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2019 DIGILAW 1378 (GAU)

Jai Kishan Sharma v. Union of India

2019-12-20

HITESH KUMAR SARMA, PRASANTA KUMAR DEKA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Hitesh Kumar Sarma, J. 1. These two appears have been preferred under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 against the order, dated 14.11.2019, passed by the learned Special Judge, Yupia in Case No. RC-03/2019/NIA/GUW under Sections 302/307/34 of the IPC read with Sections 25(1b)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act and Sections 10/13/16/17/18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as UAP Act). 2. The aforesaid Case No. RC-03/2019/NIA/GUW arose out of Khonsa PS Case No. 28/2019 under Sections 302/307/34 of the IPC read with Sections 25(1b)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act and Sections 10/13/16/17/18 and 20 of the UAP Act. 3. The fact leading to the case is that, the informant C.T. Nokliam Tekwa, lodged the FIR before the officer-in-charge, Khonsa Police Station informing inter-alia that while a convoy of Tirong Aboh, M.L.A. was crossing Pansumthong Village area, the convoy was suddenly ambushed and attacked by suspected armed undergrounds. In the said incident Tirong Aboh and 10 others were killed. On the basis of the said FIR, Khonsa Police Station Case No. 28/2019 was registered under Sections 302/307/34 of the IPC read with Section 25(1b)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act and Sections 10 and 13 of the UAP Act. Thereafter, the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh forwarded the matter to the Central Government under the provisions of Section 6(2) of the NIA Act, 2008 and thereafter, the Central Government in its Ministry of Home Affairs, vide its order dated 06.06.2019 directed the NIA to investigate the said case under the provisions of Section 6(3) of the NIA Act and, accordingly, the FIR was re-registered on 10.06.2019 and NIA Case No. RC-03/2019/NIA GUW was registered. 4. The accused-appellants along with two others were arrested in connection with East Police Case No. 204/2019, Nagaland, and were produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland on 22.8.2019 and 21.8.2019 respectively. Thereafter, on 22.8.2019 & 25.8.2019, the National Investigation Agency, Guwahati Branch, made prayers before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland for production of the accused-appellants before the Special Court, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh in NIA Case No. RC 09/2019 and also sought for 5 days and 4 days transit remand respectively. The said prayers were allowed with a direction to produce the accused-appellants before the learned Special Judge (NIA), Arunachal Pradesh. The said prayers were allowed with a direction to produce the accused-appellants before the learned Special Judge (NIA), Arunachal Pradesh. Accordingly, the accused-appellants were produced before the learned Special Judge (NIA), WSD, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh on 24.8.2019 and, on the application of the investigating agency, they were remanded to judicial custody by the learned Special Judge, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh. In me meantime, the East Police Case No. 204/2019, Nagaland, in which the accused-appellants were initially arrested, was also handed over for investigation to the National Investigation Agency, which re-registered the case as RC-10/2019/NIA-GUW. 5. In the instant case, the prayer for bail of the accused-appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 28(AP)/219 was rejected by the learned Special Judge, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh on 3.10.2019 although some accused were granted default bail who were arrested prior him. On 08.11.2019, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) made a prayer for extension of custody of the accused persons including the present accused-appellants, who would complete 90 days on 13.11.2019 and 24.11.2019 respectively, to 180 days, stating the grounds there for in the said application as per provisions of Section 43D of the UAP Act. Another application was filed on the same day seeking extension of the judicial custody of the accused persons including the present accused-appellants for a period of 30 days. It is the case of the accused-appellants that he was not given prior notice of the aforesaid two applications seeking extension of custody. However, at the time of moving the said applications, the advocate for the accused-appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 28(AP)/2019, objected and sought for an opportunity of hearing before passing any order on the prayer for such extension which was allowed by the learned Special Judge fixing the matter on 13.11.2019 for hearing. On 13.11.2019, the accused-appellant in the said appeal, through his learned counsel, filed written objection against the application for extension of the custody period beyond 90 days although no objection could be raised or filed against the report of the Public Prosecutor justifying necessity of extension of the period of custody beyond 90 days till 180 days. On 13.11.2019, the accused-appellant in the said appeal, through his learned counsel, filed written objection against the application for extension of the custody period beyond 90 days although no objection could be raised or filed against the report of the Public Prosecutor justifying necessity of extension of the period of custody beyond 90 days till 180 days. It is further alleged that the report of the public prosecutor was not furnished to the accused-appellant The learned Special Judge, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh, after hearing the prosecution as well as the accused-appellant, vide the impugned order dated 14.11.2019, extended the custody period of the accused-appellant from 90 