafter, on several occasions the matter came to be finally heard in August, 2019 whereafter judgement was reserved by us. 8. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that non-disclosure of the previous agreement and litigation arising thereunder was a vital and significant information, the nondisclosure whereof would definitely affect the decision making of the respondent-petitioner as it raises a doubt about the viability of the project. Accordingly, in the said given circumstances that since the invocation of the bid security or in other words the forfeiture of the bid security not being envisaged in the request for proposal, the same could not have been encashed and, accordingly, held it to be illegal. The learned Single Judge has also recorded that it was never a part of the understanding between the parties that the bid security would be forfeited and, therefore, the action was arbitrary and bad in law. The learned Single Judge has formed the aforesaid opinion also on a submission that the standard bidding documents were not adopted in the request for proposal and, therefore, forfeiture of the bid security in the event of withdrawal by the successful bidder is not stipulated under the agreement. The learned Single Judge has formed the aforesaid opinion also on a submission that the standard bidding documents were not adopted in the request for proposal and, therefore, forfeiture of the bid security in the event of withdrawal by the successful bidder is not stipulated under the agreement. Consequently, the Corporation could not have invoked the Bank Guarantee which was submitted by way of a bid security. 9. Having analyzed the aforesaid logic given by the learned Single Judge, it would be appropriate to deal with it after referring to the background of the case and the inference drawn by the learned Single judge about the genuine doubt in the mind of the respondent for withdrawing from the project. 10. Looking to the need for augmenting the civic needs of the citizens of Patna, particularly with regard to cleanliness involving collection, segregation, storage and transportation of garbage/solid waste, an issue was raised with regard to providing such facilities in the city of Patna. It may be pointed out that in view of the provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, Rules for management of solid waste were framed in the year 2000. In spite of framing of the said rules, there was no infrastructural development as a result whereof CWJC No.2911 of 2006 was filed in this Court in the name of People’s Watch (Jan Chowkidar) & others Versus the State of Bihar and others in order to implement the setting up of a viable infrastructure under the Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000. The said writ petition was entertained and the following order was passed on 18.08.2008:- “Inter alia, in this writ petition preferred by way of public interest litigation, a grievance has been raised with regard to non-implementation of The Municipal Solid Wastes (Management And Handling) Rules, 2000 (for short, ‘Rules, 2000’), particularly with regard to management of municipal solid wastes. It is alleged that the collection, segregation and disposal of municipal solid wastes are not being done in accord to the parameters prescribed under the Rules, 2000 in the entire State of Bihar. 2. Although, the prayer has been made for issuance of appropriate directions to all local self governing bodies of the cities and towns in the State of Bihar but we find that it is only Patna Municipal Corporation that has been arrayed as respondent no.2 in the writ petition. 3. 2. Although, the prayer has been made for issuance of appropriate directions to all local self governing bodies of the cities and towns in the State of Bihar but we find that it is only Patna Municipal Corporation that has been arrayed as respondent no.2 in the writ petition. 3. The Rules, 2000 have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986. By these Rules the management and handling of municipal solid wastes are sought to be regulated. The Rules came into effect in the month of October, 2000. 4. Rule 3 defines amongst other expressions, following expressions: - (iii) biodegradable substance; (v) collection; (viii) disposal; (xi) land filling; (xii) leachate; (xiv) municipal authority; (xviii) processing; (xix) recycling; (xxi) Segregation; and (xxiv) transportation. 5. Rule 4 makes every municipal authority, within its territorial area, responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Rules, 2000 and for infrastructure development for collection, storage, segregation, transportation, processing and disposal of municipal solid wastes. It further provides that municipal authority shall comply with the Rules as per the implementation schedule laid down in Schedule I. 6. Rule 5 casts the responsibility on the Secretary- incharge of the Department of Urban Development of the concerned State, the overall responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of these rules in metropolitan cities. It also provides that the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district shall have the overall responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of these rules within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. 7. The management of municipal solid wastes at the hands of the municipal authorities has to be in accord with the compliance criteria and the procedure laid down in Schedule-II. The waste processing and disposal facilities to be set up by the municipal authorities on their own or through an operator of a facility must meet the specifications and standards as specified in Schedules III and V. 8. Schedule-II appended to Rules sets out the parameters and the compliance criteria of diverse aspects concerning municipal solid wastes. 9. The compliance criteria for collection of municipal solid wastes is thus: - “1. Littering of municipal solid waste shall be prohibited in cities, towns and in urban areas notified by the State Government. Schedule-II appended to Rules sets out the parameters and the compliance criteria of diverse aspects concerning municipal solid wastes. 