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2019 DIGILAW 1386 (RAJ)

Rameshwar Sharma v. Jaipur Development Authority

2019-05-08

VEERENDER SINGH SIRADHANA

body2019
JUDGMENT : VEERENDER SINGH SIRADHANA, J. 1. By order dt. 15th March, 2016, the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, the 'Tribunal'), allowed an application for impleadment of third party-New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. (for short, 'respondent-Society') and prayer for its review declined vide order dt. 17th May, 2017; is the cause for institution of the present writ application praying for the following relief(s): "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ application may kindly be allowed and by way of a writ, order or direction in the nature thereof, the impugned order dt. 15.03.2016 and 17.05.2017 passed by the Learned JDA tribunal in reference No. 205/2009 may kindly be quashed and set aside and thereby the application for impleadment submitted by the society may also kindly be dismissed. Any other orders directions or relief in favour of the petitioner as may be deemed fit and proper in the fact and circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted." 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised are that: the petitioner claiming himself recorded 'Khatedar' of land bearing Khasra No. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 and 164, in Village Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur, has filed a Reference Petition before the Tribunal. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that land acquisition proceedings with reference to subject land were initiated' under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of 1953'). Notice under Sec. 4 and 6 were issued on 26th April, 1969 and 25th February, 1973, respectively. Award was made on 2nd April, 1981. On an application for regularization of his possession on a part of subject land measuring 9500 Sq. Yrds., the State Government made an order dt. 23rd October, 2008, directing the respondent-JDA to issue a lease deed for land in possession measuring 9500 Sq. Yrds., subject to withdrawal of writ application instituted by the petitioner. The State Government in continuation of the order dt. 23rd October, 2008, made another order dt. 14th May, 2014, directing the respondent-JDA to issue lease deed in favour of the petitioner wherein claim of the respondent-Society was rejected after due examination. According to the petitioner, the order dt. 14th May, 2014, was not challenged any further by the respondent-Society. The State Government in continuation of the order dt. 23rd October, 2008, made another order dt. 14th May, 2014, directing the respondent-JDA to issue lease deed in favour of the petitioner wherein claim of the respondent-Society was rejected after due examination. According to the petitioner, the order dt. 14th May, 2014, was not challenged any further by the respondent-Society. Pending the proceedings on the reference petition aforesaid; an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, was instituted by the respondent-Society), which has been granted by the Tribunal vide impugned order dt. 15th March, 2016 and an application for review of the order dt. 15th March, 2016, has been declined vide order dt. 17th March, 2017; of which the petitioner is aggrieved of. 3. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Sarthak Rastogi, emphatically argued that impugned order made by the Tribunal dt. 15th March, 2016 granting the application for impleadment as party and declining its review prayed vide order dt. 17th May, 2017; are orders, absolutely illegal, invalid and arbitrary so also contrary to the well settled principles of law. Learned counsel referring to the prayer clause of the reference petition instituted, pending before the Tribunal, asserted that no relief has been prayed by the petitioner against respondent-Society, and therefore, respondent No. 2, is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. 4. That apart, the petitioner is a dominus litus, and therefore, has a right to choose whom to implead as a party respondent/non-applicant and determine the relief prayed for. The Respondent-Society, if has any right or title in the subject land involved herein, is required to undertake independent proceedings. 5. Referring to order-sheets dt. 17th February, 2012, 23rd March, 2012, 1st may, 2012, 12th July, 2012, 23rd August, 2012, 23rd September, 2012 and 11th December, 2018; learned counsel insistently argued that the so called agreement dt. 21st January, 1976, which is the basis of the alleged claim of the respondent-Society, was allowed to be brought on record, by the Tribunal, on the dates aforesaid. However, no such alleged agreement dt. 21st January, 1976, which is the basis of the alleged claim of the respondent-Society, was allowed to be brought on record, by the Tribunal, on the dates aforesaid. However, no such alleged agreement dt. 21st January, 1976, was brought on record and the counsel representing respondent-Society, before the Tribunal on 11th December, 2012, pleaded that sufficient documentary evidence has been placed on record along with application seeking impleadment, and therefore, they would proceed to argue the matter on the basis of those documents and do not want to bring on record the agreement dt. 21st January, 1976. Accordingly, the matter was ordered to be proceeded further by the Tribunal leading to impugned order dt. 15th March, 2016, allowing the application of respondent No. 2, to be pending impleaded as opposite party respondent No. 2, to the reference proceedings. 6. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Sr. Counsel, referring to prohibition on transfer of lands acquired and/or under acquisition as contemplated under Sec. 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1976, (for short, 'the Act of 1976'), contended that no transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise of any land or part thereof, in the State of Rajasthan, acquired by the Government or lands in relation to which acquisition process having been initiated, is permissible. Hence, the pretext on which the respondent-Society claimed its stake for impleadment as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal on the Reference Petition instituted by the petitioner; cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 7. Learned counsel further pointed out that J.D.A. Appellate Tribunal, upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties on 2nd March, 2016, specifically made an order to the effect that application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, would be considered at the time of final arguments on the matter, as would be evident from the order-sheet drawn on 2nd March, 2016, while posting the matter to 16th March, 2016. Hence, the impugned order dt. 15 March 2016, is bad in the eye of law on that count as well. