JUDGMENT : RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. The petitioner is the elected Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Mahadev Shivpur, District Balrampur. On 18.6.2018, the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur issued a notice to the petitioner and to Sri Durgesh Chaudhary, Secretary, Gram Panchayat requiring them to furnish to the former the information sought for in the said notice within the time mentioned therein or else, it was stated, it would be presumed that the noticees were guilty of embezzlement. The Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat), Gaisari, Balrampur was directed to serve a copy of the said notice upon the noticees. The relevant portion of the said notice is extracted below: - *vr% vkidks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidh xzke iapk;r dks foRrh; o"kZ 2017&16 esaa jkT; foRr vk;ksx ,oa 14ok¡ foRr vk;ksx ds vUrxZr miyC/k djk;h x;h /kujkf'k ds lkis{k djk;s x;s dk;Z dk dk;Zokj fooj.k ,oa ml ij fd;s x;s O;; vkfn fooj.k cSad LVsVesUV ds lkFk rFkk foRrh; o"kZ 2018&19 esa Iyku Iyl ij viyksM djk;s x;s dk;Z;kstuk ,oa dk;Z;kstuk ds vuqlkj djk;s x;s dk;Z ,oa ml ij fd;s x;s O;; dk fooj.k ckpmlZ lfgr v/kksgLrk{kjh ds dk;kZy; esa ,d lIrkg ds vUnj miyC/k djkuk lqfuf'pr djsaA ;fn vki }kjk le;kUrxZr mijksDrkuqlkj okafNr vfHkys[k miyC/k ugha djk;k tkrk gS] rks vkids xzke iapk;r dks miyC/k djk;h x;h /kujkf'k ds lkis{k vkgfjr dh x;h lEiw.kZ /kujkf'k dk nq#i;ksx ekurs gq, izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ djk nh tk;sxh] ftlds fy, vki Lo;a mRRkjnk;h gksxasA* 2. According to the petitioner, she submitted her reply along with the relevant documents in the office of the Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat), Gaisari, Balrampur on 25.6.2018, denying the charges levelled against her. The Assistant Development Officer, it is alleged, forwarded the reply of the petitioner to the District Panchayat Raj Officer along with his covering letter dated 26.6.2018 and the same was received in the office of the latter on 27.6.2018. 3. On 2.7.2018, the District Magistrate, Balrampur passed an order under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') whereby and whereunder the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were ceased. 3. On 2.7.2018, the District Magistrate, Balrampur passed an order under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') whereby and whereunder the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were ceased. The portion of the order dated 2.7.2018 to which the attention of this Court was drawn by the counsel for the petitioner is extracted below: - *xzke iapk;r egknso f'koiqj fodkl [k.M xSlM+h dks foRrh; o"kZ 2017&18 esa prqFkZ jkT; foRr vk;ksx ,oa 14ok¡ foRr vk;ksx ds vUrxZr miyC/k djk;h x;h /kujkf'k ds lkis{k fnuk¡d 06-06-2018 dks vo'ks"k /kujkf'k dh tkudkjh ftyk vxz.kh cSad izcU/kd ds ek/;e ls izkIr dh x;hA ftyk vxz.kh cSad izcU/kd }kjk miyC/k djk;s x;s lwpuk ds vuqlkj xzke iapk;r ds xzkefuf/k&izFke [kkrsa eq0 27]856-00 #0 ek= [kkrs esa vo'ks"k gSA iz/kku ,oa lfpo] xzke iapk;r }kjk o"kZ 2018&19 esa Iyku Iyl ij fcuk dk;Z;kstuk viyksM djk;s gh fcuk vkbZ0Mh0 ds eq0 4]52]000-00 #0 dh /kujkf'k vkgfjr dj xcu@ nq#i;ksx fd;s tkus gsrq izFke n`"V;k nks"kh ik;s x;s] ftlds QyLo#i ftyk iapk;r jkt vf/kdkjh }kjk vius dk;kZy; i= la[;k&709 fnuk¡d 18-06-2018 }kjk uksfVl fuxZr djrs gq, fyf[kr Li"Vhdj.k ,oa xzke iapk;rksa esa O;; dh x;h /kujkf'k ls lEcfU/kr vfHkys[k izLrqr fd;s tkus dk funsZ'k fn;k x;k] ijUrq iz/kku ,oa lfpo }kjk dksbZ izfrmRrj izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k u gh dksbZ vfHkys[k fn;k x;k] ftlls Li"V gS fd xzke iz/kku Jh 'ks"kjke ,oa lfpo xzke iapk;r Jh nqxsZ'k pkS/kjh] xzk0fo0v0 }kjk xzke iapk;r ds xzkefuf/k& izFke [kkrs ls eq0 4]52]000-00 #0 fudky dj viO;;@xcu fd;k x;k gSA vr,o eSa d`".kk d#.ks'k] ftyk eftLVsªV] cyjkeiqj m0iz0 iapk;rjkt vf/kfu;e 1947 dh /kkjk& 95¼1½¼N%½ esa iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dks iz;ksx djrs gq, Jherh vatyh nsoh] iz/kku] xzke iapk;r& egknso f'koiqj fodkl [k.M&xkSlM+h ds foRrh; ,oa iz'kklfud 'kfDRk;ksa ds iz;ksx ,oa d`R;ksa ds lEiknu ij rRdky izHkko ls jksd yxk;k tkrk gS ,oa Jherh vatyh nsoh] iz/kku] xzke iapk;r& egknso f'koiqj fodkl [k.M&xSlM+h dks ,d ;qfDr;qDr volj iznku djrs gq, funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og viuk i{k leLr lk{;kas lfgr 15 fnol ds vUnj izLrqr djsa] vU;Fkk vkidks gVk;s tkus ds lEcU/k esa vfUre fu.kZ; ys fy;k tk;sxk] ftldk lEiw.kZ mRrjnkf;Ro vkidks gksxkA* (emphasis supplied) 4. It is this order, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 5. It is this order, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 5. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos.2, 3 and 5 it has been stated that since neither the petitioner nor the Secretary of Gram Panchayat had submitted their reply to the notice dated 18.6.2018, the charges levelled against the petitioner of embezzlement and misappropriation stood proved, and accordingly, by an order dated 2.7.2018 the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were ceased. By an order dated 31.7.2018 a three member committee was constituted to exercise the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan till the conclusion of final enquiry. It has been further stated that by an order dated 31.7.2018 the District Horticulture Officer was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry against the petitioner, who submitted his report dated 17.10.2018. The District Magistrate, not being satisfied with the enquiry report submitted by the District Horticulture Officer, by an order dated 2.11.2018, constituted a Committee comprising of District Economic and Statistic Officer, Balrampur and Assistant Engineer, District Rural Development Agency, Balrampur to conduct a fresh enquiry against the petitioner. The enquiry report is still awaited. 6. Heard Shri Suresh Chandra Yadava, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sunil Bajpai, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents and perused the record. 7. Section 95(1)(g) of the Act, which contemplates removal of a Pradhan, reads as follows: - "95. Inspection - (1) The State Government may - (g) remove a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or member of a Gram Panchayat or a Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he - i- absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings. ii- refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude. ii- refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude. iii- has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by this Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or [iii-a has taken the benefit of reservation under sub-section (2) of Section 11-A or sub-section (5) or Section 12, as the case may be, on the basis of a false declaration subscribed by him stating that he is a member of Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the backward classes, as the case may be.] iv- being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics, or v- suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5-A; Provided that where, in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Pradhan or Up-Pradhan shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a Committee consisting of three members of Gram Panchayat appointed by the State Government." 8. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 110 read with Clause (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 95 of the Act, the State Government has framed rules known as the U.P Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (for short 'the Rules') laying down the procedure for holding an enquiry (preliminary as well as final). Rules 2 (c), 3, 4 and 5 being relevant, are extracted below: - "2.(c) 'Enquiry Officer' means the District Panchayat Raj Officer or any other district level officer, to be nominated by the District Magistrate. 3. Procedure relating to complaints.- (1) any person making complaint against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan may send his complaint to the State Government or any other officer empowered in this behalf by the State Government. 3. Procedure relating to complaints.- (1) any person making complaint against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan may send his complaint to the State Government or any other officer empowered in this behalf by the State Government. (2) every complaint referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by the complainant's own affidavit in support thereof and also affidavit of all persons from whom he claims to have received information of facts relating to accusation, verified before a notary, together with all documents in his possession or power pertaining to accusation. (3) Every complaint and affidavit under this rule as well as any schedule or annexure thereto shall be verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings and affidavits respectively. (4) Not less than three copies of the complaint as well as each of its annexure shall be submitted by the complainant. (5) A complaint which does not comply with any of the foregoing provisions of this Rule shall not be entertained. (6) It shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in the foregoing provisions of this rule if a complaint against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is made by a public servant. 4. Preliminary Enquiry.--(1) The State Government may, on the receipt of a complaint or report referred to in Rule 3, or otherwise order the Enquiry Officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. (2) The Enquiry Officer shall conduct the preliminary enquiry as expeditiously as possible and submit his report to the State Government within thirty days of his having been so ordered. 5. Where the State Government is of the opinion, on the basis of the report referred to in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 or otherwise that an enquiry should be held against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan or Member under the Proviso to Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 it shall forthwith constitute a Committee envisaged by Proviso to Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95, of the Act and by an order ask an Enquiry Officer, other than the Enquiry Officer nominated under, Sub-rule (2) of Rule (4), to hold the enquiry." 