JUDGMENT : VEERENDER SINGH SIRADHANA, J. 1. Instant writ petition has been instituted by Chotu Ram and Ramdas i.e. the petitioners, with the prayer to quash and set aside the impugned order dt. 01st November, 2018, made by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal (for short, the Tribunal), and further, to hold the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved herein, initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, the 'ULCAR Act'), to have lapsed being illegal; and therefore, return the subject land, back to the petitioners. The prayer clause of the writ application, reads thus: "(i) Call for the record of the entire proceedings; (ii) Quash and set aside the order dt. 01.11.2018 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 490/2018, Shri Chhotu Ram & Another vs. Jaipur Development Authority & Others (Annexure-1); (iii) Restrain the respondents from creating third party rights on the land in question; (iv) Hold the alleged acquisition proceedings under ULCAR Act, 1976 as being illegal and vitiated on account of not taking of possession of the land in question by the respondents and non-payment of compensation; (v) Direct the respondents to restore the possession Khasra No. 193, 193/248 situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur to the petitioners. (vi) Or in the alternate direct the respondents to decide the representation of the petitioners in a time bound manner while maintaining status quo on the land in question; (vii) Any other relief, order or direction that this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good conscience." 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for adjudication of the controversy raised are: that the petitioners purchased the subject land comprising of Khasra No. 193 and 193/248, situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur, in the year of 1967. The competent authority issued notifications under Sec. 10(3) of the ULCAR Act, with reference to Khasra No. 193 vide notification dt. 4th January, 1984 and relating to Khasra No. 193/248 vide notification dt. 28th January, 1984. The subject land in question, as stated, was acquired by taking forcible possession on 6th December, 1986. Thereafter, the petitioners filed appeals bearing No. 54/91 and 55/91, before the Divisional Commissioner, unsuccessfully. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioners instituted writ applications bearing SBCWP No. 2008/93 and SBCWP No. 2209/93; challenging the applicability of the ULCAR Act to the land in question. The subject land in question, as stated, was acquired by taking forcible possession on 6th December, 1986. Thereafter, the petitioners filed appeals bearing No. 54/91 and 55/91, before the Divisional Commissioner, unsuccessfully. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioners instituted writ applications bearing SBCWP No. 2008/93 and SBCWP No. 2209/93; challenging the applicability of the ULCAR Act to the land in question. The ULCAR Act was repealed in the State of Rajasthan, with effective from 07th October, 1999. It is pleaded case of the petitioners that the State Government inserted Section 83-A in the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 (for short, the 'JDA Act'), for constitution of 'Settlement Committee', to resolve the disputes between Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) and other persons vide notification dt. 26th May, 2001. The 'Settlement Committee', vide order dt. 10th April, 2002, directed for the subject land to be regularized at the cost of 25% of the reserve price, subject to the condition that petitioners withdrew the pending writ applications before the High Court and Supreme Court involving the same subject land. The respondent-JDA, issued a demand notice dt. 18th May, 2002, thereby demanding Rs. 3,81,23,291.25/- (Rupees Three Crore Eighty One Lakh Twenty Three Thousand Two Hundred Ninety One and Twenty Five paise Only), for regularization of the subject land involved herein. The petitioners made a payment of Rs. 1,45,05,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty Five lakhs Five Thousand Only). Meanwhile, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), bearing No. 2658/03, was filed in this High Court challenging the constitution of the 'Settlement Committee' under Sec. 83-A of the JDA Act. The State Government, pending the PIL, withdrew the notification for constitution of the 'Settlement Committee' on 15th September, 2004. Be that as it may, the petitioners addressed a representation, dt. 13th August, 2013, to the State Government for regularization and compliance of the order dt. 10th April, 2002, made by the 'Settlement Committee'. The State Government constituted an 'Empowered Committee' on 19th September, 2013, seeking its legal opinion in the matter of the subject land involved herein. The Committee, in its legal opinion dt. 17th November, 2013, opined that for the entire amount for regularization was not deposited by the petitioners; therefore, the respondent-JDA was not obliged to regularize the subject land after a lapse of 11 years and this fact was conveyed to the petitioners vide order dt. 20th November, 2013. 3. The Committee, in its legal opinion dt. 17th November, 2013, opined that for the entire amount for regularization was not deposited by the petitioners; therefore, the respondent-JDA was not obliged to regularize the subject land after a lapse of 11 years and this fact was conveyed to the petitioners vide order dt. 20th November, 2013. 3. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a writ application (SBCWP 12656/2014), challenging the orders dt. 17th November, 2013 and 20th November, 2013, and to further allow the subject land in question to be regularized. The writ application was dismissed vide order dt. 25th February, 2015, so also the intra-Court appeal against the order dt. 25th February, 2015, vide order dt. 27th February, 2015, by the Division Bench. The petitioners then approached the Apex Court, of the land by way of a Special Leave Petition, which was also dismissed vide order dt. 02nd March, 2015. A review petition filed by the petitioners before the Division Bench of this Court, was also declined vide order dt. 13th May, 2016. And then a special leave petition against the order dt 13th May, 2016, before the Apex Court of the land, wherein the SLP, was withdrawn by the petitioners with the liberty reserved to them to address a representation to the State Government in order to deal with the question of non-payment of compensation and possession taken or not? In lieu of acquisition of the subject land involved herein. This prayer was granted by the Supreme Court. 