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2019 DIGILAW 143 (GUJ)

Kandhal Sarman Jadeja v. State of Gujarat

2019-02-18

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ application has been filed seeking quashing of the FIR bearing C.R.No.I-82 of 2017 registered with Ranavav Police Station, District Porbandar for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 160, 186, 294B, 332, 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('the IPC' for short) read with Sections 3 (1) & 3 (2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ('the Act' for short). 2. The brief facts leading to filling of the present application are as under: 2.1. The respondent No.2 has lodged the impugned F.I.R. on 21.12.2017, inter alia, alleging that while he was on duty at the Ranavav Police Station, one Samat Gogan Mer stormed into the police station, shouting that the applicant and his brother and others were chasing him to beat him and, therefore, the first informant had made him sit inside the chamber of the PSI. 2.2. It is further alleged that in the meanwhile, the applicant, his brother and others reached there, and started hurling filthy abuses at the first informant, and thereafter they entered in the chamber of the PSI and abused Samat Gogan Mer. Therefore, the first informant had asked both the sides to stop abusing. It is alleged that both the sides grappled with each other and Samant Gogan Mer asked the first informant not to intervene. 2.3. It is stated that since the applicant has been elected from Kutiyana constituency in the Assembly Elections held in the State of Gujarat, and since the swearing-in-ceremony was to take place on 25.12.2017, the applicant herein has been enlarged on temporary bail by concerned Magistrate vide order dated 22.12.2017. It is stated that the court below has extended the period of temporary bail till 27.12.2017 vide order dated 23.12.2017. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr.N.D.Nanavati appearing for the applicant has submitted that the impugned FIR itself could not have been filed for the offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC in light of the statutory bar under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareda'y and another, AIR 1981 SC 1417 and State of UP. v. Suresh Chandra Srivastava and others, AIR 1984 SC 1108 and the judgment of this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.24632 of 2015 and allied matters. 4. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareda'y and another, AIR 1981 SC 1417 and State of UP. v. Suresh Chandra Srivastava and others, AIR 1984 SC 1108 and the judgment of this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.24632 of 2015 and allied matters. 4. It was also contended that a bare reading of the FIR would show that none of the ingredients of the offence alleged against the applicant has been made out. It was stated that the ingredients of the offence under Section 332 of the IPC are not established in the present case. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it was urged that the impugned FIR may be quashed and set aside. 5. On the other hand, the writ application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable offence under the Cr.P.C. is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. Mr.Amin submitted that Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an F.I.R. disclosing a cognizable offence in accordance with Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. Mr.Amin very fairly submitted that it is only upon filing of the charge-sheet, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the police report that the bar of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would come into play. Mr.Amin submitted that in the F.I.R., over and above Section 186 of the I.P.C., there are other offences also of the I.P.C. which are not covered by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, ultimately, at the end of the investigation, the police may not file charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C. and may file charge-sheet only for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 160, 186, 294(B), 332, 427, and 504 of the I.P.C. and under Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. Mr.Amin submitted that Section 332 of the I.P.C. and Section 186 of the I.P.C. are distinct offences. Mr.Amin submitted that Section 332 of the I.P.C. and Section 186 of the I.P.C. are distinct offences. The ingredients necessary to constitute the two distinct offences are altogether different. Mr.Amin submitted that the quality of the offence is also different. Mr.Amin tried to develop an argument that if the charge-sheet is filed by the police for both the offences i.e. Sections 186 and 332 of the I.P.C., even then it would be open for the Court concerned to take cognizance of the other offences of the I.P.C., excluding Section 186 of the I.P.C. in view of the bar of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. In support of his submission, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Basir-ul-Haq vs. State of W.B., AIR 1953 S.C. 293 . 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties. 7. The core issue which needs deliberation in the present case is whether the impugned FIR is barred under the provisions of section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.PC. The FIR has been registered for the offence punishable under 143, 147, 160, 186 294B, 332, 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 (1) & 3 (2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 8. The FIR has been registered for the offence punishable under 143, 147, 160, 186 294B, 332, 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 (1) & 3 (2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions on the aforesaid issue, it will necessary to have a closer look at some of the decisions of the Supreme Court for ascertaining the true nature and import of the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. Section 195 of the Cr.PC reads as under: SECTION 195 : Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence (1) No Court shall take cognizance (a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), 218 [except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate]. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. 9. The first in point of time is the decision of the Supreme Court is in the case of Bari-ul-Haq (supra) (The relevant sections considered are sections 182, 297 and 500 IPC). The relevant observations are incorporated as under: “14. Though, in our judgment, section 195 not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. Though, in our judgment, section 195 not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with ail offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially all offence covered by the provisions of section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by mis- describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” Thus, the Supreme Court has approved the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of In Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De, (AIR 1921 Cal 1), and has held that section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages.” 10. In the case of Durgacharan Naik and others vs State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 , (The relevant sections considered are sections 186, 353 IPC and 195(1) of Cr.PC) the Supreme Court has held thus: “5. In the case of Durgacharan Naik and others vs State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 , (The relevant sections considered are sections 186, 353 IPC and 195(1) of Cr.PC) the Supreme Court has held thus: “5. ………… It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under section 353, Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under section 186, Indian Penal Code but it cannot be ignored that sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under section 353, Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch.X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section. In Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De(1) it was held by Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under section 211, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under Section 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court (1) 24 C.W.N. 982. (AIR 1921 Cal 1), it was held by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under section 211.I.P.C, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the Court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of Court for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, while in the other, cognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this Court in Basir-ul-Huq and Others v. The State of West Bengal (1) in which it was held that if the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of section 195,Criminal Procedure Code, from seeking redress for the offence committed against him. 6. In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under section 186, Indian Penal Code. 7. 6. In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under section 186, Indian Penal Code. 7. ………..Two distinct offences having been committed in the same transaction, one an offence of misappropriation under section 409 and the other an offence under section 477-A which required the sanction of the Governor, the circumstance that cognizance could not be taken of the latter offence without such consent was not considered by the Federal Court as a bar to the trial of the appellant with respect to the offence under section 409. 8. We have expressed the view that section 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same or slightly different set of facts and which is not included within the ambit of the section, but we must point out that the provisions of Section 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflage. For instance, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it. 11. Thus, the Supreme Court has approved the observations made in the case of Basir-Ul Huq(supra). Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal D (AIR 1921 Cal 1). 11. Thus, the Supreme Court has approved the observations made in the case of Basir-Ul Huq(supra). Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal D (AIR 1921 Cal 1). (The Full Bench of Calcutta High Court has held that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, which are fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of.) 12. In the case of State of Karnataka vs Hemareddy@ Vemareddy and another, 1981 (2) SCC 185 , (The relevant sections considered are sections 467 IPC and 195(1)(b), it is held thus: “We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in section 195 (1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.” Again in the case of State of U.P vs Suresh Chandra Srivastava and others, AIR 1984 SC 1108 , (The relevant sections considered are sections 467, 471, and 120B IPC) the Apex Court has observed thus: “6. In these circumstances, therefore, it is not necessary for us to go into the broader question as to whether if offences under SS. 467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. are committed, the complaint could proceed or not. The law is now well- settled that where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in section 195, and section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein unless such offences form an integral part so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of section 195 of the Code.” 13. In the case of Pankaj Aggarwal V/s. State of Delhi, JT 2001 (5) SC 233, (The relevant sections considered are sections 186, 332, and 353 IPC) while referring to the decision of Durgacharan Naik(supra) has observed thus: “3…….. In the case of Pankaj Aggarwal V/s. State of Delhi, JT 2001 (5) SC 233, (The relevant sections considered are sections 186, 332, and 353 IPC) while referring to