JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 14.12.2016 (Annexure-5) passed in SAR Revision No.01/2012 by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the order passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi, in SAR Appeal No.05R15/11-12 as well as order dated 01.02.2011 passed in SAR Case No.55/10-11 by the Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi, have been affirmed. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as per the pleading made in the writ petition is that the respondent No.4, Bisu Oraon, who is the son of granddaughter of khatiyani raiyat filed an application on 01.06.2010 before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi for restoration of the land bearing R.S. Khata No.53 of Plot No.71, area 0.80 acres against the petitioner no.1 and 2 which was registered as SAR Case No.55/2010-11, in which, the Special Officer, SAR vide order dated 01.02.2011 has passed order of restoration in favour of respondent no.4 but the said proceeding has been concluded without appreciating the fact that the respondent No.4 is not the descendant of Khatiyani Raiyat Turi Oraon rather he is the son of Bagi Orain, a daughter of Bhowka Oraon, Bhanka Oraon who was the son of the khatiyani raiyat Turi Oraon and according to the customary law of Oraon Community female member has got no right on her father’s property and as such, the said Bisu Oraon has got no locus standi to file a case under Section 71A of the Chota Nagapur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1908) but unfortunately the learned lower court of Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi has passed order of restoration in favour of such petitioner/respondent no.4 who has no locus standi and also the Special officer, SAR, Ranchi has not given opportunity to the petitioner no.1 and 2 and passed the order of restoration in hest on 01.02.2011. It is the further case that the petitioner No.3 to 6 having no knowledge about the SAR Case No.55/2010-11 and also they have not been impleaded as party in the case before the Special Officer under SAR, Ranchi. It is the further case that the petitioner No.3 to 6 having no knowledge about the SAR Case No.55/2010-11 and also they have not been impleaded as party in the case before the Special Officer under SAR, Ranchi. The Opposite Party in the SAR Case No.55/2010-11 and the petitioner no.3 to 6, being aggrieved with the order of the Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi, filed an appeal before the Additional Collector, Ranchi vide SAR Appeal No.05R15/11-12 for setting aside the order passed by the Special Officer under SAR, Ranchi, but the appellate authority without considering the facts and circumstances, has dismissed the appeal and the order of Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi has been affirmed vide order dated 30.09.2011. The petitioners again being aggrieved with the order passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi in SAR Appeal No.05R15/11-12, has preferred a SAR revision being SAR Revision Case No.01/2012-13 before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi but the same has also been dismissed vide order dated 14.12.2016 by confirming the order passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi as also the Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi, against which, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. The ground inter alia has been taken in assailing the aforesaid order by the petitioner is that the respondent no.4 being the son of the granddaughter of the recorded tenant/raiyat of the land in question, has no locus standi to file an application for restoration of the land under Section 71A of the Act, 1908, the principle of natural justice has not been followed and there is no contravention to the provision of Section 46 of the Act, 1908. 4. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent State of Jharkhand wherein inter alia stand has been taken that the order passed by the authorities which is the subject matter of the writ petition do not suffer with any infirmity since the authorities have passed an order after appreciating the legal provision, save and except, the permission obtained by the Deputy Commissioner, no land between tribal to tribal can be transferred and the same is the case herein since the land in question said to have been transferred in favour of the petitioner without any permission as required under the provision of Section 46 of the Act, 1908 and as such the authorities while adjudicating the issue by dealing with the restoration application filed under Section 46 of the Act, 1908 has considered this aspect of the matter as also the consideration has been made about no substantial evidence to prove the factum of possession over the land in question on the strength of sada sell, the Jamabandi receipt as also the Choukidari receipt cannot be said to be a conclusive proof of transfer of the land. 5. The rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondent wherein the stand taken by the State-respondent has been refuted by taking ground that the restoration application cannot be entertained after lapse of 62 years and as such the same is barred by limitation. Respondent No.4 has put his appearance through his counsel who has defended the order by submitting that the petitioners have got no locus to prefer revision in view of the fact that they have filed one intervention application before the appellate authority but the said intervention application has been rejected vide order dated 22.07.2011 by the appellate authority again an application was made on 05.08.2011 for recall of the order dated 22.07.2011 but no such document has been produced by the petitioner in order to establish his case, so that the matter could be considered for recall of the order dated 22.07.2011. It has been submitted that since the intervention application has been rejected vide order dated 22.07.2011 as also the order to recall the aforesaid order but the said orders have never been challenged before the court of law rather the petitioners have questioned the order passed by the appellate authority by filing a revision and therefore, the petitioner no.3 to 6 have got no locus standi to maintain revision before the revisional authority and so far as the opposite party before the original and the appellate authority they have not filed any show cause and therefore, the matter has been heard ex-parte and hence the ground which has been agitated by the petitioner about the issue of merit regarding questioning the locus of the respondent no.4, is not fit to be looked into at this stage made on behest of the petitioners. Further since the petitioners’ intervention application were rejected by the appellate authority, as such, the writ petition cannot be maintainable. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned orders it would be relevant to refer the provision of Sections 46 and 48 of the Act, 1908, which reads hereunder as: [46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by Raiyat. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned orders it would be relevant to refer the provision of Sections 46 and 48 of the Act, 1908, which reads hereunder as: [46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by Raiyat. -(1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof,- (a) by mortgage or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years, or (b) by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent: Provided that a Raiyat may enter into a 'bhugut bundha' mortgage of his holding or any portion thereof for any period not exceeding seven years or if the mortgagee be a society registered or deemed to be registered under the 'Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (B&O Act VI of 1935) for any period not exceeding fifteen years:] Provided further that,- (a) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is [a member of the Scheduled Tribes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift or will to [another person, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and], who is a resident within the local limits of the area of the police station within which the holding is situate; (b) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift, will or lease to another person, who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, Backward Classes] and who is a resident within the local limits of the district within which the holding is situate [* * *]; [(c) any occupancy-Raiyat may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof to a society or bank registered or deemed to be registered under the 'Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1935), or to the State Bank of India or a bank specified in column 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970) or to a company or a corporation owned by, or in which less than fifty-one per cent of the share capital is held by the State Government or the Central Government or partly by the State Government, and partly by the Central Government, and which has been set up with a view to provide agricultural credit to cultivators; and (d) any occupancy-Raiyat, who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes or Backward classes, may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof by sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage or otherwise to any other person.] (2) A transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof under subsection (1) shall be binding on the landlord. (3) No transfer in contravention of sub-section (1), shall be registered or shall be in any way recognised as valid by any Court, whatever in exercise, of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. [(3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Deputy Commissioner shall be a necessary party in all suits of a civil nature relating to any holding or portion thereof in which one of the parties to the suits is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and the other party is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes.] (4) At any time within three years after the expiration of the period or which a Raiyat has under clause (a) of sub-section (1) transferred his right in his holding or any portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the application of the Raiyat put the Raiyat into possession of such holding or portion in the prescribed manner [(4-A) (a) The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes, for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1): Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof: Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter. (b) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that there was no contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to subsection (1) in making such transfer, he shall reject the application and may award such costs to the transferee to be paid by the transferor as he may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit. (c) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner finds that such transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), he shall annul the transfer and eject the transferee from such holding or portion thereof, as the case may be and put the transferor in possession thereof: Provided that if the transferee has constructed any building or structure, such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before the commencement of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969 (President's Act 4 of 1969) he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, validate such a transfer made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), if the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion of a holding, as the case may be, of the equivalent value, in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor. Explanation. -In this Section "substantial structure or building" means the structure or building of the value exceeding five thousand rupees on the date of holding inquiry, but it does not include such structure or building of any value the material of which cannot be removed without incurring substantial depreciation in its value.] (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect the validity of any transfer (not otherwise invalid) of a Raiyats right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide before the first day of January 1903 in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of 'Manbhum', or before the first day of January 1909, in the district of 'Manbhum'. [(6) In this Section [and in Section 47],- (a) "Scheduled Casted" means such castes, races or tribes as are specified in Part II of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; (b) "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are specified in Part II of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950; and (c) "Backward classed" means such tribes, classes of citizens as may be declared by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be socially and educationally backward.] [48. Restrictions on the transfer of Bhuinhari tenure. -(1) A member of a 'Bhuinhari family may transfer any 'Bhuinhari tenure as defined in the Chota Nagpur Tenures Act, 1869 (Ben. Act 2 of 1869) which is held by him or any portion thereof in the same manner and to the same extent as an aboriginal 'Raiyat may transfer his right in his holding under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (2) of Section 46.] (2) The [State] Government may make rules permitting a member of a 'Bhuinhari family holds any 'Bhuinhari tenure to transfer such tenure or any portion thereof by sale, gift, exchange or will subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the said rules. (3) Save as provided in sub-section (1) or in any rules made under sub-section (2), a transfer of a 'Bhuinhari tenure or any portion thereof shall not be valid to any extent. (4) If a member of a 'Bhuinhari family transfers any 'Bhuinhari tenure which is held by him or any portion of such tenure in contravention of the provisions of this Section or on the expiration of the period for which any such member has transferred his 'Bhuinhari tenure or any portion thereof in accordance with the provisions of this Section or any rules made thereunder, the Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on the application of such member, eject the transferee and place such member in possession of the said 'Bhuinhari tenure or portion at any time within twelve years from the date of the transfer, or from the expiration of the period of the transfer, as the case may be. [Provided that a member of the Bhuinhari family may transfer by a simple mortgage his right in his tenancy or any portion thereof with a view to raising loan for agricultural purposes to a society, bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1935) or to a Company or Corporation owned by, or in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the share capital is held by the State Government or Central Government or partly by the State Government and partly by the Central Government and which has been set up with a view to providing agricultural credit to cultivators.] (5) A member of a 'Bhuinhari family, who holds land in any village in which a 'Bhuinhari tenure as defined in Chota Nagpur Tenures Act, 1869 (Ben. Act 2 of 1869) is situated may transfer such land in the same manner and to the same extent as an occupancy 'Raiyat transfers his right in his holding under subsection (3) of Section 46, and sub-section (4) of this Section shall apply to such land in the same way as it applies to a 'Bhuinhari tenure. (6) If any member of a 'Bhuinhari family transfers his 'Bhuinhari tenure or any portion thereof a lease, the lessee shall not acquire right of occupancy therein. [48A. Restrictions on the sale of Bhuinhari tenure. -(1) No decree or order shall be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a member of a Bhuinhari family in his Bhuinhari-tenure, nor shall any such right be sold in execution of any decree or order. (2) A decree for arrears of rent due in respect of any Bhuinhari-tenure hold by a member of a Bhuinhari family may be executed by the attachment and sale of the produce of the land comprised in the tenure or by sale of other movable property of the judgement-debtor and not otherwise.] Section 46 is intended by the legislature to procedure to the tenants inhabiting the area to which the Act applies their rights in their occupancy holdings and to protect them. The policy of the Act is not to be defeated by use of generous defines to circumvent and by passed statutory provision provides under Section 46. The policy of the Act is not to be defeated by use of generous defines to circumvent and by passed statutory provision provides under Section 46. Section 46 of the Act, 1908 provides restriction on transfers of their rights by raiyats whereby and whereunder no transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof by mortgages or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible even exceed five years, or by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent. Provided that a raiyat may enter into a bhugut bundha mortgage of his holding or any portion thereof for any period not exceeding seven years or if the mortgagee be a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 for any period not exceeding fifteen years. Further provided that an occupancy-raiyat who is a member of the [Scheduled tribes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift or will to another person who is a member of the Scheduled tribes and who is a resident within the local limits of the area of the police-station within which the holding is situate. [the petitioner as well as the respondent no.4 since herein are under the category of Scheduled tribe and therefore, the other provisions are not being discussed.] Sub-section (3) to Section 46 of the Act, 1908 provides no transfer in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be registered or shall be in any way recognized as valid by any Court, whether in exercise of civil, criminal or review jurisdiction. Sub-section (4) to Section 46 provides at any stage time within three years after the expiration of the period or which a Raiyat has under clause (a) of sub-section (1) transferred his right in his holding or any portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the application of the Raiyat put the Raiyat into possession of such holding or portion in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (4-A) of Section 46 thereof, the Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes, for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1). Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof. Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this sub-section, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter. Section 48 of the Act, 1908 provides provision for restriction on the transfer of Bhuinhari tenure. Section 71A of Act, 1908 also needs to be referred herein which reads hereunder as: [71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. Section 48 of the Act, 1908 provides provision for restriction on the transfer of Bhuinhari tenure. Section 71A of Act, 1908 also needs to be referred herein which reads hereunder as: [71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. -If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat [or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar a Bhuinhar] who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 [or Section 48 or Section 240] or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, [including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion] he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding : Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed : Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such a transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another Raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be, and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.] It is evident from the provision of Section 71A of the Act, 1908 which confers power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled tribes over land unlawfully transferred if it come to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner at any time the same shall be restored, if the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer has been made contrary to any of the provision of the Act, 1908. 7. An application was filed by the respondent No.4 under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 for restoration of land in question said to have been transferred without any permission of the Deputy Commissioner. In the said application, the petitioner no.1 and 2 has been arrayed as opposite party since they were in occupation of the landed property in question. 8. It is evident from the order passed by the Special Officer, SAR as contained under Annexure-2 that notice has been issued to the opposite parties, the petitioner no.1 and 2 namely Bhikhram Bhagat and Tinku Oraon, but no such show cause has been filed and therefore, the matter has been posted for order and the conclusive finding has been arrived at regarding violation of provision of Sections 46 and 48 of the Act, 1908 with a direction to restore the land in favour of the legal heirs of the original khatiyani raiyat. 9. The petitioner no.1 and 2 has preferred an appeal before the appellate authority in exercise of power conferred under Section 215 of the Act, 1908 as would appear from the memo of appeal annexed as Annexure-3 which has been dismissed vide order dated 30.09.2011. 10. It is evident from the aforesaid order that Arun Kumar Bhagat, Gandu Oraon, Parmeshwar Oraon and Sunil Kumar Oraon the petitioner nos.3 to 6 have filed an application for impleadment as party to the proceeding but since they have failed to produce any cogent evidence even when directed, therefore, their intervention application has been rejected vide order dated 22.07.2011. They have again filed a petition on 05.08.2011 for recall of order dated 22.07.2011 but again no cogent evidences/documents have been filed for review of the order passed on 22.07.2011and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 11. They have again filed a petition on 05.08.2011 for recall of order dated 22.07.2011 but again no cogent evidences/documents have been filed for review of the order passed on 22.07.2011and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 11. The petitioners have preferred revision by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 217 of the Act, 1908 but the revisional authority has also rejected the revision holding therein that the petitioner no.3 to 6 have got no locus since their intervention application has already been rejected by the appellate authority and the petitioner no.1 and 2, the original respondents before the Special Officer, SAR, has not contested the case by not putting his appearance and further on the ground that the sada sale deed said to have executed by the recorded tenant is having no evidentially value and further they have failed to prove the factum of possession over the land in question on the strength of said sada sale deed through cogent evidences, against which, this writ petition has been filed. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised following grounds: (i) The respondent no.4 being Gundu Oraon by caste and as such he is claiming his title over the land in question by virtue of being son of one Turi Oraon but according to the customary law of the Oraon Community a female member has got not right her father’s property. (ii) The restoration application has been filed after lapse of more than 60 years. (iii) The quasi-judicial authorities have not appreciated the transfer made through sada sale deed as valid by not taking the same has conclusive proof of the factum of possession. 12. (ii) The restoration application has been filed after lapse of more than 60 years. (iii) The quasi-judicial authorities have not appreciated the transfer made through sada sale deed as valid by not taking the same has conclusive proof of the factum of possession. 12. While on the other hand the learned State counsel as also the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4, have jointly submitted by refuting the aforesaid grounds by questioning the locus of the petitioner no.3 to 6 since their intervention applications have been rejected by the appellate authority but not challenged by them, so far as the petitioner no.1 and 2 are concerned, they have not appeared before the original authority although the appeal has been preferred but wherein also they have also failed to satisfy about the transfer being made by following the provision as contained under the Act, 1908 and the grounds which has not been agitated i.e. about the period of limitation can it be allowed to be agitated before the revisional authority or the High Court that to without proving the factum of possession. 13. Before answering the grounds agitated by the petitioner vis-a-vis the respondents, it needs to refer herein that the petitioners have filed this writ petition for issuance of writ of certiorari and it is settled position of law that the writ of certiorari can only be issued by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if the finding of the quasi-judicial authority is perverse or suffer from any jurisdictional error or there is infringement of any fundamental right. 