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2019 DIGILAW 14 (KER)

Sayishkumar v. State of Kerala

2019-01-07

A.M.SHAFFIQUE, N.ANIL KUMAR

body2019
JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the judgment dated 18.10.2013 and order on sentence dated 21.10.2013, passed by the Court of Session at Thalassery in S.C.No.1/2012, the appellant is before this Court. 2. Facts, shorn of unnecessary details, as unfolded by the prosecution are mentioned hereinbelow:- The appellant/accused Sayishkumar and the deceased Ambili, daughter of PW2 Achuthan and PW3 Radha, got married on 17.5.1993 at Sreekrishna Swamy Temple, Mahe and out of the aforesaid wedlock, PW4 V.Dhanya and PW7 V.Dharesh were born. The deceased at the time of marriage was employed as an 'Anganawady' worker for sometime and thereafter, the deceased was working as a salesgirl in a nearby shopping complex and the appellant was employed as a driver. The relationship between the appellant and the deceased was cordial during the first two years. The couple was initially living at Bombay for some time where the appellant was a professional driver and thereafter, settled down at the residence of the appellant. While so, the relationship between the appellant and the deceased became strained. Consequently, the deceased and children left the matrimonial home and started residing at her paternal house by name Panolikandyil House bearing Door No. XII- 101 at Kariyad Panchayath, Peringhathoor Amsom, Settumukku. The appellant was in the habit of demanding more and more money as dowry and constantly suspected the fidelity of the deceased. He was a habitual drunkard. During the month of May,2011, the accused forcibly took his son PW7 along with him to his house and locked him in a room and was set free only by the intervention of the neighbours. Subsequent to this incident, the deceased had filed a complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate against the accused on 13.6.2011. The case was referred to the Police for investigation. After conducting the investigation, the Police filed a charge sheet against the appellant and the court below took cognizance of the offences. C.C.No.463/2011 was pending against the accused. 3. On the fateful day of 5th July, 2011, at around 8 pm., PW2 was sitting on the veranda of his house. His wife PW3 was inside the house and was cutting vegetables. PW2's granddaughter (PW4) was sitting in the office room and his grandson (PW7) was studying on the upper floor of the house. 3. On the fateful day of 5th July, 2011, at around 8 pm., PW2 was sitting on the veranda of his house. His wife PW3 was inside the house and was cutting vegetables. PW2's granddaughter (PW4) was sitting in the office room and his grandson (PW7) was studying on the upper floor of the house. All of a sudden, the appellant came to PW2's house through the steps leading to the house and the latter saw the appellant only when he was barely ten metres away from him. On confronting the appellant, PW2 tried to shut the entrance door. However, the appellant forcefully intruded into the house and started to abuse the deceased, who was cooking food in the kitchen. Seeing him, the deceased ran from the kitchen through the courtyard towards the gate in order to escape from the clutches of the accused. However, the appellant overpowered her, caught hold of her from her back, dragged her towards him, threw her on the ground and inflicted stab injuries on various parts of her body with MO1 chisel, he possessed. PW2 tried to prevent the appellant from inflicting further injuries on her, by holding him away from her. On hearing the hue and cry, some neighbours rushed to the house. The accused ran away from the spot, throwing away the chisel. Immediately after the occurrence, the deceased was taken to the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital at Thalassery. When the deceased was lifted from the place of occurrence, injuries were noted all over the body and her body was completely drenched in blood. The deceased succumbed to the injuries later at 9.30 p.m. 4. At about 11.25 p.m., PW1, who is none other than the uncle of the deceased, lodged Ext.P1 FIS before the SHO, Chokli Police Station touching the occurrence. On receiving the information, PW20 recorded Ext.P1 FIS and registered Ext.P1(a) FIR. 5. The appellant was arrested on 6.7.2011. After completion of the investigation, the Police filed a charge sheet against the appellant before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thalasseri, who later committed the case for trial to the court of Sessions, Thalassery. 6. On the basis of the materials on record, the trial court framed charge against the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In essence, the accused pleaded innocence and false implication. 