days to 180 days considering the grounds for such extension. Similar are the grounds taken by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 29(AP)/2019 also with an additional fact that he could not object to the prayer for extension of custody. The relevant part of the order dated 14.11.2019, passed by the learned Special Judge, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh, is quoted below for convenience. ".................... Order .................................. It is seen that the 90 days period of judicial custody under section 167 Cr.P.C. in respect of the accused Sri Yangte Josaham arrested on 16.08.19 will expire on 15.11.19 as period of detention will have to be computed from next date of remand excluding the day on which first remand was made. And 90 days in respect of the accused Jai Kishan Sharma will come to an end by 21.11.19 and on 24.11.19 in respect the accused Sri Luckin Mashangva. Albeit the application for extending judicial custody of all three accused named above up to 180 days is being prepared by IO of the case, the learned SPP also as required under proviso of section 43-D(2)(b) UAP Act submitted report requiring extension of judicial custody up to 180 days and also explained as to why the extension as sought for is required. Learned counsel Mr. B. Prasad for the accused Jai Kishan Sharma filed objection to the prayer as sought for and also argued that the report submitted by the learned P.P. is to be furnished to accused so as to enable him to object the same. He also states this application being filed mechanically should not be allowed. Learned SPP negating argument advanced by Mr. He also states this application being filed mechanically should not be allowed. Learned SPP negating argument advanced by Mr. Prasad cited Rambeer Shokenvs State of NOT of Delhi: wherein Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra was referred to and submits that requirement of such notice before such extension is not a written notice. In Para 22 of the above cited case it was observed as: 53. As a result of the above discussion, our answers to the three questions of law referred for our decision are as under: (1) Xxxxxxxxxxxx (2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the Accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the Accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to Clause (bb) of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The requirement of such notice to the Accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the Accused giving reasons therein. Production of the Accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose. And therefore having seen this law, I find no force in the submission of Mr. Prasad in regards to non furnishing of copy of report to the accused. And though other two accused persons are not represented by any counsel, they who are very much present in the court room at the time of argument never objected prayer for extension. The Hon'ble Apex court in State of Maharashtra vs. Surendra Pundlik Gadling and Ors: 15. A perusal of the proviso to Section 34D(2)(b) ) (sic 43D(2)(b)) of the said Act shows that there are certain requirements that need to be fulfilled, for its proper application. These are as under: a. It has not been possible to complete the investigation within the period of 90 days. b. A report to be submitted by the Public Prosecutor. c. Said report indicating the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the Accused beyond the period of 90 days. These are as under: a. It has not been possible to complete the investigation within the period of 90 days. b. A report to be submitted by the Public Prosecutor. c. Said report indicating the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the Accused beyond the period of 90 days. d. Satisfaction of the Court in respect of the report of the Public Prosecutor. 40. Undoubtedly the request of an 10 for extension of time is not a substitute for the report of the public prosecutor but since we find that there has been, as per the comparison of the two documents, an application of mind by the public prosecutor as well as an endorsement by him, the infirmities in the form should not entitle the Respondents to the benefit of a default bail when in substance there has been an application of mind. The detailed grounds certainly fall within the category of "compelling reasons" as enunciated in Sanjay Kedial case. The learned Public Prosecutor in his report filed under proviso of section 43-D(2)(b) UAP Act sought for extension of judicial custody of all three accused on following grounds: (1) That during the course of investigation 10 seized many electronic gadgets and sent to CFSL for expert opinion report of which are still awaited. (2) That seized documents are being verified by NIA in different parts of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh for which 10 requires sufficient time. (3) That many bank transaction of the accused Jai Kishan Sharma has been collected from different Banks and they require some more time to verify all the documents. The accused is suspected for terror funding. (4) The 10 collected CDR and tower dump data and they require further time to verify huge numbers of data. (5) Expert opinion on arms and ammunition seized from PO is still awaited from CFSL Chandigarh. (6) Process of sending MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistant Treaty) is in progress. (7) That the arrest of some other persons involved in criminal conspiracy for killing eleven persons is in progress. In para-18 of the report, Public Prosecutor clearly stated to have gone through the case diary and satisfied himself for seeking further custody of the accused persons for purpose of completing investigation. (7) That the arrest of some other persons involved in criminal conspiracy for killing eleven persons is in progress. In para-18 of the report, Public