9. The compliance criteria for collection of municipal solid wastes is thus: - “1. Littering of municipal solid waste shall be prohibited in cities, towns and in urban areas notified by the State Government. To prohibits littering and facilitate compliance, the following steps shall be taken by the municipal authority, namely:- (i) Organizing house-to-house collection of municipal solid wastes through any of the methods, like community bin collection (central bin), house-to-house collection, collection on regular pre-informed timings and scheduling by using bell ringing of musical vehicle (without exceeding permissible noise levels); (ii) Devising collection of waste from slums and squatter areas or localities including hotels, restaurants, office complexes and commercial areas; (iii) Wastes from slaughter houses, meat and fish markets, fruits and vegetable markets, which are biodegradable in nature, shall be managed to make use of such wastes; (iv) Bio-medical wastes and industrial wastes shall not be mixed with municipal solid wastes and such wastes shall follow the rules separately specified for the purpose; (v) Collected waste from residential and other areas shall be transferred to community bin by hand-driven containerized carts or other small vehicles; (vi) Horticultural and construction or demolition wastes or debris shall be separately collected and disposed of following proper norms. Similarly, wastes generated at dairies shall be regulated in accordance with the State laws; (vii) Waste (garbage, dry leave) shall not be burnt; (viii) Stray animals shall not be allowed to move around waste storage facilities or at any other place in the city or town and shall be managed in accordance with the State laws. 2. The municipal authority shall notify waste collection schedule and the likely method to be adopted for public benefit in a city or town. 3. It shall be the responsibility of generator of wastes to avoid littering and ensure delivery of wastes in accordance with the collection and segregation system to be notified by the municipal authority as per Para 1 (2) of this Schedule.” 10. with regard to segregation of the municipal solid wastes, Schedule-II provides for the following criteria :- “In order to encourage the citizens, municipal authority shall organize awareness programmes for segregation of wastes and shall promote recycling or reuse of segregated materials. with regard to segregation of the municipal solid wastes, Schedule-II provides for the following criteria :- “In order to encourage the citizens, municipal authority shall organize awareness programmes for segregation of wastes and shall promote recycling or reuse of segregated materials. The municipal authority shall undertake phased programme to ensure community participation in waste segregation. For this purpose, regular meetings at quarterly intervals shall be arranged by the municipal authorities with representatives of local resident welfare associations and non-governmental organisations.” 11. It is the obligation of the municipal authorities to establish and maintain storage facilities of municipal solid wastes to ensure that there were no unhygienic and unsanitary conditions. Following criteria has been set out in schedule-II, which needs to be taken into account, while establishing and maintaining storage facilities:- “Municipal authorities shall establish and maintain storage facilities in such a manner as they do not create unhygienic and insanitary conditions around it. Following criteria shall be taken into account while establishing and maintaining storage facilities, namely:- (i) Storage facilities shall be created and established by taking into account quantities of waste generation in a given area and the population densities. A storage facility shall be so placed that it is accessible to users; (ii) storage facilities to be set up by municipal authorities or any other agency shall be so designed that wastes stored are not exposed to open atmosphere and shall be aesthetically acceptable and user-friendly; (iii) Storage facilities or “bins” shall have “easy to operate” design for handling, transfer and transportation of waste. Bins for storage of bio-degradable wastes shall be painted green, those for storage of recyclable wastes shall be painted white and those for storage of other wastes shall be painted black; (iv) Manual handling of waste shall be prohibited. If unavoidable due to constraints, manual handling shall be carried out under proper precaution with due care for safety of workers.” 12. The vehicles used for transportation of waste have to be covered. Waste should not be visible to public, nor exposed to open environment preventing their scattering. Schedule II provides in the criteria to be met with regard to transportation of municipal solid wastes. 13. The vehicles used for transportation of waste have to be covered. Waste should not be visible to public, nor exposed to open environment preventing their scattering. Schedule II provides in the criteria to be met with regard to transportation of municipal solid wastes. 13. The schedule II requires municipal authorities to adopt suitable technology or combination of such technologies to make use of wastes so as to minimize burden or landfill and for which following criteria is prescribed: “(i) The biodegradable wastes shall be processed by composting, vermi composting, anaerobic digestion or any other appropriate biological processing for stabilization of wastes. It shall be ensured that compost or any other end product shall comply with standards as specified in Schedule IV; (ii) Mixed waste containing recoverable resources shall follow the route of recycling. Incineration with or without energy recovery including pelletisation can also be used for processing wastes in specific cases. Municipal authority or the operator of a facility wishing to use other state-of-the-art technologies shall approach the Central Pollution Control Board to get the standards laid down before applying for grant of authorization.” 