JUDGMENT B.R. Sarangi, J. - Bhadrak Institute of Engineering and Technology (BIET), an unaided private technical institution approved and guided by (AICTE), is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It is imparting education to the students and thereby discharging a public duty. Initially, it was affiliated to Fakir Mohan University, Balasore and subsequently to the Biju Pattnaik University of Technology (BPUT). It is a constituent unit of Barapada School of Engineering and Technology (BSET) and, as such, a separate entity constituted as per the guidelines of the AICTE. 2. The BIET issued an advertisement for selection of Lecturer in Computer Science and Engineering, pursuant to which the petitioner applied for and following due process of selection was selected. He joined as Lecturer of Computer Science and Engineering, pursuant to letter dated 03.01.1998. Subsequently, he became the Head of the Department of Computer Science and I.T., being a Senior Lecturer. His scale of pay with corresponding D.A. was enhanced with effect from 01.05.1998 as a mark of recognition of his excellent performance, vide office order dated 31.03.1999, but the same was not given effect to. He was appointed as Examiner (Theory) for the Bachelor of Engineering University Examination, vide letter dated 20.07.2006, and also was nominated as a member of the Board of Studies in the subject of Computer Science for the session 200607, vide letter dated 05.12.2006, by the Fakir Mohan University, Balasore. As the BIET was affiliated to the BPUT, because of its performance, the petitioner was deputed as Supervisor for semester examinations of B.Tech courses in the years 2008 and 2009, vide letters dated 22.04.2008, 26.11.2008 and 17.12.2009. He was a member of Anti-Ragging Committee to maintain discipline and prevent ragging in the campus, including hostels of the institute, as per office notice dated 27.08.2009 and became the Head of the Department of Computer Science and Engineering. 3. All on a sudden, the petitioner was marked as on leave in the attendance register, while he was very much present in the institute and campus, and consequentially he could not sign in the attendance register, though he was present during the scheduled time. Consequentially, he informed opposite party no.1 by filing application on the very same day seeking permission to attend his duties and corrective steps onwards. Consequentially, he informed opposite party no.1 by filing application on the very same day seeking permission to attend his duties and corrective steps onwards. But on 31.03.2010, the petitioner was issued with a letter by opposite party no.1 in connection with his involvement in an untoward incident occurred on 23.03.2010 inside the campus by the hostel boarders. On enquiry, it was found that his presence in the campus was undesirable till normalcy was restored. Therefore, on the basis of the verbal order of the competent authority, the petitioner was directed to remain on leave with immediate effect till further information from opposite party no.1 was received. Consequentially, the petitioner had to wait for further information from opposite party no. 1. The petitioner, having not received any communication from opposite party no.1, in response to his letter dated 26.05.2010, reminded once again vide letter dated 14.07.2010 and sought for clarification as to the duration of his leave and the date on which he should rejoin his duties. During these periods, the petitioner has neither been paid his legitimate dues nor allowed to discharge his duty, nor was any response made to the correspondence made by him to opposite party no.1. Consequentially, he made a representation on 02.11.2010 and when no response was received, the petitioner approached this Court by filing this writ petition. 4. During pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner was directed to appear on 08.08.2011 before the authorities and when he did so he was handed over a letter dated 04.07.2011. In the said letter, the petitioner was directed to appear before the enquiry committee already constituted by the authorities. Though the petitioner sought for certain documents, the same were not provided to him, but enquiry was continued and on its conclusion enquiry report was submitted to the secretary of the BSEI (Society). The same was placed on 14.10.2011 before the General Body, which passed the order of dismissal from service. Accordingly, letter dated 15.10.2011 was communicated to the petitioner by opposite party no.1 terminating him from service, w.e.f. 15.10.2011. 5. Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. The same was placed on 14.10.2011 before the General Body, which passed the order of dismissal from service. Accordingly, letter dated 15.10.2011 was communicated to the petitioner by opposite party no.1 terminating him from service, w.e.f. 15.10.2011. 5. Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. D.K. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the entire action terminating the services of the petitioner has been taken without compliance of the principles of natural justice, particularly when the list of documents and list of witnesses were not supplied to the petitioner along with the charges levelled against him. It is further contended that the enquiry was conducted in a perfunctory manner, meaning thereby the enquiry officer submitted his report, before any explanation was received from the petitioner, and above all, while imposing penalty of termination from service, the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the enquiry report. It is further contended that since opposite party no. 1 -institute is discharging public duty, the writ petition is maintainable. Therefore, the petitioner seeks interference of this Court on the order passed by the authority terminating him from services and further seeks direction for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits as due and admissible to the petitioner in accordance with law. 6. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgments rendered in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 ; Antaryami Rath vs. State of Orissa, (1990) 70 C.L.T. 642 ; Basanti Mohanty vs. State of Orissa, (1991) 70 C.L. T. 127; Smt. Susama Patnaik vs. Managing Committee, Baxi Jagabandhu English Medium School, (1992) 1 O.L.R. 503 ; K. Krishnamacharyulu vs. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering, AIR 1998 SC 295 ; T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 2003 SC 438; Zee Tele Films Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 355 ; Ramesh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331; Dr. Uttam Kumar Samanta vs. KITT University, 2014 (Supp.-11) OLR 852; and Dr. Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University, AIR 2016 SC 73 . 7. Mr. Uttam Kumar Samanta vs. KITT University, 2014 (Supp.-11) OLR 852; and Dr. Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University, AIR 2016 SC 73 . 7. Mr. A.K. Pattnaik, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.1 raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition against opposite party no.1 on the ground that the BIET, having been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and being an unaided educational institution, is not receiving any financial assistance from the Government and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is further contended that BIET is approved by AICTE and, as such, the relationship between the employees/staff and management is purely contractual in nature and their service conditions are purely contractual, as per law settled by the apex Court in T .M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355 and P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharastra, (2005) 5 Supreme 544 . 8. It is further contended that since the petitioner could not produce M.Tech certificate, after completion of study leave from 01.11.2002 to 31.10.2004, his salary was withheld on 31.10.2009, pursuant to terms and conditions executed by the petitioner with opposite party no.1 on 27.09.2002. As the petitioner was found to be involved in an untoward incident occurred inside BIET campus by the hostel boarders, he was directed to remain on leave on 31.03.2010 with immediate effect till normalcy was restored. Since the petitioner suppressed the material fact, the action taken against him is well justified. It is further contended that the petitioner has not approached this Court with a clean hand and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. 9. This Court heard Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr.D.K.Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. A.K. Pattnaik, learned counsel for opposite party no.1. Though notice was issued to opposite party no.2 and the same was made sufficient, as A.D. returned after valid service, none has entered appearance for the said opposite party. Since no relief has been sought against opposite party no.2 and main contesting opposite party no.1 has entered appearance and is participating in the proceeding itself and it is a matter of 2010 and in the meantime more than eight years have elapsed, this Court is not inclined to grant further adjournment to enable opposite party no.2 to enter appearance. 10. 10. On the basis of the pleaded facts, this Court deems it proper to frame the following issues, which are germen for just and proper adjudication of the case:- (1) Is the writ application maintainable against opposite party no.1? (2) Whether the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was in compliance of principles of natural justice or not? (3) The relief if any can be granted to the petitioner? 11. Issue No.(1): Is the writ application maintainable against opposite party no.1? 12. Admittedly, BSET is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the said institution and its Governing Body are approved by the AICTE. The BIET is a sponsoring unit of the Society, i.e. BSET, which is a private unaided technical institution imparting education to the students, though not received any aid or funds from the State Government and as such, is discharging the public duty. 13. To examine whether writ is maintainable against opposite party no.1, it is worthwhile to scrutinize the law laid down by the apex Court. In Smt Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621 , interpreting the words "other authorities" in Article-12, the apex Court held "Again, Article 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by referring to "other authorities" within the territory of India which cannot obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude and capable of comprehending every authority created under a statute and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. There is no characterisation of the nature of the "authority" in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws." 14. In Unni Krishan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held "that a private body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that under Article 226 writ can be issued to any person or authority for enforcement any of the fundamental rights or for any 'other purpose'." 15. In Unni Krishan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held "that a private body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that under Article 226 writ can be issued to any person or authority for enforcement any of the fundamental rights or for any 'other purpose'." 15. In para-79, the Supreme Court further observed that:- "if the emphasis is on the nature of duty, on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties, irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract .from the nature of duty. "This observation of the Supreme Court with regard to private institutions is indicative of the status the private institutions enjoy." 