Prosecutor clearly stated to have gone through the case diary and satisfied himself for seeking further custody of the accused persons for purpose of completing investigation. And therefore this court having seen the grounds cited for extension of judicial custody of all these three accused persons up to 190 days find this application fit to be granted. And further I find that there is application of mind by the learned P.P. In view of the above discussion and having seen the progress of investigation reflected in the case diary and also considering seriousness of offence alleged to have been committed finds this application fit to be granted. And accordingly the judicial custody of all the accused named above are extended up to 180 days. With the above order, this application stands allowed and disposed of. Given under my hand and seal of this court on this 14th day of November, 2019. .............................." 6. We have heard Mr. P. Taffo, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 28(AP)/2019 and learned counsel Mr. Taba Tagum for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 29(AP)/2019. We have also heard Mr. Urfi Masood Syed, learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the respondent/NIA. 7. We have perused the records of the learned trial court including the impugned order as well as the case diary. 8. The accused-appellants have challenged the order, dated 14.11.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA), Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh, on several grounds, as indicated in the appeal memos. The grounds being similar, are taken up together for discussion. But, during the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the accused-appellants are found pressing mainly five grounds. Firstly, while passing the impugned order, dated 14.11.2019 extending custody period of the appellants beyond 90 days i.e. up to 180 days, the learned Special Judge did not cause the report of the public prosecutor to be provided to the accused-appellant enabling them to raise their objection against the report of the public prosecutor violating the principle of fair hearing and natural justice. Secondly, that inspite of the fact that the case was taken up by the NIA on 10.6.2019 yet till 14.11.2019 no charge-sheet could be filed against the accused persons including the accused-appellants, and therefore, the order dated 14.11.2019 is not tenable. Thirdly, it has been urged upon by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants that if an application under Section 43D of the UAP Act is filed for extension of custody beyond 90 days and up to 180 days, Magistrate has to satisfy himself with the report of the Public Prosecutor in respect of progress of the investigation as well as in respect of the specific reason for the detention of the accused beyond the period of 90 days, although, in the case at hand, the learned Special Judge extended the custody completely relying on the satisfaction of the Public Prosecutor without giving any cogent reason. Fourthly, it has been urged upon that the learned court below did not consider whether investigation of the case is required to be proceeded in the line of the grounds stated in the report and whether further custodial detention is necessary for that purpose. Fifthly, that separate application for each of the accused persons and the progress of investigation and specific reasons for extension of the detention period of each of the accused is to be indicated in the report. But, the prosecution filed an application in a mechanical manner in this case. 9. The first and the third arguments of the learned counsel for the accused-appellants are taken up together for convenience being interconnected. We have also visited the law relevant on these aspects. But, the prosecution filed an application in a mechanical manner in this case. 9. The first and the third arguments of the learned counsel for the accused-appellants are taken up together for convenience being interconnected. We have also visited the law relevant on these aspects. Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., as amended by Section 43D of UAP Act, reads as follows: (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),- (a) the references to "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty days", "ninety days" and "ninety days" respectively; and (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:-- "Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody." 10. The above provision at clause(b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 43D of the UAP Act provides for extension of the period of detention up to 180 days in the event it is not possible to complete the investigation within the period of 90 days. However, the court has to be satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation with the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the period of 90 days. 11. Vide the impugned order, detention of the accused-appellants were extended up to 180 days. On the basis of the report submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, before expiry of 90 days period in custody, as their period of custody of 90 days would have been over on 21.11.2019 and 24.11.2019 only. 11. Vide the impugned order, detention of the accused-appellants were extended up to 180 days. On the basis of the report submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, before expiry of 90 days period in custody, as their period of custody of 90 days would have been over on 21.11.2019 and 24.11.2019 only. The learned public prosecutor, vide his report, sought for extension of custody of all the three (3) accused persons on the grounds quoted in the impugned order and reproduced atparagraph-5 of this judgment. They are not mentioned here to avoid repetition. 