4. The petitioners, therefore, addressed a representation to the State Government whereby the Urban Development Department requested the respondent-JDA, to submit a 'Factual Report' regarding the subject land in question on the issues aforesaid. The respondent-JDA, submitted, the 'Factual Report' dt. 07th September, 2017 to the Urban Development Department, wherein it has been specifically stated that there is no evidence on record as to possession and compensation paid to the petitioners, of the subject land in question. Be that as it may, the State Government did not take any action even in the face of the 'factual report' aforesaid while the respondent-JDA has notified auction of some parts of the subject land in question. The petitioners, therefore, moved the JDA Appellate Tribunal, against the said auction notice. And the application of the petitioners before the Tribunal, has been declined vide impugned order dt. 1st November, 2018; of which the petitioners are aggrieved of. The petitioners, therefore, moved the JDA Appellate Tribunal, against the said auction notice. And the application of the petitioners before the Tribunal, has been declined vide impugned order dt. 1st November, 2018; of which the petitioners are aggrieved of. 5. Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned senior counsel for the petitioners with Achintya Kaushik, Advocate, vehemently argued that the petitioners were the erstwhile Khatedar tenants of agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 193 and Khasra No. 193/248 ad-measuring 25 Bigha 2 Biswas and 12 Bigha 5 Biswas, respectively; situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur. The subject land in question was purchased by the petitioners in 1967. Acquisition proceedings were initiated vide notifications under Sec. 10(3) of the ULCAR Act; with respect to Khasra No. 193 vide notification dt. 04th January, 1984 and with respect to Khasra No. 193/248 vide notification dt. 28th January 1984, although the land in question was outside the limits of Jaipur City and was being used for agricultural purposes; therefore, at the very first instance, the acquisition proceedings initiated were illegal to begin with. Further, the State Government determined the compensation to be Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Only) per Bigha, to be the compensation that was to be paid in lieu of the acquisition but no such compensation was ever paid to the petitioners. 6. According to Mr. Mathur, the petitioners challenged the acquisition proceedings initiated under the ULCAR Act, before the Divisional Commissioner and thereafter before this Court. And while the matter was still pending, the State Government repealed the ULCAR Act of 1976 vide notification dt. 07th October, 1999. Later on, the State Government vide notification dt. 26th May, 2001, inserted a provision for the constitution of a 'Settlement Committee' under Sec. 83-A of the JDA Act, 1982, for resolution of disputes between the JDA and other persons. It is further pointed out that the petitioners along with other Khatedars, filed an application before the 'Settlement Committee' and the same was registered as Application No. 26/2002. The 'Settlement Committee' upon hearing both parties vide order dt. 10th April, 2002, concluded that since the possession of the land in question was not taken and compensation was also not paid to the petitioners, and further, the subject land in question was used for agricultural purposes by the petitioners; hence, the subject land in question shall be regularized as per circular dt. 10th April, 2002, concluded that since the possession of the land in question was not taken and compensation was also not paid to the petitioners, and further, the subject land in question was used for agricultural purposes by the petitioners; hence, the subject land in question shall be regularized as per circular dt. 26th May, 2005, issued by the State Government, by charging 25% of the reserve price of the concerned area of Chitrakoot Scheme. Thus, the petitioners were to deposit Rs. 1650/- (Rupees One thousand six hundred and fifty Only), per Square Meter to the JDA. The 'Settlement Committee' further directed the petitioners that they would also withdraw the case pending before the Apex Court of the land along with all other cases pending before various Courts or forums. 7. Learned senior counsel further added that the petitioners, thereafter, in compliance of the order dt. 10th April, 2002, of the Settlement Committee; withdrew all pending litigation from various Courts, and thereafter the respondent-JDA, issued a demand letter dt. 18th May, 2002, to the petitioners along with other khatedars, raising a total demand of Rs. 3,81,23,291.25/- (Rupees Three Crore Eighty One Lakh Twenty Three Thousand Two Hundred Ninety One and Twenty Five paisa Only), as the amount for regularization of the subject land of the petitioners along with land of other Khatedars. The petitioners and other Khatedars in compliance to the said demand/deposited a substantial sum of Rs. 1,45,05,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty Five Lakhs Five Thousand Only), through various challans with the respondent-JDA. Further, the petitioners and other Khatedars were ready and willing to deposit the balance amount as well to the respondent-JDA, but the respondent-JDA refused to receive the remaining amount on one pretext or the other. 8. It is further stated that later on, a 'Public Interest Litigation' was filed bearing No. 2658/2003, titled as Ram Saran Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., challenging the formation of 'Settlement Committee' for resolution of disputes. During the pendency of the aforesaid PIL, it was conveyed to the respondent-JDA to keep the decisions of the 'Settlement Committee' in abeyance but to the contrary the respondent-JDA refused to accept the remaining amount for the regularization of the subject land involved herein. Though the petitioners on several occasions requested the respondent-JDA to accept the remaining amount for regularization of the subject land in question but the respondent-JDA refused to do so. Though the petitioners on several occasions requested the respondent-JDA to accept the remaining amount for regularization of the subject land in question but the respondent-JDA refused to do so. Further, on an application of the petitioners, the erstwhile Commissioner of the JDA, addressed a communication dt. 23rd May, 2007, to the Dy. Secretary, UHD, seeking permission of the State Government to regularize the subject land, in compliance of the order dt. 10th April, 2002, of the 'Settlement Committee'. Permission was accorded by the State Government along with the direction to release the lay out plan of the Scheme as per rules after deposit the remaining amount along with interest from the petitioners and the other Khatedars. But, to the dismay of the petitioners, the respondent-JDA, even then, refused to receive the remaining amount for the regularization and remained idle. 9. In the meanwhile, the Public Interest Litigation, aforesaid [Ram Saran Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.], was adjudicated upon vide order dt. 16th August, 2012, holding that since the 'Settlement Committee', was already dissolved on 15th September, 2004; hence, the pending cases cannot be decided by the said Committee. The petitioners then addressed a representation to the UDH on 13th August, 2013; once again requesting for regularization of the subject land in question, in compliance of the order dt. 10th April, 2002 of the 'Settlement Committee'. The State Government constituted an 'Empowered Committee' through the UDH Department, in its meeting dt. 11th September, 2013; and the matter was placed before the said 'Empowered Committee'. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners further pointed out the fact that the 'Empowered Committee', sought legal opinion in the matter and on 17th November, 2013, wherein it was opined that for the entire amount' for regularization was not deposited by the petitioners, and therefore, the respondent-JDA, was not obliged regularize the subject land in question after a lapse of 11 years, and it was so communicated to the petitioners vide order dt. 20th November, 2013. 11. It is evident from the findings of the Settlement Committee vide order dt. 10th April, 2002, that possession of the subject land in fact was never taken and no compensation was paid to the petitioners. It is for these reasons, the 'Settlement Committee' directed that the subject land involved; herein may be regularized by the respondent-JDA. 20th November, 2013. 11. It is evident from the findings of the Settlement Committee vide order dt. 10th April, 2002, that possession of the subject land in fact was never taken and no compensation was paid to the petitioners. It is for these reasons, the 'Settlement Committee' directed that the subject land involved; herein may be regularized by the respondent-JDA. Moreover, the respondent JDA in utter disregard to the order of the Settlement Committee sent its officers on to the subject land and threatened to take possession from the petitioners. For no heed was paid to the representation of the petitioners and no decision was been taken on the pending representation, the petitioners were left with no alternative but to approach this Court, and accordingly, they did file a writ petition bearing SBCWP No. 12656/2014 [Chotu Ram and Another vs. State of Rajasthan and Another], praying the following reliefs: "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that in the interest of justice this writ petition may kindly be allowed and entire record of the case may kindly be called for and be perused by this Hon'ble Court if so pleases: A. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to regularize the land of the petitioners bearing Khasra No. 193, 193/248 situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur in compliance of the order dt. 10.4.2002 (Annex. 1) passed by the State Level Committee; B. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed not to take possession of the land of the petitioners in Khasra No. 193, 193/248 situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur; C. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed riot to deprive the petitioners of their legitimate right of enjoyment of property; D. Any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in favour of the petitioners may also be passed. E. Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioners." 12. As soon as the writ petition was filed in the morning of 11th November, 2014, the respondent-JDA, sent its officials in the afternoon and pasted notices under Sec. 34-A(1) of the JDA Act, on the premises of the subject land in question of the petitioners. As soon as the writ petition was filed in the morning of 11th November, 2014, the respondent-JDA, sent its officials in the afternoon and pasted notices under Sec. 34-A(1) of the JDA Act, on the premises of the subject land in question of the petitioners. For a part of subject land had been used as 'marriage gardens' since 2008 and for which proper licenses have been obtained from the Jaipur Nagar Nigam; hence, the facts were very much in the knowledge of the respondent-JDA. Further, the time given in the said notices was only 24 hours and that too without any show cause notice; thus, the said notices were totally arbitrary to the provisions of the JDA Act and it was just a method devised to harass the petitioners. Thereafter, the respondent-JDA communicated the decision of the State Government dt. 17th November, 2014, informing that for the representation addressed by the petitioners that since the petitioners failed to deposit the entire amount for regularization of the land in question; therefore, the petitioners cannot compel the respondent-JDA to comply with the decision of the 'Settlement Committee' after a lapse of 11 years. Thus, in view of these new developments, during the course of the pending proceedings, it became necessary to amend the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition was amended with the following prayers: "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that in the interest of justice this writ petition may kindly be allowed and entire record of the case may kindly be called for and be perused by this Hon'ble Court if so pleases: A. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to regularize the land of the petitioners bearing Khasra No. 193, 193/248 situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur in compliance of the order dt. 10.4.2002 (Annex. 1) passed by the State Level Committee; B. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed not to take possession of the land of the petitioners in Khasra No. 193, 193/248 situated in Village Beed Khatipura, Jaipur; C. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed not to deprive the petitioners of their legitimate right of enjoyment of property; C1. By an appropriate writ, order or direction the notices dt. By an appropriate writ, order or direction the notices dt. 20.11.2014 (Annexure-14, 15, 16, 17 and 18) issued by the respondent No. 2 under Sec. 72 of the JDA Act, 1982 to the petitioners may kindly be quashed and set aside and further all the notices u/s. 72 of JDA Act, 1982 dt. 14.11.2014 issued regarding the shops situated on khasra No. 193 and 193/248 be also quashed and set aside and all subsequent action taken in. furtherance thereof also be quashed and set aside. C2. By an appropriate writ, order or direction the orders dt. 17.11.2014 (Annexure-9 and Annexure-11) passed by the respondent No. 1 and orders dt. 20.11.2014 (Annexure-8 and Annexure-10) passed by the respondent No. 2 may be quashed and set aside. C3. By an appropriate writ, order or direction all the notices dt. 11.11.2014 issued under Sec. 34(A) of the Act of 1982 be also quashed and set aside. C4. By an appropriate writ, order or direction it may be held that the subject land of khasra No. 193 and 193/248 situated at Beed Khatipura, Jaipur is not government property and the petitioners are haying legal and valid title and rights over the said land. D. Any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in favour of the petitioners may also be passed. E. Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioners." 13. The writ petition aforesaid, was dismissed by this Court vide order dt. 25th February, 2015, holding that possession in terms of Section 10(6) of the ULCAR Act, was taken on 21st June, 1986 and compensation was disbursed as well. The petitioners, aggrieved of the order of the learned Single Judge, preferred an intra-Court appeal before, the Division Bench, bearing DB SAW No. 201/2015, titled as Chotu Ram and Another vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, The judgment of the Single Judge dt. 25th February, 2015, was upheld by the Division Bench and the intra-Court appeal, was thus, dismissed vide order dt. 27th February, 2015. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court of land bearing No. 7366/2015, which was also declined vide order dt. 2nd March, 2015. 14. 