JUDGMENT Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. - The petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, claiming the following reliefs: "i) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned suspension order dated 09.03.2019 (Annexure-1) may kindly be declared illegal and be quashed qua the petitioner with all consequential directions; ii) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the consequential handling over-taking over of charge at Hanumangarh vide report dated 09.03.2019 (Annex.3) as well as assumption of charge at Jodhpur by the respondent No.4 vide charge assumption report dated 10.03.2019 (Annex.4) may kindly be declared illegal and be quashed; iii) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court considers just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner; iv) costs of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner." 2. Brief facts of the case, as noticed by this Court are that the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 09.03.2019 whereby he has been transferred from the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), Jodhpur to the post of Superintending Engineer (O&M), Hanumangarh against the posting of respondent No.4. The order dated 09.03.2019 has been issued to respondent No.2 making the transfer with immediate effect and the petitioner's name is at serial No.2 as his place of posting shown as Superintending Engineer (O&M), Hanumangarh. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the transfer order has been passed to accommodate the respondent No.4, who had been recently transferred to Hanumangarh on 07.02.2019 and was being transferred back to Jodhpur without any justifiable reason. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the transfer order was not served in time and in fact it was concealed from the petitioner and not communicated to the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the transfer order was passed on Saturday, which is not a working time of the respondents and it shows the extraordinary hurry, in which the transfer order has been passed and the same speaks for itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that such transfer order is actuated with malafides and without any bonafide administrative exigencies. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that such transfer order is actuated with malafides and without any bonafide administrative exigencies. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondent No.4 was having the complete knowledge of the transfer order even when the petitioner did not know about it and thus, gave his charge at Hanumangarh on 09.03.2019 itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that on 10.03.2019, the respondents No.4 assumed the charge of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur at forenoon even when it was Sunday and the charge could not have been assumed on that day. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the assumption of charge of respondent No.4 has been countersigned by respondent No.3, who happens to be Additional Chief Engineer, CSS, JdVVNL, Jodhpur whereas the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur was linked with Additional Chief Engineer (Material Management) and not with the Additional Chief Engineer (CSS). Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the respondent No.3 has countersigned the charge assumption report of respondent No.4 even when he was not authorized to do that and thus, he has done with the malafide intention. 8. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Election Commission was moving ahead with the programme of elections and the Code of Conduct pertaining to the elections were to be in place just after the transfer order on 09.03.2019, which seems to be the reason why the respondents have hurriedly passed such orders with malafide intention. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the automatic relieving deemed by the respondents should have been curtailed in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Hon'ble Court on 14.03.2019 but the respondents tried not do so and it was only now the petitioner was being allowed to hold the charge in pursuance of the order dated 14.03.2019. 10. It is also contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the officers/officials of Administrative/Accounts/ Ministerial/Technical Cadres of JdVVNL are governed by a transfer policy/guidelines approved by the Coordination Committee of Rajasthan State Power Sector Companies in its 8th Meeting held on 07.11.2017, which has been made effective from 01.04.2018. 11. 10. It is also contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the officers/officials of Administrative/Accounts/ Ministerial/Technical Cadres of JdVVNL are governed by a transfer policy/guidelines approved by the Coordination Committee of Rajasthan State Power Sector Companies in its 8th Meeting held on 07.11.2017, which has been made effective from 01.04.2018. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has shown the transfer policy, which is on record as Annexure-8 and learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Condition No.2.1, 2.3 and 3.6 for establishing his case, which reads as under: 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that despite the petitioner having holding the charge only since 30.05.2018, therefore, the same is in blatant violation of the policy in question. 13. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Natha Ram Choudhary Vs. Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6348/2008, relevant portion of which reads as under: "While examining the order impugned, this Court is to see as to whether the order of transfer "B" is in administrative exigency or is founded on extraneous considerations. As per the record available, the General Administration Department removed ban for effecting transfers in Forest Department, therefore, the State Minister for the Department of Forest by a communication dated 2.2.2008 informed the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest not to make any transfer in Department of Forest without his prior approval. The Department of Forest accordingly prepared a list of 138 Rangers Gr.I and II (Range Forest Officers) for their transfers. The Conservator of Forestcum-Technical Assistant also remitted the list for proposed transfers pertaining to the post of Forest Guards, Foresters, Assistant Foresters, Ministerial Staff, Class-IV Employees, Drivers and other technical staff to the Minister concerned for prior approval. After getting approval on 15.2.2008 the order "A" was issued whereby the petitioner was transferred from Wild Life Range, Jodhpur to Forest Range, Shiv and the respondent No.4 was transferred from Forest Range, Shiv to Forest Range, Jaswantpura in District Jalore. This fact clearly establishes that a positive decision was taken to transfer the petitioner as well as to the respondent No.4. This fact clearly establishes that a positive decision was taken to transfer the petitioner as well as to the respondent No.4. On 15.2.2008 itself as per the record made available some error was detected in the list of transfers approved by the Minister and, therefore, by a corrigendum "B" the transfer of the respondent No.4 was cancelled and the petitioner was transferred to the Forest Range, Jaswantpura. Pertinent to note here that in pursuant to the order "A" the petitioner was relieved from Wild Life Division, Jodhpur on 16.2.2008 and he joined at Shiv on 18.2.2008. Uptil 21.2.2008 no information was available either with the petitioner or with the competent authorities in Forest Division, Barmer regarding amendments made in the order "A" relating to the transfer of the petitioner and the respondent No.4. The official respondents detected error on 15.2.2008 itself but not communicated to the competent officers at Barmer or even at Jodhpur upto 16.2.2008 when the petitioner was relieved, is quite strange, specially in the circumstances that the order "A" was communicated to the authorities concerned telephonically. It is also worthwhile to note that after 15.2.2008 a ban on transfers was to come in effect and on basis of that an allegation is made by the petitioner for issuance of the order "B" antedated." 14. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Dr. Ajay Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , (2003) 1 WLC(Raj) 438, relevant para 14 and 15 of which read as under: "14. On malafide, it can be said that the principal test of a due and proper exercise of the power is to ask the question: Was the transfer made for real administrative exigency? In finding the answer the Court might have to pierce the veil of the transfer order and see what was the operative reason for the transfer. If the findings reveal a nexus with administrative necessity, the exercise of the power will be upheld. If however, the operative reason has no such nexus then the transfer will be vulnerable. In the latter case it will be a malafide use of power and will take within its sweep all situations where the nexus with administrative exigencies is absent. If the findings reveal a nexus with administrative necessity, the exercise of the power will be upheld. If however, the operative reason has no such nexus then the transfer will be vulnerable. In the latter case it will be a malafide use of power and will take within its sweep all situations where the nexus with administrative exigencies is absent. It needs to be emphasised that in the present context malafide is not limited to the personal malice of the authority making the transfer. Malafide has two components i.e. malice in law and malice in fact. 15. It may be stated here that if the transfers are made in order to adjust particular persons with no reasonable basis, such type of transfers can be termed as malafide one and liable to be quashed." 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the precedent laws laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in The State of Punjab Vs. Ramji Lal and Others. , (1971) AIR SC 1228 and Uddar Gagan Properties Limited Vs. Sant Singh and Others. , (2016) 11 SCC 378 , whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that to establish mala fide, it is not necessary to name the particular officer or officers responsible for the official act and if the act was of the State undoubtedly, the same could be gone into by the court. 16. On the other hand, learned counsel for official respondents submits that the order was passed only with an administrative exigency and thus, the petitioner has no right to seek any intervention by this Court on count of a lawful transfer. 17. Learned counsel for respondent authorities has vehemently submitted that it was not the petitioner alone, who was transferred but the transfer order contained names of 11 more persons, who have been transferred by the respondents, which is also reflected in the order dated 09.03.2019, therefore, the transfer itself was a routine exercise being done by the respondents to gear up for the month of March, which required special attention of the department due to the prevailing conditions of elections and the sensitive nature of the place of Jodhpur. 18. 18. Learned counsel for respondent authorities has further submitted that the employer has a right to transfer its employee when required and the petitioner was posted on the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur whereas other experienced person was required to be posted at Jodhpur. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that due to the extraordinary conditions in the month of March, the office of the respondents was functional on Saturday and Sunday, and thus, the activity of transfer on 09.03.2019 and 10.03.2019 were well within the realm of law and there was nothing extraordinary regarding the transfers made by the authorities. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the petitioner himself had passed on a WhatsApp message on his mobile that the stores were to be open even on Sunday i.e. 31.03.2019. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner was an Executive Engineer and was only holding the charge of Superintending Engineer whereas full time senior Superintending Engineer was required to man the specialized necessity of the town of Jodhpur. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that there are various targets which are to be achieved in the month of March and looking into such role that the post ought to carry a senior and experienced person, it was thought that the private respondent be an appropriate replacement of the petitioner which has not been prejudiced as he has been posted on the equivalent post of Superintendent Engineer though, he is an Executive Engineer. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the Model Code of Conduct had nothing to do with the transfer orders, which were regular transfer orders and which are passed by the respondents time and again as per the necessity of the respondents. 22. Learned counsel for respondent authority has also shown from his reply that the answering respondents in the endeavour to provide interrupted power supply kept on reshuffling officer and officials as per the requirement. Learned counsel for the respondent authority submits that the respondent No.4 being an experienced and senior officer was deemed appropriate to have been transferred on the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur while the petitioner was posted out. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent authority submits that the respondent No.4 being an experienced and senior officer was deemed appropriate to have been transferred on the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur while the petitioner was posted out. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent authority has further shown that the petitioner himself had handed over the charge to the respondent No.4 and thus, there could have been no requirement regarding the concealment of the transfer order and incomplete information being provided to the petitioner. 24. Learned counsel for the private respondent submits that on one hand, the petitioner has banking upon the assumptions of malafide but on the other hand, the petitioner has not impleaded even the authority who has passed the transfer orders or any other authority relevant as party in writ petition and thus, the very basis of agitating the malafide before this Court goes away. Learned counsel for the private respondent adopts all other arguments of the authority concerned. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Raees Qureshi Vs. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Transport and Others.,2019 SCCOnlineAll 1671, the relevant portion of which, reads as under: "6- In the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of transfer dated 25.5.2018 and the order passed by the opposite party no.-3 dated 28.6.2018 on the representation of the petitioner on the grounds, as appears from the record, to the effect that:(i) the order of transfer is in violation of transfer policy dated 29.3.2018, which specifically provides that transfer would be made on administrative exigencies and in case of Group-C employee on every three years only counter will be changed (Patal Parivartan),(ii) within six months of posting as Junior Assistant, on being promoted on the said post vide order dated 5.12.2017, the petitioner has been transferred from Lucknow to Kanpur,(iii) the persons who are posted since long have not been transferred and petitioner has been transferred only after completing since six months at promoted place and(iv) the opposite party no.-3 while considering and rejecting the representation of the petitioner, ignored the transfer policy dated 29.3.2018 as well as the fact pertaining to other employees who have not been transferred though they were working on the post since long. 11. 11. The issue of transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Apex Court and entire law has been settled by catena of decisions. It is entirely upon the competent authority to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is to be transferred from his present posting. Transfer is not only an incident but an essential condition of service. It does not affect the conditions of service in any manner. The employee does not have any vested right to be posted at a particular place. (Vide B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors. , (1986) AIR SC 1955, Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar , (1991) AIR SC 532, ; Union of India v. N.P. Thomas , (1993) AIR SC 1605, Union of India v. S.L. Abbas , (1993) AIR SC 2444, Rajender Roy v. Union of India , (1993) AIR SC 1236; Ramadhar Pandey v. State of U.P. and Ors. , (1993) Supp3 SCC 35; N.K. Singh v. Union of India and Ors.,1995 AIR SC 425; Chief General Manager (Tel.) N.E. Telecom Circle v. Rajendra Ch. Bhattacharjee , (1995) AIR SC 813 ; State of U.P. v. Dr. R.N. Prasad , (1995) Supp2 SCC 151; Union of India and Ors. v. Ganesh Dass Singh , (1995) Supp3 SCC 214; Abani Kante Ray v. State of Orissa , (1995) Supp4 SCC 169; Laxmi Narain Mehar v. Union of India , (1997) AIR SC 1347; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Saxena , (1998) AIR SC 925; National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shir Bhagwan , (2001) 8 SCC 574 ; Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and Ors. , (2003) AIR SC 1115; State of U.P. v. Siya Ram , (2004) AIR SC 4121; and Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath , (2004) 4 SCC 245 . 12- An employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work at a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and the Court cannot interfere with a transfer/posting which is made in public interest or on administrative exigency. 12- An employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work at a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and the Court cannot interfere with a transfer/posting which is made in public interest or on administrative exigency. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani , (1989) AIR SC 1433, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "Transfer of a Government servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the another is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of public undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration." 13- In Union of India v. H.N. Kirtania , (1989) AIR SC 1774, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "Transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of malafide." 