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2019 DIGILAW 1421 (JHR)

Jaswant Singh v. Bhagwan Mishra

2019-08-13

S.N.PATHAK

body2019
JUDGMENT : S.N.Pathak, J. This Second Appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 24.11.2014 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Hazaribagh in Eviction (T) A. No.08 of 2014 whereby the judgment and decree dated 24.06.2014 passed by Senior Civil Judge VI, Hazaribagh in Eviction Suit No.13 of 2004 has been confirmed. 2. The plaintiff-respondent had filed Eviction Suit No.13 of 2004 against the appellant-defendant for the following reliefs:- i. That on adjudication a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises morefully described in Schedule-A of the plaint be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. ii. That Khas possession of suit premises be delivered to the plaintiff after evicting the defendant therefrom at the cost of defendant through the process of the Court. iii. That a decree for cost of the suit be awarded in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. iv. That any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff be found entitled to be also granted to him. The plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit under Section 11 (1) (c) of the B.B.C. Act, 1982, contending inter alia that the plaintiff is owner and landlord of the premises morefully described in Schedule-A to the plaint. According to the plaintiff, the defendant is a month to month tenant under the plaintiff with respect to the suit premises on a monthly rental of Rs.525/-. The amount of monthly rent last paid to the plaintiff by the defendant was till March, 2007 @ Rs. 525/-, for which, the plaintiff granted rent receipt to the defendant. Thereafter, there was no payment of rent of the said house by the defendant to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the suit premises is a valuable property, but it is in a dilapidated condition, the suit premises was constructed by the father of the plaintiff more than 60 years ago when Ramgarh was not a town rather was only a hamlet. After establishment of Ramgarh Cantonment Board, the Ramgarh Town became urbanised. Further development of the town and modernisation was due to nationalisation of coal industry and collieries situated in and around Ramgarh, the installation of Patratu Thermal Power Station etc. After establishment of Ramgarh Cantonment Board, the Ramgarh Town became urbanised. Further development of the town and modernisation was due to nationalisation of coal industry and collieries situated in and around Ramgarh, the installation of Patratu Thermal Power Station etc. The plaintiff further contended that his two sons, namely Arun Kumar Mishra and Tarun Kumar Mishra, are economically dependant upon the plaintiff and, therefore, it has become imperative to set up his sons in business. In view of the aforesaid requirement, the plaintiff is taking steps for demolition and reconstruction of his old and dilapidated suit premises for constructing a commercial shopping complex. The plaintiff requires the suit premises for his personal necessity and to complete the construction of his partially built commercial complex known as “NARAYANI COMPLEX”, part of which has already been completed. The suit premises is just adjacent to his commercial complex and to complete the commercial complex he requires the suit premises. The requirement of the plaintiff is bona fide and in good faith. [From perusal of the order sheet of the trial court, it appears that the defendant filed amendment petition to amend their written statement, which was allowed vide order dated 6.6.2011 and the plaintiff was granted liberty to amend his plaint. Thereafter plaintiff filed amendment petition to amend his plaint, which was allowed by terms of order dated 26.3.2012 and paragraphs-10 (a) to 10 (d) was added, which are as follows:- “10(a) That the father of the plaintiff had acquired lands measuring 0.91acre comprised in different plots at Main Road, Ramgarh Cantt. At one place with one boundary, forming a compact block and had constructed more than 60 years ago several houses thereon, on different portions thereof, and let out the same to different tenants at a very meagre amount of monthly rent. The said land and the houses standing thereon on the death of the plaintiff’s father devolved upon the plaintiff. The land situated in the vicinities of the plaintiff’s above mentioned lands and the house standing thereon were parti, follow or barren but the same are not converted into massive and ultra modern commercial complexes. The said land and the houses standing thereon on the death of the plaintiff’s father devolved upon the plaintiff. The land situated in the vicinities of the plaintiff’s above mentioned lands and the house standing thereon were parti, follow or barren but the same are not converted into massive and ultra modern commercial complexes. 