12. Another argument that the copy of the report of the Public Prosecutor was not furnished to the accused-appellants enabling them to effectively raise objection to such report cannot sustain in view of the fact that there is no provision in the UAP Act for providing the copy of the report to the accused-appellant. 13. Section 43D(2)(b) provides for satisfaction of the court with the report of Public Prosecutor indicating progress of the investigation and the specific reason for detention of the accused beyond the said period of 90 days. From the impugned order, referred to above, it clearly appears that the learned Special Judge has taken into consideration the grounds, on which, extension of custody of the accused-appellants and others was sought for by the learned Special Public Prosecutor and also applied his mind to the report of the learned Special Public Prosecutor. The submission made by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants that the learned Special Judge has extended the period of custody, as indicated above, relying on the satisfaction of the public prosecutor, without stating any reasons there for, in effect, means that the learned Special Judge should have given his own reasons, after application of mind on the report of the public prosecutor. But, the provision of Section 43D(2)(b) of UAP Act providing for satisfaction of the learned court is worded in such a manner that only on the report of the Public Prosecutor the learned Special Judge can record his satisfaction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hitendra Vishnu (supra) Observed about the position and role of the public prosecutor with reference to Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act which is similar to the provision of Section 43D(2)(b) of UAP Act, as follows: "22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hitendra Vishnu (supra) Observed about the position and role of the public prosecutor with reference to Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act which is similar to the provision of Section 43D(2)(b) of UAP Act, as follows: "22. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued detention during unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an accused. A public prosecutor is an important officer of the State Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before Submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may find that the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer along with his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. It is not merely the question of form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the Justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where the Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in the earlier part of this judgment........" (emphasis supplied) 14. Therefore, both the arguments that a copy of the report of the public prosecutor was not provided to the accused-appellant and that the extension of the period of custody of the accused-appellant was granted on the basis of the report of the public prosecutor, without the learned Special Judge satisfying himself, fail. 15. However, the learned counsel for the accused-appellants has submitted that in the absence of notice about the prayer for extension of the custody of the accused-appellants they could not effectively oppose the same. To negate such argument, the learned special counsel for the NIA has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ateef Nasir Mulla vs. State of Maharashtra-Relevant paragraphs of the said decision are quoted below: "Before the High Court three main grounds were urged in support of the appeal. Firstly, it was contended that there was no good ground for grant of extension of the period to complete the investigation under Section 49(2)(b) of the Act. Secondly, the prosecution was guilty of having not given notice of the application to the appellant. Thirdly, it was contended that the prosecution acted in such manner only to defeat the indefeasible right of the appellant under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 49(2)(b) of the Act. The High Court on a consideration of the material placed before it rejected all the three contentions and dismissed the appeal. .................. Thirdly, it was contended that the prosecution acted in such manner only to defeat the indefeasible right of the appellant under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 49(2)(b) of the Act. The High Court on a consideration of the material placed before it rejected all the three contentions and dismissed the appeal. .................. It was then contended before us that the appellant had not been given notice of the application moved under the first proviso to Section 49(2)(b) of the Act. There is no statutory requirement to give any notice to the appellant in any particular form, but this Court has taken the view that even in the absence of any specific provision to this effect, fair play and principles of natural justice demand that before granting extension of time to complete the investigation, the Court must give notice to the accused to oppose the application, if so, advised. Dealing with a similar provision under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 this Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through C.B.I., Bombay (11) (1994) 5 SCC 410 held: "Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The requirement of such notice to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose". ................ Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose". ................ "The use of the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and go grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where the Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in the earlier part of this judgment". 