the decision of Durgacharan Naik(supra) has observed thus: “3…….. But in view of the judgment of this Court in AIR 1966 SC 1775 where the court has analysed the provisions of section 353, Indian Penal Code and 186, Indian Penal Code and held that two are distinct offences and quality of the offence is also different, we are of the opinion that Judgment of the Punjab High Court is not correct in law and has taken a view contrary to the law laid down by this Court. What has been stated earlier in the aforesaid case in relation to the provisions of Section 353, Indian Penal Code would equally apply to the provisions of Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code. This being the position, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr.Jain that the provisions of Section 195(a)(i) bars taking cognizance of section 332/34, Indian Penal Code. We, however, agree with Mr.Jain that the order taking cognizance of Section 186 of the IPC is bad in law and attracts the mischief of Section 195. In the aforesaid premises, we quash the criminal proceedings so far as the charge under Section 186 IPC is concerned and direct that the criminal proceedings would continue so far as the charge under Section 332/34, IPC is concerned.” 14. I may refer to the two decisions of the coordinate bench of this Court on the same issue. Judgment dated 13.04.2017 rendered in Criminal Misc. Application No.24632 of 2015 (Govardhankumar Thakoredas Asrani vs State of Gujarat), and judgment dated 03.11.2017 in Special Criminal Application No.7913 of 2017(Zaid Bhagat s/o Altaf vs State of Gujarat). (a) In the judgment in the case of Govardhankumar(supra), (considered sections 141, 143, 186, 332, 253, 504, 506(2)IPC) this Court after survey of various judgments of the Supreme Court has observed thus: “39. It is true that section 195 of the Code does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts and is not so stated therein. It is true that section 195 of the Code does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts and is not so stated therein. Section 195 also does not provide further that if in the course of the commission of that offence, the other distinct offences are committed, the court concerned is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. However, if the perusal of the first information report and other papers of the charge-sheet makes it clear that the offence under sections 186 or 188 of the IPC, as the case may be, is closely interconnected with the other distinct offences and cannot be split up, then, in such circumstances, the bar of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. will apply to such other distinct offences also. 41. Thus, what is discernible from the decisions referred to above of the Supreme Court is that if in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of sections in section 195, it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences. This would depend on the facts of each case. It cannot be laid as a straitjacket formula that the Court cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the nature of the allegations and the materials on record.” (b) In the judgment in the case of Zaid Bhagat(supra) (considered 186, 143, 147, 149, 332, 353 and 504 IPC and section 195(1)(a) while distinguishing the aforesaid judgment in the case of Govardhankumar (supra), has held thus: “11. Applying the principles of law explained by me in the above referred judgment, there should not be any difficulty on my part in rejecting this writ application. However, there are one or two contentions canvassed by Mr.Syed, the learned counsel, which I would like to deal with, more particularly, the distinction drawn by Mr.Syed of Section 195(1) (a) with Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. 14. The plain reading of the provisions referred to above will show that no Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C., except upon a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The plain reading of the provisions referred to above will show that no Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C., except upon a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The opening words of the Section are“No Court shall take cognizance”, and consequently, the bar created by the provisions is against taking of cognizance by the Court. There is no bar against the registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police on completion of the investigation, as contemplated by Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. 21. Thus, the only distinction between Section 195(1)(a) and Section 195(1) (b) of the Cr.P.C. is with regard to Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. The jurisdiction to make a complaint under Subsection (1) of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is limited to such cases, as are provided in Sub section (1) of clause (b) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. only. Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. does not authorise a complaint with reference to an offence described in Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. 23. Mr. Syed, the learned counsel, to salvage the situation, in the last, submitted that the investigation will be an exercise in futility, because ultimately, the Court will not be in a position to take cognizance on the police report. To make good his submission, he has relied upon the observations made by this Court in para 56 of the judgment rendered in the case of Govardhankumar Asrani(supra) referred to above. In para 56 of the judgment in the case of Govardhankumar Asrani (supra), I made myself very clear that as an exception and without citing as a precedent and in the peculiar facts of the case, the relief was being granted at the stage of investigation. 24. In the result, this writ application fails and is hereby rejected.” 