JUDGMENT : Deepak Roshan, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 19.08.2014 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 4744 of 2013 whereby the Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed the writ application holding inter-alia that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, rather it will have power to regulate their own procedure. The Hon'ble Single Judge has further held that before filing of application u/s. 22 (2)(b) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 'RDBFI Act') by the Petitioners-Appellants, not only written statement had been filed by the them but even evidence on affidavit had been filed and thereby the question of violation of principle of natural justice does not arise. In the writ application, the appellants have challenged the order dated 22.07.2013 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as DRAT) whereby the appeal filed by the appellants against the order dated 05.07.2013 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as DRT) has been dismissed on the ground that since one appeal has been filed against the dismissal of three different applications and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable and have further proceeded to treat the appeal filed against the rejection of recall of the order dated 17.06.2013 passed by the DRT, Ranchi. The said appeal has been dismissed by DRAT with cost of Rs. 15,000/- on, the ground that the appellants are trying to protract the proceeding before DRT, Ranchi 2. The Case of the petitioners-appellants is that petitioner no. 1 is a company engaged in the business of wholesale trading of Gold Jewellery. During the course of its business, the appellants applied before the Opera House Branch, Mumbai and Ballygunj Branch, Kolkata for gold loan under the State Bank of India Gold Loan Scheme. As per the terms of the Agreement, the Bank delivered Gold having value of 100% for which the appellants furnished following Bank guarantee to respective Banks through its Branches: (i) Bank guarantee of Rs. 95 lacs had been submitted to the Opera House Branch, Mumbai; (ii) Bank guarantee of Rs. 175 lacs had been furnished to the Ballygunj Branch, Kolkata. As per the terms of the Agreement, the Bank delivered Gold having value of 100% for which the appellants furnished following Bank guarantee to respective Banks through its Branches: (i) Bank guarantee of Rs. 95 lacs had been submitted to the Opera House Branch, Mumbai; (ii) Bank guarantee of Rs. 175 lacs had been furnished to the Ballygunj Branch, Kolkata. As per the terms of the aforesaid Gold Loan Agreement, the appellants were under statutory obligation to maintain 110% security in the form of Bank guarantee with respect to the Gold Loan taken from those Banks depending upon the price of the gold in the international market. Appellants had furnished such Bank guarantees to those Banks, through the State Bank of India, Commercial Branch, Ranchi. Due to huge fluctuation of price of Gold in the market, the appellants could not maintain the 110% of security and thereby made default in maintaining the same. On such default, the Opera Branch, Mumbai and Ballygunj Branch, Kolkata immediately invoked their respective Bank guarantee and realized the entire amount under the scheme. After such invocation, the Respondent Bank filed an Original Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi for recovery of following amounts from the appellants; i.e. (i) Opera House Branch, Mumbai Rs. 4.15 lakhs (as against the limit of Rs. 95 lakhs, and (ii) Ballygunj Branch, Kolkata Rs. 1.47 crores (as against the limit of Rs. 175 lakhs. The appellants appeared in the aforesaid case before DRT, Ranchi and filed written statement, evidence on affidavit and thereafter, in order to substantiate the stand of the appellants in written statement, a petition dated 18.02.2011 was filed under Section 22(2)(b) of the 'RDBFI Act' inter-alia, for discovery and production of relevant documents by the respondent Bank before the DRT. The aforesaid petition of the appellants was allowed by the DRT, Ranchi, vide order dated 15.12.2011, wherein most of the documents including documents mentioned at serial Nos. The aforesaid petition of the appellants was allowed by the DRT, Ranchi, vide order dated 15.12.2011, wherein most of the documents including documents mentioned at serial Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30 and 32 in MOA was in relation to discovery of documents and other documents was for inspection of documents but Respondent Bank failed to file those document and the said order was never challenged by the Bank and subsequently after lapse of one and half years, the new Presiding Officer, without compliance of the order dated 15.12.2011 fixed the case for hearing and recalled the aforesaid order and dispensed the Bank from production and recovery of those documents by observing that relevance of filing documents ordered to be filed and effect of non-filing of those documents shall be examined at the time of final hearing having regard to Bank's claim and defense by the defendants. The further case of the petitioners-appellants is that they were always maintaining the security margin 110% as per the terms of the agreement and it was the statutory duty of those Banks to immediately invoke the Bank guarantees as soon as the appellants failed to furnish the additional security for maintaining 110% security and therefore, there cannot be any question of differential amount. No documents and or calculation have been filed by the Bank before DRT for substantiating the alleged amount sought to be recovered from the appellants. The further case of the petitioner-appellant is that the respondent Bank is under obligation to produce the evidence/documents as to what was the price of gold on the date of such invocation and why there is so much difference in the alleged amount of Opera Branch, Mumbai and Ballyganj Branch, Kolkata. 