25th February, 2015, was upheld by the Division Bench and the intra-Court appeal, was thus, dismissed vide order dt. 27th February, 2015. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court of land bearing No. 7366/2015, which was also declined vide order dt. 2nd March, 2015. 14. Learned senior counsel for 'the petitioners asserted the fact that the possession of the Subject land involved herein was actually taken for the first time on 02nd March, 2015, and this fact has been communicated to the petitioners in response to an application seeking information under Right To Information Act, 2005 (for short, Act of 2005). Thereafter, the petitioners in the face of this new fact surfaced to their knowledge, filed a review petition for review of the order of the Division Bench instituting D.B. Civil Review Petition No. 55/2016 [Chotu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan], which was again dismissed vide order dt. 13th May, 2016. The petitioners, once again instituted an appeal against the order dt. 13th May, 2016, of the Division Bench, before the Apex Court of the land through SLP(C) No. 13844/2016 and SLP(C) No. 20233/2016, [Chotu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan]. The matter was heard by the Supreme Court and during the course of the arguments, the Apex Court of the land suggested the petitioners that the factum of non-dispossession from the land in question and non-payment of compensation in lieu of the acquisition of the land involved herein; could be more accurately and aptly be dealt with by the State-respondents. Therefore, liberty was sought for to address a representation before the State Government with respect to the same, by the petitioners and it was generously granted by the Apex Court of the land. The said SLPs, were accordingly, withdrawn by the petitioners with the liberty to address representation that was granted by the Supreme Court vide order dt. 29th July, 2016. 15. Mr. Mathur, further stated that the petitioners accordingly addressed a representation to the State-respondents and on the receipt of the representation, the State Government sought a 'Factual Report' from the respondent-JDA with respect to the subject land in question. Thereafter, the Secretary, JDA, in compliance forwarded the 'Factual Report' On 7th September, 2017 with the facts as stated therein, which reads thus: "27. Thereafter, the Secretary, JDA, in compliance forwarded the 'Factual Report' On 7th September, 2017 with the facts as stated therein, which reads thus: "27. That it seems that on receipt of the representation of the petitioners, the state Government sought factual report from Jaipur Development Authority with respect to the land in question. It is submitted that as per the information received under RTI, the Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority has forwarded the factual report on 07.09.2017 with the following observations: No Fard Kabja evidencing the forceful possession of the land in question being taken on or after 06.12.1986 is available on record. The order dt. 06.12.1986 which is available on record does not evidence the handing over of possession by the petitioners by way of either signature or thumb impression. No document evidencing either the payment of compensation or the preparation of the said cheques is available. Deposition of Rs. 1,45,05,000/- as part payment of Rs. 3,81,23,291/- in pursuance order of Settlement Committee dt. 10.04.2002 is evidenced from the record. Copy of the factual report dt. 07.09.2017 along with note sheet is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-23." 16. A copy of the 'Factual Report' has already been placed on record that was furnished to the petitioners in response to an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. According to learned counsel that a bare perusal of the report clearly explains and proves that the forceful possession of the land in question was never actually taken on 6th December, 1986, contrary to what was portrayed before the Courts and the order dt. 6th December, 1986 doesn't anywhere evidences the handing over of possession by the petitioners. Moreover, there is no evidence of payment of compensation to the petitioners as well. The alleged communications made by the respondents as regards the cheques were just a fraud played in order to mislead the Courts to get the scales in their favour. The communications indicate that Cheque No. 131584 was issued on 16th March, 1991 and the Cheque No. 131587 was issued on 13th March, 1991, which shows that the cheque bearing a later number was issued at first. Thus, the authenticity of the said cheques issued and alleged payment of compensation made is a farce and a way that was devised to mislead the Court. 17. Mr. Thus, the authenticity of the said cheques issued and alleged payment of compensation made is a farce and a way that was devised to mislead the Court. 17. Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned senior counsel insistently argued that the respondents while have repeated the plea which were raised in earlier writ proceedings have not disputed the contents of para 27 and 28 of the instant writ application whereas it is specific Stand of the petitioners that physical possession of the subject land involved herein was taken for the first time only on 2nd March, 2015, and this fact is admitted by the respondents as would be evident from communication dt. 7th September, 2017. Further, no compensation of the subject land involved herein has been paid to the petitioners and there is no evidence to this effect as admitted by the respondents in view of communication dt. 7th September, 2017. 18. Learned senior counsel further argued that the State Government being conscious of the fact that fraud in fact was played in the proceedings involving the land in question of the petitioners; is now not acting upon the 'Factual Report' dt. 7th September, 2017, submitted by the respondent-JDA. Moreover, the respondent-JDA is now intending to create third party rights over the land in question by auctioning parts of it. The petitioners, therefore, afraid of losing their land, moved to Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal under Sec. 83(8)(a) of the JDA Act, against the auction notice dt. 18th July, 2018, passed by the respondent JDA. 19. In order to fortify his stand learned counsel has relied upon the opinions, in the case of State of TN vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1996 SC 866 , Patasi Devi vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 856 to emphasize that Panchnama is the only legally accepted norm to take possession. Reliance is also placed on the opinion in the case of B. Valamarthi vs. Govt. of T.N., W.P. 4988/2010 (Madras HC), to assert that acquisition proceedings would stand abated if compensation has not been validly paid before the Repealing Act of 1999. It is further pointed out that acquisition under the ULCAR Act, cannot be said to have been concluded, if, the possession of the land in question was not taken before the Repeal Act [vide Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Addl. It is further pointed out that acquisition under the ULCAR Act, cannot be said to have been concluded, if, the possession of the land in question was not taken before the Repeal Act [vide Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Addl. Collector, (2014) 12 SCC 523 and Vinayak K. Kashinath Shikar vs. Deputy Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 18]. Further, liberty of representation must reach its logical conclusion and the cause of action would be subsist and the matter cannot be said to be infructuous [vide Baij Nathu Sharma vs. Rajasthan High Court, (1998) 7 SCC 44 ]. In the light of law declared in the case of Takaram Kana joshi vs. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the petitioners have staked claim for payment of compensation at the prevalent market rate. 20. Per contra: Mr. Anil Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the State-respondent, declined to file a separate counter affidavit on behalf of the State-respondent, despite opportunity granted to so, has relied upon and adopted the counter affidavit submitted on behalf of respondent-JDA. Further, Mr. Anil Mehta, while endorsing the stand of the respondent-JDA, has relied upon paragraph 20 of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in earlier round of litigation i.e. SBCWP No. 12656/2014 [Chhotu Ram & Anr. vs. State of Raj. And Ors.], decided on 25th February/2015, wherein it was observed that the respondents appear to have taken possession of the subject land leaving 1500 sq. meters of land out of the subject land from each of the khasra number. Reference has also been made to paragraph 23 to assert that the possession was taken by the State Government. According to Additional Advocate General, no fresh cause of action accrued to the petitioners to institute the present writ application. Further, the matter is barred by principle of res-judicata. Learned counsel further added that action of the respondent-JDA in issuance of notice under Sec. 34(A) and Section 72 of the JDA Act, cannot be faulted for the same was held to be justified vide judgment dt. 25th February, 2015. 21. Mr. Amit Kuri, learned counsel representing the respondent-JDA, vociferously argued that the conduct of petitioners in making wrongful use of the land involved herein speaks volumes, and therefore, they are not entitled to any indulgence by this Court. 25th February, 2015. 21. Mr. Amit Kuri, learned counsel representing the respondent-JDA, vociferously argued that the conduct of petitioners in making wrongful use of the land involved herein speaks volumes, and therefore, they are not entitled to any indulgence by this Court. Learned counsel has reiterated the submissions and stand that was considered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court while adjudicating upon the matter on writ application No. 12656/2014, vide judgment dt. 25th February, 2015. According to Mr. Kuri, the issue of possession taken of the vacant land stands resolved in view of findings arrived at by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dt. 25th February, 2015, under paragraph 20 and 23. Thus, the writ application is barred by principle of res-judicata. However, the response to the writ application is cryptically silent on the pleadings of para 27 and 28 of the writ application for reasons best known to the petitioners. 22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at bar, as well as considered the opinions referred to and relied upon. 23. Indisputably, the writ application No. 12656/2014, instituted by the petitioners and adjudicated upon by a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dt. 25th February, 2015, is not in dispute. The sole basis for institution of the present writ application is the subsequent information that has surfaced to the petitioner in view of response by the respondents to application under Right to Information Act, 2005, to one Chandra Shekhar Sharma, as would be evident from communication dt. 16th November, 2015 (Annexure-18) and communication dt. 18th December, 2015 (Annexure-19). 24. At this juncture, it will be profitable to take note of the contents of the 'Factual Report' dt. 7th September, 2017, which reads thus: ^^dk;kZy; t;iqj fodkl Ákf/kdj.k] t;iqjA bUæk xk¡/kh lfdZy] tsŒ,yŒ,uŒ ekxZ] t;iqjA Øekad% tfoÁk@mik@tksu&7@2017@Mh&3037 'kklu lfpo&ÁFke] uxjh; fodkl foHkkx] jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqjA Subject: Notice for restoration of land bearing khasra no. 193 and 193/248 in village beed khatipura, Jaipur acquired under of the urban land ceiling act 1976. 7th September, 2017, which reads thus: ^^dk;kZy; t;iqj fodkl Ákf/kdj.k] t;iqjA bUæk xk¡/kh lfdZy] tsŒ,yŒ,uŒ ekxZ] t;iqjA Øekad% tfoÁk@mik@tksu&7@2017@Mh&3037 'kklu lfpo&ÁFke] uxjh; fodkl foHkkx] jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqjA Subject: Notice for restoration of land bearing khasra no. 193 and 193/248 in village beed khatipura, Jaipur acquired under of the urban land ceiling act 1976. lUnHkZ% vkidk i= Øekad IkŒ 1 ¼55½ ufofo@t;iqj ikVZ 22 fnukad 31-07-2017 ds Øe esaA mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr lUnfHkZr i= esa [kljk uaŒ 193] 193@248 xzke chM [kkrhiqjk] t;iqj ds laca/k esa rF;kRed fVIi.kh pkgh gS] tks fuEu Ádkj gS %& 1- ÁkFkhZx.k Jh NksVwjke o jkenkl [kkrsnkj [kljk uaŒ 193 o 193@248 xzke chM [kkrhiqjk dk vH;kosnu e; nLrkost ÁkIr gqvk gS] ftlds lkFk ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dk ,l,yih ¼lh½] 13844@16 o 20233@16 esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 29-07-2016 Hkh layXu gSA 2- Ádj.k esa rF; ;g gS fd uxj Hkwfe ¼vf/kdre lhek ,oa fofu;eu½ vf/kfu;e 1976 jktLFkku jkT; esa fnukad 19-03-1976 ls ykxw gqvk gSA o"kZ 1991 ls iwoZ xzke chM [kkrhiqjk esa [kljk uaŒ 193 jdck 25&02 ch?kk Hkwfe NksVwjke iq= Árki tkfr vghj o 193@248 jdck 12&05 ch?kk Hkwfe jkenkl iq= gjyky tkfr vghj ds uke ntZ FkhA 3- uxj Hkwfe ¼vf/kdre lhek ,oa fofu;eu½ vf/kfu;e 1976 dh /kkjk 10¼6½ ds rgr vius vf/kdkjksa ,oa 'kfDr;ksa dk Á;ksx djrs gq;s eSa ihMh ikyhoky l{ke vf/kdkjh ÁFke uxj Hkwfe ,oa Hkou dj foHkkx t;iqj [kljk uaŒ 193] 193@248 o 204 xzke chM [kkrhiqjk dk dqy jdck 194] 310 oxZ ehVj dk dCtk cy Á;ksx dj tfoÁk ds euksfur vf/kdkjh Jh jkes'oj lkeksrk rglhynkj dks fnukad 16-12-1986 dks ekSds ij lEyk;k tkrk gS] ds vkns'k ikfjr fnukad 06-12-1986 dks tkjh fd;s x;sA mlds mijkUr mDr [kljk uaŒ 193 o 193@248 ifoÁk ds uke ntZ fd;k x;k] tks ukekUrdj.k la[;k 148 ls fnukad 07-07-1991 dks Lohdkj fd;k x;kA 4- mDr [kljku ij cyiwoZd dCtk vUrxZr /kkjk 10¼6½ vf/kfu;e 1976 fnukad 06-12-1986 dks ysuk crk;k gS] bl laca/k esa QnZ dCtk i=koyh ij miyC/k ugha gSA fnukad 06-12-1986 ds laca/k esa tks nLrkost i=koyh ij miyC/k gS] ml ij ÁkFkhZx.k }kjk dCtk lEHkykus ds laca/k esa dksbZ gLrk{kj vaxwBk fu'kkuh ugha gSA mDr [kljk uEcjku dk ÁFke ckj HkkSfrd dCtk fnukad 02-03-2015 dks fy;k x;k gSA 5- eqvkotk jkf'k ds laca/k esa uk rks dHkh eqvkotk ÁkFkhZx.k dks fn;s tkus vkSj uk gh eqvkotk jkf'k ds pSd] tfoÁk ds }kjk rS;kj fd;s tkus ds laca/k esa dksbZ nLrkost miyC/k ugha gSA mDr lwpuk vfrfuns'kd ,oa insu jkT; yksd lwpuk vf/kdkjh ¼jktLo ,oa lEifRr fuLrkj.k½ tfoÁk] t;iqj ds i=kad Mh&666 fnukad 18-12-2015 ls lwpuk ds vf/kdkj esa lwpuk nh xbZ gSA 6- i=koyh ij le>kSrk lfefr }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 10-04-2002 miyC/k gS ftlesa rRdkyhu le>kSrk lfefr }kjk ÁkFkhZx.k dk mDr [kljk uEcjku ij dCtk ekuk gSA le>kSrk lfefr }kjk fnukad 10-04-2002 ls 3 lIrkg esa 3]81]23]291@& :i;s tek djkus dk ekax i= tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk mlesa ls