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2019 DIGILAW 14 (MAN)

Naorem Jugeshwor Singh v. State of Manipur

2019-03-15

KH.NOBIN SINGH

body2019
JUDGMENT : Kh. Nobin Singh, J. 1. Heard Shri Julius Riamei, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner; Shri Y. Ashang, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents and Shri M. Devananda, learned Advocate appearing for the private respondent. 2. By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate to direct the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to cancel order dated 06.09.2018 issued by the respondent No. 1. 3.1 Facts and circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner is a Ph.D. Degree holder in Mathematics and was initially appointed as the Lecturer, Thambal Marik College, Oinam (hereinafter referred to as "the College") on 31.08.1996 and thereafter, on 06.08.2007 the petitioner was appointed as Senior Lecturer of the College and while he was serving in that capacity, on 18.02.2015 the Secretary, Governing Body of the College issued an order stating that the petitioner was appointed temporarily as the Principal in-charge of the College with immediate effect until further orders. 3.2 Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh was appointed as the Principal-in-charge of the College for about 1½ years on the strength of an order passed by this Court in a writ petition being filed by him. However, on 14.05.2018, Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh, the then Principal in-charge of the College, due to his health condition, issued a letter of authority in favour of the petitioner to look after the academic activities of the College and in continuation thereof, on 05.06.2018, the Secretary, Governing Body of the College issued an order stating that as Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh has resigned from the post of the Principal in-charge on health ground, the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge of the College without DDO power with immediate effect and since then, he had been discharging his duties as Principal in-charge without any complaint and also without any blemish and to the satisfaction of the superior officers of the concerned Department. 3.3 On 06.08.2016, the Chairman, MPCB & KVIB, Manipur wrote a D.O letter to the Commissioner (Education), Government of Manipur requesting that the petitioner be declared as the Principal-in-charge of the College with the delegation of DDO power. 3.4 While the petitioner was functioning as the Principal in- charge for about 2(two) years, it was learnt from a reliable source that the respondent Nos. 3.4 While the petitioner was functioning as the Principal in- charge for about 2(two) years, it was learnt from a reliable source that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were initiating process for appointing the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge of the College. On 06.09.2018, the petitioner got a legal notice issued, through his advocate, to the respondent No. 1 and 2 for confirming the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge of the College but on the same date i.e., 06.09.2018, to his utter shock and surprise, the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), the respondent No. 1 issued an order appointing Dr. O. Rajendra Singh, Respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge of the College. Although a copy of the said order was not formally served upon the petitioner, he could get a xerox copy thereof unofficially from a reliable source, from which he came to know that Dr. Rajendra Singh had been allowed to hold the charge of the Principal of the College until further orders. 3.5 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 06.09.2018, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner on the inter-alia grounds that since the respondent No. 3 had crossed the age of 60 years, he was not eligible for appointment as the Principal-in-charge; that the replacement of the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge is against the mandate and the settled position of law; that this Court in writ petition being WP(C) No. 496 of 2016, Dr. Ngangkhom Ibotombi Singh Vs. State of Manipur, relying upon law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court order in State of Haryana Vs. Ors Vs Piara Singh, held that an ad-hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad-hoc or temporary employee and he must be replaced only by a regular selected employee and that the order dated 06-09-2018 is very much un-natural and is not in public interest. 4.1 In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 3, it has been stated that the instant writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that the College is not made a party in the writ petition and that the petitioner has concealed material facts. 4.1 In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 3, it has been stated that the instant writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that the College is not made a party in the writ petition and that the petitioner has concealed material facts. It has further been stated that the respondent No. 3 who was appointed in the year 1983, has been serving in the College more than 30 years and is presently serving as a Senior Lecturer and HOD in Manipuri. He being an approved lecturer, has been enjoying senior scale of pay as per the UGC guidelines since 2002. On 23.09.2006, he was entrusted the task of looking after the office of the Principal, when the Principal was on leave and on 07.12.2006, the Secretary, Governing Body of the College issued an order appointing him as the Principal-in-charge with effect from 01.01.2007 to 07.12.2007 which was issued on the basis of seniority. On 20.06.2014, the Governing Body of the College appointed him as the Principal-in-charge with effect from 20.06.2014. On 01.01.2015 many Senior Lecturers submitted a