6. On the basis of the materials on record, the trial court framed charge against the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In essence, the accused pleaded innocence and false implication. Nevertheless, he admitted in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the deceased had preferred a complaint against him before the jurisdictional Magistrate and it was later registered as CC No.463/2011. He also admitted that on 5.7.2011, he went to the residence of the deceased to visit his children as they were residing separately from him. According to him, when he reached the house, he had seen the deceased talking with a stranger in the courtyard and when he went near them, a scuffle ensued between him and the stranger, during which the stranger stabbed the deceased and ran away from the spot. 7. During the trial, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 23 and marked Exts.P1 to P19 and MO1 to MO9. Exts.D1 to D3 contradictions were marked. The defence, however, did not adduce any other evidence. 8. On conclusion of the trial, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, the trial court by judgment dated 18.10.2013 found that the prosecution had been able to prove their case beyond doubt. The learned trial Judge thereafter considered the matter on 21.10.2013 and had imposed the sentence of imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,00,000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid equally to PW4 Dhanya and PW7 Dharesh, the children of the deceased. The said order of conviction and sentence imposed by the court below is under challenge in this appeal. 9. Heard Sri.Ajoy.P.B., the learned counsel for the appellant and Smt.S.Ambika Devi, the learned Special Public Prosecutor. 10. Challenging the appreciation of evidence and findings recorded by the learned trial Judge, learned counsel Sri.Ajoy.P.B. appearing on behalf of the appellant very ably argued the appeal before us. He highlighted various aspects, which were relied on by the trial court for basing its order of conviction and sentence. He mainly contended that MO1 chisel was not carried by the appellant when he was coming to the house of PW2. He highlighted various aspects, which were relied on by the trial court for basing its order of conviction and sentence. He mainly contended that MO1 chisel was not carried by the appellant when he was coming to the house of PW2. In fact, it was contended that there was no evidence that the appellant was in possession of MO1 chisel at the time of occurrence. He also contended that the motive to commit the crime was not proved. Learned counsel referred to Laxman Kalu Nikalje v. The State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1968 SC 1390 ) and Dewan Chand and Ors. v. State (24 (1983) DLT 152), in support of his contention that the trial court was not justified in convicting the accused under Section 302 of I.P.C. In support of his contention, he relied on the oral evidence of PWs.2 to 4 and 7 and contended that even assuming that there is evidence to prove his involvement, the appellant had no intention to cause the death of the deceased. 11. On the other hand, Smt.S.Ambika Devi, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the allegation of murder is proved based on cogent and convincing evidence. Pws.2 to 4 and 7 are eye witnesses to the occurrence and nothing is brought out in cross-examination to discredit the evidence tendered by PWs.2 to 4 and 7, who were present at the scene of occurrence, on the fateful day. The learned Public Prosecutor denied the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the offence is not a case of murder. In order to support the contention, the learned Public Prosecutor mainly relied on the conduct of the accused on the date of occurrence and prior to the date of occurrence. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, intoxicated by alcoholic effect, the appellant, on several occasions, ill-treated and manhandled the deceased. The learned Public Prosecutor emphasized the conduct of the accused in forcibly taking into custody of PW7 and locking him in a room. Heavy reliance is also placed on the medical certificate and the postmortem certificate issued. 12. PW12 Dr.P.P.Premnath issued Ext.P5 wound certificate on 5.7.2011 at 9 p.m., when the deceased was brought to the Indira Gandhi Hospital, Thalassery at 9 pm with cut injuries. The injuries noted by PW12 in Ext.P5 wound certificate are as follows: “1. Heavy reliance is also placed on the medical certificate and the postmortem certificate issued. 12. PW12 Dr.P.P.Premnath issued Ext.P5 wound certificate on 5.7.2011 at 9 p.m., when the deceased was brought to the Indira Gandhi Hospital, Thalassery at 9 pm with cut injuries. The injuries noted by PW12 in Ext.P5 wound certificate are as follows: “1. Incised wound 10x5 cm over left thigh. 2. Incised wound 3x2 cm. over left thigh. 3. Penetrating injury left side of abdomen. 4. Incised wound over right thigh, left breast, right forearm.” PW12 stated that though she was admitted in ICU, she expired at 9.30 pm on the same day due to shock and hemorrhage and hence the body was sent for postmortem examination. 13. PW13 Dr.Gopalakirshnan Pillai, Professor of Forensic Medicine, Medical College, Pariyaram conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased and prepared Ext.P6 postmortem certificate. PW13 noted 16 injuries on the body of the deceased. The injuries are as follows:- “1. Wedge shaped stab wound, 3x1.3cm, obliquely placed on the left breast, the upper inner blunt end being 6cm to the left of midline and 11cm below the collar bone. There was a linear cut, 5cm long from the middle of its outer margin, directed upwards and outwards. The wound passed upwards, backwards and inwards through the muscle plane to terminate by making a small cut injury on the body of the sternum just below the sternal angle. The depth of wound was 9cm. 2. Incised wound 3.5x0.8cm., oblique on the front of right forearm,6cm above the wrist. There was a railing 1 cm long, from its lower outer end, directed downwards and outwards. 