JUDGMENT : S.N.Pathak, J. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 3rd December, 2013 (decree sealed and signed on 10.12.2013) passed by the District & Addl. Sessions Judge-I, Ghatsila in Eviction Appeal No.23 of 2010 whereby the judgment dated 29th September, 2010 passed by the Munsif, Civil Court, Ghatsila in Eviction Suit No.03 of 2008 has been affirmed and the appeal stood dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the suit premises belongs to the plaintiff Co. and the building property in which its situates the suit premises and other property belonging to the plaintiff Co. was under proceeded of liquidation in C.P. No.324/1954 in the High Court of Calcutta (Kolkata) under the Company’s Act and an official liquidator was appointed by the Hon’ble High Court who was incharge of the suit premises and other properties belonging to the said plaintiff company. The appellant defendant was in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises under the plaintiff and being tenant unauthorized occupier of the suit premises was paying Rs.25/- per month as occupation charges to the official liquidator. Pursuant to the said order dated 06.04.2006 the joint special officer, Sri Krishna Murari Bakrewalla and Ratan Lal Bakrewal took over the assets and properties including the suit premises on 29.04.2006 belonging to the plaintiff co. from the official liquidator. The plaintiff/respondents further alleged that the official liquidator by his letter No. CL-2004/Misc./6008/G dt. 28.12.2006 informed the joint Special Officer mentioning in the list the names of the persons who have occupied the room/premises unauthorisedly and also the O.L. received certain amount from such persons issuing receipts “without prejudice” and as the defendant/appellant have been found in the occupation/unauthorised possession of the shop premises (suit property) on payment of Rs.25/- per month and paid occupation charges upto July, 2003, but thereafter the defendant have defaulted in payment of rent/occupation charges from August, 2003 hence the plaintiff issued legal notices through his advocates dated 10.05.2006 and 19.03.2007 to the defendant appellant to vacate and give possession within 10.4.2007 but as the defendant did not vacate, hence the suit is for recovery of possession of the suit property from the defendant appellant. 3. The Trial Court framed the following issues for adjudication of this case: i. Is this suit maintainable as framed ? ii. 3. The Trial Court framed the following issues for adjudication of this case: i. Is this suit maintainable as framed ? ii. Is this suit is maintainable in accordance with Jharkhand Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act ? iii. Whether the valuation of suit land is correct ? iv. Whether plaintiff and defendant is related as owner of tenant ? v. Whether this suit is barred by law of limitation adverse possession ? vi. Whether this suit is barred by non-joinder of necessary party ? vii. Whether defendant is defaulter to pay rent in this premises ? viii. Whether plaintiff entitled to relief as he claimed ? 4. The First Appellate Court after hearing both the sides and on perusal of the records and the documents and the evidences and findings of the Trial Court was of the view that the point to be considered before the First Appellate Court was whether findings of the Trial Court should be upheld or set aside. 5. It was the main contention of the defendants before the First Appellate Court that lower court on the basis of the pleadings of both the parties framed eight issues and after going through the records, documentary evidences and hearing the parties decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent vide judgment dated 29.09.2010 in Eviction Suit No.03/2008. It was further contended that the lower court ought not to have placed reliance on the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses who were not at all trustworthy witnesses and as such ought not to have placed reliance on the defendant’s witnesses who are all reliable and trustworthy witness. It was further contended that the learned lower court has wrongly decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff. Regarding relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant the court below has completely misdirected in arriving to the decision. In the instant case the defendant was not inducted as a tenant by the official liquidator and the defendant being in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises his eviction is not maintainable under B.B. (LRE) Act, therefore the finding of the learned lower court is against the spirit and direction of the order of the Hon’ble High Court. 6. In the instant case the defendant was not inducted as a tenant by the official liquidator and the defendant being in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises his eviction is not maintainable under B.B. (LRE) Act, therefore the finding of the learned lower court is against the spirit and direction of the order of the Hon’ble High Court. 6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that in the written statement of the appellant/defendant in paragraph No.13 it has been admitted regarding the payment of the rent by him to the plaintiff company respondent. Apart from that the admission in Exhibit No.A on behalf of the appellant in appeal on which the appellant has relied upon it has been clearly established the relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore the appellant cannot be allowed to make any departure from his own submission. It was further contended that Section 11 (1) (d) of B.B. (L.R. & E) Control Act clearly speaks that a tenant is required to pay the rent within the time fixed by the contract, if there is any contract within the parties and in absence of any contract the tenant is required to pay remit the rent of a month by the last day of next following months. 7. Further it was contended that from the own pleadings of the appellant and the document relied upon by him there is no difficulty to come to an conclusion that the status of the appellant is tenant and he is in arrears of rent for more than two months and there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned lower court below and the present appeal is devoid of any merit and hence the same is liable to be dismissed. 