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vociferously argued that the impugned order dt. 15th March, 2016, was made in absence of the counsel for the petitioner, though his presence has been recorded. Hence, the impugned order dt. 15 March 2016, is bad in the eye of law on that count as well. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vociferously argued that the impugned order dt. 15th March, 2016, was made in absence of the counsel for the petitioner, though his presence has been recorded. Further, an application instituted by the counsel for the petitioner before the Tribunal specifically detailed out the fact of his (counsel's) absence on the day, the impugned order dt. 15th March, 2016, was made. However, that application has also been declined observing that the matter required no review for the same was not within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Inviting attention of this Court to order dt. 12th June, 2009 (Annexure-11), learned Senior Counsel, contended that Reference Petition No. 97/2003, instituted by the respondent-Society, staking its claim on the subject land was declined with a specific finding that the respondent-Society, was not entitled to any relief. That apart, a Civil Suit No. 154/2012, instituted by the respondent-Society, impleading the petitioner, along with others, as defendant; was also dismissed on an application instituted under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 16 and 151 CPC, vide order dt. 6th October, 2012, which has attained finality as the same was not challenged any further. Thus, in the face of facts aforesaid respondent-society is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. 10. Learned counsel further added that order dt. 1st July, 2008, made by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 231/1975 (Rameshwar Prasad Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.), instituted by the petitioner impleading respondent-Society as a respondent along with others; pointed out that though the writ application was dismissed; however, relief was accorded in favour of respondent-Society, impleaded as respondent No. 4, in writ application No. 231/1975 (supra). Thereafter, the petitioner as well as the State-respondents, instituted intra Court appeals against the order made by the learned Single judge. 11. According to learned counsel, the intra Court appeal instituted by the State of Rajasthan (DBSAW No. 253/2010), impleading the petitioner as well as respondent-Society, as party respondents was decided vide order dt. 2nd April, 2010, specifically setting aside the observations/directions made in the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge pertaining to relief accorded to the respondent-Society. 11. According to learned counsel, the intra Court appeal instituted by the State of Rajasthan (DBSAW No. 253/2010), impleading the petitioner as well as respondent-Society, as party respondents was decided vide order dt. 2nd April, 2010, specifically setting aside the observations/directions made in the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge pertaining to relief accorded to the respondent-Society. The Division Bench in no uncertain terms held that observations/directions made in favour of the respondent-Society, could not be treated as a part of the impugned judgment dt. 1st July, 2008, made by the learned Single Judge. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner whatever observations/directions were made by the learned Single Judge contrary to law, were completely wiped out. However, respondent No. 2-Society, has interfered with the subject land at every stage in order to frustrate the claim of the petitioner on the basis of the observations/directions made by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dt. 1st July, 2008, on writ application that was instituted by the petitioner, in spite of the fact that those observations/directions, have been completely wiped out in the intra Court appeals aforesaid. 12. Mr. Rastogi, referring to order dt. 11th November, 2010, made on SB Civil Misc. Application No. 4/2010 in SBCWP No. 31/1975: (Rameshwar vs. New Pinkcity Grab Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. and Ors.), pointed out that in the backdrop of the judgment in intra Court appeals No. 1376/2008 and 253/2010, wiping out the observations made by the learned Single Judge in favour of the respondent-Society; it was held that rights of the parties would be governed by the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in intra Court appeal No. 235/2010, which had attained finality holding that any party, if made misrepresentation of any kind, the aggrieved party would be entitled to maintain proper contempt petition. In order to fortify his stand learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the opinion of the Apex Court of the land in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors., (1992) 2 SCC 524 , Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 417 , Vidur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 384 . vs. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 384 . Reference has also been made to opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jaipur Development Authority and Anr. vs. Ambiance Land Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., SBCWP No. 15546/2011, decided on 11th April, 2012. 13. Per contra: Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel, while supporting the impugned orders dt. 15th March, 2016 and 17th May, 2017, strenuously argued that institution of the writ application is a gross misuse of process of law. For in the backdrop of regularization of the Scheme of the State of Rajasthan with reference to the land involved herein; the petitioner has no right worth the name. According to learned counsel, petitioner was Khatedar of 9 bighas and 5 biswas of the land that was under acquisition. It is also pointed out that Jagannath (deceased), father of the petitioner, sold the subject land involved herein vide an agreement of sale dt. 21st January, 1976, to the respondent-Society. Moreover, while the petitioner has staked claim on the basis of 9 bighas and 5 biswas of the land acquired; but, the petitioner has restricted his claim only to the extent of land measuring 9,500 sq. yrds. 14. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, would further contend that respondent-Society has right and interest in the subject land involved herein and any order made by the Tribunal would affect its rights and interest, and therefore, has been rightly impleaded as a party respondent to the pending Reference proceedings on an application instituted under order 1 Rule 10 CPC, as would be evident from the contents of application itself. 15. Repelling the plea that the application under Order 1 Rule, 10 CPC of the respondent-Society was to be considered at the time of final arguments, in the backdrop of the order sheet dt. 2nd March, 2016; learned counsel would contend that a glance of the order sheet on 2nd March, 2016, would reflect that the matter was fixed for final arguments; and accordingly, the application has been rightly dealt with and order made on 15th March, 2016. Thus, there is no illegality. It is further pointed out that what can be considered by this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdictional, is, only jurisdictional error. 16. Thus, there is no illegality. It is further pointed out that what can be considered by this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdictional, is, only jurisdictional error. 16. Referring to application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, instituted on behalf of the respondent-Society, it is pointed out that application was accompanied with as many as 12 documents which strengthened the claim of the respondent-Society for impleadment to the pending reference proceedings. The review application instituted with a prayer for review of order dt. 15th March, 2016 impugned, was rightly declined for the counsel for the petitioner was heard, as would be evident from the contents of the order dt. 15th March, 2016; recording reasons for impleadment. Hence, the statement made on behalf of the petitioner that the application for impleadment was allowed without hearing the counsel for the petitioner; is contrary to record. 17. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel, referring to "additional agreement" dt. 5th May, 1987, urged that the father of the petitioner late Shri Jagannath did admit the factum of an agreement dt. 21st January, 1976, and also acknowledged the payment received. Hence, the Tribunal committed no error in granting the application of the respondent-Society for impleadment as party to the pending reference proceedings. 18. Referring to order dt. 1st July, 2008, made by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 231/1975: Rameshwar Prasad vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., it is urged that writ application instituted by the petitioner challenging the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved herein; was dismissed. Further, the respondent-Society was one of the parties to the writ proceedings aforesaid and while dismissing the writ application, certain observations/directions were made in favour of the respondent-Society. While upholding the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved herein, this Court directed the respondent-JDA to proceed further and issue lease-deeds to the members of the respondent-Housing Society. However, on intra-Court appeal(s), the observations/directions made in favour of the respondent-Society were wiped out; but, the findings justify impleadment of the respondent-Society to the pending reference proceedings. Moreover, the Division Bench on an application for clarification observed that the respondent-JDA may proceed according to its record and to verify the physical and actual possession on the spot, and thereafter, do the needful, in accordance with law. Moreover, the Division Bench on an application for clarification observed that the respondent-JDA may proceed according to its record and to verify the physical and actual possession on the spot, and thereafter, do the needful, in accordance with law. Therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that respondent-Society has no interest in the subject land involved herein; is without any factual foundation. 19. Referring to order dt. 2nd April, 2010, made by this Court in DBSAW No. 253/2010, learned senior counsel contended that as to acquisition, if any party intended to stake his right or claim; liberty was reserved to take legal recourse. Therefore, impleadment of the respondent-Society cannot be faulted. Learned counsel emphasized that the petitioner has right, if any, only to the extent of land measuring 2,111 sq.yrds., and therefore, the claim staked for 9,500 sq.yrds, is a claim without any factual foundation. 20. It is further added that a Civil Suit instituted by the petitioner along with his brothers, was withdrawn by institution of an application under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC. The Court below allowed withdrawal of the suit proceedings vide order dt. 26th November, 2009. However, an application for restoration filed, was allowed only in part. Surely, the petitioner has not been allowed restoration of the suit proceedings. Though, the matter is sub judice in SBCWP No. 4469/2019: Pt. Jagannath Vs. Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, with an interim protection. Reference has also been made to note-sheet of the JDA, wherein the matter of regularization has been dealt with while considering the transfer of the subject land involved herein as valid or not. And that issue is to be dealt with by the Tribunal. 21. In order to fortify his stand, learned counsel has also relied upon the opinion of the Apex Court of the land in the case of Baluram vs. P. Chellathangam, (2015) 13 SCC 579 , opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Omway Buildstate Pvt. Ltd. vs. Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, decided on 11th June, 2014 and its confirmation by the Division Bench, declining intra Court appeal (DBSAW No. 279/2012): Rajesh Agarwal vs. M/s. Omway Buildstate Pvt. Ltd. And Ors., decided along with connected intra Court appeal (DBSAW No. 222/2012): on 11th June, 2014. 22. 