16. In K. Krishnamacharylu (supra) while dealing the claim of the teachers of the private institutions for parity of pay the Supreme Court held as follows Para-4 XX XX XX "We are of the view that the State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right to education. The private institutions cater to the needs of the educational opportunities. The teacher duly appointed to a post in the private institution also is entitled to seek enforcement of the order issued by the Government. The question is as to which forum one should approach. The High Court has held that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. So, they cannot be denied the same benefit which is available to others. Accordingly we hold that the writ petition is maintainable. They are entitled to equal pay so as to be on par with Government employees under Article 39(d) of the Constitution." 17. The definition of 'State' is not confined to Governmental function and the legislature but extends to any action administrative (whether statutory or non-statutory), judicial or quasi judicial, which may be brought within the fold of State action being the action, which violates fundamental rights. The definition of 'State' is not confined to Governmental function and the legislature but extends to any action administrative (whether statutory or non-statutory), judicial or quasi judicial, which may be brought within the fold of State action being the action, which violates fundamental rights. It appears that prima facie protection against infraction of Article 14 is available only against the State and complaint of arbitrariness and denial of equality can therefore, be sustained against the society only if the society can be shown to be State for the purpose of Article 14. 18. The eStatef is defined in Article 12 to include inter alia the Government of India and the Government of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and the question therefore is whether the Society can be said to be eStatef within the meaning of this definition. Obviously the Society cannot be equated with the Government of India or the Government of any State nor can it be said to be a local authority and therefore, it must come within the expression of "other authorities" if it is to fall within the definition of eStatef. Therefore, the question is what are "other authorities" contemplated in the definition of eStatef in Article 12. While considering this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that an authority falling within the expression "other authorities" is, by reason of its inclusion within the definition of eStatef in Article 12, subject to the same constitutional limitations as the Government and is equally bound by the basic obligation to obey the constitutional mandate of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. Similar question arose when a corporation can be regarded as an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 arose for consideration in R. D. Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and the apex Court though has given wide enlargement of the meaning of "other authorities", but cautioned that it must be tempered by a wise limitation. 19. In Sabhaijit Tewary vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329 the apex Court has held that in no uncertain terms, that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12. 20. 19. In Sabhaijit Tewary vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329 the apex Court has held that in no uncertain terms, that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12. 20. If the Society is an 'authority' and therefore, "State" within the meaning of Article 12, it must follow that it is subject to the constitutional obligation under Article 14. The true scope and ambit of Article 14 has been the subject matter of numerous decisions and it is not necessary to make any detailed reference to them and it is sufficient to state that the content and reach of Article-14 must be confused with the doctrine of classification because the view taken was that the said Article forbids discrimination and there would be no discrimination where the classification making the differentia fulfils two conditions, namely, (i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; (ii) that the differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action. Reference can also be made to other judgments of the apex Court in Gulam Abbas & Ors vs. State Of U.P. & Ors, AIR 1981 SC 2198 and Som Prakash vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212 . But all these questions have been considered by the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others, AIR 1981 SC 487 . 21. In Tekraj Vasandi alias Basandi vs. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 469 (paragraphs 17-A and 20), with the approval, the observations of Justice Shah in Uajm Bai case, it is held that the expression 'authority' in its etymological sense means a body invested with power to command or give an ultimate decision, or enforce obedience, or having a legal right to command and be obeyed. But in paragraph 20 the Court observed as follows:- "In a Welfare State, as has been pointed out on more than one occasion by this Court, Governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence in the absence of a fair application of the tests to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality." 22. In Chandra Mohan vs. NCERT, AIR 1992 SC 76 , in paragraph-3, the apex Court hetd as follows: "It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as eStatef under Article 12. The State control, however, vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is 'State'." 23. In Ajay Hasia (supra) the Constitution Bench summarized the relevant tests gathered from the decision in R. D. Shetty for determining whether an entity is a estate or ginstrumentality of the State" as follows:- (1) "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicting that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency or Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classified the corporation as a instrumentality or agency of Government. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classified the corporation as a instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. 24. It was held in Ajay Hasia that if on consideration of the relevant factors, it is found that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would as pointed out in the International Airport Authority's case, be an 'authority' and, therefore, 'State' within the meaning of the expression in Article 12. The same view has also been taken into consideration by the apex Court in U.P.Warehousing Corporation vs. Vijay Narain, AIR 1980 SC 840 . 25. The tests which have been determined in Ajay Hasia (supra) are also held not rigid set of principles so that a body falling within any one of them must be considered to be 'State'. The question in case would be: whether on facts, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of Government and such control must be particular to that body and must be pervasive. Therefore, the decision in Sabhaijit Tewary (supra) has been overruled by the 7 Bench judgment of the apex Court in Pradip Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 and the apex Court by over-ruling Sabhaijit Tewary (supra) held as follows: "(1) simply, by holding a legal entity to be an instrumentality or agency of the State it does not necessarily become an authority within the meaning of "other authorities" in Article 12. To be an authority, the entity should have been created by a statute or under a statute and functioning with liability and obligations to the public. To be an authority, the entity should have been created by a statute or under a statute and functioning with liability and obligations to the public. Further, the statute creating the entity should have been vested that entity with power to make law or issue binding directions amounting to law within the meaning of Article 13(2) governing its relationship with other people or the affairs or other people their rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, It created under a statute, then there must exist some other statute conferring on the entity such powers. In either case, it should have been entrusted with such functions as are governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence governmental. Such authority would be the State for, one who enjoys the powers or privileges of the State must also be subjected to limitations and obligations of the State. It is this strong statutory flavor and clear indicia of power constitutional or statutory, and its potential or capability to act to the detriment of fundamental rights of the people, which makes it an authority; though in a given case, depending on the facts and circumstances, an authority may also be found to be an instrumentality or agency of the State and to that extent they may overlap. Tests 1, 2 and 4 in Ajay Hasia enable determination of governmental ownership or control. Tests 3, 5 and 6 are "functional" tests. The pro-pounder of the tests himself has used the words suggesting relevancy of those tests for finding out if an entity was instrumentality or agency of the State. Therefore, the question whether an entity is an "authority" cannot be answered by applying Ajay Hasia tests. (2) The tests laid down in Ajaya Hasia case relevant for the purpose of determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Neither all the tests are required to be answered in the positive nor a positive answer to one or two tests would suffice. It will depend upon a combination of one or more of the relevant factors depending upon the essentiality and overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source of governing power, if need be by removing the mask or piercing the veil disguising the entity concerned." 26. It will depend upon a combination of one or more of the relevant factors depending upon the essentiality and overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source of governing power, if need be by removing the mask or piercing the veil disguising the entity concerned." 26. Taking into consideration Pradip Kumar Biswas (supra), the apex Court in Virendra Kumar Srivastava vs. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam and another, AIR 2005 SC 411 has held that the question in each case would be-whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State. 27. Now, to answer the issue, whether the BIET, being a private technical educational institution, is amenable to writ jurisdiction, it is profitable to note that in Chandra Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Education Research and Training, (1991) 1 SCC 578 it was urged that the respondent-institution was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court because of the fact that the same cannot be regarded as an instrumentality or other authority of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It was also contended therein that the respondent-society had been registered under the Societies Registration Act. By going through the various earlier decisions of the apex Court it was held that the society was not a eStatef under Article 12, the objection relating to the maintainability of the writ application has to be upheld as the institution is also registered under the Societies Registration Act. By going through the various earlier decisions of the apex Court it was held that the society was not a eStatef under Article 12, the objection relating to the maintainability of the writ application has to be upheld as the institution is also registered under the Societies Registration Act. As to this decision, this Court even if it be conceded that the institution in question is not a 'State'within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, that would not clinch the matter