ORDER : Since all these writ petitions have been filed challenging the respective impugned orders rejecting the candidature of each of the writ petitioner by the respondents concerned for appointment to the post of Gr.II Police Constable, Grade II Jail warden or Fireman for the year 2017 and the relief sought for in all these cases are almost same or similar and the issue raised in all these writ petitions is one and the same, all these writ petitions are disposed of by this common order. 2. Before dwell into the factual matrix of these cases, the legal position, pursuant to the relevant service rule and a series of Judgments made by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, are to be taken note of. 3. Under the rule making power of the State Government under the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859 and Chennai City Police Act r/w proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State Government framed the rules called Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules 1978 (herein after referred to as "the said Rule"). 4. The said rule underwent an amendment by issuance of Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.101, Home (Police-IX) Department, dated 30.01.2003. As per the said amendment, clause (iv) with explanations 1 and 2 has been added to Rule 14(b) of the said Rules. After the amendment, Rule 14(b) of the said Rules stands as follows : "14(b). No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service by direct recruitment unless he satisfies the appointing authority. (i) that he is of sound health, active habits and free from any bodily defect or infirmity unfitting him for such service and (ii) that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service; and (iii) that such a person does not have more than one wife living. (iv) That he has not involved in any criminal case before police verification. Explanation (1): A person who is acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt or due to the fact that the complainant "turned hostile" shall be treated as person involved in a criminal case. (iv) That he has not involved in any criminal case before police verification. Explanation (1): A person who is acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt or due to the fact that the complainant "turned hostile" shall be treated as person involved in a criminal case. Explanation (2): A person involved in a criminal case at the time of Police Verification and the case yet to be disposed of and subsequently ended in honourable acquittal or treated as mistake of fact shall be treated as not involved in a criminal case and he can claim right for appointment only by participating in the next recruitment." 5. After the introduction of clause (iv) with explanations 1 and 2 as set out above, under which, a person who seeks appointment into the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service as Grade II Constable, shall be ineligible if he has involved in any criminal case before police verification and even if a person who involved in such criminal case is acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt or due to the fact that, the complainant turned hostile, even then the candidate shall be treated as a person involved in a criminal case and if the criminal case was not disposed of and subsequently ended in honourable acquittal or treated as mistake of fact, it can be treated as not involved in criminal case, even then he can claim right for appointment only by participating in the next recruitment. 6. Therefore the effect of the said clause (iv) with explanations 1 and 2 of Rule 14(b) of the said Rules makes a person ineligible, provided, if he has involved in a criminal case, even though if he has been acquitted honourably or discharged or treated as mistake of fact, he can claim right to get appointment only in the next recruitment, which means he would not be eligible to claim recruitment or appointment in the current recruitment. 7. In view of the said embargo put in by the said insertion of clause (iv) with explanations 1 and 2 of Rule 14(b) of the said Rules, one of the affected person filed writ petition before this Court, challenging the said rule. The said writ petition came to be decided by a learned Judge of this Court in V.Veeramani and another v State of Tami Nadu, rep. The said writ petition came to be decided by a learned Judge of this Court in V.Veeramani and another v State of Tami Nadu, rep. by its Secretary to Government, Home (Pol.IX) Department, Chennai and others, reported in 2007 (3) MLJ 676 . 8. Though the validity of the said rule was upheld by the learned Judge in the said Judgment, without noticing the same or having failed to notice the said development where a decision was made by this Court, under which the relevant rule has been upheld, some litigation have been entertained subsequently by various decisions of this Court, where indulgence seems to have been shown by this Court allowing those candidates who approached this Court to participate in the selection process and direction to that effect seems to have been granted to the selection/appointing authorities to select and appoint those candidates, even though they have involved in a criminal case, however subsequently acquitted. 9. In this context, it is to be further noted that, there has been a Division Bench decision, which taken the view in favour of the candidature of such persons who involved in criminal case and yet another Division Bench decision of this Court has taken a different view. In view of the conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court and based on which, orders have been passed in number of cases by learned respective single Judges in individual cases, after noticing this conflicting decisions, a learned Judge of this Court referred the matter to the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench to decide the issue. Accordingly the matter has been referred to a Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Manikandan v. Chairman, T.N. Uniformed Services. 