22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance scanned the materials available on record so also gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 23. Indisputably, the petitioner assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved herein instituted writ application SBCWP No. 231/1975, adjudicated upon vide order dt. 1st July, 2008, upholding the acquisition proceedings, holding thus: "The additional agreement Annexure-R4/1 clearly shows that the respondent No. 4 housing society has purchased the disputed land from the sole petitioner late Shri Jagannath vide agreement dt. 21st January, 1976 and additional agreement dt. 08.05.1987 and paid the entire sale consideration to him as per the details given in the additional agreement. Most of the payment has been made through Cheques and affidavit duly signed by Jagannath and attested by Notary Public is also on the record which clearly shows that the land, in dispute, was sold by the petitioner Jagannath to the respondent No. 4 housing society in the year 1976. The order dt. 30th December, 1985, passed by the Additional Collector (South), Agriculture Land Conversion, Jaipur (Annexure-R4/4) also shows that the land, in dispute, alongwith other land was converted from agriculture to residential scheme. The land conversion and regularization order was passed by the State Government also vide order dt. 18th January, 1990, a reference of which has been given in the letter dt. 24th January, 1990 (Annexure R4/3) whereby the State Government accorded its sanction for change of land use of the disputed land in the master plan also. The respondent No. 4 housing society filed the application under Sec. 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act before the Jaipur Development Authority. The Competent Officer/Authorized Officer, Zone B-I, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, vide its order dt. 9th July, 2001, has already passed an order under Sec. 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In view of the above, it is apparent that the petitioners have lost their interest in the disputed land and, in these circumstances, the petitioners have no right over the disputed land and they cannot be said to be aggrieved persons to maintain the present writ petition. In view of the above, it is apparent that the petitioners have lost their interest in the disputed land and, in these circumstances, the petitioners have no right over the disputed land and they cannot be said to be aggrieved persons to maintain the present writ petition. This is a case where the respondent No. 4 housing society chalked out the residential scheme known as Siddharth Nagar and allotted plots to its members, who have already raised constructions, which is clear from the order of the Authorized Officer passed under Sec. 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the respondent JDA is now required to proceed further in the matter by issuing lease-deeds to the members of the respondent No. 4 housing society. In view of the above discussions, I find that the writ petition filed on behalf of petitioner is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs." 24. On the intra-Court appeal (DBSAW No. 1376/2008), instituted by the petitioner, the Division Bench wiping out the observations/directions in favour of the respondent-Society, held thus: "20. The relief sought for by the appellants being the same and identical to that of involved and prayed for in other writ petitions including Writ Petition No. 2090/1987 titled Hathroi Grab Nirman Sahakari Samiti Limited, vs. State of Rajasthan which cam to be dismissed on 29th August, 1996 and Civil Special Appeal No. 926/1996 and Special Leave Petitions Nos. 3690-94 of 1981 already stood adjudicated and attained finality vide judgment of the Apex Court, maintaining the order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. In view of the acquisition proceedings being upheld and maintained up to the Supreme Court as noticed above, the appellants are not found entitled to any relief as prayed for in the writ petition. No other point or legal issue, as prayed for, was urged before us. 21. So far as the observations made by the learned Single Judge in favour of the Respondent No. 4 is concerned, these have not been rebutted by the Jaipur Development Authority or the appellants and the appellants have also not placed on record any substantial evidence to disturb it. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the land has already been acquired and the award has been passed. The acquisition proceedings have attained finality. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the land has already been acquired and the award has been passed. The acquisition proceedings have attained finality. The acquisition proceedings have also been upheld up to the Supreme Court. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appeal having no merit deserves to be dismissed and it stands dismissed accordingly." 25. By order dt. 2nd April, 2010, dismissing the intra-Court appeal (DBSAW No. 253/2010; State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Rameshwar Prasad &. Ors., against the very same order dt. 1st July, 2008, Division Bench of this Court, held thus; "We have heard rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and scanned the matter carefully. The question is as to whether learned Single Judge was correct in making observations and issuing directions in favour of non-petitioner-cooperative society in a challenge to the land acquisition proceedings. It was a petition by land holder challenging land acquisition proceedings. In view of grounds raised and challenge made, learned Single Judge was expected to decide the matter accordingly. However, while deciding the writ petition regarding challenge to the land acquisition, certain observations and directions have been made in favour of the non-petitioner No. 4-cooperative society as if it is a writ petition by them. By virtue of certain observations and directions/there exists self contradiction in the judgment of the learned-Single Judge. The writ petition was dismissed regarding challenge to the land acquisition holding it to be legal. Once the land acquisition has been confirmed, land vests in the government/JDA but ignoring this, observations and directions in contradiction were made for issuance of lease deeds in favour of members of respondent No. 4-cooperative society, which otherwise not prayed in the writ petition. It virtually nullifies the right of the State and the JDA on acquisition of land. The matter could have been discussed in detail but in view of submissions of counsel for the society that those observations/directions made in the impugned judgment pertaining to respondent No. 4-society have been wiped out by the coordinate Bench of this Court. We find that JDA and the Land Acquisition Officer filed a review petition against the judgment of coordinate Bench deciding the appeal against the same judgment of learned Single Judge/Therein certain clarifications have been made to give liberty to the JDA to proceed in accordance with law. We find that JDA and the Land Acquisition Officer filed a review petition against the judgment of coordinate Bench deciding the appeal against the same judgment of learned Single Judge/Therein certain clarifications have been made to give liberty to the JDA to proceed in accordance with law. We find that State has independently filed an appeal though along