3. On the other hand, the case of the respondent-Bank is that when the appellant No. 1 failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the loan, letter of comfort was invoked by the concerned branch. After adjustment of the said amount, total outstanding dues on both the accounts were determined at Rs. 1,47,31,836.58/-, out of which the outstanding dues of Ballyganj Branch was to the tune of Rs. 1,43,16,784.49/- whereas for Opera House, Mumbai Branch was to the tune of Rs. 4,15,052.09/-. After adjustment of the said amount, total outstanding dues on both the accounts were determined at Rs. 1,47,31,836.58/-, out of which the outstanding dues of Ballyganj Branch was to the tune of Rs. 1,43,16,784.49/- whereas for Opera House, Mumbai Branch was to the tune of Rs. 4,15,052.09/-. As a result, the respondent-Bank filed suit for recovery of the said amount with interest and future interest at rate of 16.75% per annum before the DRT, Ranchi, which was registered as O.A. Case No. 10 of 2009. 4. During the proceeding before the DRT, Ranchi, the appellants appeared on 23.01.2009 pursuant to issuance of summons by the DRT. However, the petitioners-appellants failed to file written statement and as such vide order dated 26.11.2009 passed by the DRT, Ranchi, in the said O.A. Case No. 10 of 2009, the appellants were debarred from filing of written statement. On the other hand, the respondent-Bank filed its evidence on affidavit on 30.06.2010. However, the petitioners-appellants filed an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi for recall of the order dated 26.11.2009. Pursuant to that the order dated 26.11.2009 was recalled by the DRT, Ranchi and appellants filed written statement. Further, the appellants also filed their evidence on affidavit on 25.11.2010 and the entire matter was fixed for filing argument vide order dated 03.12.2010. 5. It appears from the records that after a gap of 2 months, the appellants filed an application under Section 22 (2)(b) of the RDBFI Act for production of original/certified copies of the documents mentioned in the petition. On the said application, the DRT, Ranchi vide its order dated 15.12.2011 directed the respondent-Bank to produce certified/xerox copies of the documents which were sought to be produced. Thereafter, on 17.06.2013, the DRT, Ranchi passed an Order to the effect that relevance of production of the documents and the effect of non-filing of the said documents shall be examined at the time of trial in the context of the plea which would be taken by the petitioners-appellants and the respondent Bank. 6. On passing of the aforesaid order, an application has been filed on behalf of petitioner-appellants on 25.06.2013 for review/recall of the order dated 17.06.2013. On 25.06.2013, the petitioners-appellants also took objection over the maintainability of the petition filed by the Bank through Stressed Assets Management Branch, Patna, as loan had been taken from SBI, Ballyganj Branch, Kolkata and Opera House Branch, Mumbai. On 25.06.2013, the petitioners-appellants also took objection over the maintainability of the petition filed by the Bank through Stressed Assets Management Branch, Patna, as loan had been taken from SBI, Ballyganj Branch, Kolkata and Opera House Branch, Mumbai. On the same day, the appellants also filed another application under Section 22(2)(e) of the RDBFI Act, 1993 read with Rule 12(6) of the Debt Recovery Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1993 for summoning and enforcing for attendance of witnesses of the Bank officials for their cross-examination. 7. The DRT, Ranchi dismissed all the three applications vide its order dated 05.07.2013. While rejecting the application to recall of the order dated 17.06.2013, the DRT, Ranchi observed that the Bank has filed documents to bring its case against the defendants, and if certain necessary documents have not been filed, the Bank shall face the legal consequences for not filing such documents. The learned DRT has also held that the defendants/appellants have not denied the loan or creation of security and lastly the DRT has held that the relevance of filing documents and effect of non-filing shall be examined at the time of final hearing of the claim case. 8. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 05.07.2013 passed by the DRT, Ranchi, the petitioners-appellants preferred an appeal before the DRAT, Allahabad. There objection was taken with respect to maintainability of the composite appeal which had been directed against the order whereby three applications had been rejected. On such objection being raised, the petitioners-appellants confined their prayer with respect to the matter relating to the production of documents. The DRAT, Allahabad dismissed the said appeal vide its order date 22.07.2013 holding that non-filing of documents and its consequences shall be considered by the DRT, Ranchi at the time of trial. Thereafter, the petitioners-appellants challenged the aforesaid order/orders of DRT, Ranchi and DRAT, Allahabad before the Hon'ble Single Judge by filing the writ application being W.P.