10. The Full Bench [ 2008 (2) CTC 97 ], after having thoroughly gone through the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, has ultimately answered the two issues referred to the Full Bench and the relevant portion of the said order of the Full Bench reads thus : "40. Therefore, in conclusion, we hold that the amended Rule 14(b) of the Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services is not ultra vires or unconstitutional. Therefore, in conclusion, we hold that the amended Rule 14(b) of the Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services is not ultra vires or unconstitutional. We also hold that the non selection of the writ petitioners or the rejection of their candidatures, by the respondents, either on the basis of their involvement in criminal case or on the basis of the suppression of their involvement, is perfectly valid and justified. In answer to the reference made to the Full Bench, we hold- (a) that by virtue of Explanation 1 to Clause (iv) of Rule 14 (b) of the Tamilnadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the State and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified; and (b) That the failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or the pendency of a criminal case against him, would entitle the appointing authority to reject his application on the ground of concealment of a material fact, irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the criminal case." 11. Therefore the Full Bench has given a clear view that, the Rule 14(b) including the amended portion, i.e., clause (iv) with explanations 1 and 2 of the said Rules was not ultra vires or unconstitutional and the rejection of candidature of various candidates on the ground either on the basis of their involvement in criminal case or on the basis of the suppression of their involvement, was justifiable and valid. The Full Bench also has made it clear that, by virtue of the said Rule, i.e., 14(b)(iv), a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the State and the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. It has also held that, failure of a person to disclose in the application form either his involvement in a criminal case or the pendency of a criminal case against him would entitle the appointing authority to reject his application on the ground of suppression of material fact irrespective of the ultimate out come of the criminal case. 12. It has also held that, failure of a person to disclose in the application form either his involvement in a criminal case or the pendency of a criminal case against him would entitle the appointing authority to reject his application on the ground of suppression of material fact irrespective of the ultimate out come of the criminal case. 12. It is further to be noted that, even though such a clear order was passed by a Full Bench of this Court, since, even thereafter some of the cases of similar nature had been decided by learned single Judges of this Court contrary to the Full Bench decision, of course by following a decision of the Apex Court in Commr of Police v. Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685 , a learned Judge of this Court, directed to refer the matter to a larger Bench, accordingly, a larger Bench was constituted, before whom a batch of cases of this nature had been posted to take a decision as to whether the law declared by the Full Bench referred to above was a correct law or not. 13. The larger Bench in J.Alex Ponseelan v. The Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in 2014 (2) CTC 337 , by a majority view, has held as follows : "21. I, therefore, answer the Reference in the following: (i) The decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in Manikandan's case, reported in 2008(2) CTC 97 , is a good law. (ii) Rule 14(b)(iv) together with Explanations 1 and 2 of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules is intra vires of the Constitution, as has already been held by the Full Bench in the Manikandan's case and by the learned Single Judge in V.Veeramani's case. 22. Before parting, I may observe that I have had the privilege of perusing the judgments proposed by my learned brothers Justice S. Tamilvanan and Justice A. Selvam and it had been my endeavour not to repeat the reasonings of A.Selvam, J. with whom I respectfully agree and, with utmost respect, I dissent from the views of S.Tamilvanan,J. 23. Registry is directed to list the individual writ petitions and the Review Application before the appropriate Benches for disposal in terms of the order on reference." 14. Registry is directed to list the individual writ petitions and the Review Application before the appropriate Benches for disposal in terms of the order on reference." 14. Therefore it has become final by virtue of the larger Bench decision that, the said rule, i.e., 14(b)(iv) is valid and it is not ultra vires to the Constitution. 15. In view of the said decisions made by this Court, upholding the Constitutional validity of the said Rule, the State Government or Recruitment authorities of Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service, had rejected number of such cases, where the candidates involved in criminal case or they have suppressed their involvement in criminal case at the time of making the application or in the OMR sheet. 16. In those occasions, time and again failed candidates approached this Court by filing individual writ petitions, where in some of the cases, the Mehar Sing's case was followed and the relief had been given. 