9. It is not in dispute that in exercise of the power conferred by Section 96-A of the Act, the State Government has delegated its power under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act as well as under the Enquiry Rules to the District Magistrate vide notification no.1648/31-1-1979-123/97 Lucknow dated 30.4.1997. 10. A conjoint reading of the Rules extracted above would show that any person including a public servant can make a complaint against a Pradhan to the District Magistrate. The rider being that in case of a complaint by a person, who is not a public servant, the complaint has to be made in accordance with sub-Rule 2, 3 and 4 of Rule 3 or else it would be open to the District Magistrate not to take cognizance of the same. As per Rule 4 of the Rules, on the receipt of a complaint or a report referred to in Rule 3, a preliminary enquiry has to be made by an Enquiry Officer defined in sub-Rule (c) of Rule 2 of the Rules to find out if there was a prima facie case against the Pradhan for a formal enquiry. As per Rule 5 of the Rules, on the basis of the report referred to in sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 or otherwise if the District Magistrate is of the opinion that an enquiry should be held against a Pradhan, he is obliged to constitute a Committee in terms of the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the Act and to simultaneously nominate an Enquiry Officer, other than the one nominated for conducting the preliminary enquiry, to hold a formal enquiry in the matter. Notably, as per Rule 2(c) of the Rules, the enquiry against a Pradhan, whether preliminary or formal, can be entrusted to either the District Panchayat Raj Officer or any other District level officer nominated by the District Magistrate. 11. In so far as the controversy revolving around the petitioner having submitted her reply to the notice dated 18.6.2018 of the District Panchayat Raj Officer is concerned, in the writ petition the petitioner has categorically alleged that she had submitted her reply to the notice within the time granted to her for the purpose and the same was also received in the office of the District Panchayat Raj Officer on 27.6.2018. Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos.2, 3 and 5 is incidently sworn by the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur, Sri Naresh Chandra, himself. Though in paragraph no.4 of his counter affidavit, the District Panchayat Raj Officer has specifically stated that neither the petitioner nor the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat had submitted their reply to the show cause notice dated 18.6.2018 as alleged by them, his reply to the averments made in paragraph nos.23 and 24 of the writ petition makes an interesting reading. Paragraph nos.23 and 24 of the writ petition and paragraph nos.4 (relevant portion) and 13 of counter affidavit are reproduced below for ready reference: PARAGRAPHS NOS.23 AND 24 OF THE WRIT PETITION "23. That in pursuance of the notice/letter dated 18.6.2018, the petitioner has submitted his reply dated 25.6.2018 to the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur through Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat), Gaisari, Balrampur mentioning the details as required by the notice dated 18.6.2018. The said reply of the petitioner was submitted in the office of Assistant Development Officer Panchayat Raj, Gaisari, Balrampur on 25.6.2018 for that the official has made his signature thereon. The true copy of the reply of the petitioner dated 25.6.2018 along with its enclosures is annexed herewith as Annexure No.5. 24. That the Assistant Development Officer Panchayat Raj, Gaisari, Balrampur has forwarded the reply of the petitioner to the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur, vide his letter no.105/.Li./Gra.Nidhi Patra./2018-19 dated 26.6.2018. The same was received in the office of District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur, for that receiving and signature is made by the official. The ture copy of the letter no.105/.Li./Gra.Nidhi Patra./2018-19 dated 26.6.2018 is annexed herewith as Annexure No.6." (emphasis supplied) PARAGRAPH NOS.4 AND 13 OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT "4. .... Since the Gram Pradhan and Sachiv Gram Panchayat were found prima facie responsible therefore the District Panchayat Raj Officer issued notice vide letter dated: 18.06.2018 thereby directing to submit explanation along with all the evidences and records pertaining to the expenditures but neither the Gram Pradhan nor the Sachiv, Gram Panchayat replied the said notice nor they produced the required records therefore it was found proved that from the account of Gram Nidhi-Pratham they embezzled/ misappropriated the funds of Rs. 4,52,000.00 and as such vide order dated: 02.07.2018 the financial/ administrative powers of the Gram Pradhan/ the petitioner were ceased ....." * * * * 13. 