14. The issue of interference by the High court in the matter of writ of certiorari has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which re-quires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” It is not the case of the petitioner, raising the issue of jurisdictional error or violation of fundamental rights rather issue of perversity has been raised as such before entering into the issue of perversity the meaning of perversity needs to be discussed, ‘perversity’ means error apparent on the face of record or non-appreciation of the factual/legal aspect, if raised by the parties. It is the admitted case that before Special Officer, SAR, only petitioner no.1 and 2 were the party and the petitioner no.3 to 6 were not the party, for the reason that petitioner no.1 and 2 wherein possession of the land in question. It is further admitted fact that the petitioner no.1 and 2 has not chosen to contest the proceeding before the Special Officer, SAR, and as such, the order has been passed ex-parte against them. It is further admitted fact that the petitioner no.1 and 2 has not chosen to contest the proceeding before the Special Officer, SAR, and as such, the order has been passed ex-parte against them. Further admitted fact is that the petitioner no.1 and 2 has preferred an appeal against the order passed by the Special Officer, SAR, and at that juncture, the petitioner no.3 to 6 have filed intervention application for their impleadment but the same has been rejected vide order dated 22.07.2011 and again the recall petition for recall of order dated 22.07.2011, has been rejected but the petitioner no.3 to 6 has not chosen to assail the aforesaid order before the court of law. 15. Now the question is that when the application filed by the petitioner no.3 to 6, has been rejected and not assailed before the higher Forum, can they be allowed to file revision against the order passed either by the original authority or appellate authority in absence of any cause of action occurred against them and whether they can be said to be person aggrieved. 16. The person aggrieved has been dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of K. Ajit Babu And Ors. Vrs. Union of India And Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 473 , Gopabandhu Biswal Vrs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty And Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 447 and Nalakath Sainuddin Vrs. Koorikadan Sulaiman reported in (2002) 6 SCC 1 . The person aggrieved as has been defined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered hereinabove clearly transpires that if the person is not party to a proceeding and if any order has been passed, they cannot be said to be aggrieved party. If the petitioner no.3 to 6 were the aggrieved party, then the proper course was to challenge the order dated 22.07.2011 by filing a separate application before the competent court of law/Forum but instead of doing so they have preferred revision against the order passed by the original as well as the appellate authority and not only that the present writ petition also. 17. 17. The petitioner no.1 and 2 has never raised the issue about the applicability of customary law, sada sale deed and the period of limitation and therefore, in the aforesaid background if such factual as well as legal aspect if not raised before the competent authorities in course of the adjudication of issue and for the first time the same has been agitated by the petitioner no.3 to 6 before the revisional authority can it be considered. It is the settled position of law that if the point available and not raised by the parties in course of its adjudication they will be precluded from raising the factual aspect, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Deepak Tandon and Anr. Vrs. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 537 , whereby and whereunder, it has been laid down that if plea is not taken in the pleading by parties and no issue as such and therefore, no finding recorded, cannot be allowed to raise it before third court. 18. This Court applying the aforesaid position of law, is of the view that the point which has now been agitated and as has been agitated before the revisional authority but not agitated before the original as also before the appellate authority cannot be allowed to be agitated. Further since the writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari by taking the ground of non-consideration of the factual aspect by the revisional authority, the question is that when such grounds has not been agitated before the original as also before the appellate authority, it cannot be agitated before the revisional authority as also before this Court. 19. The revisional authority has dealt with the implication of order dated 22.07.2011 and thereby came to a conclusive finding that if the proceeding was initiated against the care taker, what prevented the real owner to come to picture and put their claims before the original court. 20. Although herein the intervention application has been filed before the appellate court but the question is that when such intervention application has been rejected, the petitioner no.3 to 6 ought to have questioned the same before the competent court/Forum but having not done so, they have seizes their right to contest the case before the revisional authority. 21. 20. Although herein the intervention application has been filed before the appellate court but the question is that when such intervention application has been rejected, the petitioner no.3 to 6 ought to have questioned the same before the competent court/Forum but having not done so, they have seizes their right to contest the case before the revisional authority. 21. The revisional authority after going across the finding recorded by the original court as also the appellate authority has concurred with their finding by holding that the sada sale deed, cannot be said to be a conclusive proof of transfer and from which also the factum of possession over the land in question has not been proved. 22. This Court on the basis of details discussion made hereinabove and in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, is of the view that the land in question has been transferred without following the procedure laid down under Section 46 of the Act, 1908 and the same having been found to be proved in dealing with the application filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 having with the three concurrent findings will come under the fold of principle for issuance of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred hereinabove. 23. In view thereof, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.