17. Subsequently the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v. UT of Chandigarh reported in (2015) 2 SCC 377 , considered a similar issue, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 18 of the Judgment has reproduced the decision of the Apex Court in Inspector General of Police v. S.Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , which reads thus : "18. The learned counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Inspector General of Police vs. Samuthiram [ (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 5661 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] of which relevant paragraph is extracted as under: (SCC p. 609, para 24) “24. The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v.Bhopal Singh Panchal [ (1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619]. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” (emphasis supplied) ... ... ... 26. Thus, we are of the opinion that the alleged past conduct of the appellant in relation to the criminal case will not debar or disqualify him for the post of the Constable for which he was successfully selected after qualifying the written test, medical test and the interview conducted by the selection authority. Further, as stated by us earlier, there has been no concealment of any relevant fact from the respondents by the appellant. The respondents were thus not justified in denying the said post to the appellant. The conclusion arrived at by them is not cogent and lacks proper application of mind." 18. Thereafter yet another decision was made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471 . In this decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court, after having analysed the issue threadbare has given a comprehensive or compendium of directions at para 38, which reads thus : "38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted: 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him. 39. We answer the reference accordingly. Let the matters be placed before an appropriate Bench for consideration on merits." 19. It is further to be noted that, even though all these decisions have been made, the candidates, who lost their candidature by facing a rejection order from the Recruiting authorities of the police department on the ground of either involvement of criminal case or on the ground of suppression of such involvement, time and again approached this Court whenever such recruitment is taken place and in some of the cases, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mehar Singh's case (cited supra) has either been quoted or has been followed and the relief has been given. 20. In order to understand further of the issue, the relevant portion of the Judgment in Mehar Singh's case is extracted hereunder : "23. 20. In order to understand further of the issue, the relevant portion of the Judgment in Mehar Singh's case is extracted hereunder : "23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force. 24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 787 ] this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram [Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229]. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in RBI v.Bhopal Singh Panchal [ (1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619], where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted." 21. In the said Mehar Singh's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court as a concluding remarks has given the following : "35. The police force is a disciplined force. In the said Mehar Singh's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court as a concluding remarks has given the following : "35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand." 22. Also in yet another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & others v. Pradeep Kumar and another, reported in (2018) 1 SCC 797 , the issue has been once again confronted by the Hon'ble Apex Court, where after taking into account Samuthiram's case, i.e., (2013) 1 SCC 598 , Mehar Singh's case, (2013) 7 SCC 685 , Avtar Singh's case, (2016) 8 SCC 471 and some other cases, the Apex Court has held that, the Court cannot substitute its views for the decision taken by the Screening Committee (Recruiting agency or part of Recruiting agency). The relevant portion of the said decision made in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration's case read thus : "15. From the above details, we find that the Screening Committee examined each and every case of the respondents and reasonings for their acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking the decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post. As pointed out earlier, the Screening Committee examined each and every case and reasonings for their acquittal and took the decision that the respondents are not suitable for the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The procedure followed is as per Guideline 2(A)(b) and object of such screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enters police force. While so, the court cannot substitute its views for the decision of the Screening Committee. 16. On behalf of the respondents, much reliance was placed upon Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh) [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2 SCC 377 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 490]. In the said case, the appellant thereon was charged under Sections 148, 149, 323, 325 and 307 IPC but acquitted by the trial court holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against him since complainant as well as injured eyewitnesses failed to identify the assailants and the complainant had stated that his signature was obtained on a blank sheet by the investigating officer. The case involved was a family dispute. In such facts and circumstances, this Court held that acquittal of appellant Joginder Singh was an honourable acquittal and hence, he should not be denied appointment to the post in question. The decision in Joginder Singh case [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2 SCC 377 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 490] does not advance the case of the respondents herein. 