4,52,000.00 and as such vide order dated: 02.07.2018 the financial/ administrative powers of the Gram Pradhan/ the petitioner were ceased ....." * * * * 13. That the contents of paragraphs 19 to 27 of the writ petition are not admitted as stated hence denied in view of the facts stated in the preceding paragraphs of this counter affidavit, which may kindly be perused and the same are also reiterated here." (emphasis supplied) 12. In paragraph nos.23 and 24 of the writ petition the petitioner has categorically stated that on 25.6.2018 she had submitted her reply to the notice dated 18.6.2018 in the office of the Assistant Development Officer, who in turn, alongwith his covering letter dated 26.6.2018, forwarded the same to the District Panchayat Raj Officer and the same was received in the office of the latter on 27.6.2018. The reply dated 25.6.2018, alleged to have been submitted by the petitioner, containing the endorsement of receipt of the office of the Assistant Development Officer and the letter dated 26.6.2018 of the Assistant Development Officer, containing the endorsement of receipt of the office of the District Panchayat Raj Officer, have been annexed as annexure nos.5 and 6 to the writ petition. In paragraph no.4 of the counter affidavit the District Panchayat Raj Officer has made a categorical statement that neither the petitioner nor the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat had submitted any reply to the notice dated 18.6.2018. However, in reply to the averments made by the petitioner in paragraph nos.23 and 24 of the writ petition, the District Panchayat Raj Officer, in paragraph no.13 of his counter affidavit, except for a vague denial, has stated nothing more. He has not disputed the receipt of reply alleged to have been submitted by the petitioner in the office of the Assistant Development Officer on 25.6.2018. He has also not denied the letter dated 26.6.2018 of the Assistant Development Officer forwarding the reply of the petitioner to the District Panchayat Raj Officer and the alleged endorsement of receipt made thereon by his office on 27.6.2018. A vague denial is no denial. 13. Be that as it may, the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner are good enough to set aside the order under challenge in the present writ petition. 14. A vague denial is no denial. 13. Be that as it may, the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner are good enough to set aside the order under challenge in the present writ petition. 14. It is no more res integra that before ceasing the financial and administrative power of a Pradhan the District Magistrate is obliged to hold a preliminary enquiry against him and after receiving the report is further obliged not only to seek an explanation from the affected Pradhan but is also obliged to consider the same. 15. In Vivekanand Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 29 LCD 221 a Full Bench of this Court, while considering the meaning of the word 'otherwise' in sub-Rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Rules, opined as under: - "85. The question is, what is the meaning of word 'otherwise' in rule 5: Can it include a report by anyone or information coming into hands of the DM; Has the DM suo motu power to cease the power and refer the case for the final enquiry? * * * 88. Under proviso to section 95(1)(g) right to exercise financial and administrative powers can only be ceased if the DM prima facie finds that the pradhan was guilty of financial and other irregularities in an enquiry (preliminary or fact finding) by such person and in the manner prescribed. It is only on such a report that might come within the purview of the word 'otherwise' in rule 5 of the Rules. All kinds of reports or information may not be relied under rule 5 lest the rule may be hit by the statutory provision. 89. In our opinion, in view of proviso to section 95(1)(g) it cannot be given as wide a meaning as we gave to the words 'otherwise' in rule 4. It has to have restricted meaning. Let's consider, what kind of reports may be covered by the proviso to section 95(1)(g) and the word 'otherwise' in rule 5 of the Enquiry Rules. 90. Rule 2(c) defines 'Enquiry Officer'. It means the DPRO or any other district level officer to be nominated by the DM. It has to have restricted meaning. Let's consider, what kind of reports may be covered by the proviso to section 95(1)(g) and the word 'otherwise' in rule 5 of the Enquiry Rules. 90. Rule 2(c) defines 'Enquiry Officer'. It means the DPRO or any other district level officer to be nominated by the DM. The following contingencies may be there: (i) A complaint can be made directly to the DM who may ask the enquiry officer as defnined under rule 2(c) to conduct a preliminary inquiry under rule 4; or (ii) A complaint can be made directly to the enquiry officer defined under section 2(c), who may submit a report without the DM asking for it; or (iii) A complaint can be made to the DM with copy to the enquiry officer, who may submit a report without the DM asking for it; or (iv) A DM can himself conduct a preliminary enquiry; or (v) A report can be submitted by any other public servant. 