8. After hearing both the parties and going through the record, examination of witnesses and evidence both oral and documentary evidence decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and held that: “Plaintiff is entitled to decree of Eviction. Ld. Munsif Ghatsila passed order in eviction suit No. 3/08 that plaintiff suit is against defendant, on contest with cost. Defendant is directed to vacate suit premises within 60 days from this decree who give possession to the plaintiff, is genuine, valid and in accordance with law. All the issues are discussed by Ld. Ld. Munsif Ghatsila passed order in eviction suit No. 3/08 that plaintiff suit is against defendant, on contest with cost. Defendant is directed to vacate suit premises within 60 days from this decree who give possession to the plaintiff, is genuine, valid and in accordance with law. All the issues are discussed by Ld. Munsif Ghatsila, in this Eviction Case No.03/2008 judgment and order passed by Ld. Munsif Ghatsila in this case is in accordance with law. Therefore, this appeal of Appellant M/s Amir Hassan (Munna Tailor) is dismissed but without cost.” 9. The correctness of the order passed by the Trial Court affirmed by the First Appellate Court has been assailed by the defendant-appellant in the instant Second Appeal. 10. This Court at the time of admission formulated the following substantial question of law for proper and just adjudication of the case. i. Whether in view of the Specific provisions of the Company’s Act, 1956, the plaintiff could have filed the suit without taking leave of the Company Court/Tribunal ? ii. Whether in view of pendency of liquidation/winding up proceeding before the Company Court, the present suit is maintainable before Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Ghatshila ? iii. Whether the Special Officer appointed in a winding up proceeding can file a suit for eviction in the capacity of Landlord? 11. Mr. A.K.Das, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant submits that as noted by the appellate court more particularly in paragraph 2, the relevant portion is at page 3 of the learned first appellate court in its judgment wherein the appellant has raised an specific issued that the appellant was never inducted as a tenant by the Official Liquidator and in support of his contention he has brought to the notice of the learned appellate court the letter marked as Ex-1/A issued by the office of the Official Liquidator vide letter No.2004 MIS 6008/G, in which the Official Liquidator clarified that the appellant was never inducted as a tenant by him nor any tenancy agreement was executed by the Official Liquidator with the appellant. 12. 12. This apart, the appellant also brought to the notice of the learned court below the orders dated 14.02.2008 which was marked as Ext.-4/B wherein the High Court of Kolkata in the appeal filed by Shri Krishna Murari Bakarewala affirmed the order dated 13.2.2007 but only clarified that the Special Officer (appellant) would be at a liberty to take all legal proceedings against the Official Liquidator/tenant inducted by the Official Liquidator in the properties of the Company. This being the position, the appellant having not been inducted as a tenant by the Official Liquidator, no permission was available to proceed against the appellant by the Special Officer by filing the instant suit. The appellate court however though taking note of the argument at few places did not decide the specific issue. In this background, when the appeal was initially filed, this Hon’ble Court by an order dated 24.7.2014 issued notice to the respondent and stayed further proceeding of Execution Case No. 1 of 2011. After notice, the case was heard on the point of admission on 11.4.2018 and after hearing the parties, the appeal was admitted on the substantial question of law mentioned hereinabove. 13. On the other hand, learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Manjul Prasad vehemently opposes the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 14. Mr. Manjul Prasad, learned Sr. Advocate argued that the point of law urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant have never been raised either in Trial Court or Appellate Court, therefore, the same cannot be termed to be substantial question of law. Para 15 of the Appellate Court judgment which speaks of the document brought on record and which shows that since July, 2002 rent was paid to the plaintiffs and rent receipts were issued and from perusal of the above rent receipts, it is clear that there is relationship of tenant with landlord, therefore, Jharkhand Building and Lease Rent & Eviction Control Act, 2000 is applied in this case. Reliance was also made on Section 280 of the Company’s Act. 15. In para 17 of the Appellate Court judgment the relationship of landlord and tenant has been admitted and there is concurrent finding of facts on the issues. Reliance was placed on AIR 2006 S.C.W. page 2606 (para 27) and 2015 AIR S.C.W. page 2095 (para 14 & 15) and AIR 2016 S.C.W. 4653 (para 27 to 31). 15. In para 17 of the Appellate Court judgment the relationship of landlord and tenant has been admitted and there is concurrent finding of facts on the issues. Reliance was placed on AIR 2006 S.C.W. page 2606 (para 27) and 2015 AIR S.C.W. page 2095 (para 14 & 15) and AIR 2016 S.C.W. 4653 (para 27 to 31). It was further argued that the appeal is fit to be dismissed as regarding maintainability both the courts have held that the suit was maintainable and as such the aforesaid substantial question of law cannot be said to be a substantial question of law to be considered in the instant Second Appeal and as such it is fit to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the Counsel for the parties and from perusal of the records, documents brought on record and in view of the concurrent findings of facts by both the courts, it would be proper to examine the relevant Sections of the Company’s Act. 279. Stay of suits, etc., on winding up order.-(1) When a winding up has been passed or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding up order, shall be proceeded with, by or against the company, except with the leave of the Tribunal and subject to such terms as the Tribunal may impose. Provided that any application to the Tribunal seeking leave under this Section shall be disposed of by the Tribunal within sixty days. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court. 280. Provided that any application to the Tribunal seeking leave under this Section shall be disposed of by the Tribunal within sixty days. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court. 280. Jurisdiction of Tribunal.- The Tribunal shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of.