JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Aggrieved by the non-selection of the petitioner for distributorship of LPG under 'Rajiv Gandhi Gramin LPG Vitrak Yojna' (for short 'RGGLV'), the petitioner has filed the instant petition for grant of the following substantive reliefs: "(a) That the writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the office letter dated 21.04.2012 (Annexure P-10) passed by the respondent No.2. (b) That the writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents No.1 and 2 for issuance of allotment letter for distributor for setting up award of Rajiv Gandhi Gramin LPG located at Gwalthai, Tehsil Shri-Naina-Devi Ji, District Bilaspur, H.P." 2. An advertisement for selection of distributorship 'RGGLV' was published in 'Dainik Jagran' and 'Dainik Bhaskar' on December, 20, 2011. The petitioner applied for the same, however, during the process of scrutiny and examination of the application form along with documents attached therewith, it was detected that the petitioner did not own and possess any land in her own name or family unit as on or before the date of advertisement as defined in the guidelines. Hence, the candidature of the petitioner was declared ineligible. However, the petitioner thereafter was afforded an opportunity to make representation in compliance of Clause 12.4 of the brochure. The petitioner accordingly submitted her representation in person on 21.03.2012, but the same was replied and rejected vide letter dated 21.04.2012 on the ground that she was "ineligible" as per Clause-9 of the advertisement. It is in this background that the petitioner has filed the instant petition for the reliefs as quoted above. 3. It is vehemently argued by Shri J.R. Poswal, learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned letter dated 21.04.2012 is wrong, illegal and, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 4. On the other hand, Shri Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondents, would contend that since the action of the respondents is strictly in accordance with the provisions as contained in the brochure qua selection of distributorship which essentially may not be to the liking of the petitioner, she cannot make out a ground and try and make out a grievance when there really exists none as the petitioner has failed to supply the documents of ownership of land in terms as required under Clause 9 of the advertisement. Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed with costs. Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed with costs. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the documents available on record. 5. First of all, it has to be examined under what circumstances and conditions, this Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, especially, in matters relating to the distributorship of LPG. The question is no longer res integra in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Shukla vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and others, (2014) 3 SCC 493 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the Court should not ordinarily exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters, particularly, when they relate to contractual matters. It shall be apposite to refer to the observations as contained in para Nos. 15 to 19 which read as under: "15. We cannot help observing that in the present case exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution has been with a somewhat free hand oblivious of the note of caution struck by this Court with regard to such exercise, particularly, in contractual matters. The present, therefore, may be an appropriate occasion to recall some of the observations of this Court in the above context. 16. In Raunaq International Ltd. Vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 492 , (paragraphs 9, 10 and 11) this Court had held as follows :- (SCC pp. 500-01) "9. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are of paramount importance are commercial considerations. These would be: (1) the price at which the other side is willing to do the work; (2) whether the goods or services offered are of the requisite specifications; (3) whether the person tendering has the ability to deliver the goods or services as per specifications. These would be: (1) the price at which the other side is willing to do the work; (2) whether the goods or services offered are of the requisite specifications; (3) whether the person tendering has the ability to deliver the goods or services as per specifications. When large works contracts involving engagement of substantial manpower or requiring specific skills are to be offered, the financial ability of the tenderer to fulfil the requirements of the job is also important; (4) the ability of the tenderer to deliver goods or services or to do the work of the requisite standard and quality; (5) past experience of the tenderer and whether he has successfully completed similar work earlier; (6) time which will be taken to deliver the goods or services; and often (7) the ability of the tenderer to take follow-up action, rectify defects or to give post-contract services. Even when the State or a public body enters into a commercial transaction, considerations which would prevail in its decision to award the contract to a given party would be the same. However, because the State or a public body or an agency of the State enters into such a contract, there could be, in a given case, an element of public law or public interest involved even in such a commercial transaction. 10. What are these elements of public interest? (1) Public money would be expended for the purposes of the contract. (2) The goods or services which are being commissioned could be for a public purpose, such as, construction of roads, public buildings, power plants or other public utilities. (3) The public would be directly interested in the timely fulfilment of the contract so that the services become available to the public expeditiously. (4) The public would also be interested in the quality of the work undertaken or goods supplied by the tenderer. Poor quality of work or goods can lead to tremendous public hardship and substantial financial outlay either in correcting mistakes or in rectifying defects or even at times in redoing the entire work - thus involving larger outlays of public money and delaying the availability of services, facilities or goods, e.g., a delay in [pic]commissioning a power project, as in the present case, could lead to power shortages, retardation of industrial development, hardship to the general public and substantial cost escalation. 11. 