17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised. As held in Mehar Singh case [Commr. The decision in Joginder Singh case [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2 SCC 377 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 490] does not advance the case of the respondents herein. 17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised. As held in Mehar Singh case [Commr. of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 669 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 910], the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointed to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 18. In the result, the impugned judgment [State (UT of Chandigarh) v. Pardeep Kumar, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 1022] is set aside and the appeals are allowed. The cancellation of candidature of the respondents is upheld. No costs." 23. With these decisions and rule position, the 2017 recruitment for Special Police Subordinate Service of Tamil Nadu had taken place, where all these petitioners, after having successfully completed the written test as well as physical/medical test, had been subjected to police verification of their past conduct and antecedents and according to the respective respondents, it was found that all these candidates/writ petitioners had either been involved in criminal case or they have suppressed such involvement and also even though some of them had been acquitted from the said criminal case, such acquittals were not honorable acquittal, therefore the respondents, in all these writ petitions, had rejected the candidature of each of the writ petitioners. 24. As against such rejection orders, sometime in January 2018, all these writ petitioners had approached this Court and filed individual writ petitions challenging such rejection orders. 25. 24. As against such rejection orders, sometime in January 2018, all these writ petitioners had approached this Court and filed individual writ petitions challenging such rejection orders. 25. In all these cases, of course by individual order, a learned Judge of this Court, having quashed the respective impugned orders, i.e., rejection orders of their candidature, had remanded the matter back to the respondents for reconsideration in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case, i.e., (2016) 8 SCC 471 and Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration's case, i.e., (2018) 1 SCC 797 , to take a fresh decision thereon. 26. Pursuant to such remand orders passed by this Court separately in each of these petitioner's case, once again the respective respondents/recruiting agency had considered the claim of the respective writ petitioners and after considering the law declared by this Court in Avatar Singh's case as well as the decision in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration's case, has once again rejected the candidature of these writ petitioners. 27. Challenging the said rejection orders passed in all these writ petitions, the respective writ petitioners have filed these batch of writ petitions, seeking for the relief sought for in the respective writ petitions, to quash those impugned orders and seek indulgence of this Court to give direction to the respondents to give selection and appointment to the petitioners. 28. I have heard the learned respective counsels appearing for the writ petitioners and Mr. B. Pugalendhi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. A.K. Baskarapandian, Spl. Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 29. All these learned counsels appearing for the petitioners made submissions stating that, even though this Court in the first round of litigation has given a clear direction that, the case should be reconsidered in the light of the decisions made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case as well as Union Territory Chandigarh Administration's case, no such indulgence have been shown by the respondents, nor the import of the said two decisions of the Apex Court have been properly understood by the respondents, therefore the ultimate rejections made by the respondents, in respect of the candidatures of each of the writ petitioners, are palpably wrong and are directly against the law laid down by the Apex Court in these two cases and therefore all these impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 30. 30. However, Mr.B.Pugalendhi, learned Additional Advocate General, by taking pain in referring all the aforesaid decisions, i.e., Full Bench and Larger Bench decisions of this Court in Manikandan's case and A.Alex Ponseelan's case, where the validity of the said rule have been upheld and also the important decisions referred to above of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mehar Singh's case, Joginder Singh's case, Avtar Singh's case, Union Territory of Chandigarh's case, submitted that, the ultimate direction given by the learned Judge in the first round of litigation was that, the respondents to consider each of the individual case, in the light of the decisions made by the Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case as well as Union Territory of Chandigarh's case. In each of the cases, the import of the said two decisions have been applied on the given facts of each of the cases and ultimately by giving cogent and acceptable reasons strictly on the basis of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in those two decisions, the respondents have rejected the candidature of each of these writ petitioners, therefore, no interference is called for in these impugned orders which are under challenge in these batch of cases. 