representation to the Commissioner, Higher Education for appointment of the Principal-in-charge of the College under the administrative control of the Government as the regular Principal was retiring on attainting his age of superannuation. But since the authority i.e., Department of Higher Education, Government of Manipur appointed the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge of the College vide order dated 18.02.2015 without considering the representation, the respondent No. 3 filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 405 of 2015 wherein this Court vide its order dated 05.06.2015 suspended it. An application being MC No. 200 of 2015 filed by the petitioner for vacating the interim order dated 05-06-2015 was rejected. On an approval being conveyed by the Deputy Secretary (Higher Education), Government of Manipur vide a letter 05.02.2016 followed a letter dated 18.02.2016 of the Director of Higher Education, the Secretary, Governing Body of the College issued an order dated 28.02.2016 appointing the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge. Being aggrieved by it, the petitioner filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 131 of 2016 in which this Court was pleased to direct the same to be heard along with WP(C) No. 405 of 2016 and WP(C) No. 41 of 2016. Being aggrieved by it, the petitioner filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 131 of 2016 in which this Court was pleased to direct the same to be heard along with WP(C) No. 405 of 2016 and WP(C) No. 41 of 2016. During the pendency of the said writ petitions, on 17-08-2017 the Secretary, Governing Body of the Collage, appointed Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh as the Principal in-charge with DDO power. 4.2 On 09.11.2017, this Court disposed of the said writ petitions with the direction that the State Government should take necessary steps, in accordance with law, for appointment of the Principal and all the claimants including petitioner, might file their detailed representations in support of their respective claims with supporting documents within a period of 2 weeks there from and in the meantime, the present arrangement ought to continue till such proper order was issued by the authorities and consequently, all previous orders stood superseded. Pursuant to the judgment and order dated 09.11.2017, the respondent No. 3 submitted his representation for appointment as the Principal-in-charge claiming that he is the senior most and qualified lecturer in College and accordingly, on 22.01.2018 the Joint Secretary (Hr Edn), Government of Manipur appointed him as the Principal-in-charge which came to be challenged by Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 90.2018 wherein this Court, suspending the order dated 22.01.2018, passed an interim order dated 05-02-2018 directing that the earlier arrangement ought to continue as directed. In compliance with the earlier court's order, the Joint Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Manipur issued an order dated 27.02.2018 appointing Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh as the Principal-in-charge of the College. 4.3 After Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh having resigned from being the Principal-in-charge, on 05.06.2018 the Secretary, Governing Body of the College, without the approval of the Government, appointed the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge of college without DDO power. On 28.06.2018, the College along with some other colleges was taken over by the State Government after the decision being taken by Cabinet on 28.03.2018. On 28.06.2018, the College along with some other colleges was taken over by the State Government after the decision being taken by Cabinet on 28.03.2018. Being aggrieved by the appointment of the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge, the respondent No. 3 submitted a representation to the Director, Higher Education on 06.07.2018 on the ground that he is senior to the petitioner and after having considered his representation, he was appointed as the Principal In-charge vide order dated 06.09.2018 issued by the Commissioner (Higher Education), Government of Manipur. 5. It has been submitted by Shri Julius Riamei, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed in terms of Rule 5 of the Manipur Aided College Employees' (Service) Rules, 1974 (hereafter referred to as "the Rules, 1974") on in-charge basis; that the order dated 05-06-2018 of the Governing Body by which the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge, was not challenged by anybody including the respondent No. 3 and that in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana & ors. Vs. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 as well as the judgment and order dated 21-11-2016 passed by this court in W.P.(C) No. 496 of 2016, Dr. Ngangkham Ibotombi Singh Vs. State of Manipur & ors., the order dated 06-09-2018 passed by the Commissioner (Hr. Edn), Government of Manipur is liable to be quashed and set aside. On the other hand, Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has submitted that the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge without the approval of the State Government as required under Rule 4(v) of the Rules, 1974; that in terms of the Manipur Higher Education Code for Government Aided College, 2016, only the senior most approved and qualified college teacher, not below the rank of Associate Professor, be designated to function temporarily as the in-charge Principal; that the material facts were suppressed by the petitioner and that the respondent No. 3 was appointed pursuant to the court's order. 6. The contention of Shri Y. Ashang, the learned Government Advocate is similar to that of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent and the only thing he emphasized, is that the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge without the approval of the State Government. 