11. When a writ petition is filed in the High Court challenging the award of a contract by a public authority or the State, the court must be satisfied that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition. If, for example, the dispute is purely between two tenderers, the court must be very careful to see if there is any element of public interest involved in the litigation. A mere difference in the prices offered by the two tenderers may or may not be decisive in deciding whether any public interest is involved in intervening in such a commercial transaction. It is important to bear in mind that by court intervention, the proposed project may be considerably delayed thus escalating the cost far more than any saving which the court would ultimately effect in public money by deciding the dispute in favour of one tenderer or the other tenderer. Therefore, unless the court is satisfied that there is a substantial amount of public interest, or the transaction is entered into mala fide, the court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputes between two rival tenderers." 17. In Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 617 there was a further reiteration of the said principle in the following terms:- (SCC pp. 623-24, para 7) "7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 , CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492 . The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." 18. A Similar reiteration is to be found in Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. Vs. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 138 , Tejas Constructions and Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. Municipal Council, Sendhwa and Another, (2012) 6 SCC 464 and several other pronouncements reference to which would only be repetitive and, therefore, is best avoided. 19. We have felt it necessary to reiterate the need of caution sounded by this Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove in view of the serious consequences that the entertainment of a writ petition in contractual matters, unless justified by public interest, can entail. Delay in the judicial process that seems to have become inevitable could work in different ways. We have felt it necessary to reiterate the need of caution sounded by this Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove in view of the serious consequences that the entertainment of a writ petition in contractual matters, unless justified by public interest, can entail. Delay in the judicial process that seems to have become inevitable could work in different ways. Deprivation of the benefit of a service or facility to the public; escalating costs burdening the public exchequer and abandonment of half completed works and projects due to the ground realities in a fast changing economic/market scenario are some of the pitfalls that may occur." 6. Similar reiteration of law can be found in a judgment rendered by a learned Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOC) & others, (2015) 1 LatestHLJ 27 (HP) and another judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Chander Pathania vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and others, (2016) 5 ILR(HP) 1749. 7. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the case of the petitioner has been rejected as she failed to meet the requirement of Clause-9 of the advertisement which reads as under: 9. Details of land for construction of godown & showroom:- In case applicant does not provide any information, then it will be deemed that applicant does not have required land and hence applicant will be ineligible for RGGLV Please provide the details of Land as per the format. Registered Sale Deed/gift deed/ Mutation and government record etc. The Date of the documents have to be on or before the date of application. Consent from the family member in form of Notorized Affidavit (Appendix-C) is required. If required, certificate from the concerned authority stating that the land is free from live overhead power transmission or telephone lines. 8. At this stage, it would be necessary to take note of relevant portion of Clause 4(g) of the brochure wherein it has been provided as under: "(g). Own a suitable land (plot) of minimum 20 metre X 24 metre in dimension at the advertised RGGLV location for construction of LPG cylinder Storage Godown. Own means having clear ownership title of the property in the name of applicant/family member of the "Family Unit" as defined in multiple dealership/distributorship norm. Own a suitable land (plot) of minimum 20 metre X 24 metre in dimension at the advertised RGGLV location for construction of LPG cylinder Storage Godown. Own means having clear ownership title of the property in the name of applicant/family member of the "Family Unit" as defined in multiple dealership/distributorship norm. In case of ownership/co-ownership by family member, consent letter from the family member will be required." 9. The petitioner admittedly on or before the date of application was not having land in her own name or in the name of her family unit and, therefore, no fault can be found in the action of the respondents whereby they have rejected the application of the petitioner. 10. Clause-16 of the brochure provides as under: "If any information furnished by the applicant is found to be false at any point of time before or after appointment as a RGGLV, the allotment shall be cancelled forthwith and RGGLV terminated in case commissioned." 11. It is vehemently argued by Shri Poswal that the petitioner had already submitted lease deed dated 21.07.2010 and, therefore, there was substantial compliance with the provisions of the brochure as also advertisement and, therefore, her case should not have been rejected. This contention is absolutely fallacious and is outrightly rejected because even in the lease deed submitted by the petitioner, the land is not leased out in her name. This is in addition to the fact that the lease deed was otherwise not admissible and could not be a substitute for a title deed. 12. Shri Poswal would then argue that the petitioner had given a title deed of another piece of land in the name of her husband and the same ought to have been considered by the respondents. Even this contention is equally without merit as the land offered by the petitioner that was standing in the name of her husband was situated in Mauza Dhalet, whereas, RGGLV has been advertised for Kasba/Village Gwalthai. 13. As a last ditch effort, learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that the respondents should have taken into consideration the sale deed dated 19.03.2012 which is in the name of the petitioner. 13. As a last ditch effort, learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that the respondents should have taken into consideration the sale deed dated 19.03.2012 which is in the name of the petitioner. However, even this contention is without merit as the sale deed is for another Khasra No. 122/115/3 and the details of the same have not been mentioned in the application form for the obvious reason that the last date for application along with documents was 20.01.2012, whereas, the sale deed has been executed two months thereafter on 19.03.2012 and, therefore, cannot be considered at this stage as admittedly the petitioner was not owner in possession of any land much less the land mentioned in the sale deed dated 19.03.2012 on the date of submission of the application i.e. 20.01.2012. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.