91. In all the aforesaid alternatives, a preliminary enquiry is conducted and a preliminary report is there. The question is, which one of these can be acted upon under rule 5 to cease the power under proviso to section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act. According to the petitioners only first of the aforesaid report can be relied upon; The respondents all five reports can be relied upon. In our opinion, answer lies somewhere in between and only the first four reports can be so relied. 92. There is no dispute so far as first contingency is concerned. The fifth one has to be rejected. In case it is accepted, then this would make rule 3(6) otiose. In our opinion this cannot be the case. However this cannot be said about contingencies number two to four. * * * 95. It is not necessary for the DM to specifically ask the enquiry officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry. There seems to be no point in asking the enquiry officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry again even if he submitted a report after the enquiry. It would be futile exercise unless the DM disagrees with the report of the enquiry officer. 96. There seems to be no point in asking the enquiry officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry again even if he submitted a report after the enquiry. It would be futile exercise unless the DM disagrees with the report of the enquiry officer. 96. A report by an enquiry officer defined under rule 2(c) is also a report by a person and the manner is prescribed under the Rules--irrespective of the fact that he was so asked by the DM or not. In our opinion, it is also a preliminary report within the meaning of the proviso to section 95(1) (g) of the Panchayat Raj Act. 97. The DM exercises the powers of the State Government under section 95(1)(g) as well as under the Enquiry Rules as the powers are delegated to him. He also appoints the enquiry officer. He is higher than all enquiry officers. He can himself conduct a preliminary enquiry. It would be anomalous that on a preliminary report of a subordinate officer, a final enquiry and cessation of power can be ordered but the DM, who appoints him, cannot conduct a preliminary enquiry. 98. In our opinion, action under proviso to section 95(1)(g) can also be taken on the preliminary report of the DM as well as on a report of a person defined as enquiry officer under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules. Only these reports would be covered in the word 'otherwise' of rule 5. Any other report would be a report under rule 3(6) of the Enquiry Rules or can be considered by the DM under his suo motu power to order a preliminary enquiry but final enquiry with cessation of power can not be ordered on its basis." (emphasis supplied) 16. In Narendra Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors, (2013) 31 LCD 90 following the decision in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court, while setting aside an order ceasing the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan in the said case, held as under: - "37. In Narendra Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors, (2013) 31 LCD 90 following the decision in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court, while setting aside an order ceasing the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan in the said case, held as under: - "37. The Full Bench of the Court in Vivekanand Yadav (supra) examined at length the provisions of Section 95(1)(g) of the Act and the Rules and observed that the District Magistrate could form his prima facie satisfaction for holding a formal enquiry and cease the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan only on the preliminary enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer defined under Rule 2(c) of the Rules or on the basis of the preliminary enquiry conducted by the District Magistrate himself." (emphasis supplied) 17. In the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) the Full Bench has also determined the extent of opportunity to which a Pradhan is entitled before his financial and administrative powers are ceased under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act. The proposition was noticed thus: QUESTION (ii) In case, the preliminary enquiry is adverse to the pradhan then, whether an opportunity is necessary before passing an order ceasing financial and administrative powers of the pradhan? 18. Answering, it was held in paragraph 71 of the report as under:- "71. It is not only necessary that the explanation or point of view or the version of the affected pradhan should be obtained but should also be considered before being prima facie satisfied of his being guilty of financial and other irregularities and ceasing his powers. Of course the consideration of the explanation does not have to be a detailed one. There should be indication that mind has been applied. This has also been explained in the Hafiz case. Nevertheless, we would like to clarify it." (emphasis supplied) 19. Adverting to the facts of the case, the impugned order recites that since the petitioner and the Secretary had withdrawn a sum of Rs.4,52,500/- for the year 2018-19, without uploading the working plan