with the JDA and Land Acquisition Officer, however, appeal has been filed by the State Government for the first time. It has to be addressed on the issues raised so as to make things very clear. The State Government has rightly pleaded that there exist self contradiction in judgment affecting right of the State. On one hand, acquisition has been upheld vesting rights of the land in favour of appellant and, on the other hand, a direction in favour of society for issuance of lease in favour of the members of the society, that too in a writ petition filed by the land holder. No observation or direction could have been made in favour of non-petitioner society, otherwise, it becomes a writ petition on behalf of non-petitioner-society and that too when the reply given by the non-petitioner society is not made available to the petitioners JDA and State. The learned Single Judge should have restricted its judgment to the extent of challenge in the writ petition, however, in the present matter, the learned Single Judge exceeded to his jurisdiction in making observations/directions in favour of non-petitioner society affecting rights of other co-respondents State and the JDA. In view of aforesaid, the observations/directions need to be taken out and is to be set aside. We, accordingly, make it clear that any observations or direction in regard to respondent No. 4-society cannot be kept as a part of the impugned judgment thus the observations and directions in favour of non-petitioner No. 4 society deserve are set aside. This is more so when learned counsel appearing on behalf of the society has stated that in the review petition filed by the JDA and the Land Acquisition Officer, observations and directions in favour of the society have been wiped out. On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their rights. On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their rights. The outcome of aforesaid is that challenge to the acquisition of land in dispute is held to be legal and to that extent judgment of the learned Single Judge is confirmed however, observations and directions given in favour of the respondent No. 1-society have been set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above." 26. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent-Society staking its claim on the subject land involved herein in the backdrop of the observations/directions made by the Division Bench in intra-Court appeal No. 253/2010, instituted suit proceedings (Civil Suit No. 154/2012): New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. The suit was dismissed sustaining an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 16/151 CPC, vide order dt. 6th October, 2012. Admittedly, the order has attained finality as the same was not challenged any further by the respondent-Society. 27. The fact that a Reference Petition was also instituted by the respondent-Society before the Tribunal being Reference No. 97/2003: New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Jaipur Development Authority, staking its claim on the subject land involved herein, which resulted into dismissal vide order dt. 12th June, 2009, and that too has attained finality for the same was not challenged any further; is also not disputed. Thus, the respondent-Society having staked its claim on the very same subject land involved herein, unsuccessfully before the Civil Court as well as the Tribunal as is evident from the materials available on record; instituted an application for impleadment to the pending Reference Petition instituted by the petitioner. 28. In the case of Vidur Impax and Traders Private Limited and Ors. (Supra), explaining the expressions "necessary party" and "proper party", the Apex Court of the land culled out broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment, on a survey of earlier opinions, observing thus: "41. 28. In the case of Vidur Impax and Traders Private Limited and Ors. (Supra), explaining the expressions "necessary party" and "proper party", the Apex Court of the land culled out broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment, on a survey of earlier opinions, observing thus: "41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are: The Court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as Plaintiff or Defendant or whose presence before the Court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the Court. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the Plaintiff. In a suit for specific performance, the Court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the Court or the application is unduly delayed then the Court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment. 43. We are in complete agreement with the Delhi High Court that the application for impleadment filed by the Appellants was highly belated. 43. We are in complete agreement with the Delhi High Court that the application for impleadment filed by the Appellants was highly belated. Although, the Appellants have pleaded that at the time of execution of the agreements for sale by Respondent No. 2 in their favour in February 1997, they did not know about the suit filed by Respondent No. 1, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accept their statement because the smallness of time gap between the agreements for sale and the sale deeds executed by Respondent No. 2 in favour of the Appellants and the execution of agreement for sale by the Appellants in favour of Bhagwati Developers would make any person of ordinary prudence to believe that Respondent No. 2, the Appellants and Bhagwati Developers had entered into these transactions with the sole object of frustrating agreement for sale dt. 13.9.1988 executed in favour of Respondent No. 1 and the suit pending before the Delhi High Court. In any case, the Appellants will be deemed to have become aware of the same on receipt of summons in Suit No. 161/1999 filed by Respondent No. 2 for annulment of the agreements for sale and the sale deeds in which Respondent No. 2 had clearly made a mention of Suit No. 425/1993 filed by Respondent No. 1 for specific performance of agreement for sale dt. 13.12.1988 and injunction or at least when the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court entertained IA No. 625/2001 filed by Respondent No. 1 and restrained Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 from transferring possession of the suit property to the Appellants. However, in the application for impleadment filed by them, the Appellants did not offer any tangible explanation as to why the application for impleadment was filed only on 4.2.2008 i.e. after 7 years of the passing of injunction order dt. 22.1.2001 and, in our considered view, this constituted a valid ground for declining their prayer for impleadment as parties to Suit No. 425/1993. 