14- In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas (supra), the Apex Court has observed that the Government instructions on transfer are mere guidelines without any statutory force and the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the order of transfer unless the said order is alleged to have been passed by malice or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions. 15- Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court, in Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta , (1992) AIR SC 519, observing that the terms incorporated in the transfer policy for posting of both the spouses, if in service, at the same place, require to be considered by the authorities "along with exigencies of administration" and " without any detriment to the administrative need and claim of other employees". 16- In State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal , (2001) AIR SC 1748, the Apex Court held as under:- "4. 16- In State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal , (2001) AIR SC 1748, the Apex Court held as under:- "4. An order of transfer of an employee is a part of the service conditions and such order of transfer is not required to be interfered with lightly by a court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction unless the court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such transfer or that the authorities, who issued the order, had not the competence to pass the order. (Emphasis supplied). 17- In Rhone-Poulence (India) Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2000) 7 SCC 675 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under.- "the mere fact that after the order of transfer had been issued and when Respondent 3 had failed to report for duty, he was also asked by the Corporate Manager, who was competent to order his transfer, to join the duties at Kanpur will not validate ' the order of transfer issued by an authority not competent to do so." 18- In Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. G. Venkata Ratnam , (2008) 9 SCC 345 , the Supreme Court deprecated the view taken by the High Court interfering in transfer matter merely on the basis of some extraordinary achievements highlighted by the respondent-employee. The Apex Court held that it is not for the Court to consider where respondent would be more suited. Such an approach is rather unusual and strange as no employee can be permitted to choose his own place of posting. 19- In Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (supra), the Apex Court in crystal clear words observed that an employee fails to join at the transferred place, he exposes himself to the disciplinary proceedings for disobedience of the order. 20- The employee cannot avoid the compliance of the transfer order. In Addisons Paints & Chemicals Ltd. v. Workman , (2001) AIR SC 436, a similar view has been reiterated and it has been held therein that refusal to report for duty upon transfer amounts to misconduct. Even if the transfer order is bad for some reason, the employee must ensure compliance of the order first and then raise the issue with the employer for redressal of his grievance. 21- In S.C. Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors. Even if the transfer order is bad for some reason, the employee must ensure compliance of the order first and then raise the issue with the employer for redressal of his grievance. 21- In S.C. Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors. , (2006) 9 SCC 583 , the Apex Court deprecated the practice of approaching the Court by the Government employees against transfer order rather joining at the transferred place. 22- In State of U.P. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order if transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision." 23- Similar view has been reiterated in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey , (2004) 12 SCC 299 . 24- The transfer order may cause great hardship as an employee would be forced to have a second establishment at a far distant place, education of his children may be adversely affected, may not be able to manage his affairs and to look after his family. This aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. S.S. Kaurav , (1995) 3 SCC 270 , wherein it has been held that it is not permissible for the Court to go into the relative hardship of the employee. It is for the administration to consider the facts of a given case and mitigate the real hardship in the interest of good and efficient administration. 25- Thus, it is clear that the transfer policy does not create any legal right in favour of the employee. It is settled law that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by an employee that there is a breach of a statutory duty on the part of the employer. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he/ she has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction. (Vide Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (1962) AIR SC 1044; Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana , (1977) AIR SC 276; State of Kerala v. Smt. A. Lakshmi Kutty , (1987) AIR SC 331; State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors. , (1989) AIR SC 49; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K , (1994) 4 SCC 422 ; State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma , (1996) AIR SC 1669; Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. , (1996) AIR SC 2736; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. , (1998) AIR SC 3104; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors. , (1999) AIR SC 943; State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma and Anr. v. S.K. Sharma , (1996) AIR SC 1669; Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. , (1996) AIR SC 2736; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. , (1998) AIR SC 3104; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors. , (1999) AIR SC 943; State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma and Anr. , (2001) AIR SC 2900; and Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr , (2003) AIR SC 1561). 26- In the case of B. Vardha Rao Versus State of Karnataka and Others , (1986) 4 SCC 131 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that frequent, unscheduled and unreasonable transfers must be deprecated. 