6. The contention of Shri Y. Ashang, the learned Government Advocate is similar to that of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent and the only thing he emphasized, is that the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge without the approval of the State Government. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Das & ors. Vs. University Burdwan & ors., (2010) 3 SCC 616 wherein the question was as to whether the resolution of the Executive Council of the University adopted on 26-06-1995 will be effective only from 10-10-2002 when the State Government approved it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after examining the meaning of the word "approval" held that the promotion made by the University on the basis of the principles laid down in the resolution of the Executive Council of the University adopted on 26-06-1995 were valid as the same had been approved by the State Government on 10-10-2002 and the relevant para of the said decision are as under: "11. In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word "approval" has been explained thus: "Approval.-The act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another." Hence, approval to an act or decision can also be subsequent to the act or decision. 12. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad this Court made the distinction between permission, prior approval and approval. Para 6 of the judgment is quoted here-in-below: (SCC pp. 458-59) "6. This Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd., considering the distinction between 'special permission' and 'general permission', 'previous approval' or 'prior approval' in para 63 held that: (SCC p. 313) '63. ...we are conscious that the word "prior" or "previous" may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such implication into Section 29(1) [of the Act].' Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission is that in the first case the action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous act. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous act. As to the word 'approval' in Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Workmen, that the management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. The requirement that the management must obtain approval was distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain permission, of which mention is made in Section 33(1)." 13. Following the decision in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, this Court again held in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh in para 40: (SCC p. 255) "40. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it is disapproved it loses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd.)" 14. Section 21(xiii) of the Burdwan University Act, 1981 is quoted here-in-below: "21. Powers and functions of the Executive council.-Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Executive Council shall exercise the following powers and perform the following functions: (i)-(xii) * * * (xiii) to determine, with the approval of the State Government, the terms and conditions of service of Librarians and non-teaching staff;" 15. The words used in Section 21(xiii) are not "with the permission of the State Government" nor "with the prior approval of the State Government", but "with the approval of the State Government". If the words used were "with the permission of the State Government", then without the permission of the State Government the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff. Similarly, if the words used were "with the prior approval of the State Government", the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff without first obtaining the approval of the State Government. Similarly, if the words used were "with the prior approval of the State Government", the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff without first obtaining the approval of the State Government. But since the words used are "with the approval of the State Government", the Executive Council of the University could determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff and obtain the approval of the State Government subsequently and in case the State Government did not grant approval subsequently, any action taken on the basis of the decision of the Executive Council of the University would be invalid and not otherwise." The other decision relied upon by him is the one rendered in State of Orissa & anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "37. It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironic to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. If an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. (Vide Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam, Mangal Prasad Tamoli v. Narvadeshwar Mishra and Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P.)." 7. The short question that arises for consideration by this court is as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appointment of the petitioner as the Principal in-charge can be replaced by the appointment of the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge. In other words, the question is whether the replacement of the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 is permissible despite the law being laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Piara Singh case. In other words, the question is whether the replacement of the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 is permissible despite the law being laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Piara Singh case. In Piara Singh case (supra), a large number of appointments were made to Class-III and IV services on ad-hoc basis and their ad-hoc services were allowed to continue for several years without their being regularised. To meet the situation, the State Governments issued orders from time to time for regularisation of such employees subject to certain conditions and those who could not be regularised for want of satisfying one or the other of the conditions, approached the High Court by way of writ petitions. The Hon'ble High Court, after hearing all the writ petitions together, delivered a common judgment and order giving certain directions with respect to regularisation of ad-hoc/temporary employees, members of work- charged establishment etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed all the appeals preferred against the judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble High Court with the direction given in para 36 of the judgment and order and the relevant portion thereof is the para 46 which is reproduced herein below: "46. Secondly, an ad-hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad-hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority." 8. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Piara Singh case is not disputed by the counsel appearing for the respondents and all that they have submitted, is that the said law will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reason that the petitioner had suppressed material facts and that the appointment of the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge was without the approval of the State Government. According to the respondents, the material facts which are alleged to have been suppressed by the petitioner, are that sometime in the year, 2006, the respondent No. 3 was entrusted the task of looking after the office of the Principal, when the Principal was on leave and on 07.12.2006, he was appointed as the Principal-in-charge with effect from 01.01.2007 to 07.12.2007 and on 20.06.2014, he was again appointed as the Principal-in-charge with effect from 20.06.2014. At that point of time, the authority i.e., the Department of Higher Education, Government of Manipur, without considering the representation submitted by some of the senior lecturers, appointed the petitioner as the Principal-in-Charge of the College vide order dated 18.02.2015 which he questioned by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 405 of 2015 wherein this Court vide its order dated 05.06.2015 suspended it. An application being MC No. 200 of 2015 filed by the petitioner for vacating the interim order dated 05-06-2015 was rejected. Thereafter, on an approval being conveyed by the Deputy Secretary (Higher Education), Government of Manipur vide a letter 05.02.2016 followed a letter dated 18.02.2016 of the Director of Higher Education, the Secretary, Governing Body of the College issued an order dated 28.02.2016 appointing the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge. Being aggrieved by it, the petitioner filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 131 of 2016 in which this Court was pleased to direct the same to be heard along with WP(C) No. 405 of 2016 and WP(C) No. 41 of 2016. During the pendency of the said writ petitions, on 17-08-2017 the Secretary, Governing Body of the College appointed Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh as the Principal-in-charge with DDO power. On 09.11.2017, this Court disposed of the said writ petitions with the direction that the State Government should take necessary steps, in accordance with law, for appointment of the Principal and all the claimants including petitioner, might file their detailed representations in support of their respective claims with supporting documents within a period of 2 weeks there from and in the meantime, the present arrangement ought to continue till such proper order was issued by the authorities and consequently, all previous orders stood superseded. Pursuant to the judgment and order dated 09.11.2017, the respondent No. 3 submitted his representation for appointment as the Principal-in-charge claiming that he is the senior most and qualified lecturer in College and accordingly, on 22.01.2018 the Joint Secretary (Hr. Edn), Government of Manipur appointed him as the Principal-in-charge which came to be challenged by Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 90 of 2018 wherein this Court, suspending the Government order dated 22.01.2018, passed an interim order dated 05-02-2018 directing that the earlier arrangement ought to continue as directed. Edn), Government of Manipur appointed him as the Principal-in-charge which came to be challenged by Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 90 of 2018 wherein this Court, suspending the Government order dated 22.01.2018, passed an interim order dated 05-02-2018 directing that the earlier arrangement ought to continue as directed. In compliance with the earlier court's order, the Joint Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Manipur issued an order dated 27.02.2018 appointing Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh as the Principal in-charge of the College. 9. Technically, the respondents might be right to some extent when they contended that the petitioner omitted certain facts as stated in the preceding para but it may be noted that on 09.11.2017, the connected writ petitions involving issues relating to them, had been disposed of by this court with the direction that a Principal be appointed on regular basis by the State Government and until then, the existing arrangement ought to continue. The aforesaid facts have nothing to do and have no relevance at all while deciding the issue involved herein. Instead of complying with this court's order, on 22.01.2018 the Joint Secretary (Hr. Edn), Government of Manipur appointed the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge which came to be challenged by Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 90 of 2018 wherein this Court, suspending the order dated 22.01.2018, passed an interim order dated 05-02-2018 directing that the earlier arrangement ought to continue as directed and accordingly, Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh was appointed as the Principal in-charge of the College vide order dated 27-02-2018 of the Joint Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Manipur. After having served for some months, Shri O. Kullabidhu Singh resigned from being the Principal-in-charge and therefore, on 05.06.2018 the Secretary, Governing Body of the College appointed the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge of the College without DDO power, as no Principal had been appointed by the State Government on regular basis. The issue concerning the petitioner and the respondents having been settled by this Court vide judgment and order dated 09-11-2017, the issuance of this order dated 05-06-2018 by the College was a fresh cause of action but it was not challenged by anyone including the respondent No. 3 nor was it cancelled by the State Government. The issue concerning the petitioner and the respondents having been settled by this Court vide judgment and order dated 09-11-2017, the issuance of this order dated 05-06-2018 by the College was a fresh cause of action but it was not challenged by anyone including the respondent No. 3 nor was it cancelled by the State Government. On 28.06.2018 when the College along with some other colleges, were taken over by the State Government, the petitioner continued to be the Principal-in-charge of the College but only on 06.09.2018, the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur being fully aware of the fact that the petitioner was the Principal-in-charge and his appointment not being challenged by anyone, issued an order appointing the Respondent No. 3 as the Principal in-charge of the College replacing the petitioner which is contrary to the law laid down in Piara Singh Case. Another contention which the learned counsel appearing for the respondents had advanced, is that since the appointment of the petitioner as the Principal-in-charge vide order dated 05-06-2018 was made without the approval of the State Government, the appointment of the respondent No. 3 cannot be said to have replaced the petitioner, thereby attracting the law that an in-charge appointment cannot be replaced by an in-charge appointment. Their contention has no merit for the reason that the petitioner was appointed on in-charge basis under Rule 5 of the Rules, 1974 which will be valid three months subject to the approval of the Director of Education, Government of Manipur. For appointment of a lecturer as the Principal-in-charge under Rule 5 of the Rules, 1974, a prior approval is not necessary at all and the approval can be obtained during the period of three months as prescribed therein. Rule 4 provides for appointment of a Principal on regular basis and that too, by direct recruitment, for which a prior approval is a must. The word "approval" has been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Das case (supra) relied upon by the learned Government Advocate and the distinction between the expressions "the prior approval" and "the approval" was considered. As regards the first, an action which requires a prior approval, cannot be valid, if prior approval is not obtained before the action being taken. As regards the first, an action which requires a prior approval, cannot be valid, if prior approval is not obtained before the action being taken. As regards the second, the approval can be obtained later, after the action has already been taken and the action shall be valid from the day when the action was taken. The approval required to be obtained in the present case falls in the second category. It so happened that before the approval could be obtained within three months, the College had been taken over by the State Government vide order dated 28-06-2018 issued by the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur but it is nowhere mentioned therein that the action taken by the Governing Body prior to the College being taken over by the State Government, should be rendered null and void. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that the said order dated 05-06-2018 by which the petitioner was appointed as the Principal-in-charge, had been cancelled by the State Government. The State Government being an institution, ought to act fairly and reasonably and in accordance with law including the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Such a controversy can be avoided provided the State Government takes appropriate steps, by now, to appoint a Principal on regular basis, as directed by this Court on 07-11-2017. 10. On top of that, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner appears to be correct that a similar issue had already been decided by this court in W.P.(C) No. 496 of 2016, Dr. Ngangkham Ibotombi Singh Vs. State of Manipur & ors., the relevant paragraphs of which are as under: "[6] Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & ors. Vs. Piara Singh reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 , the impugned order is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. In Piara Singh case (supra), a large number of appointments were made to Class-III and IV services on ad-hoc basis and their ad-hoc services were allowed to continue for several years without their being regularised. Vs. Piara Singh reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 , the impugned order is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. In Piara Singh case (supra), a large number of appointments were made to Class-III and IV services on ad-hoc basis and their ad-hoc services were allowed to continue for several years without their being regularised. To meet the situation, the State Governments issued orders from time to time for regularisation of such employees subject to certain conditions and those who could not be regularised for want of satisfying one or the other of the conditions, approached the High Court by way of writ petitions. The Hon'ble High Court, after hearing all the writ petitions