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2019 DIGILAW 1458 (ALL)

Raja Ram Pandey v. State of U. P.

2019-05-28

SANJAY KUMAR SINGH

body2019
JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR SINGH, J. 1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Tripathi and Mr. A.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the revisionist and Mr. N.D. Rai and Mr. Virendra Kumar Singh, learned Additional Government Advocates and Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned Brief holder representing the State of U.P./ Opposite party no.1 and perused the materials available on record. 2. The revisionist has preferred this criminal revision under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. against the order dated 24.1.2019 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court-I, Mathura in Sessions Trial No. 195 of 2016 (State vs. Raja Ram Pandey and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 286 of 2014, under Section 376-D and 506 IPC, police station Baldev, district Mathura, whereby the discharge application of the revisionist has been rejected and charges have been framed against the revisionist for the offence under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC. 3. Supplementary affidavit dated 26.5.2019 enclosing the copy of protest petition dated 20.11.2014 of the victim, summoning order dated 05.12.2014, order dated 26.10.2015 of revisional court, order dated 23.12.2015 of the High Court and order dated 11.03.2016 of the Supreme Court filed today on behalf of the revisionist is taken on record. 4. Filtering out unnecessary detail, the facts of the present case in nutshell are that a FIR being Case Crime No.286 of 2014, under Section 376-D and 506 IPC, police station Baldev, district Mathura was lodged by opposite party No. 2 on 2.8.2014 with respect to the incident dated 28.6.2014. In the FIR, a clear allegation of rape against the revisionist, Raja Ram Pandey and other co-accused, namely, Rinku @ Rohit and Rahul Saraswat was levelled by opposite party No. 2 alleging therein that Deepu, who is younger brother of opposite party No. 2 has falsely been roped in another case for the offence under Section 307 IPC on 19.6.2014 by the revisionist Raja Ram Pandey. The co-accused Rinku @ Rohit used to visit the house of opposite party No. 2 and on account of this reason, she narrated the whole story of his brother to him, who promised her for help. On 28.6.2014 at about 10.00 a.m. Rinku came to the house of the victim and on the pretext of withdrawing the case against her brother through Raja Ram Pandey, who is a politician, taken the victim with him to meet with Raj Ram Pandey. On 28.6.2014 at about 10.00 a.m. Rinku came to the house of the victim and on the pretext of withdrawing the case against her brother through Raja Ram Pandey, who is a politician, taken the victim with him to meet with Raj Ram Pandey. When the victim was sitting in the car of Raja Ram Pandey, the co-accused, Rinku kept a handkerchief on her mouth, which was having some medicine due to which, she became unconscious and when she regained consciousness she has found herself at the house of Raja Ram Pandey in Radhika Vihar Mathura where co-accused Rahul Saraswat was already present, thereafter the revisionist Raja Ram Pandey and co-accused Rinku and Rahul Saraswat forcibly committed rape on her and also made her obscene video clip by their mobile phone. Accused persons threatened the victim not to tell about the incident to anyone and said that if she would raise alarm, they will put her video clip on internet and defame her in the society. They also threatened to kill her father and brother. As per victim, even after the aforesaid incident, her sexual harassment was continued and on the basis of these video clippings, the victim was blackmailed and was compelled to go in Hotel etc., as such she subjected to sexual intercourse at different places. Due to all this happening victim on getting depressed told about the incident to her father and mother and lodged the report. 5. The Investigating Office after investigation submitted final report dated 26.8.2014. Against the said final report dated 26.8.2014, victim/opposite party No. 2 filed a protest petition dated 20.11.2014 making allegation that despite sufficient evidence on record, the investigating officer filed the final report ignoring all the material evidences against the revisionist, because revisionist Raja Ram Pandey is influential person being political leader of Samajwadi Party, therefore District President and Secretary of Samajwadi Party have given statement in his favour. It is also mentioned that the revisionist Raja Ram Pandey is man of bad character and felon nature, he has long criminal history. Earlier also revisionist was apprehended for flirtatious act in Agra. It is also mentioned that the revisionist Raja Ram Pandey is man of bad character and felon nature, he has long criminal history. Earlier also revisionist was apprehended for flirtatious act in Agra. Considering the facts, circumstances and material on record, the Magistrate concerned passed detailed order dated 5.12.2014 rejecting the final report dated 26.8.2014 and took cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and summoned the revisionist as well as other co-accused persons to face trial under Section 376-D and 506 IPC. 6. The revisionist Raja Ram Pandey aggrieved by the said order dated 5.12.2014 preferred Criminal Revision No. 73 of 2015 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura, but the same was also rejected vide order dated 26.10.2015 confirming the summoning order dated 5.12.2014 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura. The revisionist, Raja Ram Pandey has also preferred application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 37004 of 2015 before this Court against the aforesaid orders dated 5.12.2014 and 26.10.2015, but this Court also refused the prayer for quashing of the aforesaid impugned orders and the said application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the revisionist, Raja Ram Pandey was disposed of by the coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.12.2015, which is reproduced herein below:- "Sri Garun Pal Singh has filed vakalatnama on behalf of opposite party no. 2 which is taken on record. Heard Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Garun Pal Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and learned A.G.A. for the State. The present 482 Cr.P.C. application has been filed against the order dated 26.10.2015 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Mathura in Crl. Revision No. 73 of 2015 and the order dated 5.12.2014 passed by A.C.J.M., Court No. 3, Mathura in Case No. 3041/IX of 2014 (F.R. Case No. 152/XI of 2014) under sections 376-D, 506 I.P.C. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties present and perused the impugned order as well as the material brought on record, I am of the view that the impugned orders are based upon relevant considerations and supported by cogent reasons, hence requires no interference by this Court in its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, the prayer for quashing the impugned orders is hereby refused. However, it is directed that if the applicant appear and surrender before the court below within three weeks from today and apply for bail, his prayer for bail shall be considered and decided expeditiously. It is made clear that the applicant will not be granted any further time by this Court for surrendering before the Court below as directed above. With the aforesaid observations, the application stands disposed of." 7. Against the above order dated 23.12.2015 of this Court, the revisionist preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No. (S) No. 1866 of 2016, which was dismissed by the Apex Court also vide order dated 11.3.2016 extending the period of surrender of the revisionist for further two weeks. The said order dated 11.3.2016 of the Apex Court is reproduced herein below:- "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. No ground to interfere with the impugned order is made out, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. However, period to surrender depicted in the impugned order is extended by two weeks from today. As a sequel to the above, pending miscellaneous application if any, also stands disposed of. " 8. The revisionist after losing his case upto Apex Court, has moved a discharge application dated 12.1.2017 (Application No. 34 Kha), which has been rejected by the trial court (Additional District and Sessions Judge/FTC), Mathura by impugned order dated 24.1.2019. The trial court after rejecting the discharge application of the revisionist also framed the charges against the revisionist under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC on 24.1.2019. The accused-revisionist denied the charges levelled against him and claimed for trial, as such, the trial of the revisionist, Raja Ram Pandey is going on. 9. In the aforesaid background of the fact after a long litigation upto the Apex Court, the revisionist has again preferred the instant criminal revision against the aforesaid order dated 24.1.2019, whereby his discharge application has been rejected by the trial court. 10. Learned counsel for the revisionists assailing the impugned order dated 24.1.2019 submitted that:- 10.1. The revisionist has not committed any offence under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC and he has falsely been implicated in the present case on account of political rivalry and the trial court has wrongly framed the charges under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC. 10.2. 10. Learned counsel for the revisionists assailing the impugned order dated 24.1.2019 submitted that:- 10.1. The revisionist has not committed any offence under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC and he has falsely been implicated in the present case on account of political rivalry and the trial court has wrongly framed the charges under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC. 10.2. The revisionist and his son have earlier lodged the first information report against the brother of the opposite party no. 2 (victim of this case), on account of which the present FIR has been lodged. 10.3. The trial court has committed legal error in passing the impugned order dated 24.1.2019 without recording any finding as to whether there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the revisionist. 10.4. The trial court has wrongly held that in rape cases, the statement of the victim stands at par with the statement of the injured witness. 10.5. The trial court has committed error while considering the discharge application of the revisionist because the trial court is required to consider more than that of recording the satisfaction of the prima facie offence. 10.6. Lastly, it is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that in the present case there is no sufficient ground or material on record for proceeding against the revisionist, whereby it is very much proved that merely with a view to harass the revisionist and to defame his political career and as a means of counter blast to the first information report lodged by the revisionist, the present criminal proceedings has been launched. 10.7. On the date of incident, revisionist stayed in Hotel Najneen, Lucknow but his plea of alibi has not been considered by the trial court while deciding his discharge application. 11. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocates for the State of U.P. / Opposite party no.1 submitted that:- 11.1. There is no illegality in the impugned order dated 24.1.2019. 11.2. It is settled law that at the stage of discharge, the court below is required to see whether on uncontroverted allegations made in the prosecution case and the evidence relied in support of same discloses the commission of any cognizable offence against the accused or not. 11.3. The disputed questions of facts and defence of the accused cannot be taken into consideration at the pre-trial stage. 11.4. 11.3. The disputed questions of facts and defence of the accused cannot be taken into consideration at the pre-trial stage. 11.4. Considering the allegations and material evidence on record, the prima facie cognizable offence against the accused/revisionist is made out, therefore, the revision is liable to be dismissed. 11.5. It is also submitted by learned Additional Government Advocate that in this case after dismissing the discharge application of the revisionist, the charge under Sections 376-D and 506 IPC has also been framed against the accused-revisionist on 24.1.2019, and as such, the trial of the revisionist is going on, therefore, on this ground also the present revision has no force of law and liable to be dismissed. In support of this submission learned A.G.A. placed reliance on the following judgment of the Apex Court: (a) Bharat Parikh vs C.B.I., (2008) CriLJ 3540(SC). (b) Rati Lal vs State of Maharashtra, (1979) AIR SC 94. 12. I have gone through the entire record including the impugned order dated 24.01.2019. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the prosecutrix/victim has levelled the specific allegation of committing rape by the revisionist, Raja Ram Pandey along with other co-accused persons with further allegations that they were blackmailing her on the ground that in case of raising voice by her against the accused persons, they will upload the obscene clippings of the victim on the internet. As per the case of the prosecution, the sexual harassment of the victim was continued by the accused persons under the garb of blackmailing adopting different modus operandi as stated above. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura while rejecting the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer in favour of the revisionist has passed a detailed order with specific finding that the Investigating Officer has not conducted the fair investigation and ignoring all the material evidence against the accused persons submitted final report, because the revisionist is a political leader of Samajvadi Party and he was in power at the relevant point of time. From the record it is also apparent that the prosecutrix in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. has also supported the prosecution case, therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that no prima facie offence is made out against the revisionist. It is also admitted facts on record that the summoning order dated 5.12.2014 has been passed considering the same facts and materials on record, which was assailed by the revisionist before the revisional court, but the Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 26.10.2015 dismissed the revision. This Court vide order dated 23.12.215 as well Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 11.3.2016 have also upheld the summoning order dated 5.12.2014. 13. At this stage this Court is also of the view that, prima facie offence under Sections 376-D and 504 IPC is made out against the revisionist, as all the basic ingredients to constitute the said offences are available on record. I also find that trial court while deciding the discharge application dated 12.1.2017 (Application No. 34 Kha) has considered and discussed all aspects of the matter and decided the same in view of well settled law laid down by the Apex Court. So far as the plea of false implication, motive and plea of alibi etc., are concerned, this Court is of the view that there is no doubt about the settled law that these are the matter of evidence, which can be appropriately taken into consideration by the trial court at the appropriate stage. It is well settled that at the stage of considering the discharge application of the accused, mini trial is not permitted under the law. Whether or not allegations are true is a matter, which cannot be determined at the stage of framing of charges. Any such determination can be done only at the conclusion of trial. 14. Here it would be useful to quote some authorities of the Apex Court, which are as follows:- 14.1 The Apex court in case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 has held that at the stage of framing the charge the court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of offence by the accused. The Court has to see while considering the question of framing the charge as to whether the material brought on record could reasonably connect the accused with the trial. Nothing more is required to be inquired into. 14.2 In the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Another, (1979) 3 SCC 4 , the Apex Court has settled that at the time of framing of charge, the court is not required to make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh evidence as if it is conducting a trial. 14.3 In case of Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal vs Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors, (1979) 4 SCC 274 the Apex court has observed that it may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence. 14.4 The Apex court in case of Sheikh Zakir vs State Of Bihar,1983 2 SCR 312 has held that even though a victim of rape cannot be treated as an accomplice, on account of a long line of judicial decisions the evidence of the victim in a rape case is treated almost like the evidence of an accomplice requiring corroboration. Section 133 of the Evidence Act says that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Section 133 of the Evidence Act says that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But the rule of practice is that it is prudent to look for corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice by other independent evidence. This rule is based on human experience and is incorporated in illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Act. There must be an indication in the course of the judgment that the judge had this rule in his mind when he prepared the judgment and if in a given case the judge finds that there is no need for such corroboration he should give reasons for dispensing with the necessity for such corroboration. But if a conviction is based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration it will not be illegal on that sole ground. In the case of a grown-up and married woman it is always safe to insist on such corroboration. Wherever corroboration is necessary it should be from an independent source but is not necessary that every part of the evidence of the victim should be confirmed in every detail by independent evidence. Such corroboration can be sought from either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or from both. 14.5 The Apex court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr, (1989) 1 SCC 715 has held that in fact, sec. 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The 'ground' in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The Court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor it is necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidenciary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into. 14.6 The apex court in case of .State of Maharashtra and Ors. Nor it is necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidenciary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into. 14.6 The apex court in case of .State of Maharashtra and Ors. V. Som Nath Thapa and Ors, (1996) 4 SCC 659 has observed as follows: "Let us note the meaning of the word `presume'. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence". (emphasis ours). In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law `presume' means "to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming". Stroud's Legal dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which "A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged". (Emphasis supplied). In Law Lexicon by P Ramanath Aiyar the same quotation finds place at p. 1007 of 1987 Edn. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence; a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage." 14.7 In State of M.P. Vs. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held in paragraph 7 as under: "7.The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held in paragraph 7 as under: "7.The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused." 14.8 In case of Kanti Bhadra Shah And Anr vs State Of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC 722 the Apex court has held that if the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial judge has formed the opinion, upon consideration of the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. 14.9 In State Of Delhi vs Gyan Devi And Ors, (2000) 8 SCC 239 the Apex court has held that the legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the Trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused person. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the Trial Court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases. 14.10 In Smt.Om Wati & Anr vs State, Through Delhi Admn. & Ors, (2001) CriLJ 1723 the Apex court has observed that we would again remind the High Courts of their statutory obligation to not to interfere at the initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons which in law amount to interdicting the trial against the accused persons. Unscrupulous litigants should be discouraged from protracting the trial and preventing culmination of the criminal cases by having resort to uncalled for and unjustified litigation under the cloak of technicalities of law. 14.11 In case of State Of Orissa vs Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 the Apex court held that, no provision in the Code grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. Further, the scheme of the Code when examined in the light of the provisions of the old code of 1898, makes the position more clear. In the old code, there was no provision similar to Section 227. Section 227 was incorporated in the Code with a view to save the accused from prolonged harassment which is a necessary concomitant of a protracted criminal trial. 14.12 The Apex court in case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt.Ltd vs Sanjay Choudhary & Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 681 After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied. 14.13 The Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh Vs. 14.13 The Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh,2009 3 SCC 850 has held that the jurisdiction of Sessions Judge at the time of discharge is very limited. In the said judgment it has been held that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. 14.14 Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368 , held as under: "At the stage of framing of charge under section 228 Cr.P.C. or while considering the discharge petition filed under Section 227, it is not for the Magistrate or the Judge concerned to analyse all the materials including pros and cons, reliability or acceptability, etc. It is at the trial, the Judge concerned has to appreciate their evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the statement, veracity of various documents and is free to take a decision one way or the other." 14.15 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under: "17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the code, unless the accused is discharged under section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the Court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine quo non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of sections 227 and 228 of the Code. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine quo non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgement of the court while section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code." "19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof, but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage." 14.16 In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476 , Hon'ble Apex Court after citing the catena of judgements has summarized the principles in respect of framing of charges or discharge of the accused and held as under: "While framing charges, court is required to evaluate materials and documents on record to decide whether facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into probative value of materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that accused had committed offence. But it should not evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict accused. Even if, there is a grave suspicion against the accused and it is not properly explained or court feels that accused might have committed offence, then framing of charge against the accused is justified. It is only for conviction of accused that materials must indicate that accused had committed offence but for framing of charges if materials indicate that accused might have committed offence, then framing of charge is proper. It is only for conviction of accused that materials must indicate that accused had committed offence but for framing of charges if materials indicate that accused might have committed offence, then framing of charge is proper. Materials brought on by prosecution must be believed to be true and their probative value cannot be decided at this stage. The accused entitled to urge his contentions only on materials submitted by prosecution. He is not entitled to produce any material at this stage and the court is not required to consider any such material, if submitted. Whether the prima facie case made out depends upon fact and circumstances of each case. If two views are possible and materials indicate mere suspicion, not being grave suspicion, against accused then he may be discharged. The court has to consider broad probabilities of case, total effect of evidence and documents produced before it. The court should not act as mouthpiece of prosecution and it is impermissible to have roving enquiry at the stage of framing of charges." 14.17 The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently on 01.05.2019 in State By Karnataka Lokayukta vs M. R. Hiremath, 2019 SCC Online(SC) 734 has held as under: "23. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 of the CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In the State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan10, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject; this Court held : "29...At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In the State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan10, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject; this Court held : "29...At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 15. After going through the dictum of the Apex Court as laid down in aforesaid judgments, this court is of the view that it is also well settled that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, the Court can justifiably say that prima facie case exists against the accused. 16. Considering the facts, circumstances and materials on record of this case in the light of settled law laid down by the Apex court, as mentioned above,there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, therefore no case is made out to interfere in the impugned order. The concerned court below while passing the impugned order dated 24.1.2019 has considered all the relevant materials on record and decided the discharge application of the revisionist in accordance with law in the light of well settled principle laid down by the Apex Court . 17. In view of the above, the present revision lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 18. Any observation made herein, shall not affect the merits of the case. 19. Registrar General of this Court is directed to communicate this order to the concerned trial court as well as victim Sangeeta Pandey/opposite party No. 2.