31. The learned Additional Advocate General has further submitted that, the parameters fixed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case at para 38 has been strictly followed and also the latest decision of the Apex Court in Union Territory of Chandigarh's case has also been applied as directed by this Court in the first round of litigation and accordingly, decisions have been made. 32. I have considered the said submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both sides and have perused the materials placed before this Court. 33. On perusal of the impugned orders passed in each of these writ petitions, the reasoning given by the respondents for the rejection of the candidature of each of the writ petitioners can be categorized into the following broad categories : "(1) Candidate involved in criminal case and the same is pending. (2) Candidate involved in a criminal case, though the same has been ended in acquittal, such acquittal is not honourable acquittal. (3) The acquittal given in some of the cases are only on the basis of benefit of doubt, therefore Rule 14(b)(iv) is squarely attracted. (2) Candidate involved in a criminal case, though the same has been ended in acquittal, such acquittal is not honourable acquittal. (3) The acquittal given in some of the cases are only on the basis of benefit of doubt, therefore Rule 14(b)(iv) is squarely attracted. (4) Though candidate involved in criminal case, he has not disclosed the same at the time of making the application or the OMR sheet, therefore it can be construed as a deliberate suppression, thereby it attracts explanation 2 to Rule 14(b)(iv)." 34. Under these broad categories, all these cases are covered, according to the respondents, thus, they are liable to be rejected on those grounds by strictly applying the said Rule, i.e., Rule 14(b)(iv), in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a number of decisions referred to above. 35. Each of these cases in the batch with the reasoning for rejection of the candidature has been given category wise in the following table, which would reveal the actual reason given by the respondents in nutshell, for which the candidature of such candidates had been rejected by the respondents and also the findings of this Court after perusing the respective impugned orders. “TABLE” 36. Since almost all the counsels appearing for the petitioners have mainly relied upon Mehar Singh's case (2013) 7 SCC 685 , the relevant portions of the said Judgment have already been extracted. In para 25 of the Mehar Singh's case, the decision in Samuthiram's case (2013) 1 SCC 598 has been considered and the Apex Court has held that, the words "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code and they are coined by Judicial pronouncements. The Apex Court has also held that, it is difficult to define what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". At the same time, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held that, if the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that, the accused was "honourably acquitted". 37. At the same time, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held that, if the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that, the accused was "honourably acquitted". 37. In the same Mehar Singh's case at para 35, the Hon'ble Apex Court has made it clear that, a candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude and he must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category, even if he is acquitted or discharged in criminal case, that acquittal or discharge will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case. 38. In Joginder singh's case, (2015) 2 SCC 377 after extracting the relevant portion from Samuthiram's case, on how to decide a person has been honourably acquitted, the Apex Court at para 26 has held that, the past conduct of the appellant (appellant in that case) in relation to the criminal case will not debar or disqualify him for the post of the constable, for which he was successfully selected after qualifying the written test, medical test and the interview. 39. At the same time, in Avtar Singh's case, (2016) 8 SCC 471 , the Apex Court has given a set of guidelines, which are to be strictly followed in finalising the selection/recruitment to Government service, especially disciplined service. In respect of suppression of fact where even there is an acquittal, which has already been recorded, which is not a clean acquittal or it was on benefit of reasonable doubt, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents and to take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. This has been specifically stated at para 38 of Avtar Singh's case. It is further added in the said paragraph that, if criminal case was pending, which is not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the authority concerned would take a decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 40. It is further added in the said paragraph that, if criminal case was pending, which is not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the authority concerned would take a decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 40. Ultimately in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration's case, the Apex Court taking into account the guidelines issued by the Chandigarh Administration, especially guidelines 2 (A)(a) and 2 (A)(b) and also by taking into account Samuthiram's case and Mehar Singh's case, by extracting the paras 23, 24, 25, 33 and 35 of Mehar Singh, the Court has held that, acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post, still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he or she is suitable to the appointment to the post. 41. The Apex Court has further held in Union Territory of Chandigarh's case that, the observation of the court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan's cases [State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 ] made it clear that, the candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. 