- (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company; (b) any claim made by or against the company, including claims by or against any of its Branches in India; (c) any application made under section 233; (d) any scheme submitted under section 262; (e) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or facts, including those relating to assets, business, actions, rights, entitlements, privileges, benefits, duties, responsibilities, obligations or in any matter arising out of, or in relation to winding up of the company, whether such suit or proceeding has been instituted, or is instituted, or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made or such scheme has been submitted, or is submitted, before or after the order for the winding up of the company is made. On the point of substantial question of law in case of concurrent findings of facts, the Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment in A.I.R. 2016 S.C. 4653 has held: 27.- In our considered opinion, the aforementioned questions cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being a “substantial questions of law” within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in our view, are essentially questions of fact. In any event, the second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law as contemplated under Section 100 of CPC and lastly no case was made out by the respondents before the High Court for remanding of the case to the trial court for de novo trial in all the civil suits. This we say for following reasons. 28. In any event, the second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law as contemplated under Section 100 of CPC and lastly no case was made out by the respondents before the High Court for remanding of the case to the trial court for de novo trial in all the civil suits. This we say for following reasons. 28. Firstly, when the trial court and the first appellate court on appreciation of evidence concurrently held in three civil suits filed by the respondents that they failed to prove their title over the suit-land and further in two civil suits filed by the appellants that @ page-SC 4662 They were able to establish their relationship of landlord and tenant in relation to the suit-land, such findings in our opinion, were binding on the High Court being concurrent in nature. 29. Secondly, none of the findings of the two courts below were perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever come to such conclusion and that these findings were not in conflict with any provision of law governing the issue and that the findings were also not against the pleadings or evidence. In this view of the matter, in our view, these findings were not capable of being set aside by the High Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, rather they were binding on the High Court. 30.-Thirdly, apart from what is held above, the questions formulated were neither debatable nor arguable and nor did they involve any question of law which could be said to arise in the case. In other words, sine qua non for admitting the second appeal was existence of “substantial question of law in the case” and therefore unless the questions framed were debatable, or/and arguable or/and involving any legal question, the High Court had no jurisdiction to formulate such questions treating them to be substantial question of law. Indeed the High Court had the jurisdiction under sub-Section (5) of Section 100 of CPC to examine at the time of hearing as to whether the questions framed under substantial questions of law or not and whether they arose out of the case, but the High Court failed to do so. Indeed the High Court had the jurisdiction under sub-Section (5) of Section 100 of CPC to examine at the time of hearing as to whether the questions framed under substantial questions of law or not and whether they arose out of the case, but the High Court failed to do so. 31- Fourthly- having formulated the questions(though wrongly), the High Court went on to discuss all the issues in 59 pages as if it was hearing first appeals and instead of answering the questions, set aside the judgment/decree of the two courts below and proceeded to remand the cases to the trial court for de novo trial in all civil suits. In our opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction to remand the case to the trial court inasmuch as no party to the appeal had even raised his ground before the first appellate court or/and the High Court as to why the remand of the case to the trial Court is called for and nor there was any finding recorded on this question by the first appellate court.” 17. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in its case reported in 2015 AIR SCW 4095 has held: 14.- All the aforesaid evidences were noticed and appreciated by the Appellate Court to come to a definite finding about the relationship of plaintiff and the defendant as landlord and tenant and the need for demolishing the existing building for construction of a new building for his personal use. The Appellate Court also held that the defendants-tenant had not paid rent to the plaintiff-landlord since he purchased the suit property. 15.- Evidence being also on record, relationship- which was the only dispute raised by the defendant without disputing the other pleadings about personal necessity of plaintiff or non-payment of arrears of rent by defendant having established, we are of the view that the High Court was not correct in entertaining the Second Appeal by interfering with finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Court. The finding of appellate court being based on evidence, the High Court erred in interfering with the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court while deciding a second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. 18. From perusal of findings of both the courts, lower court records oral and documentary evidence, it appears that relationship of landlord and tenant has been established. The defendants were defaulter in payment of rent. From perusal of findings of both the courts, lower court records oral and documentary evidence, it appears that relationship of landlord and tenant has been established. The defendants were defaulter in payment of rent. The substantial question of law cannot be termed to be a substantial question of law as Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on appreciation of evidence concurrently held that there is tenancy between the land holder as plaintiff and tenant as a defendant and eviction suit was maintainable if defendant/appellant is defaulter under Section 11(1) (d) of the Jharkhand Building and Lease Rent & Eviction Control Act, 2000. 19. In view of the aforesaid observation and concurrent findings of the court below, law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed above, no case is made out for interference and hence this Second Appeal is dismissed.