on the website of Plan Plus and without a work I.D., they were prima facie found guilty of dissipation / embezzlement. Adverting to the facts of the case, the impugned order recites that since the petitioner and the Secretary had withdrawn a sum of Rs.4,52,500/- for the year 2018-19, without uploading the working plan on the website of Plan Plus and without a work I.D., they were prima facie found guilty of dissipation / embezzlement. Consequently, the District Panchayat Raj Officer issued a notice requiring the petitioner and the Secretary to submit their reply to the charges levelled against them and since no reply was submitted by the petitioner and the Secretary, they were found guilty of embezzlement. It is, thus, apparent that the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner have been seized only on the premise that the petitioner had not submitted her reply to the notice dated 18.6.2018 of the District Panchayat Raj Officer. 20. In the impugned order no reference has been made to any preliminary enquiry having been held against the petitioner nor the order refers to any report of the District Panchayat Raj Officer. Moreover, before passing the impugned order the District Magistrate has made no attempt, whatsoever, to obtain the explanation or version of the petitioner. The averments contained in the counter affidavit filed by the District Panchayat Raj Officer also do not show that he had made any preliminary enquiry against the petitioner or that he had made any report against the petitioner. It is also undisputed that before ceasing the financial and administrative power of the petitioner no opportunity was afforded to her, by the District Magistrate, to submit her explanation. Paragraphs 48 and 49 of the writ petition and paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit being relevant are extracted below: - PARAGRAPH NOS.48 AND 49 OF THE WRIT PETITION "48. That no preliminary enquiry has been held against the petitioner by District Panchayat Raj Officer, Balrampur nor by the District Magistrate, Balrampur under the Uttar Pradesh provisions of Section 95 (1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and The U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiries Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred as Rules of 1997) to arrive at a prima facie conclusion that he has committed financial and other irregularities. 49. 49. That no opportunity of showing cause has been afforded to the petitioner against the action proposed within the meaning of second proviso of Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act of 1947), which provides that no action shall be taken under clause (f) and clause (g) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed." (emphasis supplied) PARAGRAPH NO.18 OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT "18. That in reply to the contents of paragraphs 31 to 51 of the writ petition it is submitted that keeping in view seriousness of the irregularities pertaining to the misappropriation of funds the orders impugned in the writ petition have been passed and at present the enquiry is being conducted by the Enquiry Committee constituted vide order dated 02.11.2018. It is relevant to submit here that for utilization of the funds allocated to the Gram Panchayats under 14th Finance Commission the State Government vide Government Order dated 18.02.2018 issued guidelines. A copy of the guidelines issued vide Government Order dated 18.02.2018 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No.CA-2 to this counter affidavit. Para II of the Government Order dated 18.02.2018 provides that the Gram Panchayats will prepare work plan as per the guidelines of the 14th Finance Commission. The Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) will collect these work plan and obtain approval of the District Magistrate through the District Panchayat Raj Officer. In respect of each work I.D. will be generated at the webside (www.reportingonlinc.gov.in) and the statement of expenditure will also be uploaded through Priya Software at the website (www.planningonline.gov.in). Thereafter the State Government issued Government Order dated 9.6.2016, wherein it has been provided that the Gram Panchayats will prepare working plan and the same shall be uploaded at website of Plan Plus. A copy of the Government Order dated 9.8.2016 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No.CA-3 to this counter affidavit. It is submitted that the petitioner acted against the guidelines issued vide Government Order dated 23.9.2008 in purchasing the materials. A copy of the Government Order dated 23.9.2008 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No.CA-4 to this counter affidavit." (emphasis supplied) 21. It is submitted that the petitioner acted against the guidelines issued vide Government Order dated 23.9.2008 in purchasing the materials. A copy of the Government Order dated 23.9.2008 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No.CA-4 to this counter affidavit." (emphasis supplied) 21. It is, thus, apparent that neither any preliminary enquiry as mandatorily required by the Rules was held