42. In this regard, the decision of the screening committee appointed by the Chandigarh Administration was to be taken into account and the Court has made it clear that, the court cannot substitute its views for the decision of the screening committee. The Court has further pointed out that, in a catena of Judgments of the Court, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised. It has further been held that, as per the decision in Mehar Singh's case, the screening committee's decision must be taken as a final unless it is malafide. 43. By making all these observations and after holding so, the Apex Court in Chandigarh Administration's case has rejected the plea raised by the candidate and allowed the appeal filed by the authorities. 44. 43. By making all these observations and after holding so, the Apex Court in Chandigarh Administration's case has rejected the plea raised by the candidate and allowed the appeal filed by the authorities. 44. All these decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above make it abundantly clear that, the police force is a disciplined force, therefore whoever wants to become member of that disciplined force must have an impeccable character and integrity. It further says that, the person with criminal antecedents cannot be fit into a police force. 45. In the given rule position as well as the factual matrix of each of the case, whether the appointing authority or scrutiny committee or screening committee is empowered to scan the entirety of the facts of each of the case and can take a decision thereon. If we analyse the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, especially Avtar Singh's case, such a power has been vested with the recruiting agency or employer. The Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration's case went one step further and states that, the Court cannot substitute its views for the decision of the screening committee. Suppose the recruiting agency or a screening committee or an employer verified each of the case and takes a decision consciously by giving reasons cogently stating that, either the candidate has involved in a criminal case, which has been suppressed both at the time of application as well as at the time of verification and the candidate who involved in a criminal case though subsequently acquitted by a competent criminal Court, such acquittal is not a honourable acquittal but it is a acquittal on benefit of doubt, these two types of the cases in the opinion of this Court, by applying various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court cited above, can be out rightly rejected. 46. 46. But at the same time, if a candidate has not disclosed the involvement in criminal case at the time of application but has subsequently disclosed at the time of verification and cases, where the involvement has been disclosed both at the time of application as well as at the time of police verification and cases where there had been no occasion to disclose the involvement of criminal case, if it is registered after the application was made by the candidate, whether these kind of cases can also be equated with the case of the first two categories mentioned above, is yet another question. 47. In this context in Avtar Singh's case, several directives have been issued. Under para 38.4 of the Avtar Singh, in case of suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filing of the application/verification form and later it comes to the knowledge of the employer, some recourses mentioned therein can be adopted. By citing this, the Apex Court has given various measures to be adopted under sub-para 38.4.1, 38.4.2 and 38.4.3. 48. When we look at these directives issued by the Apex Court in Avtar Singh's case, much discretion have been given to the employer/screening committee to decide each of the case depending upon the circumstances, when there is a suppression of disclosure of the fact that, he has involved in a criminal case, from which has been acquitted. 49. In so far as the conviction is concerned, no doubt the candidate become ineligible to be considered for appointment. In so far as acquittals are concerned, the Courts have taken a view that, there can be a distinction between the complete exoneration and the acquittal on benefit of doubt. Both cannot be equated and a differential treatment can be given to the category of persons who got complete exoneration and the persons who have been acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt. 50. Both cannot be equated and a differential treatment can be given to the category of persons who got complete exoneration and the persons who have been acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt. 50. Analysing all these parameters as has been held in number of decisions and by having in mind the paramount consideration of the Hon'ble Apex Court's views in all these decisions that, the police force is a disciplined force and a person who wants to become member of the police force must have impeccable integrity and his criminal antecedents shall be a matter for consideration of the recruiting agency or employer, the cases in these batch, on the factual matrix of each of the case, can be decided. 