3. Incised wound 3.5x1 cm vertical on the inner aspect of right palm, close to the wrist. 4. Incised wound 4x1 cm vertical on the back of right palm, 2cm behind injury No.3. The lower end of the wound was blunt. The injury was connected to injury No.3, through the muscle plane for a distance of 2.5 cm. 5. Superficial incised wound 1.7x0.5 cm., on the back of right forearm,at its middle. 6. Contusion 2x2 cm on the back of right upper arm, at its middle part. 7. Abrasion 0.5x0.5cm on the back of left elbow. 8. Wedge shaped incised penetrating wound 3.5x1x5cm vertical in the left flank. Upper end of the wound was blunt. The wound terminated by just penetrating into the abdominal cavity. 9. 6. Contusion 2x2 cm on the back of right upper arm, at its middle part. 7. Abrasion 0.5x0.5cm on the back of left elbow. 8. Wedge shaped incised penetrating wound 3.5x1x5cm vertical in the left flank. Upper end of the wound was blunt. The wound terminated by just penetrating into the abdominal cavity. 9. Incised stab wound 6x1 cm on the upper part of left inner thigh, 4cm outer to the vagina. It was directed upwards and inwards for a depth of 10 cm. 10. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 4x1 cm, obliquely placed on the front of right thigh, 6cm above the knee. The inner lower end of the wound was blunt. The wound traversed the muscle plane for 10 cm., to come out at the inner aspect of thigh (1.5x0.4cm). The track of the wound was directed upwards and inwards. 11. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 7.5x3cm obliquely placed on the outer aspect of left upper thigh, with a side cut 2.5x1.5 cm starting from the middle part of upper margin and directed upwards and backwards. The wound traversed the muscle plane for 8.5 cm to come out 2 cm below the above injury (5.5x2cm). The track of the wound was directed downwards and outwards. 12. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 3x1.5x6cm, vertical, on the left thigh, 5cm below the exit wound of injury No.11. The wound was directed upwards and inwards. 13. Linear abrasion 7cm, long, horizontal on the outer aspect of middle of left leg. 14. Incised wound 3.5x0.8 cm, oblique on the outer aspect of left ankle. 15. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 4x1cm, obliquely placed on the back of right upper thigh, the upper outer end of the wound was split. The wound, directed forwards, upwards and inwards almost transfixed the thigh and terminated by severing the femoral vessels, there was no exit wound. The track measured 12 cms. 16. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 4x0.7 cm., obliquely placed 6.5 cm above injury No.15. It was directed forwards, downwards and inwards for a depth of 7cm.” 14. We have been taken through the entire documents, oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution at length. 15. Immediately after the occurrence, the Police Party recovered MO1 chisel from the occurrence place. Wedge shaped incised stab wound 4x0.7 cm., obliquely placed 6.5 cm above injury No.15. It was directed forwards, downwards and inwards for a depth of 7cm.” 14. We have been taken through the entire documents, oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution at length. 15. Immediately after the occurrence, the Police Party recovered MO1 chisel from the occurrence place. It is brought out in evidence that the said weapon was available at the workshop owned by PW10, the Proprietor of M/s.Shameena Wood Industries, Chavakkad, where the appellant was employed. The fact that PW11, an employee of PW10, who had been working in the shop for the last three years, deposed that on getting information that the accused murdered the deceased with a chisel, he noticed one chisel missing from the shop which was being used by the carpenters. MO1 chisel was connected to the crime and the blood stains found therein was confirmed by the subsequent examination by the Chemical Examiner and the Doctor, who testified in court, and stated that the injuries caused to the deceased was possible with MO1 chisel. 16. Recovery of MO1 chisel from the occurrence place immediately after the occurrence is an added factor to prove the prosecution case. PW6, an independent witness alleged to have witnessed the recovery of MO1, supported the case of the prosecution. This is supported by the oral evidence of PW22 the investigation officer in this case. The independent witness categorically stated that MO1 chisel with blood stains was recovered in his presence. In the facts of the case, the recovery of MO1 chisel cannot be doubted, as the independent witness supported the case of the prosecution. The ocular evidence of PWs.2, 3 and 7 was fully corroborated by the Doctor who conducted the postmortem as well. Thus analysed, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant was in possession of MO1 on his arrival at the occurrence place leads us unimpressed and accordingly, we repel the same. 17. It is clear from the evidence that the appellant inflicted several injuries on the deceased. PWs.2, 3 and 7 testified that on account of marital dispute, PW7 was taken into custody by the appellant forcibly and locked inside the house of one of the friends of the appellant. 