14. As regards disposal of municipal solid wastes, compliance criteria is thus: - “Land filling shall be restricted to non-biodegradable, inert waste and other waste that are not suitable either for recycling or for biological processing. Land filling shall also be carried out for residues of waste processing facilities as well as pre-processing rejects from waste processing facilities. Land filling of mixed waste shall be avoided unless the same is found unsuitable for waste processing. Under unavoidable circumstances or till installation of alternate facilities, land-filling shall be done following proper norms. Landfill sites shall meet the specifications as given in Schedule III.” 15. It will not be out of place to mention here that Schedule-III appended to the Rules provides for specification of landfills and those specifications have to be kept in mind at the time of selection of landfill sites. The site so selected must have facilities as provided in paragraph 11 to 17 of Schedule-III. Schedule-III also provides for specification for landfill. 16. Mr. The site so selected must have facilities as provided in paragraph 11 to 17 of Schedule-III. Schedule-III also provides for specification for landfill. 16. Mr. Vishwa Bibhuti Kumar Singh, counsel for Patna Municipal Corporation informs us that 77 acres of land have been selected as land filling site for disposal of solid wastes from the municipal area of Patna but the land has not yet been made available by the District Magistrate, Patna; although according to him the District Magistrate, Patna has initiated the process for acquisition of the land for that purpose. 17. That civic amenities are virtually nonexistent in the city of Patna was experienced by its residents during this monsoon. Lack of management of solid wastes by Patna Municipal Corporation in accord with Rules, 2000 aggravated the problem. For days together, the helpless citizens were compelled to live with garbage floating in and around their houses and colonies. Patna city, with no planned development, no storm water drains, garbage littered all-around and no solid waste management, at best, is an urban slum. Surely, the erstwhile Patliputra (now city of Patna) and its citizens deserve better living and hygienic conditions. 18. With such pathetic condition of the City, it is imperative that the Municipal Corporation of Patna, without loss of time, implements the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000.Collection, segregation, storage, transportation and disposal of municipal solid wastes by the Corporation, that meet the compliance creiteria provided in the Rules, 2000 shall go a long way in restoration of hygienic conditions in the City. As it is, compliance of Rules, 2000 is obligatory upon the municipal authority. 19. That somebody has to approach this Court, in public interest litigation, for enforcement and implementation of these Rules speaks volumes about inaction on the part of the Corporation in discharging its duties. The city virtually turned into hell during the Monsoon, and that makes all the more important that the municipal authority now comes out of slumber. 20. We, as of now, issue following directives: - (i) The Municipal Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Patna Municipal Corporation shall take necessary steps, without delay, for implementation of Rules, 2000, particularly with regard to collection, segregation, storage and transportation of solid wastes in accord with the compliance criteria provided therein. There has to be total implementation of compliance criteria in respect of collection, segregation, storage and transportation by 31stDecember, 2008. There has to be total implementation of compliance criteria in respect of collection, segregation, storage and transportation by 31stDecember, 2008. (ii) The Municipal Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Patna Municipal Corporation shall take-up the matter with the District Magistrate, Patna for making available “landfill sites” as required in Section 3 of the Rules,2000 and the District Magistrate, Patna shall ensure availability of such land to the Municipal Corporation as early as possible and in no case later than 31stMarch, 2009. (iii) The Municipal Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Patna Municipal Corporation shall also take steps that help in making use of wastes so as to minimize burden or land fill as per the criteria prescribed in the Rules,2000. (iv) The compliance report by way of affidavit shall be submitted by the Municipal Commissioner-cum- Chief Executive Officer, Patna Municipal Corporation on 3rd January, 2009. 21. Let the matter come-up for further consideration in the second week of January, 2009.” 11. The said order was followed by another order on 20th February, 2009 which is extracted hereinunder:- “A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of Patna Municipal Corporation. At present We are concerned with full and effective implementation of this court’s directions no. 1 and 3 issued on 18-08- 2008. The criteria laid down in the Rules of 2000 in respect of collection, segregation, storage and transportation were required to be implemented by the Patna Municipal Corporation by 31-12-2008. As on date only some machinery and provision for collection and transportation appears to have been made but there is no transparency or accountability. The residents of various wards under different circles of the Corporation have to be fully informed regarding the action taken by the Corporation for collection, segregation, transportation and storage of solid waste. The places where the bins have been placed or shall be placed and also timing when waste will be picked from the door-steps must be disclosed to the residents by organizing local campaign and distributing pamphlets/handbills. The education of local residents in the matter of requirement of Rules relating to segregation of solid waste is a necessary step. For this the Patna Municipal Corporation would be well advised to take help of Non Governmental Organizations or voluntary organizations which are interested in imparting such education to the house wives and residents in each ward. The education of local residents in the matter of requirement of Rules relating to segregation of solid waste is a necessary step. For this the Patna Municipal Corporation would be well advised to take help of Non Governmental Organizations or voluntary organizations which are interested in imparting such education to the house wives and residents in each ward. For this purpose the petitioner has assured to collect details of various Non Governmental Organizations or voluntary organizations which may be interested in doing this work voluntarily in collaboration and co-operation