(C) no. 4744 of 2013. The Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed the writ application vide its order dated 19.08.14 holding inter-alia that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, rather it shall have power to regulate their own procedure. 4744 of 2013. The Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed the writ application vide its order dated 19.08.14 holding inter-alia that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, rather it shall have power to regulate their own procedure. It was further held by the writ Court that before filing of application u/s. 22 (2)(b) of the RDBFI Act by the Petitioners-Appellants, not only written statement had been filed by the them, but even evidence on affidavit had been filed and thereby the question of violation of principle of natural justice does not arise. 9. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that DRT, Ranchi upon an application filed by them under Section 22(2) (b) of the RDBFI Act, has passed an order on 15.12.2011 directing the respondent-Bank to produce the documents sought for. However, after a gap of more than 1 & 1/2 years, the said tribunal vide its order dated 17.06.2013 recalled its earlier order dated 15.12.2011, as such, the action of DRT, Ranchi is illegal and beyond jurisdiction. He further submits that sub-section (1) of section 22 does not stipulate that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure but it definitely be acted by the principle of natural justice; sub-section (2) of section 22 of the said Act does stipulate specifically that the Tribunal with respect to certain matters enumerated therein including the matter relating to discovery and production of the documents shall have the same power as has been vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submits that in that eventuality, all the provisions relating to discovery and production of documents as enshrined under Order 11, Rule 14 envisaging the production of the document of being ordered by the Court and also Rule-21 of Order-11 stipulating about the consequences of the suit being dismissed on account of non-compliance of the order passed under the said provision/will be applicable under the RDBFI Act. He further submitted that the order dated 17.06.2013 passed by DRT, Ranchi and also the older dated 22.07.2013 passed by DRAT, Allahabad becomes bad in law in view of the aforesaid legal position and as such, the Hon'ble Single Judge has committed a gross error in not deciding the question of law. He further submitted that the order dated 17.06.2013 passed by DRT, Ranchi and also the older dated 22.07.2013 passed by DRAT, Allahabad becomes bad in law in view of the aforesaid legal position and as such, the Hon'ble Single Judge has committed a gross error in not deciding the question of law. The Hon'ble Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the OA filed by the Bank ought to have been dismissed for non-compliance of the order dated 15.12.2011 passed by DRT, Ranchi as per the provision of CPC quoted hereinabove. In order to buttress his argument, the learned senior counsel has referred several decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court which is quoted hereinbelow:- (a) Allahabad Bank, Calcutta Vs. Radha Krishna Maity And Others reported in (1999) 6 SCC 755 : "7. In a recent decision of this Court under this Act in Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd. this Court considered the provisions of the Act and the powers of the Tribunal. The question that arose in that case was whether the Tribunal could pass an order granting ex parte injunction. In that context, reference was made to Section 22 of the Act. This Court observed that the Tribunal's powers were [except as stated in sub-section (2)], wider than the powers of a civil court and the only limitation was that it should observe the principles of natural justice. Wadhwa, J. stated as follows: (SCC p. 716, para 11) "11. We, however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by the High Court. When Section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice. " (emphasis supplied) After contrasting the provisions of the Act with the restrictions imposed upon certain other tribunals under other statutes, this Court observed (SCC pp 717-18, para 12) "It will, thus, be seen that while there are no limitations on the powers of the Tribunal under the Act, the legislature has thought fit to restrict the powers of the authorities under various enactments while exercising certain powers under those enactments... Further, when power is given to the Tribunal to make an interim order by way of an injunction or a stay, it inheres in it the power to grant that order even ex parte, if it is so in the interest of justice...." (emphasis supplied) (b) Sunil Poddar And Others v. Union Bank of India reported in : (2008) 2 SCC 326 "19. In this connection, we may refer to the provisions of Section 22 of the Act which lays down procedure to be followed by the Tribunals. The relevant part of the said section reads thus: "22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.