fnukad 08-08-2002 rd 1]45]05]000@& :i;s gh tek fd;s x;s gSaA 7- xzke chM [kkrhiqjk rglhy t;iqj ds [kljk uaŒ 193 o 193@248 dk HkkSfrd dCtk fnukad 02-03-2015 dks fy;k x;kA mDr [kljk uEcjku dk dCtk fy;s tkus ij mDr [kljk uEcjku ij t;iqj fodkl Ákf/kdj.k }kjk dqcsj dkWeySDl ;kstuk l`ftr dj ekufp= vuqlkj ;kstuk esa fefJr Hkw&miksx ¾ 16624-37 oxZ ehVj] xzqi gkmflax ¾ 21609-85 oxZ ehVj] vkoklh; ¾ 1516-16 oxZ ehVj] fjVsy 'kkWi ¾ 2031-43 oxZ ehVj] ikdZ ¾ 4029-71 oxZ ehVj] ikfdZx ¾ 1224-03 oxZ ehVj] lMd ¾ 15378-96 oxZ ehVj] QsflfyVh ¾ 1240-27 oxZ ehVj] gkWfLiVy ¾ 22500-00 oxZ ehVj] dCts ls ckgj Hkwfe ¾ 3749-36 oxZ ehVj dqy 89]904-14 oxZ ehVj Hkwfe ntZ fd;k gSA 8- vf/kdka'k Hkw[k.Mksa o nqdkuksa dks ykWVjh ¼vkWuykbZu½ }kjk cspku fd;k tk pqdk gSA vr% mijksDr fcUnqvksa ds Øe esa rF;kRed fjiksVZ lknj ÁLrqr gSA lfpo t;iqj fodkl Ákf/kdj.k] t;iqjA** 25. A glance of the Tactual Report' dt. 7th September, 2017 (Annexure-23) supra, which has been furnished in response to application(s) under RTI, in no uncertain and undisputed terms details out the following facts: (a) there is no 'Fard Kabja' to evidence the forceful possession of the subject land involved herein taken on or after 6th December, 1986, on record. The document/order dt. 6th December, 1986, available on record does not evidence handing over of possession by the petitioners for it neither bear signature or thumb impressions of the petitioners. (b) there is no documentary evidence available on record to evidence either payment of compensation or preparation of the cheques as per details on record and; (c) deposition of an amount of Rs. 1,45,05,000/- (Rupees one crore forty five lakhs five thousand) as part payment against a demand of Rs. 3,81,23,291/- (Rupees three crore eighty one lakhs twenty three thousand two hundred ninety one) in pursuance to order of 'Settlement Committee' dt. 10th April, 2002, is substantiated from the record. 26. From the 'Factual Report' as extracted herein above, indisputably, it is evident that there is no evidence of forceful possession of the subject land involved herein, taken on 6th December, 1986, in accordance with law. It is also not in dispute that no compensation has been paid to the petitioners in lieu of acquisition of the subject land involved herein whereas the petitioners deposited part payment in pursuance to order made by 'Settlement Committee' dt. 10th April, 2002. 27. In the case of Gajanan Kamlya Patil (supra), the Apex Court of the land on a survey of earlier opinions dealing with the peaceful and forcible possession of lands in the backdrop of the provisions of ULCAR Act, held thus: "5. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, submitted that the issue raised in this case stands fully covered by the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 and that the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the MMRDA is in possession of the land in Survey No. 54/4 and hence the question as to whether possession had been legally taken or not has to be decided by the Civil Court. Learned senior Counsel also submitted that the State of Maharashtra has adopted the Repeal Act, 1999 on 1.12.2007 and that Respondent No. 1 had executed the possession receipt in favour of Respondent No. 3 on 2.7.2008 behind the back of the Appellant, without following the due process of law. Learned senior Counsel submitted that since possession had not been taken in accordance with law, the Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999, as was rightly held in respect of Survey No. 47/10. 11. We may indicate, apart from the affidavits filed by the officials in this case, no other document has been made available either before the High Court or before this Court, either showing that the Appellant had voluntarily surrendered or the Respondents had taken peaceful or forcible possession of the lands. In Hari Ram (supra) this Court examined the meaning and context of Sub-Sections (3) to (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act and held as follows: "30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as Sub-Sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words "acquired" and "vested" have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary surrender 31. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary surrender 31. The "vesting" in Sub-Section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh vs. State of U.P. ( 1977 (1) SCC 155 ), while interpreting Section 117(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 held that "vesting" is a word of slippery import and has many meanings and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan ( 2000 (8) SCC 99 ) held as follows: (SCC p. 114, para 28) 28. We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a 'vesting' certain. To "vest", generally means to give a property in (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton (1878) 4 QBD 104 (CA) : Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To 'Vest', cannot be termed to be an executory devise. Be it noted however, that 'vested' does not necessarily and always mean 'vest in possession' but includes 'vest in interest' as well. 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Sec. 10(3) of the Act. 33. 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Sec. 10(3) of the Act. 33. Before we examine Sub-Section (5) and Sub-Section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of Sub-Section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under Sub-Section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under Sub-Section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification, and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under Sub-Section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in Sub-Section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dis-possession 34. Sub-Section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of "possession" which says that where any land is vested in the State Government under Sub-Section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under Sub-Section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested" under Sub-Section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under Sub-Section (3) of Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Sec. 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under Sub-Section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under Sub-Section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-Section (5) of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering and delivering possession peacefully while Sub-Section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession. 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under Sub-Section (5) of Section 10. Sub-Section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under Sub-Section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force-as may be necessary-- can be used. Sub-Section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under Sub-Section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under Sub-Section (6) and not under Sub-Section (5) of Section 10. Sub-Sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving notice, that is, "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Sec. 10(5), then "forceful dispossession" under Sub-Section (6) of Section 10. 