JUDGMENT : Krishna S. Dixit, J. The petitioners, being the defendants in a money suit in O.S.No.668/2014 are invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court for assailing the order dated 06.02.2019 made by the learned XXXVth Additional City Civil judge, Bengaluru, whereby their three applications in IA Nos. 10, 11 & 12, respectively filed under Order VIII Rule 1(A), Order XVIII Rule 17 and under Section 151 of CPC, 1908 have been rejected. The respondent having been served with the Court notice has entered appearance through its counsel and resists the writ petitions. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-defendants submits that their application in I.A. No.10 was filed seeking leave to produce one 'Original Unsecured Loan Undertaking' dated 06.04.2009; the second application in I.A. No.11 was filed for recalling PW1 for further cross-examination in relation to that document and the third application in I.A. No.12 was filed for reopening the case for facilitating the prayers made in the other two applications; the need to file these applications arose on 20.08.2018 when the DW1 was cross-examined by the respondent - plaintiff's side, inter alia, in relation to Ex.D9 relating to withdrawal of the quasi capital by the director of the company; the document now sought to be produced being the cognate documents could not have been out rightly refused from being produced on the ground that the plea in respect of which the said document is sought to be produced is lacking in their pleadings. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argues that the version of the Court below that the production of these documents would amount to introducing a new case altogether is absolutely unsustainable inasmuch as no new plea was ever sought to be introduced and what was being sought to be produced was only a document to silence the case of the respondent and nothing beyond; the reason assigned by the Court below that the document is being produced at a later stage of the proceedings and therefore such production is impermissible, is not sustainable in law. Having so argued, he seeks allowing of these writ petitions. 4. Having so argued, he seeks allowing of these writ petitions. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiff per contra contends in justification of the impugned order stating that a party to the proceeding can produce a document only in relation to the plea taken up in his pleadings and in the absence of such a plea, no document can be produced; the petitioners had earliest opportunity of producing this document if they chose, but they did not and therefore, now it is only a tactic to protract the proceedings which the trial Court did not agree with and therefore, the writ petition is misconceived. So contending, he seeks dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent. I have perused the writ petition papers. I have also adverted to the Rulings cited at the Bar. 6. The contention of the petitioners that the need to produce the documents in question arose only after their witness was cross-examined by the plaintiff's side on 20.08.2018 is substantiated by the cursory look at the deposition of DW1 which runs as under: "It is true to suggest that the defendant bank has permitted to overdraft the cash credit facility in the month of August, September and November-2009, February and April-2010. It is true to suggest that our bank has charged penal interest 21.44 Lakhs for withdrawal of quasi capital of Rs.24 Lakhs by the Director of the plaintiff company. I do not know whether the bank was aware about the withdrawal of quasi capital by the Director of the plaintiff company. It is true to suggest that as per Ex.D.9, our bank was aware about the withdrawal of the quasi capital by the Director of the plaintiff Company. Bank has not given any time to bring back that money. The undertaking mentioned in Ex.D.9 is obtained by the bank but not produced. The bank has not issued any notice to the plaintiff till 28.07.2010." 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that a party to the judicial proceedings can produce the evidence only if he has taken up a plea in that regard, in his pleadings appears to be too farfetched an argument. The bank has not issued any notice to the plaintiff till 28.07.2010." 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that a party to the judicial proceedings can produce the evidence only if he has taken up a plea in that regard, in his pleadings appears to be too farfetched an argument. Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the right to produce evidence in any suit or proceedings, relating to the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and also the facts relevant to the facts in issue; Sections 6 to 55 of the Act speak of relevancy of the facts; there are certain other facts which are not covered by sections 6 to 55 which may have to be elicited for the purpose of discrediting a witness or to prove his unworthiness; similarly, whatever is likely to be construed as an admission by the witness, evidence can be lead to explain away or to show such circumstances which render the same unworthy of it's face value. 8. Whether evidence can be looked into by the court in the absence of plea, is not debatable, the law being as clear as gangatic waters that no amount of evidence can be looked into when plea is lacking, as rightly contended by the counsel for the respondent by placing reliance on the decision of this court in the case of BASHA BAIG VS. CHOODANTH, 1998 ILR(Kar) 1632; the observations at Page No.1653 read as under: "...It may be in a proper case where the tenant had proper opportunity of meeting the case tried to be made out during enquiry by cross-examining the land-lord and his witnesses, the want of pleading by itself may not be made & ground for rejecting the application for eviction, if it could be said that the tenant knew what was the requirement of the landlord, but where there was no such opportunity, prejudice being writ large, it may not be proper for the Court to make an order of eviction taking into consideration the evidence adduced during the enquiry; because such evidence adduced during enquiry without pleading is valueless and has to be eschewed..." The Apex Court too has considered this aspect of the matter in the case of RAM SARUP GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. VS. BISHUN NARAIN INTER COLLEGE AND OTHERS, (1987) AIR SC 1242. 9. VS. BISHUN NARAIN INTER COLLEGE AND OTHERS, (1987) AIR SC 1242. 9. There can be no quarrel with the propositions emerging from the above decisions at all; the question is whether those propositions are invokable at the stage of recording of the very evidence itself; ordinarily, parties should be allowed to lead their evidence either by examination-in-chief or by production of other evidentiary material or by cross-examination of the witnesses of the other side, subject to all just exceptions; if the parties going to the trial have understood each other's case, the absence of pleadings may pale into insignificance; in any circumstance, whether there is plea or not, will be addressed by the trial Court only after recording the evidence; I hasten to add that this does not mean that the parties to the lis can load irrelevant or inadmissible evidence to the record of the case. 10. As already stated above, the petitioners wants to produce certain documents so that whatever apprehension he has about his deposition being construed in a way adverse to his interest, is taken care of. Whether what the petitioners said in the witness box during the course of cross-examination amounts to his admission or not, can be better appreciated if the documents now sought to be produced by him are permitted to come on record and he is permitted to depose about the same, if need be. It is open to the respondent to meet the case of the petitioners by further cross-examination or by leading additional evidence from their side, by making appropriate applications, if grounds do exist. 11. The contention of the respondent that the document is sought to be introduced to the record belatedly, again is untenable inasmuch as the circumstances that warrant production of the said document have already been discussed by this court in the initial paragraphs above. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions are favoured; the impugned order is invalidated; the petitioners' three subject applications are allowed and they are permitted to produce the documents in question subject to the rider that, in that guise, they should not seek any adjournment in the suit; the trial court to process the matter further. The learned trial judge is requested to try and dispose off the suit as expeditiously as possible. No costs.