10(b) that the changes brought into physical features, use and utility of the lands situated in the vicinity of plaintiff’s land at Ramgarh, created bona fide necessity for the plaintiff to replace the existing old dilapidated structures standing on his lands by constructing Modern commercial complex and owning to the above mentioned changes, plaintiff got evicted many of the tenants through process of the Court and constructed modernised marked complex thereon consisting of three big halls in the first floor and several shops/stalls on the ground. The complex constructed by the plaintiff on portion of his land is known as “Narayani Complex”. No part of Narayani Complex is used or let out for residential purpose, rather the shops and/or stalls are let out to desirous shop keepers only for carrying their trade and commerce thereon. Construction of proposed market complex on plaintiff’s land at Ramgarh is incomplete and will be completed only when remaining old structures including the suit premises is replaced by now befitting structures, which is possible only after evicting tenants in occupation thereof including the defendant and getting vacant possession therefrom, and to achieve that goal, plaintiff has instituted several eviction suits against his old tenants occupying the rest part of his land or the small, old and dilapidated houses thereon which are pending before the court-below. Institution of the suit for evicting defendant from the suit premises to pre-requisites for completion of plaintiff’s proposed market complex on his land at Main Road, Ramgarh Cantt. 10(c) That letting out the shops and stalls etc. in Narayani Complex has no relevancy with issue in this suit and under the facts and circumstances of this suit, the same does not establish any mala fide on the part of the plaintiff in any manner as falsely alleged by the defendant. 10(c) That letting out the shops and stalls etc. in Narayani Complex has no relevancy with issue in this suit and under the facts and circumstances of this suit, the same does not establish any mala fide on the part of the plaintiff in any manner as falsely alleged by the defendant. 10(d) That the plaintiff has specific case that his main object is to develop his valuable immovable property at Main Road, Ramgarh Cantt, which is on N.H.-33 by constructing commercial complex to get optimum use and maximum benefit, for which, demolition of entire old structures including the suit premises is essential. Object of the plaintiff behind such demolition and construction is not eviction of old tenants including the defendant. Such object cannot be termed as mala fide, rather is bona fide and in good faith. The plaintiff has been regularly and repeatedly requesting the defendant to vacate the suit premises, but on 31.3.2004, the defendant refused to vacate the suit premises. The plaintiff’s requirement will not be fulfilled by partial eviction. The plaintiff has got the building plan prepared by an architect but the same has not been submitted to Ramgarh Cantonment Board for sanction of building plan due to defendant’s occupation of the suit premises. The plaintiff has instituted various eviction suits for evicting other tenants for construction of his commercial complex, which has been decreed and confirmed up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. According to the plaintiff, he requires the suit premises in good faith for construction and/or completion of his commercial complex and for development of his properties including the suit premises for his benefit and for his sons. According to the plaintiff, he requires the suit premises in good faith for construction and/or completion of his commercial complex and for development of his properties including the suit premises for his benefit and for his sons. [it shall be relevant to state here that there is no whisper of word default in the plaint filed by the plaintiff, however, the trial Court in paragraph-2 of the judgment has committed an apparent error of record by recording that “the defendant being a tenant on month to month basis failed to pay the rent of the suit premises @ Rs.525/- Month after March, 2004 and being in default of payment of rent for more than two consecutive months is liable to be evicted from the suit premises”, another glaring error committed by the Trial Court will appear from paragraph-26 of the judgment, in which, it has been recorded “The learned counsel for the plaintiff during the course of argument also conceded that no any relief on the ground of default in payment of rent is sought and further conceded that no any evidence towards default in payment of rent has been adduced by the plaintiff] 3. The defendant appeared and contested the suit contending inter alia that the same was not maintainable and barred by waiver, estoppels, acquiescence and various provisions of law including B.B.C. Act, 1982. The defendant admitted that he was a tenant of the suit premises but denied any default in payment of rent @ Rs.525/- per month, according to the defendant, plaintiff himself has refused to receive the monthly rent and, therefore, the defendant has remitted through money order for the months of April, May, June and July, 2004. The defendant further denied that the tenanted premises is in dilapidated condition alleging on the contrary that the same was repaired/renovated and maintained by him at his own cost. The defendant further stated that he has been running business in the suit premises since the year 1957 and has no other source of livelihood, he is not in position to vacate the premises. The defendant further denied the dependency of the sons of the plaintiff and contested that the Narayani Complex constructed by the plaintiff was a huge marking complex with around 36 shops including a Bank. The defendant further denied the dependency of the sons of the plaintiff and contested that the Narayani Complex constructed by the plaintiff was a huge marking complex with around 36 shops including a Bank. The elder son of the plaintiff is employed as a teacher, while the second son is looking after the affairs of Narayani Complex. The plaintiff himself is a lawyer of long standing and, hence, there is no personal necessity of the suit premises and, therefore, the plaintiff’s suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. After hearing the Counsel for the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues:- i. Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of the rent of the suit premises since March, 2004 ? ii. Whether the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of his sons? iii. Whether the requirement of plaintiff would be substantially satisfied by evicting the defendant from a part only of the suit premises ? iv. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction of the defendant from the suit premises ? 5. On perusal of the record and the relevant documents, evidence and exhibits, the learned Trial Court vide its judgment dated 24th June, 2014 and decree dated 18.7.2014 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff holding therein that the plaintiff is entitled for decree of eviction of the defendant from the suit premises. 6. The plaintiff had already constructed a marketing complex known as Narayani Complex and as such it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff has no sufficient resources for construction of any further such complex. No any material was brought on record on behalf of the defendant to show that the requirement of the plaintiff of the tenanted premises is not bona fide or reasonable. The Court was of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has reasonable and bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises and accordingly held that plaintiff shall be entitled for khas possession of suit premises upon evicting the defendant. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, passed by the trial Court, the tenant, defendant/appellant preferred Eviction (T) Appeal No.8 of 2014 in the Court of Principal District Judge, Hazaribag. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, passed by the trial Court, the tenant, defendant/appellant preferred Eviction (T) Appeal No.8 of 2014 in the Court of Principal District Judge, Hazaribag. The First Appellate Court after hearing the parties vide its order dated 24.11.2014 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 14 (8) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000, since the suit filed by the plaintiff was under Section 11 (1) (c) of the JBC Act, 2000 and as per Section 14 read with Section 14 (4) a special procedure has been provided for disposal of an eviction suit. The learned lower Appellate Court observed that: “On going through the pleadings and the relief sought by the appellant and day to day proceeding it appears that the appellant had sought leave in terms of Section 14 (4) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction), Control Act, 2000 and leave was granted. The entire pleading of the respondent/plaintiff shows that the suit was filed under Section 11 (c) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 and Section 14 (8) of the Act bars appeal before this Court. If the appellant wants to file appeal then it shall lie, if any before the Hon’ble High Court. In view of the above facts this Court is of opinion that this appeal is not maintainable before this Court. So, this appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction at the admission stage itself.” 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, appellant-defendant preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 24.11.2014 passed by the Principal District Judge, Hazaribag in Eviction (T) Appeal No.8 of 2014 on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 14 (8) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, appellant-defendant preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 24.11.2014 passed by the Principal District Judge, Hazaribag in Eviction (T) Appeal No.8 of 2014 on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 14 (8) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000. After hearing the learned Counsel for the Appellant vide order dated 18.07.2018 the appeal was admitted by this Court by formulating the following substantial question of law:- “Whether in a case the eviction suit has been brought by the plaintiff on composite grounds of default in making payment of rent as well as for personal necessity under the provisions of JBC Act and the learned trial court settled the issues on both the grounds for adjudication of the lies, the findings of the learned court of appeal below regarding maintainability of the appeal on erroneous consideration are at all sustainable and the same is against the mandate of law ?” 9. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-defendant at the very outset draws the attention of the Court towards the issue framed by the Trial Court specifically issue No.4, 5, 6 & 7 which have been elaborately dealt with in paragraph No.27 to 36 of the Trial Court judgment. 10. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel further argued that for better appreciation of the case, it would be proper to go through the provision of Order 14 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:- “Power to amend and strike out issues- (1) The Court may at any time before passing a decree amend the issues or frame additional issues on such terms as it thinks fit, and all such amendments or additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties shall be so made or framed. The court may also, at any time before passing a decree, strike out any issues that appear to it to be wrongly framed or introduced. The court may also, at any time before passing a decree, strike out any issues that appear to it to be wrongly framed or introduced. It is respectfully submitted that from bare perusal of the averments made in para 2 of the plaint it appears that the plaintiff has specifically asserted that the defendant has not paid rent of the suit premises and last rent was paid to the plaintiff by the defendant till March, 2004 was at the rate of Rs.535/- only and thereafter no rent was paid and as such the contention of the plaintiff is that the defendant is a defaulter and the defendant has denied this fact in his written statement stating therein that the defendant has not defaulted in making payment of rent and as such the learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties rightly settled the issues of default and personal necessity and the issue of default has been elaborately discussed in the trial court judgment.” 11. It was also argued that since both the issues i.e. issue of default and personal necessity have been decided and elaborately discussed by the learned trial court the only remedy to the defendant was to file regular appeal in accordance with the provision contained in Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the appeal was well maintainable and the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of jurisdiction was not proper rather not tenable in the eyes of law. 12. Further it was argued that in view of the provision contained in Order XIV Rule 5 C.P.C. it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to file appropriate petition for amending/striking the issues framed by the trial court but the plaintiff did not choose to file any petition for striking out the issue relating to default and the learned trial court after detailed discussion decided the issue of default against the plaintiff and as such the only remedy left with the defendant is to prefer appeal before the lower appellate court since the suit has been decided on composite grounds of default in payment of rent as well as on the ground of personal necessity. 13. Learned Counsel places heavy reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of “Alka Gupta vrs. Narender Kumar Gupta”, reported in 2011 (1) PLJR (SC) 65. 14. 13. Learned Counsel places heavy reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of “Alka Gupta vrs. Narender Kumar Gupta”, reported in 2011 (1) PLJR (SC) 65. 14. The issue of default was never assailed by the plaintiff by filing appeal/cross appeal and the appeal filed by the appellant before the learned District Judge was well maintainable and as such the order of the lower appellate court is fit to be set aside and the matter be remanded back to the lower appellate court for deciding afresh in accordance with law. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Vikas Kishore Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the only issue, which is to be decided in the instant appeal is whether the suit filed by the landlord, plaintiff/respondent was only under Section 11 (1) (c), which provides for eviction on the ground of personal requirement or the suit was also under Section 11 (1) (d), which provides for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. 16. It has been argued that the Trial Court misconstrued the averments made in the plaint and the prayer made in the relief portion and wrongly framed an issue of default in payment of rent and erroneously recorded a finding of default in favour of the tenant, defendant/appellant. 17. It was further argued that the suit of landlord, plaintiff/respondent was only on the ground of personal requirement and not on the ground of default and a revision as provided under Section 14 (8) of the BBC Act, 1982 is maintainable before the Hon’ble High Court and not an eviction appeal before the District Judge. 18. Further it was argued that from the order dated 23.03.2005 admittedly the tenant, defendant/appellant took leave of the Court to contest the suit as provided under Section 14 (4) of the BBC Act, 1982. Therefore, by the principles of estoppel by conduct, the tenant/defendant/appellant cannot be allowed to contend that since an issue was framed on the ground of default, as provided under Section 11 (1) (d) and a finding has been recorded on the ground of default, therefore, a title appeal is maintainable. Provisions of Section 14 (8) of the Act prohibits an appeal or second appeal against an order for eviction, recovery of possession passed in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. Provisions of Section 14 (8) of the Act prohibits an appeal or second appeal against an order for eviction, recovery of possession passed in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. The language used in the sub-Section is unambiguous. The procedure prescribed under sub-Sections 4,5,6 & 7 if followed, there shall be no appeal or second appeal. 