against the petitioner nor any opportunity to place her version was afforded to the petitioner by the District Magistrate before the impugned order was passed by him. The impugned order having been passed in contravention of the statutory Rules and the dictum of the Full Bench in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra), cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 22. That apart, relying on the italised portions in the impugned order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that even at the stage of recording a prima facie satisfaction for holding a regular enquiry, the District Magistrate has completely made up his mind and has reached a definite conclusion about the alleged guilt of the petitioner. This has rendered the subsequent proceedings an empty ritual and an idle formality. 23. This Court finds that there is a lot of substance in the aforesaid contention. The District Magistrate while ceasing the financial and administrative powers of a Pradhan must act fairly and with an open mind. At the stage of recording his satisfaction under Rule 5 of the Rules for holding an enquiry against a Pradhan, the District Magistrate cannot confront a Pradhan with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in the instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the impugned order gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceedings become an idle ceremony. 24. In the instant case, from a perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that the District Magistrate has demonstrated a totally closed mind at the stage of Rule 5 itself. Such a closed mind is inconsistent with the scheme of the said Rule. 25. This brings the Court to the last contention of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. He has vociferously submitted that in the present writ petition only the order dated 2.7.2018 passed by the District Magistrate, Balrampur whereby financial and administrative powers of the petitioner has been ceased has been assailed. 25. This brings the Court to the last contention of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. He has vociferously submitted that in the present writ petition only the order dated 2.7.2018 passed by the District Magistrate, Balrampur whereby financial and administrative powers of the petitioner has been ceased has been assailed. He submits that since the order dated 31.7.2018, by means of which a three member committee was constituted to exercise the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan till the conclusion of final enquiry, the order dated 2.7.2018 whereby the District Horticulture Officer was appointed as an Enquiry Officer, as well as, the order dated 2.11.2018 by means of which an Enquiry Committee has been constituted to hold an enquiry against the petitioner are not under challenge, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. In the alternative he submits that even if the impugned order ceasing the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner is not upheld, the respondents be permitted to conclude the final enquiry pending against the petitioner. 26. The submission made by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is liable to be rejected at the outset. 27. It is well settled that if the basic order goes the consequential order automatically becomes inoperative. In Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 395 the Court held as under: - "This flows from the general principle applicable to "consequential orders". Once the basis of a proceeding is gone, may be at a later point of time by order of a superior authority, any intermediate action taken in the meantime- like the recommendation of the State and by the UPSC and the action taken thereon- would fall to the ground. This principle of consequential orders which is applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders." 28. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kesari Devi vs. State of U.P., (2005) 4 AWC 3563 , wherein after relying upon a number of decisions of the Apex Court, this Court held as under: "115. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kesari Devi vs. State of U.P., (2005) 4 AWC 3563 , wherein after relying upon a number of decisions of the Apex Court, this Court held as under: "115. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of the Court to another feature of this case and submitted that once the basic procedure of preliminary inquiry falls through as being invalid, the consequential action taken by the State Government by holding a regular inquiry and passing the impugned order has also to necessarily be treated to be invalid. 116. There can be no dispute with the settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it cannot be made good by efflux of time or by subsequent improvement. In Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam and Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 381 , the Apex Court held that the writ Court should not validate an action which was not lawful at inception. 