JUDGMENT : Rohit B. Deo, J. 1. The applicants are invoking inherent power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Code) to assail the order dated 14-1-2019 rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Akola in Sessions Trial 43/2015, by and under which the application preferred by the accused under Section 91 of the Code is rejected. 2. Heard learned Counsel Shri S.V. Sirpurkar for the applicants and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Smt. Ritu Sharma for the respondent-State. With consent, the application is finally heard at the admission stage. 3. The applicants are facing prosecution for offence punishable under Sections 376(g), 342 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 4. The genesis of the prosecution is first information report dated 04-11-2014. 5. The charge is framed. 6. The applicants-accused preferred an application under Section 91 of the Code seeking production of the documents of enquiry conducted by the Police Station Officer, Murtizapur as regards the earlier reports dated 04-9-2014 and 06-9-2014. 7. In the application under Section 91 of the Code, it is averred that prior to the first information report dated 04-11-2014 on the basis of which the offence is registered, the first informant lodged report on 04-9-2014 the entry of which is taken in the station diary at Serial 45/2014. Thereafter, on 06-9-2014 one Biju Pralhad Solanke lodged a report which is recorded in the station diary at Serial 19/2014. An enquiry ensued in the afore mentioned reports in which the statements of Shamrao Narayan Athawale-the President of the Tanta Mukti Committee, Pravin Athawale, Ravi Uike, Ganesh Uike, Ramkrushna Banekar, Anusaya Madavi, Anil Madavi and Hari Narayan Sardar-accused 2 were recorded. It is further averred that since the police found that no cognizable offence is made out, no action was taken pursuant to the two reports. It is then averred that the cousin brother of applicant 2 preferred applications dated 05-9-2014 and 04-11-2014 seeking information and documents connected with the enquiry, under the provisions of the Right to Information Act. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Murtizapur refused to provide the copies of the report and the relevant documents relying on the provisions of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act. 8. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Murtizapur refused to provide the copies of the report and the relevant documents relying on the provisions of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act. 8. It is averred in the application that the documents of which production is sought are necessary to unable the accused to put forth proper defence. The Public Prosecutor opposed the application under Section 91 of the Code. The cryptic reply in the opposition contends that the accused cannot force the prosecution to act as per the whim and choice of the accused. Pertinently, the prosecution did not plead that the documents of which production was sought are not relevant or necessary for effective defence. 9. The learned Sessions Judge correctly appreciated and articulated the position of law in paragraph 7 of the order impugned which reads thus : "7. Section 91 of the Code empowers a Court to issue summons to a person to produce before the Court, a document or thing believed to be in possession of such person if the Court considers the production of such documents or other things necessary or desirable for the purpose of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. The scope of Section 91 is very wide and obviously, it cannot be restricted only to the documents on which the prosecution relies, nor the stage contemplated by Section 233 or 243 of the Code. There may be cases where for an effective cross-examination of a witness, the cross-examiner would require certain documents in his hand. Without the availability of such documents, the rights and obligations of a cross-examiner under section 155(3) and 145 of the Evidence Act, cannot be effectively discharged or exercised by him. To overcome such a situation, he can urge the Court to supply such documents to him. If they are in the Court, copies thereof can be supplied, but if they are not, the Court would be expected to use the powers under Section 91 of the Code, whenever it finds necessary or desirable. To overcome unfair or just result, the Court certainly would be entitled to exercise the powers under Section 91 of the Code, which section is widely framed and contains nothing to indicate otherwise. To overcome unfair or just result, the Court certainly would be entitled to exercise the powers under Section 91 of the Code, which section is widely framed and contains nothing to indicate otherwise. It is not that the documents called for by the accused, must be called by the Court, just for asking, but, surely, that the prosecution is not relying on such documents cannot be a consideration that should weigh in deciding such application made by an accused." However, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the application reasoning that the charge-sheet contains all the relevant documents which appear to be necessary and desirable for the proper and just adjudication of the matter. The learned Sessions Judge, however, did not advert muchless adjudicate on the submission that the documents of which production is sought are necessary to enable the accused to put forth an effective defence. 