17. It is clear from the evidence that the appellant inflicted several injuries on the deceased. PWs.2, 3 and 7 testified that on account of marital dispute, PW7 was taken into custody by the appellant forcibly and locked inside the house of one of the friends of the appellant. Consequently, the deceased lodged a complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate and on a reference, the Police filed a final report in this case. The case was pending trial. However, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the person, who caused the injuries on the body, could not be held guilty of murder under Section 302 of IPC, but at the most be held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of IPC. 18. The main question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellant could be held guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 of IPC. 19. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to examine the testimonies of the eye witnesses. From the evidence recorded by the trial court, it is clear that the case of the prosecution is mainly based on the oral evidence of PWs.2 to 4 and 7. PW2, the father of the deceased testified in terms of the prosecution case as stated in paras 2 and 3 (supra). According to him, the appellant came to his residence on 5th July, 2011 in the night around 8 p.m., trespassed into the house and tried to get into the kitchen where the deceased was cooking food. According to PW2, the deceased tried to escape from his clutches by running away from the house soon after she apprehended danger. However, according to PW2, the appellant followed her, caught hold of her roughly, pulled her down on the ground and inflicted several stab injuries on her body with the MO1 chisel. He further deposed that when he went to her rescue, he saw the appellant inflicting injuries on the deceased with MO1 chisel. PW2 further stated before the court below that the appellant inflicted fatally grievous injuries on her body for the mere reason that the deceased had preferred a complaint against him before the jurisdictional Magistrate. He further deposed that when he went to her rescue, he saw the appellant inflicting injuries on the deceased with MO1 chisel. PW2 further stated before the court below that the appellant inflicted fatally grievous injuries on her body for the mere reason that the deceased had preferred a complaint against him before the jurisdictional Magistrate. PW2 further testified that the nature of the injuries inflicted by the appellant were such that the appellant had an intention to do away with her totally. He had identified MO1 as the weapon used by the accused to inflict injuries on her. He had also identified MO2 maxi, the dress worn by the deceased and Mos.3 and 4, the clothes worn by the appellant at the time of occurrence. According to him, there were sufficient electric lights from the house and he had seen clearly the appellant inflicting several stab injuries on the deceased. PW2 testified that he had rushed to save the deceased from further injuries. However, he could not save her as the appellant had already inflicted several fatal injuries on her. By the time he reached the spot where the deceased laid, the appellant had run away from the scene of occurrence throwing away MO1 chisel on the ground. He stated that when he found the deceased lying in a pool of blood, he took her head on his lap and after giving her some water, she was taken to the Indira Gandhi Hospital, Thalassery with the help of the neighbours, who had rushed to the scene of occurrence on hearing the hue and cry. Another eye witness to the occurrence was PW3, who is none other than the wife of PW2 and the mother of the deceased. PW3 supported the prosecution case in full and added that the appellant caught hold of the deceased and latter was struggling to get away from his clutches. She further stated that the appellant inflicted several injuries on the deceased with MO1 and ran away from the scene of occurrence immediately after the occurrence. PW3 stated that besides PWs.2 and 3, PW4 and PW7, the children of the deceased also witnessed the occurrence. The evidence tendered by PWs.4 and 7 is trustworthy and is in support of the prosecution case in full. 20. PW3 stated that besides PWs.2 and 3, PW4 and PW7, the children of the deceased also witnessed the occurrence. The evidence tendered by PWs.4 and 7 is trustworthy and is in support of the prosecution case in full. 20. We may also notice that PW13, the autopsy Doctor had conducted postmortem examination on the body of the deceased and as per Ext.P6 postmortem certificate issued, the deceased sustained as many as 16 injuries all over her body, out of which injuries 2 to 5 were defence injuries. All other injuries were antemortem injuries. After analysing the testimonies of PWs.2 to 4 and 7 and 13 and Ext.P6 postmortem report, we are satisfied beyond doubt that the appellant had inflicted fatal injuries on the deceased and the injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 21. The case was tried by the trial Judge who held that the appellant was guilty of murder. It was not urged before the trial court that the appellant was not guilty of murder, but at the most the appellant could be held guilty under clause (2) of Section 304 of I.P.C. The contention was taken first time before this Court. 