44. The ratio of the judgment in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal (supra), on which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the Appellants, does not help his clients. 22.1.2001 and, in our considered view, this constituted a valid ground for declining their prayer for impleadment as parties to Suit No. 425/1993. 44. The ratio of the judgment in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal (supra), on which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the Appellants, does not help his clients. In the present case, the agreements for sale and the sale deeds were executed by Respondent No. 2 in favour of the Appellants in a clandestine manner and in violation of the injunction granted by the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that any valid title or interest has been acquired by the Appellants in the suit property and the ratio of the judgment in Surjit Singh vs. Harbans Singh (supra) would squarely apply to the Appellants case because they are claiming right on the basis of transactions made in defiance of the restraint order passed by the High Court. The suppression of material facts by Bhagwati Developers and the Appellants from the Calcutta High Court, which was persuaded to pass orders in their favour, takes the Appellants out of the category of bona fide purchaser. Therefore, their presence is neither required to decide the controversy involved in the suit filed by Respondent No. 1 nor required to pass an effective decree." 29. In the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra), the Apex Court of the land in no uncertain terms held that "necessary party" or "proper party" would be one, who has direct or legal interest in the litigation. At this juncture it will be profitable to take note of the text of para 6 and 8, which reads thus: "6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touch stone of Order I Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 8. The case really turns on the true construction of the Rule in particular the meaning of the words "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the Rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions." 30. In the case Mumbai International Airport Private Limited (supra), while dealing with the issue of discretion of Court to strike out or add parties with specific illustrations in the backdrop of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, the Supreme Court held thus: "22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the Court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The Court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The Court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the Court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the Court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. 23. This Court in Ramp Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. Invest Import reiterated in SCC 89 p. 96, para 20 the classic definition of 'discretion' by Lord Mansfield in R. vs. Wilkes 1770 (98) ER 327 that 'discretion' "when applied to Courts of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular'. 24. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said Sub-Rule. If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the Court may implead him having regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order 1. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sate of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual possession. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the Court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the Court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the Court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides etc., the Court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and Court finds him to be a proper party, the Court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the Court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the Court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if 'D' claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of 'P' representing that he is the co-owner with half share, and 'P' files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the Court may permit the other co-owner who contends that 'D' has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the Court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the Other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the Court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance; that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced." 31. In the case of M/s. Omway Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court while considering the effect of Section 4 of the Act of 1976, in the face of text of Section 48 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, held thus: "Taking note of Taking note of judgments (supra), in the opinion of this Court, after issuance of Gazette notification U/S. 48 of LA Act the very inception of acquisition proceedings stands withdrawn & effect of S. 4 of the Act, 1976 ceases to subsist and slate becomes clean and such transaction/transfers of lands which took place during the interregnum period are held to be valid even against the State Government & in general for all practical purposes; however it will not preclude the State Govt. if intends to acquire the subject land afresh at a later stage, but that too by initiating acquisition proceedings afresh if required for public purposes. As regards judgment on which Counsel for respondent placed reliance in Meera Salmi vs. Lt. if intends to acquire the subject land afresh at a later stage, but that too by initiating acquisition proceedings afresh if required for public purposes. As regards judgment on which Counsel for respondent placed reliance in Meera Salmi vs. Lt. Governor (2009 (8) SCC 177), it was a case where the land was purchased after declaration of acquisition U/s. 6, but no notification U/s. 48 which empowers State Government to withdraw the land from acquisition, was issued/published in gazette and in such circumstances/examining scope of restriction regarding transfer of land, imposed U/s. 4, it was held that such transaction being void would not be recognized by State Government but in instant case, on the date when the subject land was purchased, such transfer of land might be void qua State Government, but after issuance of notification U/s. 48 of LA Act petitioners became holders of subject land & competent enough to submit their application U/s. 90-B(3) of LR Act. Thus, the sale might be void qua State Government; at one stage but after issuance of notification by State Government U/s. 48 withdrawing subject land from acquisition, such transfer of lands certainly be considered to be valid in general for all practical purposes and whatever rights being available to the land owners are available to the land holders." 