JUDGMENT : Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. 1. Heard Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Nagendra Kumar Srivastava for Insurance company - respondent. 2. This appeal, at the behest of the claimants, challenges the judgment and award dated 27.8.2001 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Etah, (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 247 of 2000. 3. All these matters arise out of the same accident and, therefore, are being taken up for hearing today. There is involvement of maruti van UP-32-B-3377 in which the deceased and the injured were travelling met with an accident with Truck No. UP-77-A-3869. 4. The claimants have felt aggrieved on two counts: (i) that Tribunal held that driver of the maruti car was also negligent despite the fact that the truck driver never appeared before the Tribunal; and (ii) the Charge-sheet was laid against driver of truck. There was a death of driver of Maruti car and the impact showed that driver of truck was solely negligent. 5. It is submitted by counsel for the appellant that despite these gruesomeness of the accident, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the driver of maruti car was negligent to the tune of 50% which could not have been held in absence of proof to the contrary. He has relied on the decision in Hari Babu v. Amrit Lal and others, FAFO No. 3199 of 2004, decided on 4.4.2019 of this High Court. 6. It is submitted by Sri Srivastava for the respondent that the said judgment will not apply as the truck did not come from behind. There is a head on collision. 7. Sri Swapnil Kumar appearing for the appellant has vehemently relied on the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Archit Saini and another v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2018 SC 1143 , and has submitted that the driver of the Car died in the vehicle and the appellants - claimants had discharged their burden of proof to show that the truck driver came on the opposite direction and came on wrong side, dragged the maruti van for a considerable distance. 8. 8. Learned Advocate Sri Srivastava for Insurance company has submitted that the finding of fact as far as negligence is concerned, it cannot be disturbed in the light of the fact that there is no perversity in the finding. The maruti driver was also driving the vehicle at an exorbitant speed. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that the Tribunal has taken care to see that the claimants failed to prove that the deceased driver was not negligent. 9. Sri Swapnil Kumar for the appellant has further relied on the decision in the case of The Senior Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Kamla Devi and others, First Appeal From Order No. 2294 of 2011, decided on 7.10.2017. According to him, the said decision would apply on all force more particularly observations from paragraph Nos. 14 to 17, which are as under: "14. This takes this Court to the second submission of learned counsel for appellant as to the contention whether the deceased was negligent and or the finding of fact about negligence requires any interference or requires to be confirmed. 15. It would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 16. The term negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care an.: caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to cause physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to cause physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently." It is submitted by Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents, that the decision in Senior Division Manager, New India Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Kamla Devi and other, 2018 (6) AWC 6146, will not apply to the facts of this case as it was the duty of the appellants-claimants, who had to discharge the duty of proving that there was no negligence of driver of Maruti Car who died in the accident. 10. The concept of contributory negligence has been time and again evolved, decided and discussed by the Courts. 11. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself would apply. 12. The term contributory negligence has been discussed time and again a person who either contributes or is author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. 12. The term contributory negligence has been discussed time and again a person who either contributes or is author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. The Apex Court in Pawan Kumar and another v. M/s. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal and others, decided on 29 January, 2014 has held as follows: 7. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony (supra) followed in K. Hemlatha and others (supra). Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony (supra) which are relevant may be extracted hereinbelow: "6. "Composite negligence" refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the Court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of "composite negligence" will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." 13. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Renu Singh and others) decided on 19.7.2016 which has held as under: "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any. other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ (SC) 1840). 22.. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." 