15. Thus, the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Satis Chandra Chakravarti (supra) is approved by the Apex Court in the case of Basirul Haq (supra), which is subsequently followed in all the judgments. The Full Bench has specifically bifurcated the offence viz. offence against the public justice and where the personal element is largely involved. The Full Bench has specifically bifurcated the offence viz. offence against the public justice and where the personal element is largely involved. It is further observed that wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the Court concerned. It is also observed if the two offences are fundamentally distinct in nature, the same could be separately taken cognizance of. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very material to the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, if the distinct offences for which no complaint is required are barred by the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. then same would amount to legislating and adding the same to the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. In the case of Pankaj Aggarwal (supra), the Supreme Court has quashed the charge under Section 186 of the IPC but has allowed the criminal proceedings to continue so far as the charge under Section 332/34 of the IPC is concerned. 16. The conspectus of the aforementioned judgments establishes the following parameters: (a) There is no bar of taking cognizance under section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. if the offences are separate and distinct having different ingredients and characteristics from those contained in section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C.; (b) Bar of taking cognizance under section 195 of the Cr.P.C. will apply if the offences cannot be segregated and they form integral part; (c) The offences must be committed as a part of the same transaction; (d) Such offences can be segregated on the basis of element of public justice (viz. Offences occurring in Chapter-X of the Cr.P.C.) and personal element (viz offences under Chapter-XVI of the Cr.P.C.) though committed as a part of the same transaction. Offences occurring in Chapter-X of the Cr.P.C.) and personal element (viz offences under Chapter-XVI of the Cr.P.C.) though committed as a part of the same transaction. If the personal element largely predominates, such offence can be taken cognizance without a written complaint; and (e) Change of label or garb of an offence or misdescribing an offence will create a bar of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. The coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Zaid Bhagar (supra) has observed that the common thread of the aforesaid proposition of law is the expression “taking cognizance” under section 195 of the Cr.P.C. since the opening words of the section are “No Court shall take cognizance”. Thus, there is no bar against the registration of the criminal case or investigation by the police or submission of a report by the police under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. I would like to further supplement the said view by observing hat if after the investigation, it is found that a charge sheet is required to be filed for the distinct offences of the IPC other than which are barred under section 195 of the Cr.P.C., then the concerned Court can take cognizance of such distinct offences of the IPC. The plain and simple reading of the opening recital of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. bars taking of cognizance of the offences of the IPC mentioned therein except on the complaint in writing to the Court. The offences can be said to be distinct even if they form part of the same transaction and if their characteristics and ingredients are different. Thus, the offences which do not require any complaint as stipulated under section 195 of the Cr.P.C. will fall under the category of distinct offences if their characteristics and the ingredients are different though they form part of the same transaction. However, this Court while exercising the inherent powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can quash the offence which is exclusively barred and stipulated under the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. 17. In the present case the FIR has been registered for the offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 149, 186, 332, 160, 294B, 427 and 504 of the IPC. In the present case the FIR has been registered for the offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 149, 186, 332, 160, 294B, 427 and 504 of the IPC. Thus, the offence under section 186 of the IPC(obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions) would attract the mischief of section 195(1)(a) since the offence of section 332 of the IPC, which postulates voluntary causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty is maintained as it does not attract the mischief of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. since the same involves an offence of personal element falling under Ch.XVI regarding offence affecting the human body. The rest of the offences, indubitably, have distinct characteristics and ingredients of the same are also different for which no complaint is necessary. Prima facie the contents of the FIR reveal that there was scuffle in the police station, hence at this stage this Court cannot examine whether the ingredients of section 332 of the IPC are satisfied or not. The FIR is also registered for the offence under Sections 3 (1) & 3 (2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. Thus, for the bar imposed vide section 195 of the Cr.P.C. for the offence under section 186 of the IPC cannot be fatal for the entire case of the prosecution. Hence, the investigation shall proceed further with regard to other offences except the offence under section 186 of the IPC and for Sections 3 (1) & 3 (2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 18. Resultantly, the writ petition is partly allowed. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.