117. If the basic order falls being illegal, invalid or void the consequential order cannot be given effect to as it automatically becomes inoperative. * * * 119. The Apex Court held that if the basic order stands vitiated, the consequential order automatically falls. (emphasis supplied) 29. It is as a consequence of the impugned order dated 2.7.2018 that by an order dated 31.7.2018 a three member committee has been constituted to exercise the financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan and the final enquiry is being conducted against the petitioner under Rule 5 of the Rules. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order dated 2.7.2018 and the petitioner has assailed the said order. In case the order dated 2.7.2018 is set aside, the consequential orders would also not survive. 30. It is an equally well settled principle of law that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. In Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 , the Apex Court has held as under: - "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. In Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 , the Apex Court has held as under: - "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor, which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, who stated as under: (Nazir Ahmad case, IA pp. 381-82) ''... where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.' 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, (1954) SCR 1098 = AIR 1954 SC 322 and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1962) 1 SCR 662 = AIR 1961 SC 1527 . These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, (1964) AIR SC 358 = (1964) 1 SCWR 57 and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law." (emphasis supplied) 31. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors, (2002) 1 SCC 633 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court reiterated the above principle in by observing as under: - "It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself." (emphasis supplied) 32. Removal of an elected Pradhan is a serious matter. Such action leads to grave consequences. The same cannot be dealt with in a casual manner as has been done in the present case. In case such an action is to be taken by the administrative authorities, the same should be done as per the prescribed procedure. 33. Removal of an elected Pradhan is a serious matter. Such action leads to grave consequences. The same cannot be dealt with in a casual manner as has been done in the present case. In case such an action is to be taken by the administrative authorities, the same should be done as per the prescribed procedure. 33. In the case of Vivekanand Yadav (supra) a Full bench of this Court has categorically held that the action under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the Act can be taken by the District Magistrate "only on the basis of a report of an Enquiry Officer defined under Rule 2(c) or on the basis of the preliminary enquiry conducted by the District Magistrate himself" and "final enquiry under Rule 5 of the Rules can be ordered only on the basis of the aforesaid preliminary enquiry report". 34. In the case of Smt. Kesari Devi (supra) a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with Rule 5 of the Rules observed as under: - 127. In view of the above, law can be summarised, that an inquiry is to be conducted against any such office bearer applying strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The provisions of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules are mandatory in nature. Non-compliance of any of the sub-rules thereof would render the proceedings illegal. The complaint should be filed in the manner prescribed by the 1997 Rules, verification of the complaint as well as of the affidavit has to be made in accordance thereof. As per Rule 5 of the 1997 Rules unless the State Government is of the opinion, that the complaint has been processed strictly in accordance with Rule 3, and the preliminary inquiry has been conducted by the designated authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules and strict compliance has been observed, it shall be impermissible for the State Government to proceed any further for regular inquiry." (emphasis supplied) 35. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 the Apex Court has held as under: - "34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed. 35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal." (emphasis supplied) 36. Admittedly, in the case at hand, no preliminary enquiry, whatsoever, was held against the petitioner either by the District Panchayat Raj Officer or the District Magistrate himself. In the circumstances final enquiry cannot be held against the petitioner. 37. In view of the settled legal position, the prayer made by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel regarding liberty to the respondents to conclude the final enquiry as contemplated under Rule 5 of the Rules is also to be rejected. 38. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 2.7.2018 passed by the District Magistrate is hereby set aside. 39. It is, however, open to the District Magistrate to proceed against the petitioner afresh, in accordance with law.