with Patna Municipal Corporation. A list of such organizations may be made available to the counsel for the Patna Municipal Corporation within a week. The education of the residents of each ward should be done in a phased manner. Along with necessary education regarding segregation of solid waste, full information about the machinery set up for collection and transportation should be disclosed to the residents so that all the infrastructure created by the Patna Municipal Corporation in this matter is made transparent and if the residents have any grievance that the system is not working properly then they may be able to communicate their grievance to a grievance cell/complaint room of the Patna Municipal Corporation. The details of such grievance cell/complaint cell including phone number, address, fax number, if any, and E. Mail address, if possible, should be made available to the residents in course of the aforesaid educational campaign. The aforesaid directions should be carried out by all the concerned authorities of the Corporation without any delay and preferably within six weeks. If the Patna Municipal Corporation requires any special direction by way of help, its authorities must approach this court so that other institutions can be asked to cooperate. Let this matter be listed under the same heading after six weeks. Let a copy of this order be given to learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the Corporation.” 12. An advertisement was issued by the Patna Municipal Corporation for awarding a contract in order to set up the aforesaid infrastructure for garbage cleaning and drainage maintenance throughout the Municipal limits of Patna. The said advertisement has been filed as Annexure-15 to the writ petition and the area of operation as disclosed in the expression of interest in the said advertisement consists of four circles. The said advertisement has been filed as Annexure-15 to the writ petition and the area of operation as disclosed in the expression of interest in the said advertisement consists of four circles. The contract came to be awarded to M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Private Limited, a Company located at Gurgaon vide a letter of intent dated 12.09.2009 issued by the Municipal Commissioner, Patna. This was taken notice of by the High Court in the abovementioned case in the order passed on 16.12.2009. The area of operation as mentioned in the said contract which was entered into on 9th of January, 2010 defines the Service Area in Clause 5 (xi) as the entire area under different Wards of Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna. The contract was for a period of seven years from the date of issuance of acceptance letter with an annual review for renewal of contract for the subsequent operating year. This was, therefore, on the basis of performance level with a further stipulation of renewal for another five years. The said contract in its Terms of Reference gave a brief description of the task in Clause 1 thereof. The same is extracted hereinunder:- “Terms of Reference 1. Brief Description of Task Patna Municipal Corporation (PMC) wishes to engage private operators for Daily Primary Collection of MSW, Mechanical Street Sweeping, Drain cleaning and Transportation of waste as per MSW Rules 2000 within Patna Municipal Corporation Limits. Presently Patna Municipal Area is divided into four circles. Sl. No. Circle Ward Numbers 1. New Capital Circle 1 to 28 and 37 2. Bankipur Circle 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50 & 51 3. Kankarbag Circle 29 to 35, 44 to 46 & 55 4. Patna City Circle 52 to 54 & 56 to 72 PMC is keen to improve the quality of service delivery by involving the private sector in the collection and transportation of municipal waste. To start with, the service will have to be provided in the New Capital Circle of Patna (One of the four identified circles of the city). Patna Municipal Corporation has invited sealed bids for daily door to door collection of municipal sold waste from all households in the identified service area and its transportation to disposal site as per specifications defined in Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000. Patna Municipal Corporation has invited sealed bids for daily door to door collection of municipal sold waste from all households in the identified service area and its transportation to disposal site as per specifications defined in Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000. Contractor will also be responsible for mechanical street sweeping and storm water drain cleaning operadons in the designated areas. The Contractor will be responsible for procuring and maintaining all equipment necessary for successful operations in the designated areas and vehicles and equipment currently owned and operated by the PMC in the designated service zone will be redeployed to other parts of the city.” 13. The broad tasks as defined in the said document indicated the description of four circles, namely, the New Capital Circle consisting of Ward Nos. 1 to 28 and 37, Bankipur Circle consisting of certain Wards, Kankarbagh Circle and Patna City Circle as would be evident from the chart extracted hereinabove. Over and above this, Mechanical Street Sweeping and Storm Water drain cleaning was also to be carried out on nine main roads in the city of Patna which are as follows:- i. Bailey Road (from Dak Bunglow to Canal) ii. Boring Canal Road iii. Boring Road iv. Ashok Rajpath v. Exhibition Road vi. Old Bye Pass vii. Fraser Road viii. Hardings Road ix. Beerchand Patel Marg. 14. According to the pleadings of the Corporation even though there were 29 Wards mentioned, but the actual work was conducted by the said contractor only in respect of nine Wards with regard to which payments were being claimed. The said Contractor also claimed expansion of work for 29 Wards as per the agreement and on account of inaction on the part of the Patna Municipal Corporation, the Contractor stopped its work with effect from 20th June, 2011 and filed CWJC No.15855 of 2011 claiming its balance of payments and also the expansion of work as per the said contract dated 9th of January, 2010. 