in view of what has been held in V.R. Rudani, (supra) inasmuch as it was pointed out in paragraph 19 of that judgment that the term 'authority' used in Article 226 must receive a liberal meaning unlike this term in Article 12, because of which it was opined that the words 'any person or authorityf used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State. In Basanti's case (supra), reference was made to another decision of this Court in Antaryami Rath (supra). That decision dealt with the question as to whether private educational institutions are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. By relying on V.R. Rudani's case (supra) it was held in paragraph 7 of the judgment rendered in Antaryami Rath (supra) that private educational institutions would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that they perform public duty. This Court is of the view that the case at hand attracts the ratio of Antaryami Rath and Basanti Mohanty (supra) rather than that of Chandra Mohan (supra), and this Court would, therefore, hold that the institution at hand is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 28. Applying to the present case the tests laid down in Pradip Kumar Biswas, Ajay Hasia, Virendra Kumar Srivastava (supra) and also Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) and keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court in V.R. Rudani and Chandra Mohan (supra), this Court is of the considered view that a private body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction and, as held by the apex Court, under Article 226 writ can be issued to any person or authority for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or in any other purpose. Therefore, taking into consideration the nature of duty discharged by the opposite party no.1 educational institution to be a public duty, this Court holds that the writ application as against the opposite party no.1 institution is maintainable. By holding so, Issue No.(1) is answered in affirmative. 29. Issue No.(2): Whether the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was in compliance of principles of natural justice or not? 30. It is admitted fact that the petitioner, pursuant to letter dated 03.01.1998, was appointed as a Lecturer under BIET, which is a sponsoring unit of the society, i.e., BSET, by executing a contract followed by terms and conditions of service of the society. The petitioner, while continuing in the said post, availed study leave for higher education for the period from 01.11.2002 to 31.10.2004 at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, subject to execution of a bond with the society. Consequentially, he was relieved from his duty from 01.11.2002, though the relieve order was dated 03.12.2002. Since the petitioner received full salary along with employees provident fund share for the period from 01.11.2002 to 31.10.2004 for M. Tech Course, he was informed by the Establishment Officer, vide letter dated 12.10.2004, to submit his progress report and mark sheet of M.Tech Course. The said letter was duly communicated to the petitioner through Jadavpur University, Kolkata, as well as his residential address at Cuttack, but no reply was received. The petitioner, after completion of M.Tech. Course by availing the study leave, joined in the institution' on 31.10.2004. Opposite party no.1 on 22.09.2009 detected that the petitioner had not produced M.Tech. certificate and accordingly issued a show cause notice on 22.09.2009 calling upon the petitioner to submit M.Tech. certificate without fail, but the petitioner did not respond to the same. After resuming his duty on 31.10.2004 the petitioner also received salary till 22.09.2009. As the petitioner could not produce M. Tech. certificate, opposite party no.1 passed resolution dated 29.10.2009 to withhold his salary from 31.10.2009. 31. The petitioner was then found involved in an untoward incident occurred on 23.03.2010 inside the college campus by instigating and provoking the boarders and non-boarders and basing upon which an FIR was lodged on 28.03.2010. As the petitioner was found involved in the untoward incident causing damage to the institution, which was detrimental to the interest of the institution, he was not allowed to sign the attendance register. As the petitioner was found involved in the untoward incident causing damage to the institution, which was detrimental to the interest of the institution, he was not allowed to sign the attendance register. Subsequently, on 31.03.2010, he was issued with notice of show cause, pursuant to resolution passed by opposite party no.1 on 27.03.2010, with a direction to remain on leave with immediate effect. The petitioner, while remaining on leave, was called upon to give his explanation/representation with regard to the incident took place on 23.03.2010. In reply thereto, the petitioner claimed his arrear salary, but the same was not acceded to. 32. As the petitioner did not submit his M. Tech. certificate, as requested by the opposite party no.1, following charges were framed calling upon the petitioner to give reply thereof: - "1. Why you have failed to submit the M. Tech certificate despite repeated notice though you have availed the study leave from the period 1st November, 2002 to 31st October, 2004 after receiving full salary of Rs. 2m 26m 491/- including employees provident fund share by executing a bond on 27th September, 2002 which is binding? 2. Your conduct seems to be detrimental to. the institution as from reliable source it has come to our notice about your involvement in the untoward incident that took place on 23.03.2010 inside the campus by the students." 