22. The trial court came to the conclusion that the direct evidence brought on record contained positive proof, credible evidence, sequence of events, factual truth linking the accused with the commission of murder. The trial court convicted the accused upon the following evidence:- (i) relied upon the statements of PWs.1 to 4 and 7 regarding consistent maltreatment, beating and thrashing the deceased even before the date of occurrence; (ii) PWs.2 and 3 stated that while in a state of intoxication, the appellant used to beat the deceased and quarrelled with her. Hence the deceased and her children were forced to shift the residence to their parental house; (iii) The appellant had been maintaining his criminality consistently; (iv) The appellant forcibly took into custody of PW7 and locked him inside the house of a friend. (v) The conduct of the appellant on the fateful night indicates that he trespassed into the house, threatened the deceased and when the deceased tried to run outside, the appellant followed her and inflicted severe injuries on all over her body. (vi) The appellant was present at the occurrence place. (vii) The injuries found on the victim are sufficient to cause death. (vi) The appellant was present at the occurrence place. (vii) The injuries found on the victim are sufficient to cause death. (viii) The nature of injuries found on the deceased was antemortem. (ix) The appellant did not take the deceased to the hospital and left the place immediately after the occurrence. (x) The appellant brought MO1 chisel with design to cause the death of the deceased. (xi) Considering the nature of injuries found on the deceased, those could not have been caused by accident or negligence. (xii) Testimonies of PWs.2 to 4 and 7 are accepted regarding the time, place, light, nature of fatal injuries sustained by the deceased on the date of occurrence, the manner in which the incident took place as well as the identity of the appellant. 23. As indicated earlier, the deceased suffered a homicidal death in her parental house at a time when her husband was present. On the occurrence day, at about 8 p.m., it is stated by PW6, whose house is situated near to the residence of PW2, that he saw the accused going to the residence of PW2. Evidence tendered by PWs.2 to 4 and 7 would show that the appellant was present at the scene of occurrence on the date and time of occurrence. 24. Once it is proved by the prosecution that the appellant was present at the time of occurrence and the wife suffered a homicidal death, the burden was heavy on the part of the appellant to show how his wife suffered a homicidal death. Section 106 of the Evidence Act requires a person having special knowledge of the fact to explain the same as laid down by the Apex Court in C.S.D.Swamy v. The State ( AIR 1960 SC 7 ), P.N.Krishna Lal and others v. Govt. of Kerala and another (1995 Supp.(2) SCC 187), Sidhartha Vashisht@Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 2010 SC 2352 ) and State of Rajasthan v. Parthu ( (2007) 12 SCC 754 ), this legal position is clarified. The appellant was admittedly present at the residence of PW2 at the time of occurrence. It was for him to explain as to how so many injuries found on the body of the deceased were caused. The appellant was admittedly present at the residence of PW2 at the time of occurrence. It was for him to explain as to how so many injuries found on the body of the deceased were caused. The injuries inflicted all over her body as held by the trial court were caused while attacking her forcibly is a strong circumstance against the appellant, which cannot be brushed aside lightly. More so, in view of the conduct of the accused, majority of the injures was on the front portion of her body which indicates that the deceased was subjected to violence before inflicting injuries. 25. The evidence of PWs. 2 to 4 and 7 also indicate that there was consistent ill-treatment and incidents of beating and thrashing caused to the victim earlier on several occasions. In the 313 statement, the accused admitted his presence at the time of occurrence at the residence of PW2. Yet another circumstance, which points a finger of doubt on the accused is that though he was fully aware that the condition of the deceased was critical and was struggling for water to drink while bleeding due to the injuries sustained on her, he somehow opted to escape from the occurrence place. One of the contentions taken by the appellant/accused is that the stranger attacked the deceased on the date of occurrence whereby the deceased sustained the said injuries. Strange as it may sound, the appellant intentionally left the scene of occurrence and did not take the deceased to the hospital. The deceased was taken to the hospital by PW2 and other neighbours. Needless to say, had the appellant been innocent as contended by him, he would have certainly taken the deceased to the hospital immediately and lodged the complaint before the Police. The conduct of the accused in not taking the deceased to the hospital points a finger of doubt upon him. The lack of logic in several areas of the case is obvious. 