15. The said writ petition was allowed on 18th of May, 2012 and the report as well as the denial by the Patna Municipal Corporation for payments was quashed with a direction to pay the entire dues of the contractor together with 8% interest. However, the Court observed that since the petitioner had himself stopped the work from 20.06.2011, he is not entitled for any further relief. However, the Court observed that since the petitioner had himself stopped the work from 20.06.2011, he is not entitled for any further relief. Paragraph 26 and 27 of the said judgement are extracted hereinunder:- “26. Accordingly, the letter/report of the Municipal Commissioner dated 23.07.2011 (Annexure- 42) is hereby quashed and the respondents are directed to pay the entire dues of the petitioner amounting to Rs.7,62,65,817.00 along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum to be calculated from the date the respective amount fell due till the date of actual payment. The said payments must be made to the respondents authorities expeditiously and in any case within four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. However, since the petitioner having himself stopped work after 20.06.2011, he is not entitled for any further relief. 27. With the aforesaid observations/directions, this writ petition is allowed.” 16. To complete the chronology of the said litigation by M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited, we may put on record that the Municipal Commissioner filed Letters Patent Appeal No.729 of 2013 where the Division Bench carved out a relief to the effect that 50% of the dues of the Contractor will be settled and paid by the Municipal Corporation and any such payment or the settlement of the balance of the payment will be subject to outcome of an arbitration which the parties had consented to invoke and pursue. The Division Bench itself appointed an Arbitrator through the said judicial order in the said Letters Patent Appeal and the Appeal was disposed of accordingly. 17. Thus, the claim of the said Contractor for further continuing the work or expanding his areas of operation under the Contract dated 9th January, 2010 stood foreclosed as is evident from a perusal of the aforesaid two judgements. 18. It is in between this dispute and the aforesaid proceedings that after M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited had stopped doing work, the Municipal Corporation through its statutory body, namely, the Standing Committee constituted under the Bihar Municipal Empowered Standing Committee Conduct of Business Rules, 2010 took a decision on 9th of July, 2011 to proceed to take fresh steps for awarding a contract under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model. This was followed by another decision of the Board of Corporaters on 15th September, 2011. 19. This was followed by another decision of the Board of Corporaters on 15th September, 2011. 19. Another decision was taken by the Standing Committee on 20.12.2011, but the matter proceeded with an advertisement dated 28th March, 2012 calling for expressions of interest through the request for proposal. 20. The respondent-petitioner participated against the said advertisement and was declared the successful bidder, in pursuance whereof, a letter of intent was issued on 4th of July, 2012. In between this period, M/s. A2Z had filed another CWJC No.4117 of 2012 challenging the decision of the Patna Municipal Corporation to proceed to award any contract and also filed I.A. No.2595 of 2012 in the said petition for quashing the advertisement dated 28th of March, 2012. This challenge was raised on the ground that this action of the Patna Municipal Corporation to enter into a new contract was contrary to the agreement which had been entered into on 9th of January, 2010 and was contrary to the decision of the Standing Committee of the Patna Municipal Corporation. The Standing Committee could not have reversed its decision unless it was by a two-third majority. From the record, it appears that an interim order was passed on 14th of May, 2012, but the petition was finally dismissed on 29th of June, 2012. A copy of the said judgement is on record. 21. Against the dismissal of CWJC No.4117 of 2012, LPA No.1104 of 2012 had been filed in which the following order was passed on 22.08.2012:- “From the submissions advanced on behalf of parties it appears that the issue of res judicata or constructive res judicata may have to be decided in details. It also appears that against the decision of the learned single Judge dated 18-5-2012 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 15855 of 2011,the Patna Municipal Corporation has decided to prefer an appeal. In view of all the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this appeal is admitted for hearing. No notice need be issued as the parties have already appeared through their counsels. So far as respondent no.6 is concerned, learned counsel for Patna Municipal Corporation has assured that he will appear on behalf of respondent no.6. Learned counsel for Patna Municipal Corporation submits that no interim relief should be granted because they will interfere with the municipal works in major wards of the Corporation. So far as respondent no.6 is concerned, learned counsel for Patna Municipal Corporation has assured that he will appear on behalf of respondent no.6. Learned counsel for Patna Municipal Corporation submits that no interim relief should be granted because they will interfere with the municipal works in major wards of the Corporation. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he is not pressing the prayer for interim relief. In view of aforesaid stand of the appellant no interim order need be passed. Appellant is granted liberty to move for early hearing of the appeal.” 22. Thus, there was no stay order or any impediment in the process of the award of the new contract under the advertisement dated 28.03.2012. 23. It is this background of the litigation that the respondent-petitioner alleges that the said relevant information was not brought to the notice of either the respondent-petitioner or anybody participating in the bid. 24. The respondent-petitioner, therefore, contends that the appellant-Corporation gave a wrong description and misrepresented the description of work that was to be undertaken and which according to the respondent-petitioner also included the area which was subject matter of dispute with M/s. A2Z. It is this part which is being alleged to have been suppressed by the appellant-Corporation in the RFP or even subsequently and its discovery after the Letter of Award compelled the respondent-petitioner to withdraw from further negotiations. 