14. The insurance company has failed to prove that accident occurred due to carrying of more persons as pillion rider. The insurance company has failed to prove that accident occurred due to carrying of more persons as pillion rider. In absence of such a finding, the insurance company having not proved factum of negligent on the part of the scooterist, cannot be benefitted. The negligent act must contribute to the accident having taken place. The Apex Court recently has considered the principles of negligence in case of Archit Saini and Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2018 SC 1143 ." Principle for Composite Negligence: 15. The Apex Court in Khenyei v. New India Assurance Company Limited and others, 2015. Law Suit (SC) 469, has held as under: "4. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tortfeasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tortfeasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tortfeasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the by the Court. However, in case all the joint tortfeasors are before the Court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tortfeasor vis-à-vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tortfeasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant. 14. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan and others, 2008 (3) SCC 748 , has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the Court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: "6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the Court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." 18. This Court in Challa Bhdrathamma & Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing Court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tortfeasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of ' respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle - trailer-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailer-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tortfeasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: (i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-à-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-à-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (iii) In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the Court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it - has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the Court/tribunal, in main case one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the Court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award." 16. The issue of negligence has to be considered in light of the aforesaid settled legal principles. In this case, can it be said that the driver of the Maruti van was a co-author as submitted by Sri Srivastava? The findings returned by the Tribunal suffers from 3 infirmities: (i) It has held the driver of maruti van to be 50% negligent though the truck driver came on the wrong side dashed with the right side of the maruti van and it. can be seen from the site Map that the maruti van was being driven on its correct side but the impact shows that the driver might be driving the vehicle at the time when the accident took place which was 04.00 p.m. at some speed and some negligence will have to be attributed to the driver of maruti van also. 17. The reason being the driver of the maruti van could have taken more caution, could have moved his vehicle to the left and the finding of fact that the driver of said van also contributed to the accident. 17. The reason being the driver of the maruti van could have taken more caution, could have moved his vehicle to the left and the finding of fact that the driver of said van also contributed to the accident. The evidence of the other witnesses go to show that the driver of the maruti van was cautious but did not move the vehicle towards his left. The Tribunal has considered that just because it was a head on collision, both the drivers were equally negligence. This finding is against the record. The claimants had already proved that the road was 20 ft. broad and, therefore, the bigger vehicle had to take more caution just because scooter driver came, it cannot be said that the truck and maruti van were equally negligent. However, 20% is attributed to the driver of maruti van hence the said finding is modified. 18. The submissions of learned Advocate for appellant are accepted qua the issue of negligence in part. This takes this Court to the liability as far as driver of maruti van is concerned, his heirs cannot be benefited hence 20% can be deducted from the compensation awarded to them. 19. As far as other appellants of other matters are concerned, it being a question of composite negligence, qua the claimants they can recover from any of the tortfeasors. The Insurance company represented by Sri N.K. Srivastava would be at liberty to recover the amount deposited from the Insurance company of the maruti van as the owner and driver of the maruti van died due to the injuries and the Insurance company of the maruti van though impleaded has absented itself before the Tribunal throughout. This is the law laid down by this High Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Raj Beti and others, FAFO No. 1791 of 2001, decided on 8.11.2016. QUANTUM IN ALL MATTERS: FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1853 of 2001 The claimants are the parents of 10 years old child, who was studying in 7th class. The total compensation awarded by the Tribunal is Rs. 1,50,000/- which is enhanced to Rs. Ltd. v. Smt. Raj Beti and others, FAFO No. 1791 of 2001, decided on 8.11.2016. QUANTUM IN ALL MATTERS: FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1853 of 2001 The claimants are the parents of 10 years old child, who was studying in 7th class. The total compensation awarded by the Tribunal is Rs. 1,50,000/- which is enhanced to Rs. 2,25,000/- as per the judgment of the undersigned in Mahipal Singh v. Vimal Bharti and another, FAFO No. 1230 of 2000, decided on 5.1.2018, of this matter was a non-tortfeasor and hence additional amount namely 50% of compensation granted which has been deducted would be payable by the Insurance company with interest. FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1854 of 2001 Smt. Poonam Varshey was injured in the said accident and was awarded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- only which calls for interference and the amount is enhanced to Rs. 70,000/- as she has fracture in both her legs. However, as no evidence was led about her injuries or her functional disability, Rs. 25,000/- under the head of No Fault Liability and Rs. 25,000/- under the head of pain shock suffering and Rs. 20,000/- under other heads. The claimant of this matter was a non-tortfeasor and hence the additional amount of compensation granted will have to be paid by the Insurance company with interest @ 9% from filing of claim petition till the judgment of the Tribunal and 6% thereafter. The appeal is partly allowed. FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1855 of 2001. The deceased Gaurav Varshney was 27 years of age, who was a driver of the said vehicle. His income has been considered to be Rs. 60,000/- per year which is not disturbed. 40% will have to be added which comes to Rs. 84,000/-. 1/3rd will have to be deducted and not 1/4 as submitted which would bring the round figure to Rs. 56,000/- to which multiplier of 17 and not 14 would apply to which Rs. 40,000/- under the head of Non-pecuniary damages requires to be added. Hence, Rs. 56,000 x 17 + 40,000 = Rs. 9,92,000/- would be the amount of compensation. The interest @ 9% which has been granted by the Tribunal will remain un-affected up to the date of judgment of the Tribunal. 40,000/- under the head of Non-pecuniary damages requires to be added. Hence, Rs. 56,000 x 17 + 40,000 = Rs. 9,92,000/- would be the amount of compensation. The interest @ 9% which has been granted by the Tribunal will remain un-affected up to the date of judgment of the Tribunal. Hence, on the whole added amount, the interest would be 9% from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of award and 6% thereafter till the amount is deposited. 20% shall be deducted from the compensation awarded. FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1856 of 2001 This takes this Court to the quantum. Vishal Varshney died at the young age of 30 years. He left behind his minor daughter and his widow. It is submitted that the deceased was earning Rs. 7,365/- per month, which is rounded up to Rs. 7,500/- per month. The Tribunal did not add any amount to the said amount under the head of future loss of income would have to be added. Hence, 40% would have to be added to the income of the deceased which would come to Rs. 3,000/- per month. He has left behind his widow and minor daughter as legal heirs. The 1/3rd would have to be deducted from his income towards his personal expenses. Hence, Rs. 5,500/- x 12 x 17 and not 13 as granted by the Tribunal will have to be added, which comes to Rs. 11,22,000/- plus Rs. 70,000/- under the head of non-pecuniary damages as per National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Setthi and others, S.L.P. (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014, decided on 31.10.2017, total of which would be Rs. 11,92,000/-. 9% which has been granted by the Tribunal shall remain undisturbed. The multiplier would be 17 and not 14 as granted by the Tribunal. FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 1857 of 2001 Smt. Kalpna Varshey was injured in the said accident and was awarded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- only which calls for interference and the amount is enhanced to Rs. 70,000/- as she has fracture in both her legs. However, as no evidence was led about her injuries or her functional disability, Rs. 25,000/- under the head of No Fault Liability and Rs. 25,000/- under the head of pain shock suffering and Rs. 20,000/- under other heads. 5,000/- only which calls for interference and the amount is enhanced to Rs. 70,000/- as she has fracture in both her legs. However, as no evidence was led about her injuries or her functional disability, Rs. 25,000/- under the head of No Fault Liability and Rs. 25,000/- under the head of pain shock suffering and Rs. 20,000/- under other heads. The claimant of this matter was a non-tortfeasor and hence the additional amount of compensation granted will have to be paid by the Insurance company with interest @ 9% from filing of claim petition till the judgment of the Tribunal and 6% thereafter. The appeal is partly allowed. 20. The appeals are partly allowed. 21. The judgment and decree shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The amounts awarded be deposited by the Insurance company. They may recover the amount of 20% which they have deposited from the owner and the Insurance company of the Maruti van. The amount shall carry 9% rate of interest from the date of filing of claim petitions and 6% from the date of filing of the appeal. 22. This Court is thankful to counsel for the appellant and counsel for the Insurance company in ably assisting this Court in deciding these appeals.