51. Accordingly the cases where there has been a complete suppression both at the application and at the time of verification with regard to the involvement of the criminal case, this Court is not inclined to show any indulgence and those cases deserve to be rejected out rightly. 52. Like that, cases where the candidate involved in a criminal case and subsequently been acquitted not honourably but based on the benefit of doubt, even in that case also, in view of explanations to clause (iv) of Rule 14(b), he become ineligible to be considered for appointment. 53. However cases of the nature, (1) where at the time of application, they did not reveal the involvement but subsequently revealed at the time of verification and (2) the cases where it cannot be easily ascertained whether the acquittal has been given by the trial Court concerned on the basis of benefit of doubt or by way of complete exoneration and (3) cases where there has been a discharge or the names of the candidate have subsequently been deleted in the FIR and (4) the cases where it ended in acquittal because of compromise between the parties, whether the very same yardstick as has been mentioned in the first two categories by invoking explanations 1 and 2 of Rule 14(b)(iv), can be adopted with same vigour, is the only question. 54. 54. After having analysed all these parameters as has been exhaustively given in those decisions by the Hon'ble Apex court, this Court is of the view that, those four category of cases mentioned above, though may not be equated with the first two categories, the Recruiting Agency/Employer or Screening Committee cannot be expected to give a green signal to those four categories and clear the names, but at the same time, the employer/screening committee/the respondents herein can certainly apply the various yardsticks given by the Apex Court in those Judgments and a pragmatic decision can be taken. 55. This view of this Court is taken purely on the basis of the directives issued in Avtar Singh's case as well the decision rendered in Chandigarh Administration's case. 56. Very particularly in Chandigarh Administration's case, a recent decision, the Apex Court since has categorically stated that, the Court cannot substitute its view for the decision of the screening committee, this Court wants to refrain itself from making its own views and comments on each of the case on merits, which falls under the said four categories mentioned above. But at the same time, this Court cannot also approve the way in which it has been dealt with by the respondents by merely stating that, the import of Avtar Singh and Chandigarh Administration cases have been applied. 57. In those borderline cases, which cannot be undoubtedly equated with first two category, i.e., total suppression and definitely acquittal on benefit of doubt, these category of cases can be treated differently where enormous discretion is vested with the employer/screening committee/respondents herein to take a decision ultimately whether if appointment is given to these kind of candidates, will they spoil the disciplined force by taking into account their criminal antecedents, despite the fact that, in all those cases they have been acquitted, of course, on reasons like compromise, removal of name in the FIR and other reasons. 58. Therefore by considering the reasons in each of the cases for rejection of the candidature of the writ petitioners, this Court categorise the cases in three categories. The first category of cases where the impugned orders passed are to be interfered with by quashing the same and give a direction to the respondents to consider the candidature of those writ petitioners for selection and appointment to the post. 59. The first category of cases where the impugned orders passed are to be interfered with by quashing the same and give a direction to the respondents to consider the candidature of those writ petitioners for selection and appointment to the post. 59. At the same time, in the second category of cases, even though this Court inclined to remand those matters once again, the sole discretion is vest with the employer/respondents/screening committee to decide the cases once again by taking into account the parameters indicated above. 60. In the third category of cases, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the decisions taken in the respective impugned orders as those cases fail. 61. Therefore three category of cases broadly have been given under; (1) Cases are allowed with positive direction (I) ; (2) Cases are partly allowed with remand order (II); and (3) Cases are rejected (III) 62. Accordingly, W.P.(MD).Nos.13979 of 2018, 14003 of 2018, 14004 of 2018, 14080 of 2018, 14086 of 2018, 14247 of 2018, 14248 of 2018, 14669 of 2018, 16036 of 2018, 16037 of 2018, 16264 of 2018, 16403 of 2018, 16501 of 2018 and 17155 of 2018 which come under category (I) are allowed. (ii) W.P.(MD).Nos.8756 of 2018, 11374 of 2018, 12073 of 2018, 12074 of 2018, 12075 of 2018, 12077 of 2018, 12078 of 2018, 12079 of 2018, 12405 of 2018, 12553 of 2018, 13142 of 208, 13870 of 2018, 13971 of 2018, 14015 of 2018 and 14075 of 2018 which come under category (II) are partly allowed by remanding the same with a direction to reconsider. (iii) W.P.(MD).Nos.11344 of 2018, 12053 of 2018, 12076 of 2018, 12195 of 2018, 12457 of 2018, 12670 of 2018, 13108 of 2018, 13515 of 2018, 13733 of 2018, 13939 of 2018, 14341 of 2018, 14420 of 2018, 15224 of 2018, 16404 of 2018, 16405 of 2018, 16406 of 2018 and 17245 of 2018 which come under category (III) are liable to be rejected, accordingly they are dismissed. The connected miscellaneous petitions in all the above three categories are accordingly disposed of. However there shall be no order as to costs.