together, delivered a common judgment and order giving certain directions with respect to regularisation of ad-hoc/temporary employees, members of work- charged establishment etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed all the appeals preferred against the judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble High Court with the direction given in para 36 of the judgment and order and the relevant portion thereof is the para 46 which is reproduced herein below: 46. Secondly, an ad-hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad-hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority. Shri R.K. Deepak, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has countered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner by contending that the law laid down in the Piara Singh' case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reason that the question of replacement of an in-charge employee by another in-charge employee is not involved therein at all and it was a case of replacement of ad-hoc or temporary employee initially appointed as such by another ad-hoc or temporary employee. According to him, in the present case, the question of appointment of the petitioner and private respondent initially as the Principal on ad-hoc or temporary basis does not arise because both of them are holding substantive post of Associate Professor and therefore, the issue involved herein is as regards the appointment of the in-charge Principal which is a promotional post. According to him, in the present case, the question of appointment of the petitioner and private respondent initially as the Principal on ad-hoc or temporary basis does not arise because both of them are holding substantive post of Associate Professor and therefore, the issue involved herein is as regards the appointment of the in-charge Principal which is a promotional post. It has also been contended by him that the private respondent being senior to the petitioner, she ought to have been given preference for appointment as the in-charge Principal and in support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the judgment and order dated 14-06-2016 passed by this court in W.P. (C) No. 215 of 2016, R.K. Nando Singh Vs. State of Manipur wherein the Government order dated 29-02-2016 by which the private respondent therein was appointed as the in-charge Principal, Government Polytechnic, Takyelpat, came to be challenged by the petitioner therein. This court, relying upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, quashed the Government order making it open to the Government to appoint a Lecturer as the in-charge Principal in the light of the observations made therein. Shri Y. Ashang, the learned Government Advocate did not make any submission in respect of Piara Singh's case but has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Wahengbam Uttarani Devi Vs. State of Manipur, reported in 2009 (1) GLT 331 and Mangshatabam Ibomcha Singh Vs. State of Manipur reported in 2012 (4) GLT 808. In Wahengbam Uttarani Devi' case, the respondents/writ petitioners were appointed as CDPOs on in-charge basis from amongst the Supervisors and while they were working in that capacity, the State Government issued an order dated 17-02-2004 cancelling their appointment on in-charge basis and issued another dated 05-05-2005 appointing the appellants as CDPOs in-charge. These two orders dated 17-02-2004 and 05-05-2005 came to be challenged by way of a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 324 of 2004 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide its judgment and order dated 10-07-2006. These two orders dated 17-02-2004 and 05-05-2005 came to be challenged by way of a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 324 of 2004 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide its judgment and order dated 10-07-2006. Two writ appeals came to be preferred wherein the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court vide its judgment and order dated 12-06-2008 upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge holding inter-alia that the appointment of the appellants for replacing the respondents/writ petitioners who are admittedly senior to them, are bad in law. [7] On perusal of the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court and in particular, the decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh and anr. Vs. A.V. Venugopala Rao, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 179 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the interim arrangement made by the State Government to keep the senior most in the provisional list of respective divisions who are eligible for promotion to the posts of Executive Engineer as in-charge so as to avoid heart burning among the officers, it is seen that it is well settled that in matters of appointment on in-charge basis, the senior most employee is to be given preference for consideration to his juniors. But the issue involved herein is not as to whether a junior employee, ignoring the case of the senior most employee, can be appointed to a particular post on in-charge basis or not. In the present case, the petitioner, along with other incumbents, was appointed as the in-charge Principal, Imphal College vide order dated 04-03-2016 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur. It may be noted that at the time of issuing the said order dated 04-03-2016, the fact that the private respondent and two other Associate Professors who are senior to the petitioner are available for consideration, is known to the State Government and as has been stated herein above, the said order dated 04-03-2016 has not been challenged by anyone including the private respondent and the said two other Associate Professors which clearly indicates that they have no any grievance thereto. In partial modification to the said order dated 04-03-2016, the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. In