32. Intra-Court appeal instituted against the opinion of the learned single judge, in the case of M/s. Omway Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (supra); DBSAW No. 279/2012; was declined vide judgment dt. 11th June, 2014, affirming the opinion, observing thus: "16. The purchase of land in the face of prohibition and restriction imposed by Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, has to be examined in the backdrop of the fact that the State Government by publication of notification dt. 1st December, 2006, under Sec. 48 of the Act of 1894, released the land in dispute from acquisition. The purchase of land in the face of prohibition and restriction imposed by Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, has to be examined in the backdrop of the fact that the State Government by publication of notification dt. 1st December, 2006, under Sec. 48 of the Act of 1894, released the land in dispute from acquisition. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, in juxtaposition to Section 48 of the Act of 1894, would reflect that the prohibition and restriction of transfer imposed is with a view to prevent the mischief during acquisition proceedings and therefore, any transfer of the land, sought to be acquired, without previous permission, would be void qua the State Government, but the same principle cannot be applied in a situation when the same land has been de-acquired in exercise of power under Sec. 48 of the Act of 1894." 33. In the case of Baluram (supra), the Apex Court of the land while dealing with the issue of impleadment of a party in a case of specific performance, held thus: "13. After due consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the view that the High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court impleading the Appellant as a party Defendant. Admittedly, the Appellant is a beneficiary of the Trust and under the provisions of the Trusts Act, the Trustee has to act reasonably in exercise of his right of alienation under the terms of the trust deed. Appellant cannot thus be treated as a stranger. No doubt, it may be permissible for the Appellant to file a separate suit, as suggested by Respondent No. 1, but the beneficiary could certainly be held to be a proper party. There is no valid reason to decline his prayer to be impleaded as a party to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Order I Rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure enables, the Court to add a necessary or proper party so as to "effectually and completely, adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." 14. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) this Court observed: 13. Order I Rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure enables, the Court to add a necessary or proper party so as to "effectually and completely, adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." 14. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) this Court observed: 13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the Plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the Plaintiff But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code", for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: 10. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.--The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. 14. The said provision makes it clear that a Court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as Plaintiff or Defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in 'order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the Court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. In short, the Court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the Plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the Plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 19. Referring to suits for specific performance, this Court in Kasturi [ (2005) 6 SCC 733 ], held that the following persons are to be considered as necessary parties: (i) the parties to the contract which is sought to be enforced or their legal representatives; (ii) a transferee of the property which is the subject-matter of the contract. This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a proper party on his application Under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the Defendant vendor will not be a necessary party. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) Code of Civil Procedure regarding striking out or adding parties. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) Code of Civil Procedure regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the Court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the Plaintiff or the Defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The Court can add anyone as a Plaintiff or as a Defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the Court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the Court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. 15. In the present case, the Appellant could not be held to be a stranger being beneficiary of the Trust property. The trial Court was justified in impleading him as a party; The High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court." 34. Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, contemplating prohibition and restrictions on transfer of land acquired or in relation to which the acquisition proceedings have been initiated, reads thus: "3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by State Government-No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which has been acquired by the Government under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose. 4. 4. Restriction on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been initiated.