25. It may be mentioned that the letter of intent was awarded to the respondent-petitioner on 4th of July, 2012 and the Letter of Award was issued on 28.08.2012. The respondent-petitioner acknowledged the same on 31.08.2012 and then later on withdrew from the contract on 21.09.2012. 26. The respondent-petitioner came up with a case that in order to secure its finances, since it was working in a consortium with two companies, one of Abu Dhabi and one of Spain, such facts on coming to their notice led to a decision on their part not to further finance the said project as a result whereof the respondent-petitioner had to withdraw on account of the high risk factor involved in the matter. The respondent-petitioner took up a case that concealment of such facts about the same subject matter amounts to suppression of material facts and ill motive on the part of the Corporation. Hence such malice shattered the confidence of the respondent-petitioner to further negotiate and sign the agreement. The respondent-petitioner took up a case that concealment of such facts about the same subject matter amounts to suppression of material facts and ill motive on the part of the Corporation. Hence such malice shattered the confidence of the respondent-petitioner to further negotiate and sign the agreement. Accordingly, the respondent-petitioner tendered its written intention to withdraw on 21st of September, 2012 and also simultaneously sought refund of the bid security amount. 27. A show cause was issued by the appellant-Corporation on 1st of October, 2012 to which a reply was given by the respondent-petitioner on 08.10.2012. Immediately following the said reply, CWJC No.19212 of 2012 was instituted by the respondent-petitioner on 9th October, 2012 that has given rise to the present Appeal. 28. On 10th of October, 2012, the appellant-Corporation called upon the Union Bank of India, SDA Brach, New Delhi for encashment of the Bank Guarantee tendered by the respondent-petitioner as the bid security amount invoking the Bank Guarantee clause as per Appendix V to the RFP documents. An intention to black list was also taken and a decision for encashment was also informed to the respondent-petitioner on 14th of February, 2013 against which the petitioner protested on 20th May, 2013. The appellant-Corporation rejected the said request on 12.08.2013 which was challenged by way of two I.As. No. 6920 of 2012 and 7169 of 2013 in the petition. 29. The contention of the appellant-Corporation further is that the respondent-petitioner cannot contend that they had no knowledge as the authorized signatory of the respondent-petitioner is the same person, who was the authorized signatory of M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited, the previous contractor, who was fighting the litigation from before. It is further the contention of the Corporation that since only nine Wards were subject matter of dispute, the payment whereof had to be settled through arbitration, there existed no such dispute so as to cast any shadow on the present proceedings which were afresh and hence the advertisement dated 28th March, 2012 did not suppress any fact nor any such fact was relevant for awarding a fresh contract. It is also submitted that the request for proposal under the advertisement dated 28th March, 2012 was issued excluding the nine wards for which the dispute of payment existed with the previous contractor. It is also submitted that the request for proposal under the advertisement dated 28th March, 2012 was issued excluding the nine wards for which the dispute of payment existed with the previous contractor. In such circumstances, there was no reason for the respondent-petitioner to withdraw or express any apprehension of any such complication arising in future. 30. Shri Lalit Kishore, learned Senior Counsel contends that if the respondent-petitioner was facing any difficulty in financing the project, the same was its own problem. It was the respondent-petitioner that voluntarily failed to sign the agreement resulting in breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement of Bank Guarantee which is a separate agreement altogether. He contends that the agreement for invoking of the Bank Guarantee is independent of the contract and he, therefore, submits that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board (Supra), the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on this issue. 31. Learned counsel for the parties have cited the decisions in the cases of Ram Barai Singh and Company Versus State of Bihar and others, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 592 , Union of India Versus Vertex Broadcasting Company Private Limited and others, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 198 and Suresh Kumar Wadhwa Versus State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 757 . 32. Learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner submits that the judgement in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board (Supra) is in relation to performance guarantee and, therefore would clearly stand distinguished on the facts of the present case where the contention is that there is an absence of forfeiture clause in the request for proposal in the event of withdrawal by the successful bidder. For this, he has relied on other judgements referred to hereinabove. It is also contended that the apprehension in the mind of the respondent-petitioner rightly persisted as the contract has not been finally rescinded that was entered into on 9th of January, 2010 with M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited. 33. Having considered the submissions raised, it would be appropriate to refer to Clause 1 of Appendix V where it is categorically stated that if the bidder fails to fulfill and comply with all or any of the terms and conditions contained in the bidding documents, then the guarantee was liable to be invoked. 