partial modification to the said order dated 04-03-2016, the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur issued the impugned order by which the private respondent was appointed as the in-charge Principal by replacing the petitioner without any cogent reason being assigned therein except stating that the impugned order has been issued in the public interest. It may be noted that the State government being an institution having no heart and soul and manned by individuals, it will make no difference whether the post of Principal is held by the petitioner or the private respondent on in-charge basis and the only concern of the State Government appears to be to ensure the smooth functioning of the administration. But any appointment of an employee on in-charge basis in the absence of proper norms or guidelines, by simply following the method of pick and choose, will render itself to be unreasonable and arbitrary. The State Government through the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), issued the impugned order on its own only in respect of the petitioner without the order dated 04-03-2016 being challenged by anyone. Had the Government order dated 04-03-2016 been challenged by any aggrieved person, a similar order passed by this court in R.K. Nando Singh's case (supra), could have been passed in this case also. But it has not been done so in this case. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents, the reasons given for issuing the impugned order are that the appointment of the petitioner as in-charge Principal is purely on stop-gap/temporary arrangement and that the private respondent is senior to the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that the appointment of an employee on in-charge basis is within the domain and jurisdiction of the State Government and in other words, it is a matter of discretionary power of the State Government but it is well settled that such discretionary power shall be exercised by the State Government in accordance with certain principles of law on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness. But neither of the counsels appearing for the parties has produced any material on record relating to guidelines being issued by the UGC or the State Government with respect to appointment of Principals on in-charge basis. But neither of the counsels appearing for the parties has produced any material on record relating to guidelines being issued by the UGC or the State Government with respect to appointment of Principals on in-charge basis. The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the appointment of the petitioner as in-charge Principal can be replaced by the private respondent as in-charge Principal in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Piara Singh's case. Shri R.K. Deepak, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has submitted that the law laid down in the said Piara Singh's case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reasons as contended by him herein above. It is true to some extent that the term "in-charge" has not been used in Piara Singh's case. In matters relating to appointment in Government service, different terminologies namely, ad-hoc, temporary, contract, in-charge, etc. are also being used quite often by the State Governments including various governmental authorities but the purpose for which the appointment is made on ad-hoc, temporary, contract, in-charge, etc. remains almost the same for the reason that such appointment is made purely as a stop-gap arrangement till the regular appointment is made in respect of the posts which are held by such ad-hoc, temporary, contract, in-charge, etc. employees. The learned counsels appearing for the parties have not brought to the notice of this court any statute in which the term "in-charge" is defined nor have they brought to the notice of this court any decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting it. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has no substance and the law laid down in the Piara Singh's case will apply to the facts of the present case also and accordingly, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has no substance and the law laid down in the Piara Singh's case will apply to the facts of the present case also and accordingly, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. However, it is open to the State Government to take any decision with cogent reason for replacing the petitioner by any other Associate Professor appointing him on in-charge basis, provided the petitioner is found to be incapable or unsuitable or to be indulging in any corrupt practice or maladministration in the discharge of his duties or take a decision consequent upon the examination of the overall issue relating to appointment of Principals on in-charge basis in respect of all the Government colleges after laying down a detailed guidelines which appears to be indispensable for the reason that many posts of Principal are lying vacant for want of Associate Professors, as seen in one of the cases which has come to this court in the recent past, who fulfill the requisite qualifications prescribed in the UGC Regulations, 2010 for appointment on regular basis and that Principals are required to be appointed on in-charge basis, for the time being, in the interest of the administration of the college." 11. In view of the above and having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this court is of the view that the impugned order dated 06-09-2018 by which the petitioner was replaced by the respondent No. 3 as the Principal-in-charge of the College is bad in law. 12. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed with the direction that the State respondents and in particular, the respondent No. 1 shall cancel the impugned order dated 06-09-2018 forthwith after the receipt of a copy of this judgment and order. There shall be no order as to costs.