JUDGMENT : YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Sri Deepak Kumar Jaiswal and Sri Sanjay Maurya, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri H.R. Misra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Swatantra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party. 2. The present revision has been filed against the order dated 23.04.2019 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Gorakhpur rejecting the amendment application (Application No.92ga) whereby the amendment sought by the revisionist-defendant in his written statement filed in SCC Suit No.31 of 2012 has been rejected. 3. Contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that under Order VI Rule 17 the court may at any stage of proceedings allow the amendment of pleadings so as to determine the real question in controversy between the parties, and the trial court has rejected the amendment application without recording any finding to arrive at a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the defendant could not have sought the amendment before the commencement of the trial. 4. Per contra learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party-landlord submits that proceedings in the case were at an advanced stage, and after framing of issues dates were being fixed for evidence of the parties, and the amendment had been sought by the defendant-tenant only as a dilatory tactics so as to delay the proceedings. 5. The court below while rejecting the amendment application has referred to the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 in terms of which no application for amendment is to be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of the due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The only reason which had been assigned by the defendant-tenant in his application to support his prayer for amendment was the engagement of a new counsel which has been held by the court below to be wholly insufficient. Further, placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswami and Sons & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 84 the amendment application has been rejected. 6. Further, placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswami and Sons & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 84 the amendment application has been rejected. 6. The purpose and object of rules relating to pleadings being to decide the real controversy between the parties and not to punish them for their negligence, the provisions relating to the amendment of pleadings are usually to be liberally construed with a view for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them, and consequently the courts generally allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. 7. The proviso to Rule 17 under Order VI, as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, however, restricts and curtails the power of the court to allow amendment of pleadings by enacting that no application for amendment is to be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. 8. The proviso to Rule 17, as per the Amendment Act, 2002, has introduced the "due diligence" test, which requires that the court must be satisfied that in spite of "due diligence" the party could not discover the ground pleaded in the amendment. The term "due diligence" has been specifically used so as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise the discretion in situations where amendment is being sought after commencement of the trial. 9. The provisions contained under Order VI Rule 17 proviso as introduced in the year 2002 came up for consideration in the case of J. Samuel Vs. Gattu Mahesh & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 300 wherein the principles relating to allowing amendments under Order VI Rule 17 were reiterated and the object of the proviso and the meaning and significance of "due diligence" of the parties seeking amendment has also been stated. The observations made in the judgment in this regard as follows:- "18. The primary aim of the court is to try the case on its merits and ensure that the rule of justice prevails. For this the need is for the true facts of the case to be placed before the court so that the court has access to all the relevant information in coming to its decision. The primary aim of the court is to try the case on its merits and ensure that the rule of justice prevails. For this the need is for the true facts of the case to be placed before the court so that the court has access to all the relevant information in coming to its decision. Therefore, at times it is required to permit parties to amend their plaints. The court's discretion to grant permission for a party to amend his pleading lies on two conditions, firstly, no injustice must be done to the other side and secondly, the amendment must be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. However, to balance the interests of the parties in pursuit of doing justice, the proviso has been added which clearly states that: "... no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." 19. Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. An advocate representing someone must engage in due diligence to determine that the representations made are factually accurate and sufficient. The term "due diligence" is specifically used in the Code so as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise the discretion in situations of requested amendment after the commencement of trial. 20. A party requesting a relief stemming out of a claim is required to exercise due diligence and it is a requirement which cannot be dispensed with. The term "due diligence" determines the scope of a party's constructive knowledge, claim and is very critical to the outcome of the suit. x x x x x 23. ...The entire object of the amendment to Order VI Rule 17 as introduced in 2002 is to stall filing of application for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other's case. It also helps checking the delays in filing the applications. x x x x x 23. ...The entire object of the amendment to Order VI Rule 17 as introduced in 2002 is to stall filing of application for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other's case. It also helps checking the delays in filing the applications. [Vide Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, (2005) 7 SCC 534 , Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N., (2006) 12 SCC 1 , Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 , Rajkumar Gurawara v. S.K. Sarwagi and Co. (P) Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 364 , Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, (2009) 2 SCC 409 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 563] and Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 239]." 10. Reference may also be had to the judgment in the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswami and Sons & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 84 wherein some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with an application filed under Order VI Rule 17 have been enumerated in the following terms:- "63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 64. The decision on an application made under Order 6 Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never be undertaken in a casual manner. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 64. The decision on an application made under Order 6 Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never be undertaken in a casual manner. We can conclude our discussion by observing that while deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments." 11. In a recent judgment in the case of M. Ravanna Vs. Anjanamma, 2019 4 SCC 332 it has been held that after commencement of trial amendment of pleadings is not permissible except under conditions stated in the proviso and the burden is on the person seeking the amendment after commencement of trial to show "due diligence" on his part as contemplated under the proviso. The relevant observations in the judgment are as follows:- "7. Leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case, or challenges the fundamental character of the suit. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money." 12. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money." 12. In the case at hand, the court below upon due consideration of the facts of the case has come to the conclusion that the amendment which was being sought was not imperative for determining the real question in controversy between the parties, and also that the same was barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC which curtails the discretion to allow amendment of pleadings after the trial has commenced, and introduces the "due diligence" test in terms whereof the burden is on the person seeking the amendment after commencement of trial to show that in spite of "due diligence" such an amendment could not have been sought earlier, and as such the order passed by the trial court cannot be faulted with. 13. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (in short 'the Act, 1887') fell for consideration in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan V. Ram Lal & Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 566 wherein referring to the earlier judgment in the case of Hari Shankar Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, (1963) AIR SC 698 Bell & Co. Ltd. Vs. Waman Hemraj, (1938) AIR Bombay 223 and Mundri Lal Vs. Sushhila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609 it was held as follows:- "15. The scope of Section 25 of the 1887 Act, came for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, (1963) AIR SC 698, in paras 9 and 10, this Court laid down the following: (AIR p. 701) "9. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, (1938) 40 BLR 125 : 1937 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : AIR 1938 Bom 223], where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: (SCC OnLine Bom paras 3-4) ''3. ...The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. 4. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.' This observation has our full concurrence. 10. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.' This observation has our full concurrence. 10. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to Section 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plain finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption." 16. Another judgment which needs to be noted is judgment of this Court in Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609 . This Court held that jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. The Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence or (iv) findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidence." 14. Counsel for the revisionist has not been able to dispute the aforementioned legal proposition with regard to the principles to be applied while allowing the amendment of pleadings after commencement of trial, and has also not been able to point out any material error or irregularity in the orders passed by the courts below so as to warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 15. The revision lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.