27. In the case of Dharmendra Kumar Saxena Versus State of U.P. And Others , (2013) LawSuit(All) 1796 this Court has held as under: "After careful consideration of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that this Court cannot interfere with the transfer matter as the Government servant has no vested right to continue at a place of his choice. The Government can transfer the officer/employee in the administrative exigency and in public interest. However, if a transfer is made against the executive instructions or transfer policy, the competent authority must record brief reason in the file for deviating from the transfer policy or executive instructions and the transfer must be necessary in the public interest or administrative exigency. If an officer/employee, who is aggrieved by his/her transfer, makes a representation to the competent authority, his/her representation must be decided objectively by a reasoned order." 28- In view of the above, the legal position on the issue of transfer can be summarized as under: (1) Transfer is an incident/condition of service. (2) It does not adversely affected the status or emoluments or seniority of the employee. (3) The employee has no vested right to get a posting at a particular place or can choose to serve at a particular place for a particular tenure. (4) It is within the exclusive domain of the employer to determine as to at what place and for how long the services of a particular employees are required. (5) Transfer order should be passed in public interest or administrative exigency, and not arbitrarily or for extraneous consideration or for victimization of the employee nor it should be passed under political pressure. (5) Transfer order should be passed in public interest or administrative exigency, and not arbitrarily or for extraneous consideration or for victimization of the employee nor it should be passed under political pressure. (6) An employee should not be subjected to frequent transfer. (7) There is a very little scope of judicial review by the Court/Tribunal against the transfer order and the same is restricted only if the transfer order is found to be in contravention of the statutory Rules or mala fides is established. 29- Looking into the facts of the case particularly the impugned order dated 28.06.2018 affirming the order of transfer dated 25.05.2018, wherein the concerned authority considered all the aspects of the case and settled legal position on the issue of interference in the matter of transfer of an employee from one place to another this Court is of the view that order impugned dated 28.06.2018 is not liable to be interfered by this Court. 30- Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 31- No order as to costs." 26. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case alongwith the precedent laws cited by learned counsel for the parties at the Bar, this Court is of the opinion that the interference in the transfer orders can be broadly made on the grounds of established malafides, non-compliance of statutory provisions and the transfer orders beyond the reason of administrative exigency. 27. After carefully perusing of the case law, this Court finds that the aforesaid reasons have to be considered before passing any order pertaining to the transfer order. 28. This Court observes that the petitioner has been posted in Jodhpur since year 2012 and was holding the post in question since 30.05.2018 i.e. the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur and has been transferred on a Saturday. 29. This Court finds that the transfer of the petitioner from Jodhpur is after he has completed about six years' tenure on various posts. The record as shown by learned counsel for the parties also show that the petitioner himself wrote a letter, in which he has stated that he has been relieved from the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), Jodhpur vide order dated 09.03.2019, and therefore, he was handing over the official instruments and official SIM card to the respondent No.4. 30. The record as shown by learned counsel for the parties also show that the petitioner himself wrote a letter, in which he has stated that he has been relieved from the post of Superintending Engineer (I&S), Jodhpur vide order dated 09.03.2019, and therefore, he was handing over the official instruments and official SIM card to the respondent No.4. 30. This Court also finds that the party impleaded is only the authority who enabled the assumption of charge to private respondent whereas the order to be assailed by the petitioner was the order of transfer and no malafide has been attributed to any officer or any particular authority, who would have acted malafidely against the present petitioner by sending him out on transfer on the post of Superintending Engineer at Hanumangarh. 31. This Court is also of the opinion that the JdVVNL is a company which is providing electricity and for maintaining its services, it is not very unnatural they worked on Saturday and Sunday, so as to meet the extraordinary challenges of providing electricity services to the citizen at large. The transfer being made in a hurried manner before election Model Code of Conduct coming in place does not show any malafide and moreover, the transfer order dated 09.03.2019 includes 11 such officers, who have been transferred from one place to another and thus, there is no such exclusive treatment awarded to the petitioner, which would entitle him to claim any malafides. The transfer order contained total 13 names, assumption of charge by an authority would be of no consequence and the petitioner, who is admittedly an Executive Engineer and was holding the charge of Superintending Engineer (I&S), JdVVNL, Jodhpur would not have the kind of experience with the regular Superintending Engineer would have and admittedly, respondent No.4 is a regularly placed Superintending Engineer and for a large town like Jodhpur, the services of senior and experienced Superintending Engineer's being required is the reason furnished in the reply of the respondent authority which is quite convincing. 32. This Court after considering the order on the parameters of malafide/statutory violation and the administrative exigency alongwith the precedent law, does not find any reason to interfere with the transfer order. 33. In light of the aforesaid observations, the present petition is dismissed. Stay Petition No.3791/2019 also stands dismissed accordingly.