26. The contention next raised is that the appellant had no intention to cause death because he did not cause injuries to any vital part of the body of the deceased. The sum and substance of the contention is, whether the facts established bring the case within clause (3) of Section 300 of I.P.C. This contention further narrows down in to consideration of the following two points. The sum and substance of the contention is, whether the facts established bring the case within clause (3) of Section 300 of I.P.C. This contention further narrows down in to consideration of the following two points. (i) Whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the appellant? (ii) If so, whether the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature? If both the points are established, the offence will be of murder irrespective of the fact whether an intention on the part of the accused to cause death had or had not been proved. 27. Now let us consider the principal question before us. The principal question arising for consideration in this appeal is whether the facts and circumstances established by the prosecution against the appellant is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 28. As per the scheme of Indian Penal Code, all murders are culpable homicide, but not vice versa. For the purpose of awarding punishment, directly proportionate to the gravity of the offence, the Indian Penal Code practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 IPC as “Murder”. The second may be termed as culpable homicide of the second degree. The offence is made punishable under first part of Section 304 IPC. Then, there is culpable homicide of the third degree. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for is the lowest among the punishment for three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the Second part of Section 304. The acts done with the intention of causing death will always be murder as defined in clause (1) of Section 300 of IPC and it will be culpable homicide only if the act falls in any of the exceptions of Section 300 IPC. It is pertinent to note that words “intention to cause death” is not an essential requirement of Clause (2) or Clause (3) of Sec. 300 IPC. For Clause (2), the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injuries causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring the murder within the ambit of this Clause. For Clause (2), the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injuries causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring the murder within the ambit of this Clause. Clause (3) of Sec. 300 deals with those cases where the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injuries, which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Judged by the above standards, it can be concluded that the intention to cause death is the essential ingredient of Clause (1) of Section 300 IPC whereas for Clauses (2) and (3), the intention is not for causing death and rather it is limited to the intention to inflict bodily injuries. In the circumstances, the cases falling in Clause (1), the main emphasis is upon the acts done with the intention of causing death. 29. According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1958 SC 465 ), even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be of murder. To consider as to whether the act was done with the intention of causing death, all the acts, utterances and circumstances will be counted together. 30. In Virsa Singh’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, “thirdly”; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present ; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 13. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout), the offence is murder under Section 300 “thirdly”. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. 14. We were referred to a decision of Lord Goddard in R v. Steane ( 1947-I ALL ER 813 at p.816(A) where the learned Chief Justice says that where a particular intent must be laid and charged, that particular intent must be proved. Of course, it must and of course, it must be proved by the prosecution. The only question here is, what is the extent and nature of the intent that S.300 “thirdly” requires, and how is it to be proved?” 15. Of course, it must and of course, it must be proved by the prosecution. The only question here is, what is the extent and nature of the intent that S.300 “thirdly” requires, and how is it to be proved?” 15. The learned counsel for the appellant next relied on a passage where the learned Chief Justice says that: “if, on the totality of the evidence, there is room for more than one view as to the intent of the prisoner, the jury should be directed that it is for the prosecution to prove the intent to the jury's satisfaction, and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they either think that the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted." We agree that that is also the law in India. But so is this. We quote a few sentences earlier from the same learned judgment: “No doubt, if the prosecution proves an act the natural consequences of which would be a certain result and no evidence or explanation is given, then a jury may, on a proper direction, find that the prisoner is guilty of doing the act with the intent alleged.” 