16. In the instant case, the accused-appellants although did not receive copy of the report of the public prosecutor, yet, in the absence of any provision there for, on request of the learned counsel for one of the appellants another date was fixed, on which date, the learned counsel for the said accused-appellant submitted written objection and also argued on the matter. The other accused-appellant was also produced in the court on that day. This appears to this court to be sufficient notice for the sake of fair play and principle of natural justice, as indicated above, in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ateef Nasir (supra). That apart, in the decision itself, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the decision of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) wherein, referring to Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act, it is stated that production of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of Cr.P.C. amounts to notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period. In the absence of any specific provision as regards notice to the accused-appellant in a case under the UAP Act, the analogy can be drawn from the decision in Ateef Nasir (supra). Therefore, the accused-appellants had notice of the prayer of the Special Public Prosecutor seeking extension of custody beyond 90 days and till 180 days. 17. So far the argument in respect of the fact that although the NIA had taken up the case on 10.06.2019, yet till 14.11.2019 no charge-sheet could be filed against the accused persons including the present accused-appellants, and therefore, the order, impugned in the appeals, is not tenable. 17. So far the argument in respect of the fact that although the NIA had taken up the case on 10.06.2019, yet till 14.11.2019 no charge-sheet could be filed against the accused persons including the present accused-appellants, and therefore, the order, impugned in the appeals, is not tenable. In the instant case, the accused-appellant was shown arrested on 22.08.2019, and therefore, statutory period prescribed for laying of charge-sheet was still there and even then also the prosecution got the time for completion of investigation extended by the impugned order before expiry of 90 days finding that there is no possibility of completing the investigation within 90 days. Charge-sheet is laid after completion of investigation. In this case, there is still time to complete the investigation after extension of time there for. Accordingly, there is no violation of the provisions of the UAP Act and the learned counsel for the accused-appellants have also failed to substantiate such plea by any authority of law. 18. So far the arguments that the learned court below did not consider as to whether investigation of the case is required to be directed in the line of the grounds taken by the learned Special Public Prosecutor in his report is concerned, since the learned Special Judge has recorded his satisfaction on the report of the Special Public Prosecutor and the grounds stated therein, there is no further requirement of his recording any reason as to whether the investigation needs to be directed in the line on the grounds taken in his report. That apart, it is the settled position of law that the court cannot interfere with the investigation of a case. If the court cannot direct the investigating agency to proceed with the investigation in a particular direction, which would amount to interference with the investigation of the case, this argument of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant appears to be not founded on any legal principle. 19. The argument that separate application for each of the accused persons including the accused-appellants was necessary for extension of the period of custody is concerned, to a pointed quarry, the learned counsel for the accused-appellant fails to show as to under what provision this is necessary. 19. The argument that separate application for each of the accused persons including the accused-appellants was necessary for extension of the period of custody is concerned, to a pointed quarry, the learned counsel for the accused-appellant fails to show as to under what provision this is necessary. Since the application was moved on the same day on common grounds, there is no requirement for separate application for each of the accused persons and this is also not the prescription of Section 43D of the UAP Act and the provisions thereof. 20. Although it has not been taken as a ground in the appeals, yet the learned counsel for the accused-appellants have argued that the report of the Special Public Prosecutor was placed in the court in a sealed cover and the learned court below could not have taken cognizance of a sealed cover report and to substantiate his such argument, he has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (Criminal Appeal No. 1831/2019 arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 10493 of 2019) particularly the paragraphs 23 & 24. 21. I have examined the submission made by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant with reference to the decision in P. Chidambaram (supra). Relevant portion of the paragraph-23 of the decision reads as follows. "23........................At the same time, this Court, had disapproved the manner in which the learned Judge of the High Court in the said case had verbatim quoted a note produced by the respondent. If that be the position, in the instant case, the learned Judge while adverting to the materials, ought not have recorded a finding based on the materials produced before him. While the learned Judge was empowered to look at the materials produced in a sealed cover to satisfy his judicial conscience, the learned Judge ought not to have recorded finding based on the materials produced in a sealed cover. Further while deciding the same case of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 1340 of 2019, after holding so, this Court had consciously refrained from opening the