JUDGMENT : Rajiv Joshi, J. 1. Heard Sri Satish Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 18.4.2019 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation Varanasi in Appeals Nos. 98/530/2500+Appeal Nos. 999/531/2501 (Chandrama Prasad v. State) filed under Rule 109 -A (3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Rules 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') whereby the appeals were dismissed affirming the order dated 15.7.2000 in Case no. 61 filed under Rule 109-A of the Rules. 3. The brief facts involved in the present writ petition are thus; the application under Rule 109-A was filed by Smt. Chamela Devi for implementation of the order dated 12.6.2000 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation in Appeal No. 669 filed under Section 11 (1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act').; The application filed by the ancestors of the contesting respondents was allowed vide order dated 15.7.2000 whereby the name of the respondents were directed to be mutated in the revenue record pursuant to the order dated 15.6.2000. Against that order, two appeals were filed by the petitioners on 18.7.2000 under Rule 109 (3) of the Rules. The appeal filed by the petitioners were dismissed vide impugned order dated 18.4.2019 affirming the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 15.7.2000. Against the order of Settlement Officer Consolidation, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules, the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation is final and therefore, the present writ petition is maintainable. 5. On the other hand, learned Standing counsel raised an objection that the petitioner had an alternative remedy to challenge the impugned order by way of revision under Section 48(1) of the Act and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to the petitioner. 6. I have considered the submission so raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 7. The question is whether against the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissing the appeal under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules, the writ petition is maintainable or the petitioner had an alternative remedy to file the revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act. 8. 7. The question is whether against the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissing the appeal under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules, the writ petition is maintainable or the petitioner had an alternative remedy to file the revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act. 8. For considering the said aspect of the matter, it is relevant to have a look upon sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules and Section 48 of the Act which read thus: Sub-rule (3) of Rule 109-A of the U.P. C.H. Rules 1954: "(3) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, may, within 15 days of the order passed under sub-rule (2), file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, or the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division, as the case may be, who shall decide the appeal after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, which shall be final." Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act 1953: "The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order] [other than an interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit." 9. Now the question is whether the order passed by appellate authority in the Rule under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules attained finality or the revision would be maintainable under Section 48 (1) of the Act. It is well settled proposition of law that the rules cannot supersede the power given in the Act to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to examine the correctness or legality by any order passed by the consolidation authorities. Mere mentioning that the order passed under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A is final cannot take away the power of revisional authority conferred under Section 48 (1) of the Act. Rule made under any Act cannot override the specific provisions of the parent Act. Mere mentioning that the order passed under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A is final cannot take away the power of revisional authority conferred under Section 48 (1) of the Act. Rule made under any Act cannot override the specific provisions of the parent Act. The purpose of the enactment of the rules is to provide for procedural matter or matters which are subsidiary to the provisions of the Act. They may in some cases explain the provisions of the Act and it might in certain cases be legitimate to read the rules alongwith the provisions of the Act in order to find out the true intention of the legislature. In enacting the latter, no rules can ever be construed to override the specific provisions of the Act itself. Although rules made under the Act cannot override the Act, they may used as contemporanea expositio of an ambiguous provision in the Act, especially when they are to have effect as if enacted in the Act. Oders opined in The Construction of Deeds and Statutes: "Rules which must read together with the Act under which they are made cannot repeal or contradict express provisions in the Acts from which they derive their authority, and if the Act is plain, the rule must be interpreted so as to be reconciled with it, or, if it cannot be reconciled, the rule must give way to the plain terms of the Act." For instance, it is for the legislature to confer a right to appeal or revision, or not to confer. The right so conferred may be restricted one. If the right conferred is unrestricted the executive cannot regulate the right in procedural matters but cannot impose impediments and restrictions of an onerous and burdensome in its exercise not contemplated by the statute under which the right is conferred. It is well recognized principle of interpretation of the statues that if the rules framed in the statues are in excess of provisions of the statutes or are in contravention or inconsistent with such provision then these must be regarded ultra virus of the statutes and cannot be given effect to. 10. It is well recognized principle of interpretation of the statues that if the rules framed in the statues are in excess of provisions of the statutes or are in contravention or inconsistent with such provision then these must be regarded ultra virus of the statutes and cannot be given effect to. 10. In view of the above, it is clear that rules framed under the Act cannot supersede the power of the revisional authority under the Act and therefore, the revision under 48 (1) of the Act would be maintainable before the revisional authority against the order passed in Appeal under sub-rule 3 of Rule 109-A of the Rules. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to file revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act against the impugned orders. The writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to him. No order as to costs.