ORDER : 1. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking for the following reliefs:- (a) For quashing the order contained in Memo No. 5125 dated 02.10.2010 (Annexure 1) whereby major penalty of dismissal from service has been passed against the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh. (b) For quashing the appellate order contained in Memo No. 750 dated 13.05.2011 (Annexure 3) passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, whereby the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. Facts, as derived from the writ petition, are that in the year 2007 the petitioner was posted as Police No. 15 in Hazaribagh and thereafter he was transferred to Ramgarh District and there he was promoted as Hawaldar and thereafter again transferred to Chatra District. Suddenly on 30.10.2010, the petitioner was served with dismissal order contained in Memo No. 5125 dated 02.10.2010 (Annexure 1), wherein services of the petitioner was terminated pursuant to alleged Departmental Proceeding No. 63/2007. In the year 2011 the petitioner preferred appeal which was also dismissed vide Annexure-3. 3. Mr. Ashutosh Anand, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that pursuant to the dismissal order, the petitioner for the first came to know that he has been dismissed from service pursuant to a departmental proceeding. It was further submitted that the allegations are false and baseless and after completing 20 years of service, without any show cause notice, the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 4. Per contra, a counter affidavit has been filed. Mr. Vijayant Verma, learned counsel appearing for the State, who has submitted that the petitioner used to attend his duty at S.P. residence in drunken state, for which a written report dated 30.06.2007 was made by a Havaldar. The Sergeant Major vide Memo No. 5055 dated 17.07.2007 also reported to the Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh that the petitioner came outside his chamber in intoxicated condition. Some further complaints dated 15.07.2007 and 17.07.2007 were also made against the petitioner. Learned State Counsel further submits that the petitioner was suspended and a charge Memo No. 5742 dated 14.08.2007 was served upon him. It is further submitted that the conducting officer fixed several dates in the departmental proceeding, but the petitioner did not turn up. Thereafter enquiry report dated 13.10.2010 was submitted. Learned State Counsel further submits that the petitioner was suspended and a charge Memo No. 5742 dated 14.08.2007 was served upon him. It is further submitted that the conducting officer fixed several dates in the departmental proceeding, but the petitioner did not turn up. Thereafter enquiry report dated 13.10.2010 was submitted. Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh vide Memo No. 748 dated 12.02.2010 issued a second show cause notice to the petitioner for filing his explanation against the proposed dismissal order, but the petitioner did not submit explanation to the second show cause notice and the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of enquiry report and other materials available on record, dismissed the petitioner vide Annexure-1. The appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed vide Annexure-3. 5. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. From perusal of the documents brought on record and after going through the counter affidavit and submission of the parties, it appears that in the charge-sheet, several witnesses have been mentioned and the basis of proceeding was a complaint of Hawaldar Shatrughan Prasad Singh, Hasan Imam and Ranjay Kumar on different consecutive dates i.e. 02.03.2007, 30.06.2007 and 15.07.2007 respectively regarding consumption of liquor in the duty period and also regarding using abusive words against the fellow police officials. From the enquiry report, which was not served to the petitioner, which is apparent from the order of the Superintendent of Police, it appears that only Ranjay Kumar was examined and other witnesses Shatrughan Prasad Singh and Hasan Imam were not examined. No opportunity of cross-examination was ever given to the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer passed the order ex parte. The coy of the enquiry report was not served to the petitioner which is evident from the order passed by the Superintendent of Police. Even the 2nd show cause given to the petitioner was a mere formality. The plea taken by the respondents-State that the petitioner never appeared in the departmental proceeding, is not accepted to this Court, because nothing has been brought on record to show that for serving notice upon the petitioner, any step for substituted service was ever taken or the Superintendent of Police of the native District, to which the petitioner belonged, was ever intimated regarding the whereabouts of the petitioner. 6. 6. Rule 843 of the Police Manual is very clear on the point under which if any officer does not return in time on duty, enquiries shall be made by the Superintendent/Commandant within one week from the S.P. of the native district and should there appear that the officer has not returned to his duties in time for good reasons, he should be suspended and departmental proceeding should be undertaken as per rule. In the instant case, nothing has been brought on record to show that ever enquiry was made from the S.P. of the native district. 7. Rule 828(b) read with Appendix 49 of the Police Manual clarifies that without prejudice to the provision of the Public Servants Enquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal shall be passed on any police officer (other than an order passed on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. 8. A Court sitting in appeal against a punishment imposed in a disciplinary proceeding will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty. However, if the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court, then the Court would mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary authority/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rate cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the Court would interfere in such a case. 9. Similar view has been taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 442 , which reads as under:- “15...........It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeated the same view in the case of Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 , which reads as under:- “25...........The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 11. In the instant case, copy of the enquiry report was not served to the petitioner which is apparent from the order of the disciplinary authority. The finding of the Enquiry Officer is further bad in law in view of relevant provisions of the Police Manual, mentioned above and also in view of the facts that neither the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet have been examined, nor any opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine them, nor the doctor, who had given the report, has been examined during enquiry and as a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, the finding of the enquiry officer is totally perverse and fit to be quashed and set aside. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (2003) 8 SCC 9 has further held as under:- “6............if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation. It may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the above noted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.” 13. It may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the above noted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.” 13. In the aforesaid circumstances, the punishment of dismissal on ground of intoxication is totally disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and the same certainly shocks judicial conscience. 14. As a sequitur of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order at Annexure 1 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the respondents-authorities to take a fresh decision on the quantum of punishment other than the order of dismissal.