sealed cover and perusing the documents lest some observations are made thereon after perusal of the same, which would prejudice the accused pre-trial. Further while deciding the same case of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 1340 of 2019, after holding so, this Court had consciously refrained from opening the sealed cover and perusing the documents lest some observations are made thereon after perusal of the same, which would prejudice the accused pre-trial. In that circumstance though it is held that it would be open for the Court to peruse the documents, it would be against the concept of fair trial if in every case the prosecution presents documents in sealed cover and the findings on the same are recorded as if the offence is committed and the same is treated as having a bearing for denial or grant of bail." Paragraph-24 of the said decision reads as follows: "24. Having said so, in present circumstance we were not very much inclined to open the sealed cover although the materials in sealed cover was received from the respondent. However, since the learned Single Judge of the High Court had perused the documents in sealed cover and arrived at certain conclusion and since that order is under challenge, it had become imperative for us to also open the sealed cover and peruse the contents so as to satisfy ourselves to that extent. On perusal we have taken note that the statements of persons concerned have been recorded and the details collected have been collated. The recording of statements and the collation of material is in the nature of allegation against one of the co-accused Karti Chidambaram-son of appellant of opening shell companies and also purchasing benami properties in the name of relatives at various places in different countries. Except for recording the same, we do not wish to advert to the documents any further since ultimately, these are allegations which would have to be established in the trial wherein the accused/co-accused would have the opportunity of putting forth their case, if any, and an ultimate conclusion would be reached. Hence in our opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court based on the material in sealed cover is not justified." 22. The facts of the case in P. Chidambaram (supra) and the case at hand are entirely different. In P. Chidambaram (supra), the investigating agency i.e. the Directorate of Enforcement has laid some documents before the court in sealed cover in connection with a bail application. The facts of the case in P. Chidambaram (supra) and the case at hand are entirely different. In P. Chidambaram (supra), the investigating agency i.e. the Directorate of Enforcement has laid some documents before the court in sealed cover in connection with a bail application. Those documents contain some allegations as found from the paragraph-24 above. Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved the manner in which the sealed cover materials are referred to in the order by the Hon'ble High Court. But, in the case at hand, the Special Public Prosecutor furnished to the court a statutory report as required under Section 43D(2)(b) of UAP Act. From the order of the learned court below, it appears that the report of the Special Public Prosecutor was submitted to the court in a sealed cover. The learned court below was required to satisfy itself in respect of the report of the Public Prosecutor and the grounds etc., and therefore, he needs to refer the same in his order. Had the report been not submitted in sealed cover then also it would not have altered the position in view of the fact that the manner in which the report of the Public Prosecutor is required to be submitted in the court is not mandated by any of the provisions of the UAP Act. The relevant provision, quoted above, provides for a report of the Public Prosecutor. Since this is a statutory report, in whatever manner it is placed before the court, the learned court below is mandated to examine the same for the purpose of its satisfaction. Therefore, the P. Chidambaram (supra) is not applicable in the instant case. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants have also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Syed Shahid Yousuf vs. National Investigation Agency (Crl. A. 426/2018 & C.R.L.M.A. 7469/2018), and argued that the report of the public prosecutor was given to the court in sealed cover to which the accused-appellant or his counsel did not have any access. This argument made in Syed Shahid (supra) did not receive consideration as no opinion of the court on this aspect was recorded in the decision. 23. A. 426/2018 & C.R.L.M.A. 7469/2018), and argued that the report of the public prosecutor was given to the court in sealed cover to which the accused-appellant or his counsel did not have any access. This argument made in Syed Shahid (supra) did not receive consideration as no opinion of the court on this aspect was recorded in the decision. 23. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the NIA that although this appeal has been preferred under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 yet the appeal is not maintainable, the order appealed against being an interlocutory order. Section 21 of the NI Act is reproduced below for convenience of discussion to take a view as to whether the order appealed against is appealable or not. Section 21 in The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 21. Appeals.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days. 24. Interlocutory order has nowhere been specifically defined. However, there is a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing on interlocutory orders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I., reported in 1980 Supp. 24. Interlocutory order has nowhere been specifically defined. However, there is a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing on interlocutory orders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I., reported in 1980 Supp. SCC 92, para-graph-24, while interpreting the Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 observed as follows: "24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM. Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in CQRPU JURIS SECUNDUM. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term "interlocutory order" as used in Section 11(n of the Act. WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON (14th Edn., p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus: An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights parties. Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. That is to say if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act. 25. That is to say if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act. 25. A Division Bench of our own Hon'ble High Court, in Londhoni Devi & Ors. Vs. State, reported in 2013 (3) GLT 249, while discussing as to what is an interlocutory order, with reference to the provisions of Section 21(3) of NIA Act held, after referring several authorities, held that an order framing charge under the scheme of NIA Act, 2008, is an interlocutory order and no appeal lies therefrom. Drawing analogy with the said decision of our own High Court, we can hold that the order impugned in this appeal does not terminate the proceeding or finally decide the rights of the parties and as such is an interlocutory order only. That being so, in view of the provisions of Section 21(3) of NIA Act, the appeal is not maintainable. 26. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants have once again referred Syed Shahid (supra) to counter the argument that the appeal is not maintainable and has submitted that this court can convert the appeal to an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and decide the matter. On perusal of the said decision, it appears that the said decision also held that the order extending custody beyond 90 days being an interlocutory order is not appealable. However, to avoid multiplicity of litigarion, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has converted the proceeding to one under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and decided the matter on merit in respect of extension of custody of the accused therein. 27. However, this court is not inclined to accept the said decision in view of the decision of our own Hon'ble High Court in Londhoni Devi (supra). In the said case our High Court has considered the issue of applicability of Code of Criminal Procedure and in paragraphs 25, 26 & 27 thereof observed as follows: "25. 27. However, this court is not inclined to accept the said decision in view of the decision of our own Hon'ble High Court in Londhoni Devi (supra). In the said case our High Court has considered the issue of applicability of Code of Criminal Procedure and in paragraphs 25, 26 & 27 thereof observed as follows: "25. A bare reading of Section 21(1) very clearly shows that while providing for a right of appeal to the High Court under Section 21(1) from any judgment, sentence or order, passed by a Special Court, constituted under Section 11 or 22 of the NIA Act, 2008, as the case may be, what the Parliament has done is that it has denied any right of appeal from an order, which is interlocutory. This apart, while providing a right of appeal, the Parliament has completely denied to a person, covered by Section 21, the benefit, if any, of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 opens with the expression, "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code". 26. Coupled with the above, Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 makes it further explicit that no Court, other than the High Court, as provided under Section 21, shall have the power to entertain either an appeal or revision from the judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order, of a Special Court and even when a right of appeal is provided to the High Court, under Section 21, it is made explicit that no appeal will lie to the High Court if the order impugned is an interlocutory order. 27. When, therefore, Section 21 is read minutely and cautiously, it is found to have denied to an accused any right of appeal or revision from an order, which is interlocutory in nature, and has also ousted the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to an order passed by a Special Court, whether the order is interlocutory or otherwise." 28. It transpires from the above position that applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure is completely ousted by Section 21 of the NIA Act, and therefore, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is also not applicable. It transpires from the above position that applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure is completely ousted by Section 21 of the NIA Act, and therefore, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is also not applicable. Therefore, the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, referred to above, being in conflict with the decision of the Division Bench of our own High Court in Londhoni Devi (supra) so far as applicability of Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, this court is inclined to accept the decision of our own High Court as precedent. This court is therefore, not inclined, to convert the proceeding to one under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Inspite of the fact that these appeals are not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 21(3) of the NIA Act yet we have dealt with the other arguments canvassed before us to understand the legal principles relevant to such argument. However, both the appeals are dismissed being not maintainable. Return the LCR to the learned court below and the case diary to the learned Public Prosecutor, NIA.