37. The requirement of giving notice under Sub-Sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word "may" has been used therein, the word "may" in both the Sub-Sections has to be understood as "shall" because a Court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under Sub-Section (5) or Sub-Section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word "may" has to be read as "shall". 12. We have, therefore, clearly indicated that it was always open to the authorities to take forcible possession and, in fact, in the notice issued under Sec. 10(5) of the ULC Act, it was stated that if the possession had not been surrendered, possession would be taken by application of necessary force. 12. We have, therefore, clearly indicated that it was always open to the authorities to take forcible possession and, in fact, in the notice issued under Sec. 10(5) of the ULC Act, it was stated that if the possession had not been surrendered, possession would be taken by application of necessary force. For taking forcible possession, certain procedures had to be followed. Respondents have no case that such procedures were followed and forcible possession was taken. Further, there is nothing to show that the Respondents had taken peaceful possession, nor there is anything to show that the Appellants had given voluntary possession. Facts would clearly indicate that only de jure possession had been taken by the Respondents and not de facto possession before coming into force of the repeal of the Act. Since there is nothing to show that de facto possession had been taken from the Appellants prior to the execution of the possession receipt in favour of MRDA, it cannot hold on to the lands in question, which are legally owned and possessed by the Appellants. Consequently, we are inclined to allow this appeal and quash the notice dt. 17.2.2005 and subsequent action taken therein in view of the repeal of the ULC Act. The above reasoning would apply in respect of other appeals as well and all proceedings initiated against the Appellants, therefore, would stand quashed." 28. In the case of Vinayak K. Kashinath Shilkar (supra), the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law without actual possession is not sufficient for operation of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. The difference between de facto and de jure possession was once again reiterated in view of the earlier opinions. At this juncture, it will be profitable to take note of contents of para 7 to 10, which reads thus: "7. Section 2 of the Repeal Act reads as follows: "2. Repeal of Act 33 of 1976.-The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed. 8. Section 3 of the Repeal Act reads as follows: 3. Section 2 of the Repeal Act reads as follows: "2. Repeal of Act 33 of 1976.-The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed. 8. Section 3 of the Repeal Act reads as follows: 3. Savings.-(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect- (a) the vesting of any vacant land under Sub-Section (3) of Section 10/possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under Sub-Section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary; (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Sub-Section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where- (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under Sub-Section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. 9. It is clear from the above provisions that where the possession of the vacant land has not been taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority, the proceedings under the Act would not survive. Mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law without actual possession is not sufficient for operation of Section 3(1) (a) of the Repeal Act. 10. We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of this Court in Ritesh Tewari and Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. This Court in Ritesh tewari : (2010) 10 SCC 677 considered the matter thus: "14. 10. We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of this Court in Ritesh Tewari and Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. This Court in Ritesh tewari : (2010) 10 SCC 677 considered the matter thus: "14. Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants has submitted that as the State Government had not taken possession of the land in exercise of its powers under Sec. 10(6) of the 1976 Act, on coming of the 1999 Act into force, the proceedings stood abated and the Respondents have no business to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. 15. We find full force in the submissions so made by Shri Jayant Bhushan to a certain extent, and hold that all proceedings pending before any Court/authority under the 1976 Act, stood abated automatically on coming of 1999 Act into force, provided the possession of the land involved in a particular case had not been taken by the State. Such a view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust vs. State of U.P., (2000) 6 SCC 325 , Ghasitey Lal Sahu vs. Competent Authority (2004) 13 SCC 452 , Mukarram Ali Khan vs. State of U.P., (2007) 11 SCC 90 and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande vs. Pune Municipal Transport." 29. In the case of Baij Nathu Sharma (supra), while dealing with the principle of res-judicata, the Apex Court of the land, observed thus: "5. We do not think that High Court was right in holding that the second writ petition (CWP No. 3455/97) was barred by principle of res judicata. Appellant made his representations on the basis of observations made by the High Court on 27.05.1996 in his earlier writ petition. When this writ petition came up for hearing again, the appellant had retired. He, therefore, withdrew the writ petition. Liberty was granted to him to file another writ petition, "if occasion arises". This certainly does not mean that fresh writ petition could be filed only if fresh cause of action arose. In any case fresh cause of action did arise when representations of the appellant were rejected by the High Court and his case for promotion to RHJS was not considered for giving him notional promotion. This certainly does not mean that fresh writ petition could be filed only if fresh cause of action arose. In any case fresh cause of action did arise when representations of the appellant were rejected by the High Court and his case for promotion to RHJS was not considered for giving him notional promotion. However, our holding that second writ petition was not barred by principle of res judicata does not help the appellant as his writ petition was also dismissed on merit. There is some controversy if grant of selection grade to the appellant would give him seniority over those officers who though senior in the seniority list of RJS were not granted selection grade. Admittedly seniority list was never under challenge. This controversy is, however, not material for our purposes inasmuch as it is not disputed that on the date when the appellant retired from service, posts in the promotional quota were available and the appellant could have been considered for promotion to RHJS in that quota. He was not so considered because the High Court had taken a decision by resolution of the Full Court dt. 09.02.1996 not to make