-(1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in. a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding ilex parte; (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (h) * * *" Bare reading of the above provision makes it clear that DRT and DRAT have, for the purpose of discharging their functions under the Act, the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 22, therefore, has to be read with Rule 13 of Order 9 of the Code which provides for setting aside ex parte decree passed against a defendant. Rule 13 of Order 9 as originally enacted in the Code of 1908 reads thus: "13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant.-In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the court by which the, decree was passed for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit: Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also " 10. Per-contra, Mr. Per-contra, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank submits that the action of Petitioners-Appellants of filing the application before the DRT, Ranchi as well as \ subsequent appeals before the DRAT, Allahabad including the writ application and the instant Letters Patent Appeal have been filed just to delay the proceeding pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi. Admittedly, the application under Section 22(2) (b) of the RDBFI Act has been filed not only after filing of the written statement but also after filing of the affidavit on evidence, when the matter was fixed for final arguments. He further submits that the statements made by the appellants in the written statement filed before the DRT, Ranchi, would indicate that entire loan amount had been admitted by them so there should not be any reason for filing such frivolous applications, except to delay the pending proceedings before the DRT, Ranchi. However, even on such application, the learned Tribunal, though initially directed the Bank to produce the documents, which were not produced then the tribunal vide its order dated 17.06.2013 has rightly passed an order that the relevance of those documents and consequences of non-filing would be taken into account at the time of trial and thereby, neither the Tribunal nor the Appellate Tribunal had committed any illegality and no prejudice has been caused to the appellants nor it is a case of violation of principle of natural justice. He further submits that the contention raised by the appellants that the original application filed by the Bank ought to have been dismissed for non-compliance of the order dated 15.12.2011 passed by DRT, Ranchi as the provision of Code of Civil Procedure is required to be strictly complied with in relation to the items mentioned in Section 22(2) of the Act is misplaced and non-est in the eye of law It is a settled proposition of law that Section 22(1) of the Act clearly stipulates that Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down by the CPC. 11. 11. After hearing the learned senior counsel for the appellants and learned senior counsel for the respondent-Bank, it appears, that the issue involved in the instant appeal is that when once the Tribunal passed an order for production of document, consequence of it as contemplated under Older XI Rule 21 is mandatorily required to be given effect to by the Tribunal. Meaning thereby, to say as to whether for non-compliance of the order for production of the documents as directed by the Tribunal would lead to dismissal of the case in view of Rule 22 (2) read with Order XI Rule 21 of CPC. 12. For better appreciation of the case, relevant provisions of RDBFI, ACT & Code of Civil Procedure are quoted herein below: Section 22 of the RDBFI Act: "22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal- (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (h) any other matter which may be prescribed; Order XI Rule 14 and Order XI Rule 21 of Code of Civil Procedure: "Order XI Rule 14 Production of documents- It shall be lawful for the Court at any time during the pendency of any suit, to order the production by any party thereto, upon oath, of such of the documents in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question in such suit, as the Court shall think right; and the Court may deal with such documents, when produced, in such manner as shall appear just. Order XI Rule 21. Non-compliance with order for discovery-(1) Where any party fails to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of documents, he shall, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his suit dismissed for want of prosecution, and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had not "defended, and the party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection may apply to the Court for an order to that effect, and [an order may be made on such application accordingly, after notice to the parties and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard.] [(2) Where an order is made under sub-rule (1) dismissing any suit, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action.] 