33. Having considered the submissions raised, it would be appropriate to refer to Clause 1 of Appendix V where it is categorically stated that if the bidder fails to fulfill and comply with all or any of the terms and conditions contained in the bidding documents, then the guarantee was liable to be invoked. The said clause also refers to clause 1. 3. 6 of the RFP document. On a conjoint reading of the terms of the RFP document, it is evident that Appendix V is the Bank Guarantee document and stands as an independent agreement where the appellant has been authorized without reservation and unconditionally to invoke the Bank Guarantee in the event, the successful bidder fails to comply or fulfill any of the terms and conditions. 34. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the respondent-petitioner himself refused to sign the agreement and, therefore, he failed to comply with the terms and conditions contained in the bidding documents that required the successful bidder to sign the agreement. 35. The question, therefore, is as to whether the respondent-petitioner was justified in setting up a plea giving a reason for not signing the agreement. It is here that we find that the learned Single Judge has arrived at the conclusion that whatever be the reason behind the withdrawal there was no stipulation for forfeiture of the bid security amount under the RFP documents. To this extent, the learned Single Judge may not be wrong as there is no specific stipulation under the RFP documents for forfeiture of bid security amount if the successful bidder withdraws from the project, but at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that the letter of intent was issued on 4th of July, 2012, the Letter of Award of contract on 28th August, 2012 and its acknowledgment made by the respondent-petitioner on 31st August, 2012. The learned Single Judge has nowhere discussed the impact of this acknowledgment by the petitioner and has not recorded any finding as to whether the respondent-petitioner could have withdrawn from the contract at that stage or not. Without recording any such finding, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge committed an error in virtually assuming that some right was conferred on the respondent-petitioner to exercise his option of withdrawal even at that stage. Without recording any such finding, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge committed an error in virtually assuming that some right was conferred on the respondent-petitioner to exercise his option of withdrawal even at that stage. We have not been able to find any such condition in the Request For Proposal documents that after the acceptance and acknowledgment, the successful bidder was conferred with any such option under the agreement to withdraw from going ahead and not sign the agreement. In the absence of any such option given, the withdrawal by the respondent-petitioner on 21st of September, 2012 was, therefore a voluntary act of resiling back from the contract on an apprehension of a legal risk on account of non-disclosure of the past litigation. 36. The learned Single Judge has presumed prima facie that the litigation did give a reasonable cause of apprehension in the mind of the respondent-petitioner that raised a doubt as to the viability of the project. We find that the learned Single Judge did not traverse the entire facts to arrive at such a conclusion. As noted above, M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited failed in their attempt to get any expansion of their services beyond nine Wards which is evident from the judgement dated 18th of May, 2012 where only payments of the past had been directed to be paid to M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited. It was further categorically observed in the said judgement that since the petitioner had itself stopped work after 20.06.2011, he was not entitled to any further relief. This part of the order was not even modified in the LPA and to the contrary the Division Bench only extended the benefit of 50% of payments leaving the balance of the amount to be settled in arbitration. The said litigation, therefore, clearly indicates that it stood foreclosed and it could not give rise to any such apprehension that may cause any legal impediment in the negotiation of a new contract. It is correct that the said litigation was not disclosed in the advertisement dated 28th March, 2012, but the litigation had been decided on 18th of May, 2012 which is much prior to the issuance of the Letter of Intent to the respondent-petitioner. The Letters Patent Appeal against the same being LPA No.729 of 2013 was filed in the year 2013 long after the Letter of Award to the respondent-petitioner. The Letters Patent Appeal against the same being LPA No.729 of 2013 was filed in the year 2013 long after the Letter of Award to the respondent-petitioner. There was, therefore, no question of disclosure of any pending litigation with regard to the contract of M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited who was found not entitled for any further relief in the judgement dated 18th May, 2012. 37. The challenge raised to the advertisement and the process of award of contract to the respondent-petitioner by M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited in CWJC No.4117 of 2012 in the second installment of litigation also stood dismissed on 29th June, 2012 which was prior to the award of letter of intent to the respondent-petitioner on 4th July, 2012. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgement has no where discussed the impact thereof even though an observation has been made that there was no order of restrain by the High Court in going ahead with the advertisement that was probably to the order dated 22.08.2012 in LPA No.1104 of 2012. This order as is obvious from the date, was passed much after the award of contract to the respondent-petitioner and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Corporation to disclose the passing of this order to the respondent-petitioner. The learned Single Judge has presumed that in the business world any information of litigation has a significance as the prospective bidder has to invest a substantial amount. We may only observe that this speculation by itself cannot be a ground to impede any further action by the contracting parties on mere apprehensions for invoking their options under the new contract. 