further promotions from RJS till recruitment from the Bar to RHJS was made. The appellant in his first writ petition had challenged the resolution of the Full Court not to make promotions to the cadre of RHJS till appointments from the Bar were made. This resolution of the Full Court he certainly could not challenge in the second writ petition. High Court in its counter affidavit has given justification as to why it took decision not to make any promotion to the cadre of RHJS though at the relevant time 21 posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges were vacant to be filled in by promotion and direct recruitment in the ratio of 3:1 as per Rule 9(2) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969. This is how the High Court justified its decision:- "The Full Court in its meeting held on 09.02.1996 resolved that no promotion shall be made till direct recruitment is made. The decision to this effect was taken by Full Court keeping in view the inequitable operation of quota 3:1 which has to be maintained between promotees and direct recruits to the R.H.J.S. which was not being done. The decision to this effect was taken by Full Court keeping in view the inequitable operation of quota 3:1 which has to be maintained between promotees and direct recruits to the R.H.J.S. which was not being done. While vacancy in the direct recruit quota were being determined on the basis of sanctioned strength of the cadre, the promotional quota was being operated on the basis of the recruitment. There were 89 sanctioned posts but factually more than 200 officers were working on the R.H.J.S. posts. The posts in excess of 89 were being manned by temporary/ad hoc promotees from R.H.J.S. only and therefore factually the proportion of direct recruits has gone down abysmally. The embargo on promotions was therefore, imposed by the Full Court to stop further inequality and imbalance in the proportions between the two quotas which created problems in determining inter se seniority in R.H.J.S. on the basis of Rota-quota rule. Therefore, the Full Court took the decision not to promote the officers from R.J.S. cadre to R.H.J.S. cadre till the direct recruitment is made keeping in view the inequitable operation of Rota-quota rule. The resolution passed by the Full Court in its meeting held on 09.02.1996 did not require any interference of his excellency the Governor. Therefore it is wrong to contend that the Full Court has no authority to stop the promotions by way of recruitment to the R.H.J.S. to maintain the proportional representation and inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees." 30. From the pleadings of the parties and materials available on record it is not in dispute that neither physical possession de-facto of the subject land involved herein, was taken, in accordance with law nor compensation paid to the petitioners rather part payment of charges for regularization was made in pursuance of order of 'Settlement Committee', by the petitioners. The Tactual Report dt. 7th September, 2017, which has not been disputed, has surfaced/vital factual matrix on the aspects of de facto possession not taken by the respondents and compensation not paid to the petitioners. The 'Factual Report' is based on the materials available on record with the respondents. The 'Factual Report, appears to have been drawn in view of notice for restoration of subject land addressed on behalf of the petitioners. The 'Factual Report' is based on the materials available on record with the respondents. The 'Factual Report, appears to have been drawn in view of notice for restoration of subject land addressed on behalf of the petitioners. The 'Factual Report' leaves no room for any doubt that the petitioners are sought to be deprived of their land without de facto possession taken so also without payment of compensation, contrary to law declared by the Apex Court of the land as has been taken note of herein above. In the singular, matrix of the case at hand, the principle of res-judicata cannot be attracted for the respondents themselves have admitted the fact that for the first time the de facto possession, of the subject land involved herein, was physically taken only on 2nd March, 2015, and there is no evidence of the fact that compensation was ever paid to the petitioners in lieu of acquisition of the subject land. 31. The requirement of notice under Sub-Sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory and the word "may" used in both the Sub-Sections has to be construed as "shall" because a Court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under Sub-Section (5) or Sub-Section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word "may" has to be read as "shall". To enter upon taking forcible possession, the procedures relevant have to be followed [vide Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan] supra. Whereas in the case at hand these mandatory procedures were, not followed and forcible physical possession, if any, for the first time, was taken only on 2nd March, 2015. 32. By how it is well settled law that Panchnama, is, the only legally accepted norm to take possession. Further, the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed, if, compensation is not paid in accordance with the procedure prescribed before the Repealing Act of 1999. Acquisition under the ULCAR Act, 1976, could not be construed as concluded, unless, possession of the subject land involved herein, was not taken before the Repeal Act, 1999. Further, the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed, if, compensation is not paid in accordance with the procedure prescribed before the Repealing Act of 1999. Acquisition under the ULCAR Act, 1976, could not be construed as concluded, unless, possession of the subject land involved herein, was not taken before the Repeal Act, 1999. It is also relevant to take note of the fact that once liberty of representation was reserved to the petitioners by the apex Court of the land while allowing their review petition to be withdrawn, the re-presentation must have been taken to its logical conclusion. However, the respondent-State did not adjudicate upon the representation for reasons best known to it. Be that as it may, the cause of action would continue to subsist and the petitioners cannot be denied of remedy. The petitioners' claim for payment of compensation at the prevalent market rate, has substance. 33. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the conspicuous factual matrix of the case at hand so also in the face of the undisputed Tactual Report' of the respondent-JDA, the claim and prayer of the petitioners merits acceptance. 34. Accordingly, the writ application succeeds, and is, hereby allowed. 35. In the result, the impugned order dt. 1st November, 2018, made by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 490/2018 (Chhotu Ram and Anr. Vs. Jaipur Development Authority and Ors.); is hereby quashed. The acquisition proceedings in ULCAR Act, 1976, stand vitiated for non-payment of compensation so also for not taking de-facto possession of the subject land. As a consequence, the respondents are directed to restore possession of the subject land involved herein to the petitioners forthwith. 36. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.