13. From perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law, it is crystal clear that Section 22 (1) stipulates that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure, laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. Further, Section 22(2) stipulates that for the purpose of discharging their function, under this Act, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have the same power, as are vested in the Civil Court, under the Code of Civil Procedure. In such an event, when both the provisions are taken together harmoniously, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is for the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal to follow the procedure or not to follow the procedure relating to the matter, incorporated under Clause (a) to (h), but if the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal resort to some of the provisions of CPC then it will have the same power which has been vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. We are of the considered opinion that Sub-section 2 of Section 22 of the Act, deals with the procedure and power of the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunals, and once they chose to exercise such power with respect to the matter, they shall have the same authority, which the Civil Court does have under the code. In other words, it can be said that it is discretion of the Tribunal to enforce or not to enforce any of the provisions relating to each of the item as enumerated as Clause (a) to (h), including the matter relating to the discovery and production of the documents, as is there under Section 22(2)(b). We are conscious of the fact that if we hold-that the Tribunal shall strictly adhere to the provisions of CPC concerning the matter as enumerated Clause (a) to (h) of Section 22(2) of the RDBFI Act, then the provisions of Section 22 (1) thereof shall be rendered nugatory. The intent of the legislature is quite clear with regard to sub-section (1) of section 22 of the RDBFI Act. The intent of the legislature is quite clear with regard to sub-section (1) of section 22 of the RDBFI Act. At the first instance, it says that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure of CPC, but they should be strictly guided by the principle of natural justice, however, for the purpose of discharging their functions under the Act they can import the provision of CPC and in that case obviously they will have the same power as vested in the Civil Court under the CPC. 15. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that the very purpose of establishing the DRT is to expedite the disposal of applications filed by the Banks and other Financial Institutions for realization of money and it is precisely for this reason Section 22(1) of the RDBFI Act stipulates that the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure to regulate his own procedure. The Act requires that any procedure laid down by the Tribunal must be guided by the principles of natural justice. The learned Tribunal has already taken note of the effect of non filing of the documents and held that the same shall be examined at the time of trial having regards to the Bank's claim and defence taken by the defendant. The contention of the petitioners-appellants that without filing of documents, the proceeding before DRT, Ranchi cannot proceed is misplaced in the eye of law. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of T.P. Vishnu Kumar v. Canara Bank, P.N. Road, Tiruppur And Others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 652 has held as under: "4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. This is a classic case which shows how the parties can protract proceedings in fiscal matters. Parties as well as the system have contributed to the delay. At every stage of the proceedings there was delay. Facts disclosed that Canara Bank had filed the application in the year 2002 vide OA No. 152 of 2002 for total amount of Rs. 1,59,51,477.93 with interest and the OA stands at the stage at which it was filed, not an inch forward. 6. At every stage of the proceedings there was delay. Facts disclosed that Canara Bank had filed the application in the year 2002 vide OA No. 152 of 2002 for total amount of Rs. 1,59,51,477.93 with interest and the OA stands at the stage at which it was filed, not an inch forward. 6. The Debt Recovery Tribunals in the country are established for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions It was noticed that banks and financial institutions have been experiencing considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with them and therefore the actual need was felt to work out a suitable mechanism through which the dues to the banks and financial institutions could be realised without delay. It was noticed that on 30-9-199 more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the financial institutions were pending in various courts, recovery of debts involved more than Rs. 5622 crores in dues of public sector banks and about 391 crores of dues of the financial institutions. The locking up of such huge amount of money in litigation, it was noticed, prevents proper utilisation and recycling' of the funds for the development of the country. It is in the above scenario, Parliament enacted the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 (51 of 1993). The Act itself provides the mechanism to an aggrieved party, if he is dissatisfied with an order passed by the Tribunal. 10. Powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be invoked in the matter of recovery of dues under the Act, unless there is any statutory violation resulting in prejudice to the party or where such proceedings or action is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. When the Act itself provides for a mechanism, by an appeal under Section 20 of the Act, in our view, the High Court is not justified in invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine that the rejection of the applications by the Tribunal was correct or not. The petitioner and the contesting respondents have no case that either the Bank or the Tribunal had violated any statutory provisions by rejecting their applications. 11. The petitioner and the contesting respondents have no case that either the Bank or the Tribunal had violated any statutory provisions by rejecting their applications. 11. A writ petition was preferred against the rejection of applications and the same were entertained by the learned Single Judge and decided on merits and which in our view is impermissible while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the correctness or otherwise of each and every interim order passed by the Tribunal is going to be tested in a writ court, it will only defeat the object and purpose of establishing such Tribunal. We have already noticed that due to the intervention of the writ court, the matter got delayed for four years defeating the very purpose and object of the Act. We, therefore, find no merit in these petitions and the same are dismissed. " 17. Further, the object of this Act is very well described in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon And Others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , para-5 and 6, which is as under: "5. An analysis of the provisions of the DRT Act shows that primary object of that Act was to facilitate creation of special machinery for speedy recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions. This is the reason why the DRT Act not only provides for establishment of the Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority to make summary adjudication of applications made by banks or financial institutions and specifies the modes of recovery of the amount determined by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal but also bars the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. The Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals have also been freed from the shackles of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. To put it differently, the DRT Act has not only brought into existence special procedural mechanism for speedy recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions, but also made provision for ensuring that defaulting borrowers are not able to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts for, frustrating the proceedings initiated by the banks and other financial institutions " 18. Needless to say that the issue raised by the appellants has been well answered in the case of Union of India And Another Vs. Delhi High Court Bar Association And Others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 275 , para 16 & 17 which is as under: "16. The aforesaid section prescribes the manner in which an application to the Tribunal filed by a bank or a financial institution is to be dealt with. Section 22 provides that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the Rules framed. They shall have powers to regulate their own procedure as given to them. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal under Section 22(2) are given the same powers as are vested in a civil court with regard to the matters specified in the said sub-section, which include the power of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. 17. The very purpose of establishing the Tribunal being to expedite the disposal of the applications filed by the banks and financial institutions for realisation of money, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are required to deal with the applications in an expeditious manner. It is precisely for this reason that Section 22(1) stipulates that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even though the Tribunal can regulate its own procedure, the Act requires that any procedure laid down by it must be guided by the principles of natural justice while, at the same time, it should not regard itself as being bound by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. " 19. In view of the aforesaid facts, discussions and judicial pronouncements, we are of the considered opinion that the Hon'ble Single Judge has not committed any error in dismissing the writ application, filed by the appellants-petitioners and the appellants-petitioners have failed to make out a case so as to warrant any interference with the impugned order by this Court. 20. As a result, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. 20. As a result, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The learned DRT, Ranchi is directed to proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible, as we are conscious of the fact that the money involved in the instant case is public money, as such no further delay should be there in disposing the claim application filed by the Respondent Bank.