38. Apart from this, the aforesaid facts all stood disclosed at least to the respondent-petitioner prior to 21st of September, 2012 which could not give rise to a genuine apprehension so as to create a corresponding right of withdrawal. The RFP documents did not envisage any such exigency. 39. The learned Single Judge did not assess the entire gamut of facts as explained above and the facts had not been traversed in its entirety including the history of past litigation. There is always a flip side of the coin. The learned Single Judge took note of the lurking uncertainty in the mind of the respondent-petitioner without calibrating it with the chronology of the legal battle in it’s entirety as noted above. There is always a flip side of the coin. The learned Single Judge took note of the lurking uncertainty in the mind of the respondent-petitioner without calibrating it with the chronology of the legal battle in it’s entirety as noted above. The impact of non-disclosure therefore had to be assessed with the corresponding facts of either side. To assume a complete disadvantage towards the respondent-petitioner would amount to a lopsided verdict against the appellant. The relevancy of litigative details said to have been not disclosed seems to have lost it’s worth in the background above, and moreso when the litigation by M/s A 2 Z set up in 2011 had virtually terminated against it on 18.05.2012. Any further pursuit against the fresh advertisement by M/s A 2 Z was almost a lost battle when the firm surrendered it’s right by not pursuing it’s application for interim relief that goes to the advantage of the respondent-petitioner. 40. The respondent-petitioner professes complete absence of knowledge of the litigation. There appears to be a veiled pretence in it because if the financers (the other consortium, partners) were backing out, then there is no material placed on record by the respondent petitioner to establish any such deliberations amongst the Consortium members, nor any such material has been discussed by the learned Single Judge to substantiate the inference drawn on any objective material. On the other hand if they backed out compelling the respondent petitioner to withdraw, then such facts as to when the petitioner came to know of these facts and when was it conveyed to the Consortium members is lacking in details. There is no factual analysis of the said case set up by the petitioner by the learned Single Judge. Be that as it may, a plaintiff has to stand on its own legs and cannot merely succeed on the weakness of the defence. The non disclosure of the previous litigation of 2011 in the advertisement dated 28.03.2018 therefore does not appear to have acted so as to cause any actual or material prejudice to the respondent petitioner, nor did such non disclosure have the potential to pose a threat to a fresh contract. The non disclosure of the previous litigation of 2011 in the advertisement dated 28.03.2018 therefore does not appear to have acted so as to cause any actual or material prejudice to the respondent petitioner, nor did such non disclosure have the potential to pose a threat to a fresh contract. To harbor or enshrine a belief that the respondent petitioner had genuinely backed out has not been gauged on unimpeachable facts which may be possibly an exercise to be undertaken before a different forum like arbitration or a money claim before a Court of competent civil jurisdiction where the impact of non-disclosure could be assessed on material evidence and not only on a hypothesis of mental uncertainty. A writ court may not be possibly well equipped, like the in present case, to engage itself in a legal drill to weigh things one way or the other. 41. The learned Single Judge also appears to have not noticed the clear pleading of the appellant-Corporation, which remained unsuccessfully rebutted, that the authorised signatory of the respondent-petitioner was the same person, who had been the authorised signatory of the previous contractor M/s. A2Z Infrastructure Limited that had been litigating in the past. We would say nothing further on this except to comment that the respondent-petitioner was feigning ignorance of the past litigation, but having come to know of the outcome thereof which was nowhere adverse to the contract awarded to the respondent-petitioner, still backed out from the contract. This conduct of the respondent-petitioner remains unexplained and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have exercised his discretion without recording any findings on such facts. 42. In our opinion, there was no reason on this account for the respondent-petitioner to have withdrawn and not sign the contract. This positive act on the part of the respondent in refusing to sign the agreement, therefore, was a clear default on the part of the respondent-petitioner and, consequently, in terms of the Bank Guarantee Document (Appendix V to the RFP), the appellant- Corporation was fully justified in invoking the Bank Guarantee and getting it encashed. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, not justified in holding the said action to be illegal, arbitrary or bad in law. 43. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, not justified in holding the said action to be illegal, arbitrary or bad in law. 43. We also hold that the ratio of the judgement and the principles culled out in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board (Supra) would also be attracted and the principles laid down therein would equally apply in respect of a Bank Guarantee of the present nature. The distinction sought to be drawn on the basis of a performance guarantee would not make any difference on principle. 44. We, accordingly, partly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgement declaring the encashment to be illegal. 45. In the event, the respondent-petitioner is aggrieved, it can set up its claim before the appropriate forum for refund of the disputed amount and in the event any such steps are taken before the competent forum, then any findings as observed hereinabove shall not be an impediment in the disposal of any such claim by the appropriate authority. 46. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed upholding the judgement in respect of black listing and setting aside the order in respect of the encashsment of the Bank Guarantee in the terms indicated above.