31. To judge as to whether the act was done with the intention of causing death, all the acts, utterances and circumstances will be counted together otherwise there will be no difference in cases falling in clause (1) and clause (3) of Sec. 300. To clarify the position, the discussion held in the House of Lords in Regina v. Moloney [(1985)1 All ER 1025] will be significant wherein the point of consideration was whether the accused was having the necessary intent either to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm. The following passage quoted from this judgment clarifies the position: "In deciding the question of the accused man's intent, you will decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances. Members of the jury, it is a question of fact for you to decide. As I said, I think when I was directing you originally, you cannot take the top of a man's head off and look into his mind and actually see what his intent was at any given moment. Members of the jury, it is a question of fact for you to decide. As I said, I think when I was directing you originally, you cannot take the top of a man's head off and look into his mind and actually see what his intent was at any given moment. You have to decide it by reference to what he did, what he said and all the circumstances of the case. An intent may be an impulsive intent or it may be premeditated. Nobody has suggested in this case that there was that element of premeditation. What the prosecution have said is that when he pulled the trigger of that gun it must have been pointing at the deceased and that the accused knew that it was pointing at him, knew it was loaded and when he by a deliberate act pulled the trigger and fired the live barrel of that gun at his stepfather then, say the Crown, he must have intended at the very least to have caused him some really serious bodily injury.” xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx “............To constitute murder what had now to be proved was either an intention to kill (express malice) or an intention to do grievous bodily harm (implied malice). The admirably clear and simple directions to the jury by Hinchcliffe J., the trial judge, were expressly approved as 'impeccable'. Those directions several times indicated that to support a conviction for murder an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm must be proved, but contained no paraphrase or elaboration of what the concept of intention involved.” 32. Now, we shall consider the dictum laid down in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith [(1961) AC 290]. Putting aside for a moment the distinction which the Court of Criminal Appeal was seeking to draw between results which were “certain” and those which were “likely”, the House of Lords relied on Rex v. Lumley ((1911) 22 Cox C.C.635,636). In Rex's case (supra), Avory J. directed the jury in these terms: “When he did the act, did he contemplate, or must he as a reasonable man have contemplated, that death was likely to result, or must he as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result? In Rex's case (supra), Avory J. directed the jury in these terms: “When he did the act, did he contemplate, or must he as a reasonable man have contemplated, that death was likely to result, or must he as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result? If, in your opinion, he must as a reasonable man have contemplated either of those consequences, then your duty is to find him guilty of murder.” 33. PW13 -Dr. Gopalakrishna Pillai has stated that the cause of death was the stab injury on the thigh severing the Femoral vessels. According to him, injury No.11 had a maximum length of 7.5 cm and injury No.8 was penetrating into the abdominal cavity and it was likely to cause death. He also stated that a major blood vessel of the thigh was cut resulting into a fatal injury and all other injuries could have also contributed to death. All the injuries were grouped around vagina, upper thigh and breast. On going through the evidence of PW13, it is clear that the appellant inflicted severe injuries on her body with MO1 chisel and the nature of the overt acts suggest that none of the acts were an impulsive act and rather the manner in which these acts were done clearly establish the acts are being premeditated acts. The manner in which MO1 was used to inflict injuries on the body of the deceased, rules out the possibility that the appellant used MO1 only to overpower the deceased. Although PWs.2 to 4 and 7 cried aloud, the appellant inflicted severe injuries on the deceased in a pre-planned manner, which is clearly evident from the fact that the deceased sustained several other injuries which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. MO1 was applied deep in the body of the deceased resulting in multiple injuries. This would lead to the inference that the accused did the overt acts with the intention of causing death of the deceased. This categorical opinion of the Doctor was not assailed in cross-examination. 