19. Learned Counsel places heavy reliance on the following judgments: 1992 (2) PLJR 111 (Shailendra Kumar Singh vrs. Kamal Singh) 1999 (2) PLJR 16 (Subodh Kumar vrs. Sitaram Prasad & Ors.) 1996 (2) PLJR 556 (Anil Kumar Tekriwal vrs. Navin Chandra Singh & Ors.) 20. Learned Counsel further argued that in view of the settled provisions of law and the judgment rendered by the Apex Court this Second Appeal is not maintainable and fit to be dismissed. There is no any illegality or infirmity in the order of the First Appellate Court and the Second Appeal is fit to be dismissed. 21. Be that as it may, on hearing of the parties and perusal of the records, this Court is of the opinion that for better appreciation of the case, it would be proper to examine the provision of Section 11 (1) (c) and Section 11 (1) (d) of the B.B.C. Act which reads as under: Eviction of tenants:- (1) Notwithstanding, anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ACT XIV of 1947), and to those of section 18, whether a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds:- (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rent and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall hence forth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation I.- In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation II.- Whether there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. (d) whether the amount of [two months rent lawfully payment by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 16; Section 14 of the BBC Act, 1982 provides special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and expiry of the period of lease which is quoted herein below:- Section 14- Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (3) (i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgement due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the Official Gazette or in newspapers circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personality worked for gain. (ii) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided, and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this Section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this Section : Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where no application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in sub-section 14 (8) above, the Court, which passed the order for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908): Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety days of the date of order of eviction. 22. Section 14 (8) of the Act prohibits an appeal or second appeal against an order for eviction, recovery of possession passed in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. 22. Section 14 (8) of the Act prohibits an appeal or second appeal against an order for eviction, recovery of possession passed in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. The language used in the sub-Section is unambiguous. The procedure prescribed under sub-Sections 4,5,6 and 7 if followed, there shall be no appeal or second appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of “Shailendra Kumar Singh vrs. Kamal Singh”, reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 111 has clearly held that “if the decree for eviction has been passed on the ground of personal necessity or expiry of the period of lease an appeal is not maintainable and the remedy is to file a revision under Section 14 (8) before the High Court. Similarly, in case of “Subodh Kumar vrs. Sitaram Prasad & Others”, reported in 1999 (2) PLJR 16 the Court held that “once a decree in a suit for eviction is passed against a tenant, Section 90 or 100 or other ancillary provisions provided under the C.P.C. is not available, as the right of appeal is taken away by virtue of sub-section 8 of Section 14 of the Act.” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of “Anil Kumar Tekriwal vrs. Navin Chandra Singh & Ors., reported in 1996 (2) PLJR 556 further held that “no appeal against the order of eviction passed on the ground of personal necessity and sub-section (8) of Section 14 bars such appeal.” 24. It is settled principal of law that “no appeal against the order of eviction passed on the ground of personal necessity and sub-section (8) of Section 14 bars such appeal.” 25. In view of the settled principal of law and in view of the aforesaid decision, this Court is not inclined to interfere and take another view than what has already taken in case of ““Subodh Kumar vrs. Sitaram Prasad & Others”, reported in 1999 (2) PLJR 16 that “once a decree in a suit for eviction is passed against a tenant, Sections 90 or 100 or other ancillary provisions provided under the C.P.C. is not available, as the right of appeal is taken away by virtue of sub-section 8 of Section 14 of the Act. 26. The Court is in full agreement with the findings of the First Appellate Court. 26. The Court is in full agreement with the findings of the First Appellate Court. I do not find any merit in the instant appeal and the same is devoid of any merit and hence it is dismissed.