33. Consequentially, an inquiry committee was constituted by the General Body of the society and the petitioner was called upon to provide the date and time of arrival so that the inquiry committee can accordingly be intimated. But, the petitioner, instead of appearing before inquiry committee, filed this writ application claiming arrear salary and other benefits. However, this Court, vide order dated 13.07.2011, directed as follows:- "Put up this matter on 25th August, 2011. In the meantime, petitioner shall appear before the authorities on 08.08.2011 to participate in the personal hearing. On his appearance, the authorities shall fix a date of hearing and complete the same by 22.08.2011. We hope and trust that the petitioner shall cooperate with the Management for personal hearing. The report thereof shall be produced before us by the Management." Again on 25.08.2011 this Court passed the following order:- It is stated that the interview could not be conducted due to the reason that the petitioner is suffering from fever. We hope and trust that the petitioner shall cooperate with the Management for personal hearing. The report thereof shall be produced before us by the Management." Again on 25.08.2011 this Court passed the following order:- It is stated that the interview could not be conducted due to the reason that the petitioner is suffering from fever. We direct the petitioner to appear before the Enquiry Committee on 12lh of September, 2011 as last chance. On his appearance, the proceeding shall continue day to day and the same shall be completed by end of September, 2011. It is admitted that all the documents have been handed over to the petitioner and the petitioner does not make any grievance for non-receipt of the documents. Put up this matter on 17th of October, 2011." Thereafter, the petitioner appeared before inquiry committee and asked for certain documents. Though some of the documents were supplied to the petitioner, but some were not. On the basis of the reply given by the petitioner, the inquiry committee, after considering all the relevant records including the representations, statements forwarded to the society and taking into consideration the seriousness and gravity of misconduct, recommended on 04.10.2011 for dismissal of the petitioner from service. I Consequentially, the society passed resolution on 14.10.2011 for dismissal of the petitioner from service, which was communicated on 15.10.2011. Consequentially, the present writ application was amended challenging the order of dismissal passed by the authority. 34. A perusal of the charge sheet in Annexure-11 would go to show that none of the documents have been provided to the petitioner by the authority along with charge sheet, nor any list of witnesses. As already indicated, when the petitioner asked for, though he was provided with certain documents, some other required documents were not supplied to him and reasons for non-supply of such documents were not indicated. In any case, vide order dated 30.08.2017, this Court observed as follows:- "This case has been argued by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the petitioner on 29.08.2017 but none appeared on behalf of the opposite parties and as such the case has been adjourned to be listed on the very next date, i.e., 30.08.2017. On 30.08.2017 also none represented for the opposite parties. On 30.08.2017 also none represented for the opposite parties. Since learned senior counsel for the petitioner has raised the question of legality and propriety of the order passed by the authority in course of the disciplinary proceeding and as such it would be appropriate to direct the opposite parties to produce the record of the disciplinary proceeding including the enquiry report on the next date. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the opposite party no.1 forthwith. List the case on 10.10.2017. 35. In spite of above order passed by this Court, opposite party no.1 did not produce any record for perusal and satisfaction of this Court that the petitioner was supplied with the required documents and given list of witnesses along with charge sheet. Further, the inquiry committee when submitted its inquiry report on 04.10.2011, copy thereof was not supplied to the petitioner to give effective reply, and on the basis of such report and recommendation made by the inquiry committee action for dismissal from service was taken against the petitioner on 14.10.2011. 36. In State of U.P. vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131 the apex Court pointed out that an employee should be treated fairly in any proceeding which may culminate punishment being imposed on him. 37. In view of the law discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that while imposing punishment of termination from service, there was non-compliance of principles of natural justice. Thereby, the order so passed on 14.10.2011, which was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 15.10.2011, cannot sustain in the eye of law and accordingly the same is hereby quashed. 38. However, taking note of the factual matrix of the case this Court is of the considered view that since the order of termination dated 14.10.2011 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by the inquiry committee at the stage of inquiry, the matter is relegated to that stage. The inquiry committee shall cause a de novo inquiry by affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and make necessary recommendation on compliance of principles of natural justice. Such proceedings shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible. Needless to mention, the petitioner, without taking unnecessary adjournments, shall extend all cooperation by participating in the inquiry proceedings so that the authority can conclude the same without causing any further delay. 39. Such proceedings shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible. Needless to mention, the petitioner, without taking unnecessary adjournments, shall extend all cooperation by participating in the inquiry proceedings so that the authority can conclude the same without causing any further delay. 39. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to cost.