10. The power of the Court to issue summons to a person to produce a document or thing believed to be in possession of such person, if the Court considers the production of such documents or other things necessary or desirable for the purpose of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Court, is by its very nature wide. A discretion is conferred which the Court must exercise judiciously. The grant or refusal of the prayer to produce documents must be supported by recording reasons. Irrefutably, the documents of which production is sought are in possession of the investigating agency. The accused are seeking production of the documents on the premise that the reports lodged prior to the first information report on the basis of which the crime is registered and the statements of witnesses recorded are necessary to enable the accused to put forth an effective defence. It does not appear from the order impugned that the learned Sessions Judge addressed the desirability of producing the documents on the touchstone of the contentions raised in the application under Section 91 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge observes that the charge-sheet contains all the relevent documents which appear to be necessary and desirable for the proper and just adjudication of the matter. The learned Sessions Judge clearly erred in not recording any reason for rejecting the contention that the previously lodged reports and the documents of enquiry would assist the accused in effectively defending the charge. 11. The learned Sessions Judge clearly erred in not recording any reason for rejecting the contention that the previously lodged reports and the documents of enquiry would assist the accused in effectively defending the charge. 11. Be it noted, that while granting anticipatory bail to the accused this Court referred to the previous two reports lodged by the complainant Biju Mangesh Madavi. This Court observes thus in the order of bail dated 16-12-2014 : "I am not inclined to accept the contention made by learned A.P.P. for the reason that there are two first information reports filed in this case by the complainant Sou. Biju w/o Mangesh Madavi. The first report is dated 04-9-2014 in which it has been alleged by the complainant that her mother-in-law, Anusaya instigates the applicant to drive the complainant out of her house and harass her and also ignites quarrel between the complainant on the one hand and her in-laws on the other hand. On the basis of subsequent report dated 04-11-2014, an FIR for the offences punishable under Sections 376-G, 342, 506 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 3(i)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act vide Crime No.242/2014 has been registered against the present applicant and others. From the nature of allegations made in the subsequent report, one can prima facie see that the grievance disclosed by those allegations was also there in existence on 04-9-2014 and yet, the complainant did not vent that grievance there. It would show that possibility of some extraneous reason having weighed with the complainant in making the subsequent FIR containing some exaggerated facts is not ruled out and this creates prima facie doubt about the genuineness of the allegations made against the applicant." I am satisfied, that it was not appropriate for the learned Sessions Judge to brush aside the contention of the accused that the documents of which production is sought would enable the accused to defend themselves effectively, on the premise, that the charge-sheet contains all the relevant documents which appear to be necessary and desirable for the proper and just adjudication of the matter. 12. It would be useful to note the following observations of this Court in Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) CriLJ 858. "33. 12. It would be useful to note the following observations of this Court in Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) CriLJ 858. "33. Section 91 of the Code empowers a Court to issue summons to a person 'to produce before the Court, a document or thing believed to be in possession of such person if the Court considers the production of such documents or other things necessary or desirable for the purpose of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. The scope of Section 91 is very wide and obviously, it cannot be restricted only to the documents on which the prosecution relies, nor to the stage contemplated by Section 233 or 243 of the Code. There may be cases where for an effective cross-examination of a witness, the cross-examiner would require certain documents in his hand. Without the availability of such documents, the rights and obligations of a cross-examiner under Sections 155(3) and 145 of the Evidence Act, cannot be effectively discharged or exercised by him. To overcome such a situation, he can urge the Court to supply such documents to him. It they are in the Court, copies thereof can be supplied, but if they are not, the Court would be expected to use the powers under Section 91 of the Code, whenever it finds it necessary or desirable. To overcome an unfair or unjust result, the Court certainly would be entitled to exercise the powers under Section 91 of the Code, which section is widely framed and contains nothing to indicate otherwise. It is not that the documents called for by the accused, must be called by the Court, just for asking, but, surely, that the prosecution is not relying on such documents cannot be a consideration that should weigh in deciding such application made by an accused." 13. It is trite law that graver the offence and harsher the punishment the more onerous the burden on the investigating agency to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The jurisprudential logic may as well be relevant to the exercise of power under Section 91 of the Code albeit with different contours. It is trite law that graver the offence and harsher the punishment the more onerous the burden on the investigating agency to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The jurisprudential logic may as well be relevant to the exercise of power under Section 91 of the Code albeit with different contours. The discretion, which at first blush, appears to be absolute must be exercised judiciously and if in the perception of the accused production of certain documents are vital to defence, the perception must be addressed liberally and from the prism of the defence unless the prosecution makes out a compelling case for rejection of an application under Section 91 of the Code or if the Court finds that the documents of which production is sought are absolutely irrelevant. 14. I am satisfied, that a case is made out to interfere with the order impugned ex debito justiae. 15. The order impugned is set aside. The application under Section 91 of the Code (Annexure-I) is allowed. 16. The application is allowed.