-No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the, scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the State Government under Sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Lan Acquisition Act, 1953 or under the corresponding provision of any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose, and the State Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under Sec. 48 of that Act or under any such law." 35. From the factual matrix as has emerged from the pleadings of the parties and materials available on record, reflects that the respondent-Society admittedly instituted a Civil Suit staking its claim on the very same subject land involved herein and the Civil Suit was dismissed in view of the application instituted by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 16/151 CPC vide order dt. 6th October, 2012. It is also not in dispute that Reference Petition instituted by the respondent-Society was also declined by the Tribunal vide order dt. 12th June, 2009 (Reference No. 97/2003). Both the proceedings on the Civil Suit as well as Reference Petition, have attained finality for the respondent-Society did not challenge those adjudications any further. 36. The issue as to withdrawal of the suit proceedings, in Civil Suit No. 343/2018: Pt. Jagannath and Ors. vs. Suresh Chand Jain and Ors., is still pending consideration before the trial Court. In view of the order dt. 18th July, 2018, while adjudicating upon an application under Sec. 151 read with Order 23 Rule 1(5) CPC, the trial Court has sustained the suit proceedings, partly allowing the application while permitting plaintiff No. 1/2 (brother of the petitioner), to continue the suit proceedings, restoring the Civil Suit which was stated to be withdrawn by the respondent-Society. 18th July, 2018, while adjudicating upon an application under Sec. 151 read with Order 23 Rule 1(5) CPC, the trial Court has sustained the suit proceedings, partly allowing the application while permitting plaintiff No. 1/2 (brother of the petitioner), to continue the suit proceedings, restoring the Civil Suit which was stated to be withdrawn by the respondent-Society. That apart, permission declined to the petitioner to continue to the suit proceedings, is pending consideration before this Court in SBGWP No. 4469/2019, with an interim protection, restraining the Court below to proceed further as would be evident from the order made on the above writ application No. 4469/2019. 37. In the case of M/s. Omway Buildstate Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. (supra), this Court dealt with the issue with reference to Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in juxtaposition to Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976. Thus, the opinion was entirely in a different factual matrix and provisions of law. 38. In the case of Baluram (supra), the Apex Court of the land examined the controversy as to impleadment of the appellant-Baluram in the factual matrix wherein the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, acting as trustees of "Subbaiah Paniker Family Welfare Trust" entered into the agreement for sell of suit property in favour of the plaintiff. The price of the property was settled and appellant-Baluram sought impleadment as defendant staking that he would suffer prejudice being beneficiaries of the Trust Thus, the factual matrix of the case referred to and relied upon, is entirely different and distinguishable from the one at hand. 39. Applying the principles deducible from the opinions referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the parties as taken note of hereinabove; it can safely be said that the respondent-Society did stake its claim on the same subject land involved herein, before the Civil Court as well as by institution of the Reference Petition, before the Tribunal; unsuccessfully, as would be evident from the order dt. 6th October, 2012 and 12th June, 2009. 40. A glance of the order made by the Division Bench of this Court while declining intra Court appeal of the State of Rajasthan and Ors. (DBSAW No. 253/2010), specifically observed thus: "On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their rights." 41. 40. A glance of the order made by the Division Bench of this Court while declining intra Court appeal of the State of Rajasthan and Ors. (DBSAW No. 253/2010), specifically observed thus: "On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their rights." 41. Thus, the respondent-Society after having exercised its right and having taken recourse to legal remedy unsuccessfully and proceedings attaining finality; cannot be permitted to be impleaded as a party to the Reference proceedings instituted by the petitioner in the factual matrix of the case at hand. 42. By now it is well settled that if Court finds that addition of a party will introduce a new cause of action, it ought to dismiss the application seeking impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. In the factual matrix of a case at hand, the respondent-Society intends to re-agitate once again, the same subject matter, for the third time, after having lost on the same claim in the suit proceedings as well as in Reference Petition, as taken note of in the foregoing paragraphs herein above. Further, it is an admitted fact that the subject land involved herein, was purchased vide alleged agreement for sale dt. 21 January 1976, subsequent to notices issued under Sec. 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894, in the year 1969 and 1973, respectively. Thus, contrary to restrictions as contemplated under Sec. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976. No notification under Sec. 48 of the Act of 1894, which empowers the State Government to withdraw the subject land from acquisition, was issued. The Reference Petition is not with reference to enforcement of the contract dt. 21st January, 1976, which is the basis of the claim of the respondent-Society. That apart, several opportunities were allowed to the respondent-Society to place on record the aforesaid contract, but the respondent-Society failed to do so for reasons best known to it. Be that as it may, applying the principles deducible from the opinions referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the parties to the factual matrix of the case at hand while considering the attendant facts and circumstances in totality; it is apparent that the respondent-Society is neither a necessary nor a proper party, whose presence is essential for effective and complete adjudication of the pending Reference Petition. The respondent-Society has already availed of legal remedy with reference to its claim on the subject land by institution of Civil Suit and Reference Petition, unsuccessfully. Furthermore, the respondent-Society is guilty of transactions contrary to restrictions as contemplated under Sec. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976. 43. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the conspicuous factual matrix of the case; the writ application merits acceptance and is hereby allowed. 44. In the result, impugned orders dt. 15th March, 2016 and 17th May, 2017, made by the Tribunal in Reference Petition No. 205/2009; are hereby quashed. 45. However, there shall be no order as to costs.