34. In the present case, the injuries sustained to the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is nothing to show that injuries were caused accidentally or negligently. This categorical opinion of the Doctor was not assailed in cross-examination. 34. In the present case, the injuries sustained to the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is nothing to show that injuries were caused accidentally or negligently. The motive was to take revenge on the deceased for having filed a case against him before the jurisdictional Magistrate alleging that the appellant was instrumental in forcibly taking into custody of PW7. 35. In the decision reported in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of AP ( (2006)11 SCC 444 ), the Apex Court held that whether there was an intention to cause death has to be gathered from several circumstances and one of the circumstances mentioned is whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot. In the case on hand, it is brought out that it was carried by the appellant right from the beginning and that may be one of the circumstances to indicate that there was an intention to cause death if it was used for attacking the deceased on the vital parts of her body. In the decision reported in Muthu v. State ( 2007 (4) KLT 982 (SC)), the Apex Court held that the observation made in the decision in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy 's case (supra) that “it is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C., are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II” cannot be understood to mean that the court should somehow try to find out some way of treating the offence to be under Section 302 IPC. In our considered opinion, the facts are different in this case. The appellant adopted a strange method to inflict injuries on the deceased. The appellant came to the residence of PW2, intruded into the house and tried to get into the kitchen where the deceased was cooking food. Frightened by his attack, the deceased ran away from the house. However, the appellant followed her, caught hold of her roughly, dragged her down and inflicted several stab injuries with MO1 chisel all over the body. This is a clear case of premeditated attack with intention to cause death. 36. Frightened by his attack, the deceased ran away from the house. However, the appellant followed her, caught hold of her roughly, dragged her down and inflicted several stab injuries with MO1 chisel all over the body. This is a clear case of premeditated attack with intention to cause death. 36. Put shortly, we are satisfied from the forensic evidence that the deceased was attacked by the appellant within the compound of PW2's residence immediately outside his house. It is unlikely that someone would attack the deceased just outside the house and we have no hesitation to reject such a possibility. We are also satisfied that the appellant was carrying MO1 safely with him from the beginning with an intention to cause the death of the deceased. 37. Having regard to the statement of the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem, we are satisfied that the deceased would meet her maker consequent upon the injury on her private part as well. PW13 opined that all the injuries around vagina, upper thigh and breast suggest sexual jealousy on the part of the appellant. The act of complete destruction of most vital parts of the body in the manner indicated in the post-mortem report could never be termed as intending to cause bodily injuries alone and rather it was an act done with an intention of causing death. Express and implied malice were proved by the prosecution. It is a matter of common knowledge that serious injuries sustained to the appellant was not only capable of stopping the metabolism but also preventing blood circulation in the remaining organs. Since the injuries were caused in such a brutal manner, there is no scope for discussing the case from the point of having committed the offence due to the lack of knowledge on the part of the appellant or its consequences. The present case does not fall under any of the exceptions mentioned in Section 300 IPC nor has any such exception been proved by the appellant during the trial. Needless to say all the acts of the accused would squarely fall within the first category of Section 300 IPC as these acts were done with the intention of causing death. The victim also died within a short time due to the injuries suffered by her. 38. Needless to say all the acts of the accused would squarely fall within the first category of Section 300 IPC as these acts were done with the intention of causing death. The victim also died within a short time due to the injuries suffered by her. 38. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there are no valid grounds to alter the conviction of the appellant/accused from one under Section 302 to that under Section 304 Part II of the I.P.C. In our opinion, the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court was based upon proper appreciation of evidence and the circumstances found established by the trial court in the instant case cannot be doubted and brushed aside. Resultantly, we uphold the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the court below for the several reasons set out above. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant will suffer the remaining sentence imposed by the court below.